After Afghanistan: A Small Army and the Strategic Employment of Land Power

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The Australian Army commitments to East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq since 1999 comprise the longest if not the largest commitment by this small army since its formation. All of these commitments were the result of circumstances largely unforeseen by strategic planners, and demanded significant institutional adaptation to build, deploy and sustain land forces over a period of fifteen years.

The Army is now entering an era where it will be less involved in deploying forces for contemporary warfare, and more involved in transforming and posturing its forces for the contingencies of future warfare.1 Direction from government in the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers confirmed the strategic role and the expeditionary character of the Australian Army.2 However, this direction needs to be enriched with the lessons from the myriad of operations conducted since 1999. This requires the Army to undertake a form of ‘intellectual pivot’ to learn the lessons of the past fifteen years and think deeply to ensure it is prepared for conflict in the coming decades.

There are three types of lessons that might be gained from reviewing the Australian operational commitment in the past fifteen years. Strategic lessons examine the effectiveness of national armed forces in securing by force the objectives set by political leadership.3 Tactical lessons review the

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1 However, as recent events in Iraq and Syria have demonstrated, the unpredictability of the global security environment may dictate a shorter inter-war period than we might have anticipated even 12 months ago.
2 The Defence White Paper in 2009 stated the requirement for “land forces to be undertake combat in our littoral environment and territory, are necessary to secure offshore territories and facilities, defeat incursions onto Australian territory and potentially deny adversaries access to staging bases from which they could attack us. They are also required to undertake amphibious manoeuvre, and stabilisation and reconstruction operations in our immediate neighbourhood, as well as operations further afield in support of our wider interests”. See Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), p. 60. The 2013 Defence White Paper requires land forces “proficient in joint and multi-Agency operations for the security of Australia and the region”. Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White Paper 2013 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), p. 85.
conduct of land operations to secure operational outcomes and are generally short term in nature. In between are the institutional lessons that will allow the Army's current and future leadership to gain sufficient manoeuvre room in the policy and budget debates to structure the Army to meet the demands of future conflicts.

The aim of this article is to examine institutional lessons the Army might take from the East Timor, Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq commitments. As historians and military professionals understand, the immediate period following a war is a rich opportunity for learning the lessons of the recently concluded conflict in order to help inform the institution for future conflicts. The Australian Army must now address this challenge. It must take the lessons of the past fifteen years, use them in concert with the larger body of lessons from previous wars, and apply them to preparing for future military commitments.

Learning Lessons

In her book on the evolution of strategy, Heuser has noted that most works on war since antiquity have commenced with a firm assumption that one could learn lessons from past examples. Learning from operational experience, and encoding in the force the key elements of those lessons, is a core function for professional military organisations. Irrespective of the size of the organisation, it must be designed to ensure that it remains fit and effective for future conflicts.

The Australian Army has captured tactical lessons from all of its recent commitments. The Centre for Army Lessons and the Combat Training Centre have executed robust programs to collect lessons from Army task forces, elements and individuals who have returned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has provided a sound return on the Army’s investment in people, time and resources by ensuring that deploying individuals and units are prepared, based on the most recent lessons from both theatres. The large database of lessons and publications resulting from this collection activity has also resulted in changes to the Army’s certification processes for deploying forces, revised training courses and a range of new doctrinal publications.

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4 For a description of tactical effectiveness, see, ibid., pp. 19-26.
5 This differentiation between strategic and institutional lessons is discussed in Robert H. Simpson and Mark C. Smith, Army Adaptation from 1898 to the Present: How Army Leaders Balanced Strategic and Institutional Imperatives to Best Serve the Nation, Land Warfare Papers no. 98 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, September 2013).
7 For example the Centre for Army Lessons has published thirty-five editions of its 'Smart Soldier' handbook since 2001, as well as a series of handbooks on leadership from junior non-commissioned officers through to unit commanders, and has standing pre-deployment material for all theatres in which Australians have served since 1999.
As useful as the collection of tactical lessons is for force generation in the Army, it does not provide the full spectrum of lessons that might be taken from the past fifteen years of operations. There has been limited collection and analysis of lessons that might apply to the Army as an institution. These are the lessons of how the Army sees itself, how it executes the full spectrum of raise, train, sustain and adapt functions across time, how it commands and plans, and how the Army interacts with the various non-Army organisations and entities—be they government, other Services or families.

In the remainder of this article, I propose five institutional lessons from the last fifteen years. These form, in my view, the most important institutional lessons for the modernisation of the Army to ensure it retains its effectiveness for future operations. These lessons incorporate the changing character of land warfare, the preparation of land forces to adapt to these changes, and how land forces can work with a range of different actors to build tactical excellence and generate strategic impact.

**Lesson 1: Evolution in the Character of Land Warfare**

Over the past fifteen years, the Army has relearned that the nature of warfare—humans seeking to impose their will on other human beings—is enduring. This has been best described by Clausewitz, when he wrote that "war is thus an act of force to compel an enemy do our will … war is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass but always the collision of two living forces".\(^8\) Despite this enduring nature of war, a key lesson for the Army from the past fifteen years has been that the character of land warfare has evolved—significantly. There have been several aspects to this evolving character. Some, like the need to achieve influence, support to populations, and sustenance to families, are old themes with new manifestations. Other aspects, such as the ubiquity of technical networking, the availability of low-cost highly lethal weapons, closer integration of conventional and special operations or the greater ambiguity in the strategic outcomes of war, are newer elements in land warfare. Together, they have provide the Army with insights in how much warfare has evolved since its last major conflict in Vietnam, and how it must assume ongoing changes in its approach modernisation.

Even with all of the developments in the technological systems that provide land forces with an unprecedented capacity to monitor the battlefield and share information, the human capacity to seek and achieve surprise remains and will continue to be an enduring aspect of military operations. Various adversaries over the past fifteen years have demonstrated a capacity to watch and learn from friendly forces, to ascertain weaknesses and adapt their tactics—and strategic messaging efforts—accordingly. In particular,

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Afghanistan has provided a demonstration in how humans will outwit their opponents to achieve surprise, even in what has probably been the most densely surveilled area in the history of warfare.\(^9\)

This human adaptation is a key aspect of the changing character of the threat to land forces. Often described as hybrid\(^10\) threats, contemporary conflicts have often denied land forces a clearly defined enemy. Authors such as Frank Hoffman, Nathan Freier, and Christopher Bowers have proposed similar definitions for this type of threat, broadly defined as the ability to engage effectively in multiple forms of war, simultaneously.\(^11\) This is indicative of the types of threats faced by land forces in the past fifteen years. Multiple reports on trends in future conflict and national security have found that hybrid threats are also likely to remain a persistent element of the environment. Publications such as the UK Ministry of Defence’s *Future Character of Conflict,*\(^12\) the US National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2030,*\(^13\) and the Australian Army’s 2014 *Future Land Warfare Report*\(^14\) have described the convergence of regular and non-state actors as a highly likely feature in future conflict.

Many reports focused on future trends in warfare have also identified the decreasing cost of increasingly lethal weapon systems. The proliferation of improvised explosive devices\(^15\) has demonstrated another ‘low cost’ way that

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\(^9\) There are multiple examples over the recent years that prove this, including the September 2012 attack on the large Marine Corps base in Helmand province where fifteen insurgents penetrated the perimeter outfitted in American military uniforms, attacked across the north-east flight line, killing two American Marines, wounded nine others, destroyed six AV-8B Harrier jets and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. Matthew Komatsu, ‘Responding to an Insurgent Attack on an Afghan Base’, *New York Times*, 29 October 2013. See also, International Security Assistance Force, ‘ISAF Provides Additional Details on Camp Bastion Attack’, 16 September 2012, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-provides-additional-details-on-camp-bastion-attack.html> [Accessed 13 September 2014].

\(^10\) Bowers notes there is no commonly agreed definition for ‘hybrid threats’. The US military definition is: “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects”. Christopher Bowers, ‘Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries’, *Parameters*, vol. 42 (Spring 2012), p. 39.


\(^12\) See UK Ministry of Defence, *Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045*, fifth edition, Strategic Trends Programme, 30 June 2014.


\(^15\) The impact of IEDs on contemporary warfare has been examined in multiple works. Some of these include Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006); David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting
future adversaries might seek to influence or attempt to impose their will. The Army should expect that it will see these most future missions. Cheap, precise lethal weapons are becoming ubiquitous. Almost anyone can use Google Earth to gain high fidelity targeting information. Coupled with cell phones and cheap, man-portable weapons, the barriers have been significantly lowered for those who might wish to threaten friendly land forces now and in the future.

The Army has regained an appreciation of the need to influence populations as a core competency of military forces and senior leaders. Among other sources, this is examined in Emile Simpson’s recent book, War from the Ground Up (2012). Simpson proposes that this greater understanding of influence is a profound change that is being facilitated by the interconnectedness provided by the information age, and a more ‘population-centric’ approach to war, and has consequent importance for strategic influence operations.

But lessons on influence have extended beyond the conduct of land operations. To generate strategic effect, armies must also have the capacity to influence their coalition partners and allies in developing strategic objectives as well as the many subordinate and supporting operational plans. This includes informing and influencing military and other agency plans that may impact on the conduct of land operations. Over the last decade, the placement of senior planners in such diverse locations as NATO headquarters in Brussels, within the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, and in senior coalition appointments in Baghdad and Kabul has become an essential complement to the deployment of land forces. These embedded officers build relationships and provide a variety of views within coalition headquarters. For a small army that can provide niche support to larger coalitions, the provision of high-quality staff officers in coalition headquarters is now business as usual and likely to remain a key requirement for a small army that seeks to influence the planning and conduct of wars.

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16 This is not a new lesson. The works of David Galula (Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, 1964); Frank Kitson (Bunch of Five, Faber and Faber, 1977); and Andrew Krepinevich (The Army in Vietnam, 1988) are all examples of scholarship that have covered this issue prior to the current series of operational deployments.

The evolving character of war has seen an evolution in the kinds of missions armies undertake. The engagement with—and development of—indigenous forces has come to the fore in places as diverse as Timor Leste, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands. Population support and reconstruction operations, like the Australian experience in Vietnam, have again become something conducted concurrent with, instead of after, combat operations. This evolution in mission sets has been driven by the different types of threats and adversaries that present themselves. As a result armies have changed their structures and interactions, with both conventional and special forces adapting their organisational approaches. For conventional forces, battle grouping—building a force first around a mission—has become the norm. Units such as the engineer-led Reconstruction Task Force and the Mentoring Task Forces have been formed, certified and deployed since 2006. Special Forces have also learned about grouping different capabilities around their particular segments of the Afghanistan mission. The Special Forces Task Group has routinely combined Special Air Service, Commandos and other elements in their deployed task forces.

A closer integration of conventional and unconventional forces has also evolved over the past fifteen years. The Australian special and conventional units, co-located in Uruzgan province, developed a more closely synchronised approach to operations over several years of operations. This deepening integration of land conventional and special forces has been a defining feature of the broader coalition approach in Afghanistan. Reinforcing this in Army doctrine, and its individual and collective training regimes, will be essential to continue this collaboration in the future.

One of the enduring lessons reaffirmed in recent conflicts is that combined arms close combat remains a core capability of a professional land force.

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20 This closer integration of conventional and special forces was also a finding in the United States Department of Defense report, Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, 15 June 2012, pp. 22-3.
21 Key works that have reviewed the effectiveness of modern combined arms capability include Michael Evans and Alan Ryan (eds), From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, Working Paper no. 122 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, July 2003); Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, August 1984); Dr Bob Hall and Dr Andrew Ross, The Effectiveness of Combined Arms Teams in Urban Terrain: The Battle of Binh Ba, Vietnam 1969, and the Battles of Fallujah, Iraq, 2004, University of New South Wales, prepared under DSTO Research Agreement, Ref: 2006/1175725 for Land Operations Division, DSTO; Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, KS:}
An army proficient in close combat will possess the foundational skills (in broad terms these are to command, see, move, engage, and support) that can be adapted to changing conditions and applied to less taxing missions such as peacekeeping and low tempo stability missions. While this runs against the narrative of several prominent Australian commentators, it is not a new revelation. Tactically effective military organisations that employ a mix of capabilities (combined arms) to achieve realistic strategic objectives remain the foundation of military success in land operations.

A final element of the evolving character of land warfare—and warfare more generally—is that the past fifteen years has been an era of ambiguous outcomes. In East Timor, the Army largely departed in the early 2000s and then returned in force in 2006 to address continuing instability. Neither of the operations in Iraq or Afghanistan has resulted in clear strategic success, or victory as might have been understood in earlier conflicts. As Sir Hew Strachan has noted, “wars have become fuzzy at the edges: they have no clear end and army forces increasingly have to reject the appropriateness of classical definitions of military victory”.

The Australian Prime Minister noted in addressing troops during an October 2013 visit to Afghanistan, “Australia’s longest war is ending, not with victory, not with defeat, but with we hope an Afghanistan that’s better for our presence.” The following day, an editorial in the Australian Financial Review noted that “Afghanistan cannot be judged in conventional terms as win, loss or draw … but the country is no longer the failed state of 2001”. It is possible that land forces will be required to participate in operations in the future with similar ambiguous outcomes. Michael Howard describes this as warfighting and peacekeeping melting into one another, with the conduct of each determining the success of the other. The cognitive demands on leaders at all levels are extremely high in these types of situations. It

Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1981); and Russell Glenn, Diggers Downtown: A Review of Australian Army Developmental Concepts for Control Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004). The conduct of combined arms has been encoded in contemporary Australian Army doctrine since the first edition of Land Warfare Doctrine 1, the 1977 publication titled The Fundamentals Of Land Force Operations (Provisional).

22 For example, see Brendan Nicholson, ‘Slim Down the Army and Think Again about New Subs and JSFs: Defence Analysts’, The Australian, 11 December 2013, p. 6.

23 For a detailed review of the tactically effectiveness of military organisations in the twentieth century, see Millet and Murray, Military Effectiveness: Volume 1, The First World War, p. 16-26.


requires mental agility and enhanced tolerance for ambiguity and chaos. ‘Train for certainty and educate for uncertainty’ is a common mantra in many professional military organisations. The Army’s training continuum and its approach to professional education (which must include the study of military history) must evolve, built on its sound existing foundation, to ensure it prepares its people appropriately for these circumstances.

Lesson 2: Sustaining an Expeditionary Army

The 1976 Defence White Paper resulted in the Army being focused on continental defence. The Army would no longer be required to be sent overseas to fight as part of another nation’s force. By the time the Army commenced small-scale offshore operations—commencing with Namibia in 1989—its capacity to train, deploy and sustain land forces offshore had atrophied. As one former Chief of Army noted,

during the 1980s and for much of the 1990s, the strategic guidance given to the Army ultimately diminished land force capabilities. We gradually lost strategic agility; our units became hollow; and our ability to operate away from Australian support bases declined to a serious degree.

But as Lieutenant General David Morrison also notes, while the Army did atrophy post-Vietnam, this was partially because the Army did not make the case to government to sustain its warfighting proficiency at unit and formation levels.

Since 1999 the Army has relearned the personnel, logistic and other difficulties of training and sustaining deployed land forces—in diverse

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32 For more on this topic, among others, see Mick Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, February 2005).


34 David Morrison, ‘The Australian Army for the Next Decades’, speech to the Lowy Institute, Sydney, 19 February 2014.
theatres—over a long period of time. It has been forced through necessity to re-examine logistic structures, planning processes and the training mechanisms to deploy and support land forces over long periods of time. This self-examination resulted in the 2008 Adaptive Army initiative that reorganised the Army. This reorganisation, the largest since the 1971 Hassett Report, aimed to ensure the Army was better at incorporating operational lessons into force preparation in the short term, better at assuring the performance of our forces through a very robust and transparent certification process and developing medium and longer term initiatives to enhance the Army’s combat weight and effectiveness through training, equipment and doctrine.

Recent operations have reinforced that effective expeditionary armies must be trained in a core set of military individual and collective skills, that can then be adapted before deployment by additional training and equipment relevant to the specific theatre of operations. The Army’s force structures have not always facilitated this—in particular the different structures of each manoeuvre Brigade have posed substantial force generation problems. While the Army’s current Plan Beersheba aims to address this challenge, in many respects it is likely to be the initial steps in moving from an analogue, twentieth-century organisation to one that is digitised (and all that means culturally and organisationally) and optimised for warfare in the information age.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the need to rebalance land force capabilities towards many of the combat support functions—human intelligence, electronic warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal among others. These have become essential for the conduct of land operations and will likely be required in greater densities for future


operations. An important response should be a rebalancing of the combat and combat support (or enabling) functions of the land force. The Army that deployed to East Timor in 1999 was largely an infantry force, with limited integral intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and other combat support functions. The past fifteen years has demonstrated that a higher proportion of capabilities such as engineers, intelligence analysts, unmanned reconnaissance and logistics are needed.

The Army has also learned how to better employ a total force—its regular, reserve and civilian workforce—on expeditionary operations over the past decade. While this has involved large reserve deployments to East Timor and the Solomon Islands concurrent with the Afghanistan commitment, it has also involved the broad employment of reserves in specialist roles in deployed and force preparation functions. This represents the Army moving closer to achieving the aspirations for a ‘total force’ recommended in the 1974 Millar Report into the Army Reserve.40

A final and most crucial element of sustaining an expeditionary army is support to its soldiers. Since 1999, the Army has relearned the importance of supporting soldiers and their families better. The Army has launched ‘wounded warrior’ initiatives, including clinics and health centres, for the recovery of those with physical wounds. But the care of those with psychological wounds is just as vital. While the Army and wider Defence Department has instituted a range of programs for reporting and dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder, there remains room for improvement. Recent audits by the Australian National Audit Office41 and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs42 have found weaknesses in the systems developed since 2001, particularly those for supporting members with psychological wounds. These require ongoing attention from the Army and the Department to redress.

There will be a temptation to reduce investment in this area as the Army draws down the number of soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. While this would align with a similar approach to that taken after Vietnam, it is a mistake. Not only will the Army continue to deploy soldiers in various exercises and deployments, there remains an ongoing need to support

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soldiers and their families who suffer from the physical and psychological trauma of their service on operations. The Army had to relearn many of its lessons from Vietnam over the past decade. It should not have to relearn them again should the Army be called upon to undertake long-term commitments overseas in the future.

**Lesson 3: Joint, Coalition, Networked, and Interagency Approaches**

The Army has learned how to synchronise and collaborate more broadly over the past fifteen years. This more connected approach—with joint, coalition and interagency elements—has manifested a range of lessons in the conduct operations where networking, synchronisation and sharing information has become ‘business as usual’ and have been a key enabling aspects for operations where adversaries are also adept at exploiting information age global connectivity.

The deployment of Australian forces, under the Australia-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), represented a new era for the conduct of joint operations by the Australian Defence Force. The integration of land, air and maritime operations under a single operational headquarters represented a significant enhancement of the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force.\(^{43}\) The follow-on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have served to strengthen the tight relationships between the Services, notwithstanding the different geographic circumstances involved.

Just as East Timor introduced the Army and broader Australian Defence Force to contemporary joint operations, it provided many experiences that primed the Army for learning about coalition operations in the more complex coalition environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^ {44}\) The former Defence Minister, Steven Smith, provided some insights into this in a speech in April 2013 where he noted that Australia’s operations had enhanced its relationship with the United States and NATO.\(^ {45}\) Ryan has noted that the demands of the counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations since

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\(^{43}\) Horner, ‘Deploying and Sustaining INTERFET in East Timor 1999’, p. 204-29.


2001 have provided further evidence that any contemporary multinational operation is likely to involve a wide variety of partners.\textsuperscript{46}

This has been the case for the Army in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While a junior partner in both conflicts, Australia operated alongside the armies of multiple allies and coalition partners. In Iraq, Australia partnered with a Japanese land force while under the command of the British.\textsuperscript{47} In Afghanistan, Australia partnered with the Dutch while serving under Canadian, British and American commanders in southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{48} These coalition operations have highlighted some critical capabilities which underpin successful prosecution of operations with allies and other coalition partners. In a coalition, being able to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, transport and logistic support to one’s forces, and to the broader coalition force, is valuable. Being able to shoulder risk and conduct combat missions is also a key contribution within a coalition force.\textsuperscript{49} Recent remarks by the President of the United States,\textsuperscript{50} and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, highlight US expectations of increased burden sharing with allies in the future.\textsuperscript{51}

Australia has led several regional security operations in the past fifteen years. Defence has learned much by doing so, including that as the lead nation, Australia becomes responsible for providing the framework of the coalition for such capabilities as communications and logistics. As experiences in East Timor and the Solomon Islands demonstrate, a key underpinning of Australia’s success has been the establishment of the coalition framework at both the strategic and operational level—the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands architecture has been a useful model in this regard.


\textsuperscript{47} For more on these operations, see John Blaxland, \textit{The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard}, pp. 218-56.

\textsuperscript{48} In the later stages of the Afghanistan deployment, Australian forces were joined by small contributions from other nations such as Singapore.

\textsuperscript{49} For one useful study on this topic, see Dickens, ‘Can East Timor be a Blueprint for Burden Sharing?’, pp. 29-40.

\textsuperscript{50} During a speech at West Point in May 2014, President Obama noted that “when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to the United States, when such issues are at stake—when crises arise that stir our conscience or push the world in a more dangerous direction but do not directly threaten us—then the threshold for military action must be higher. In such circumstances, we should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action”. See The White House, ‘Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony’, U.S. Military Academy-West Point, New York, 28 May 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academy-commencement-ceremony> [Accessed 16 September 2014].

\textsuperscript{51} The QDR noted that “with our allies and partners, we will make greater efforts to coordinate our planning to optimize their contributions to their own security and to our many combined activities”. US Department of Defense, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review}, 4 March 2014, p. vi.
Australian Defence Force operations over the last fifteen years have demanded close cooperation with other government agencies and a broad range of international and non-government organisations. Some missions have proven to be best led by these other agencies (for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade led the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands); while others are best led by the Australian Defence Force.

Interagency operations, while increasingly routine, are hardly seamless. While the Australian Defence Force is structured and prepared for overseas operations in violent and dangerous circumstances, most other government agencies are not. They are typically staffed with large numbers of people who are not available at short notice for long and arduous deployments. Nor do they typically have the theatre-level logistic, intelligence, and security support required to operate in an expeditionary mode.

Risk management has also been a difficult concept for different government departments to agree on, with no common method for determining risk within the non-military components. However, the establishment of the Australian Civil Military Centre in 2008 has provided a useful starting point for examining the lessons of interagency cooperation. While it is at the forefront domestically in developing better Defence, government and non-government agencies cooperation, there is more to be done within the Army and Defence to educate and train its personnel in this facet of operational capability.52

While many insights have been gained into human networking over the last fifteen years, there have also been major developments in technical connectivity and networking. The integration of technology with the political, economic, and military institutions of the state is accelerating at a tremendous rate.53 This has enabled a deepening of the capacity of the land force to synchronise and integrate its planning and operations within a networked, joint, coalition and interagency construct. By necessity, the Army had to improve its capacity to network its forces, within a joint force, during the East Timor operations in 1999. The Army commenced that operation as an industrial age organisation, with an immature and unsophisticated approach to networking. Through the mid-2000s, Defence followed the developed theory of Network Centric Warfare that emerged in the United

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States. This led to the publication of joint doctrine in 2003, and a series of Network Centric Warfare Roadmaps.

Although the term Network Centric Warfare has fallen into disuse, the broader examination of the benefits of networking a military organisation has continued. In particular, the linkages between sensors, decision-makers and weapon systems have continued to become more tightly coupled. The broad availability of multiple layers of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance feeds, linked to commanders and thereon to weapon systems, has been a defining feature of Iraq and Afghanistan. The increasing availability of cheap, commercially available airborne and ground based surveillance capabilities and the enhancement this provides to the precision of engagement systems is likely to be a key element in future operating environments.

But in the future the Army in a joint force might not be able to guarantee the dominance in these capabilities as they have in the past fifteen years. Contemporary adversaries have seen the value in asymmetric approaches which use simple, inexpensive techniques. With the proliferation of cheap sensors, unmanned vehicles and electronic systems that can interfere with friendly communications, future land forces must also be prepared to operate where an adversary might deploy these almost ubiquitous capabilities to generate degraded information environment.

It is also probable that future adversaries, particularly non-state actors, will continue to exploit global connectivity in the pursuit of their tactical and strategic objectives. Over the past decade, a range of different non-state actors have used the internet and social media to share lessons, conduct information operations, raise funds and support radicalisation.

55 The first of these was endorsed by the Chiefs of Service Committee in November 2003. Subsequent editions were released in 2005, 2007 and 2009.
57 The degraded information environment, and the conduct of degraded operations, has been the topic of much investigation over the past five years particularly in the United States (for the impact on its systems) and in Russia and China (for how they might generate this degraded effect on others). See US Department of Defence, Enhancing the Adaptability of US Military Forces, Defense Science Board 2010 Summer Study, January 2011, pp. 75-121. On China’s capacity to degrade friendly systems in informationised warfare, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, 24 April 2014.
Whether working in a large, international coalition led by the United States or leading a smaller regional commitment, joint, coalition and interagency has been the experience of the Army for the past decade. The more tightly connected approaches of the past fifteen years of friendly and adversary organisations—in the human and technical areas—provide insights for training, education and force design for the Army and wider Defence organisation.

**Lesson 4: Strategic Warning, Mobilisation and the Readiness of Land Forces**

Former Prime Minister John Howard recently noted that East Timor “put an enormous strain on us and it brought home to me just how much of the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War peace dividend we had taken. Our military capabilities had been run down and we needed to do something about it”.

Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and into the 1990s, an underlying narrative existed in the Defence establishment that the Army could be maintained in its traditional role of foundation for an expanded land force should the need arise.

The result of this was a hollow, barely capable force that was just able to cope with the deployment to East Timor in 1999. In a government inquiry in the wake of East Timor, it was found that the funding of the Army reflected a lack of appreciation of the funds required to generate and maintain ground combat capability in a useable state; and a failure to determine minimum acceptable levels of capability and then provide consistent resourcing to meet these levels. It possessed a force structure ‘hollowness’ that had been a persistent feature of the Army organisation, which consumed resources while not delivering capability in meaningful time frames. This situation was the outcome of two strategic concepts.


61 Ibid., p. 105-6.
The first is that Australia would have the necessary strategic warning to undertake the required expansion of the land force. As the eminent author Colin Gray has reminded us, the peril of strategic surprise is a condition of international and national security. Strategic shocks occur—and the past fifteen years in particular have routinely demanded the deployment of land forces on much shorter deployment timelines than anticipated by intelligence agencies. Examples such as the 1999 East Timor deployment, commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, the return to East Timor in 2006, as well as several large-scale disasters testify to this. Australian land power theorist Mike Evans perhaps described this situation best when he stated that:

between 1999 and 2003 Australia entered the new age of globalised security, in which it became apparent that there was no longer any such phenomenon as convenient warning time or preparation for a protracted mobilisation of manpower and economic resources.

The second concept posits that the Army can be reduced to small cores for rapid regeneration in an emergency. But the mobilisation model adhered to for the First and Second World Wars is not relevant to the twenty-first century for several reasons. Most notably the character of warfare has changed significantly. It has resulted in the contemporary Combat Brigade, an information age organisation comprising more than 3,000 troops and hundreds of vehicles all linked in a digital network, which is arguably more complex than an Air Warfare Destroyer or Joint Strike Fighter. This is far removed from giving citizens a rifle, a tin hat and minimal training, as occurred in the early twentieth century. Additionally, with the exception of a major conflict, the globalised nature of the Australian economy is unlikely to support rapid industrialised mobilisation, either economically or socio-culturally.

The lesson from this is that the twentieth-century industrial age approach to sustaining a small army as the basis for expansion no longer holds. An army, especially a small one, must be prepared when called upon to deploy within short periods of time. It must be an organisation that is prepared to ‘deploy as is’. The first three lessons in this article provide sufficient insights into potential future conflict, and the type of land forces required, to challenge old concepts of mobilisation and highlight the likelihood of surprise. The Army must therefore retain sufficient breadth of capabilities,

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63 The 2000 Defence White Paper described in some detail the key lessons of the East Timor deployment, which included the acknowledgement that warning times for regional crises, and the need to respond, were shorter than Defence planning had generally allowed for. Commonwealth of Australia, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2000), p. 49-50.

64 Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, p. 95.
combat weight and mass to be able to respond quickly to government requirements for unanticipated needs.65

Lesson 5: The Strategic Relevance of Land Forces

Recent debate has questioned the relevance of sustaining the current size and capabilities of the Australian Army after its Afghanistan commitment draws down. Hugh White has argued that in future, the biggest task “may well be the defence of the continent itself”.66 An alternative view, expressed by Alan Dupont, is that the Army is likely to continue to bear the brunt of future deployments.67 This debate on the future strategic relevance of land forces is an important one to have. But it is one that the Army must also contribute to.

Stephen Metz recently noted that contemporary armies have been so heavily engaged on operations over the past fifteen years that they have possessed limited time for reflection, strategic thinking, and writing.68 However, this is changing. Foreign military organisations have commenced reviewing the lessons of the past fifteen years, with the US Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis publication A Decade of War being one exemplar of this process.69 The ongoing collaborative effort between the United States’ military instruments of land power in reviewing the future of its application is another manifestation of this desire to learn from contemporary operations. The 2013 Strategic Land Power paper, developed jointly by the US Army, US Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command, describes the aspirations for the employment of land forces over the coming decades.70

The term ‘land power’ reflects the dynamism of the strategic environment over the past fifteen years. Land power encompasses the employment of an array of land capability to achieve specified strategic and tactical objectives. It is a ‘multi-dimensional’ approach: land power may include the employment

65 An effective army is one that retains sufficient breadth of capabilities, combat weight and mass to be relevant to the achievement of national strategic objectives in the coming decades. To do so requires ongoing and iterative modernisation. This must be founded upon better knowledge about trends in the environment in which land forces will likely be employed and demands a sound understanding of the convergence of developments in conflict, society and technology. Exploiting this understanding allows an army to remain relevant for future contingencies through modernisation, acquisition of new capabilities or disinvestment in obsolete systems.
70 US Department of Defence, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills, 2013, p. 3.
of capabilities from multiple operational environments (land, sea, air, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace) to achieve results on land. While the growing literature on the strategic role of land power is mainly generated from the United States, it is relevant as well to the future employment of the Australian Army.

The differences in scale and outlook between the US and Australian armies have not precluded the Army thinking and writing about its role in achieving Australia’s national security objectives. In particular, the landmark 1998 edition of the Australian Army’s *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* examined the strategic effectiveness of land forces generally, and in the Australian context. It noted that armies generate strategic effect through four key functions: maintenance of a war fighting capability (although the definition of this was generic); sustaining a force in being at certain preparedness levels, shaping operations (through engagement activities and exercises); and, military support operations.71

In 2002, a subsequent edition of this publication defined the Australian conception of land power. It described the strategic application of land power in its description of the Army as an expeditionary organisation, focused on securing national sovereignty and interests, and a force, the commitment of which provides the ultimate demonstration of national commitment.72 A later 2008 version eschewed the term ‘land power’ and substituted a concept called ‘strategic manoeuvre’.73 Notwithstanding some of the weaknesses in this definition, it is indicative of an Army that aspires to operate beyond the realm of tactics and be capable of generating strategic effects in support of national objectives.

The past fifteen years have provided several examples where this is the case. The commitment of strategically deployable land forces into East Timor resulted in tactical security being achieved in Dili and its surrounds, through the rapid build-up of land power. It was also a demonstration of political and national will, and employed land forces to achieve the strategic outcomes of Australia in concert with the international outcomes adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1999.74 Similar commitments to Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2005 demonstrated Australia’s adroit use of land forces to achieve strategic outcomes.

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The 2005 re-commitment of land forces into Afghanistan is another example of this approach. Initially a small, tailored Special Operations deployment in 2005, the commitment was significantly expanded in 2006 into the larger Reconstruction Task Force. While the commitment to securing Afghanistan from international terrorist organisations was a part of the rationale for this, the deployment of Australian forces to Uruzgan province also played a role in the strategic aim to secure the commitment of a non-ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand) NATO partner (The Netherlands) into southern Afghanistan.

The operations in East Timor, Solomon Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that armies operate beyond the exclusive domain of tactics. As Metz notes, land power is particularly important in the human domain, largely because it puts forces in direct contact with those they seek to influence; whether by deterring enemies or convincing them to stop what they are doing, or by convincing civilian policymakers and populations that they share objectives and priorities. In the contemporary security environment, strategic success requires an ability to understand, influence, or control the human domain.75

It is in the human domain where the capability of land forces—large or small—converge. The capacity of a land force of any size to understand, influence, or control the human environment in which they operate provides a unique, strategic capability. Notwithstanding the potential need for sea and air forces as well as cyber and space operations, the capacity to execute operations on land is an important instrument of national policy for any sovereign nation, regardless of size. In doing so, these land forces provide their national governments with the capacity to generate tactical and strategic impacts.76

**Conclusion: Preparing for the Next War**

While the Army’s current operational commitments are on the wane, the long-term strategic uncertainty of maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific and regions such as the Middle East remains high. As Michael Wesley has recently noted, our strategic environment is changing far more quickly than Australians appreciate, with complexities and challenges greater than any the nation has had to deal with in its history.77 The Australian military may therefore face a range of daunting challenges in its future. As the draw down in Afghanistan takes place, it is time to turn more fully to preparations for the next conflict. A smaller institutional commitment to operations provides

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76 This theme is examined in the 2014 re-write of the Army’s capstone *Land Warfare Doctrine 1*, which has been re-written to incorporate lessons from the past fifteen years. It will be published in late 2014.
increased intellectual opportunity to learn from those operations and produce innovative technical, organisational and training solutions for future conflict.

Recent studies have also highlighted the perils of ignoring or paying lip service to this post-conflict endeavour. In his 1986 study of institutional learning in the post-Vietnam era, Andrew Krepinevich proposed that in spite of its anguish in Vietnam, the US Army learned little of value.\textsuperscript{78} The collective institutional avoidance of counterinsurgency between Vietnam and Iraq was to have a profound impact on recognising and responding to an unconventional threat after the initial operation in 2003 that resulted in the US seizure of Baghdad. Small armies, with their limited manpower and resources, cannot afford such an approach.

But learning lessons from past operations is only part of the pathway to success in future conflict. As Cohen and Gooch have proposed, the flipside is that failing to learn the lessons of the recent past is but one of several pathways to military failure.\textsuperscript{79} As Rosen finds, preparing for the future demands the capacity to take lessons and apply them within a strategic approach to innovation, led by senior military leaders, that has both intellectual and organisational components.\textsuperscript{80} It demands that the Army has a vision of the future, and its place within that future be connected to operational realities drawn from the lessons of recent operations.\textsuperscript{81} The Army post-Afghanistan must also be one that is highly energetic in the intellectual investment in preparing for future conflict.

All military organisations to some degree get the next conflict wrong.\textsuperscript{82} It is simply not realistic to expect the Army to “get it right” from the outset of all complex missions in the future. But, it must be able to improve performance over time, and do that more quickly than an adversary.\textsuperscript{83} As a component of a small military, the Australian Army also has less capacity than larger nations to absorb the consequences of getting it wrong. A robust approach to learning the institutional lessons of recent operations will assist in the Army husbanding and applying its scarce resources in order to minimise the chances of this occurring.

\textsuperscript{83} See, Anne-Marie Grisogono and Alex Ryan, \textit{Adapting C2 to the 21st Century: Operationalising Adaptive Campaigning}, Paper presented to 12th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, June 2007, Newport, USA.
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