Japan’s Air and Missile Defence Surveillance System

Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties
Norifumi Namatame

The Transformation of the JASDF’s Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities for Air and Missile Defence
Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter

and...

A ‘Friendly Elephant’ in the Room?
The Strategic Foundations of China’s Multilateral Engagement in Asia
Anna Samson

Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011: A Deepening but Cautious Partnership
Claude Rakisits

An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches
Peter Layton
Security Challenges

Volume 8 Number 3 (Spring 2012)
ARTICLES

Norifumi Namatame
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties ....................... 1

Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter
The Transformation of the JASDF’s Intelligence and Surveillance
Capabilities for Air and Missile Defence .......................................................... 19

Anna Samson
A ‘Friendly Elephant’ in the Room?
The Strategic Foundations of China’s Multilateral Engagement in Asia .......... 57

Claude Rakisits
Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011:
A Deepening but Cautious Partnership ............................................................. 83

Peter Layton
An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches... 103
Editors’ Note

The changing strategic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region continue to throw up challenges and elicit a multitude of defence and policy responses. The authors in this edition focus on four key regional powers; Japan, China, Australia and Pakistan. The growing power of China and the development of missile technology by North Korea have led to major changes in the Japanese Self Defence Forces. In this issue Norifumi Namatame traces the development of Japan’s ballistic missile defence program, highlighting the double edged sword of defensive orientated systems that may still be seen as a threat by neighbouring states. Des Ball and Richard Tanter provide an in-depth assessment of the Japanese Air Self Defence Force’s intelligence and surveillance capabilities and argue that despite the commitment in 2010 for the JSDF to increase its ISR capabilities that these reforms have been underway for over a decade.

China’s presence in the region is felt well beyond Japan and its engagement in Asia takes on many forms. Anna Samson explores the links between Chinese grand strategy and multilateralism while in the field of bi-lateral relations Claude Rakisits explores the developing relationship between China and Pakistan. In the final article Peter Layton investigates the complexities surround national security strategies and the need of Australia to consider an organising construct.

Andrew Carr       Peter Dean       Stephan Frühling
Managing Editors
September 2012
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties

Norifumi Namatame

Japan has deployed its own ballistic missile defence (BMD) system in cooperation with the United States. The Japanese Government claims that Japan’s BMD system would not pose a threat to other states, and would only be deployed in strict compliance with Japan’s senshu boei (exclusively defence-oriented defence) policy. However, its BMD program could be considered a “double-edged sword”, that is, it may still be seen as a threat by neighbouring states and cause a regional arms race that could lead to conflict. Japan must make a careful distinction between offence and defence, and clearly emphasise the program’s defence-oriented intentions.

The international security environment in East Asia is far from stable or predictable. A variety of states in the region have long, troubled relationships. China is a regional military power with a nuclear arsenal that could contend for global superpower status in the future. China has a number of security problems inside and outside its vast territory; among which the greatest concern is the issue of Taiwan. Taiwan has an advanced economy and considerable military forces to counter the threat from the mainland. Another focus of concern is the divided Korean Peninsula, a legacy of the Cold War. North Korea poses the most imminent post-Cold War threat to the region with its nuclear weapons development and ballistic missile programs. South Korea, like Taiwan, showed impressive economic growth in the 1980s and has maintained a stable democratic regime since the late 1980s. Above all, the United States, the only global superpower after the Cold War, is the key actor in the region. The United States has played a dominant role in East Asia, adopting a hub and spokes type of alliance with Japan, South Korea, and (informally) Taiwan; unlike the collective defence organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In this complex environment, Japan’s defence and security policies have a significant impact on international relations.

Following the defeat in World War II, Japan became known as a peaceful nation and mercantile state. However, it has gradually developed its role in the international security field and increased its military power. Japan faces a number of issues with its neighbours: territorial disputes with China regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands; a dispute with South Korea over Takeshima (Dokdo) Island; issues with Russia regarding the Northern Territories; history-related issues such as Japanese prime ministers worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, reactionary revisions of Japanese history.
schoolbooks, and chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese military in Chinese territory during World War II; and economic concerns, including the development of energy and natural resources in the East China Sea.

This study focuses on Japan's ballistic missile defence (BMD) program. There has been little public discussion of this program compared with the debate on missile defence in the United States. But the substantive shift in Japan's defence strategy should be of great concern. Few scholarly works have examined the development of strategic thinking in Japan's policy on defence against ballistic missile threats. It is worth exploring the defence and security policy of the third largest economy in the world, a major actor in the regional and world security arena, and the holder of one of the world's largest and most sophisticated armed forces.

History of Japan's BMD

It was in May 1993 that the US Government officially proposed that Japan join its Theater Missile Defence (TMD) program. This followed significant events in East Asia: North Korea's 10 January declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its first launch of a Nodong short-range ballistic missile on 29 May. At the Japan-US Defence Summit in September 1993, it was agreed that a forum for policy study on ballistic missile defence would be created under the Security Sub-Committee (SSC). The TMD Working Group (TMD-WG) was then established in December 1993. Since then, TMD-WG meetings have been a forum for administrative-level exchange of information on the two countries' missile defence programs. The Japanese Government uses the term Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) for its own program, to avoid its being linked with the US TMD.

In September 1994, it was agreed that a Japan-US bilateral study group be formed to allow Japan to obtain information on TMD necessary for its policy decisions. And in April 1995, the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) established the Office of Ballistic Missile Defence Research (BMDR). Since January 1995, experts from both nations have been studying the characteristics of ballistic missiles and the technological feasibility of missile defence systems, among other topics. A JDA white paper asserted that, "it is necessary to thoroughly investigate various BMD issues from comprehensive perspectives in order to make decisions on Japan's future attitude." With US cooperation, the JDA thus undertook the study, 'Comprehensive Research on Japan's Future Air Defence System'. Costing 560 million yen (4.7 million dollars) over fiscal years 1995–98, the study focused on TMD.

---

1 During the Clinton Administration, the US ballistic missile defence program was composed of two parts: National Missile Defence (NMD) designed to protect the US mainland and Theater Missile Defence (TMD) defending US forces abroad and US friends and allies.

weapon systems, sensors, and Battlefield Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I) systems. Continued cooperation in these studies was assured by the Japan US Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996.

**Figure 1. Outline of the Japan-US Joint Development**

In August 1998, North Korea's test launch of a three-stage rocket, possibly the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) *Taepodong 1*, spurred calls for Japan's own BMD system. The rocket flew over Japanese territory, and the Japanese people were stunned and humiliated by the intimidating test of a missile "over their heads". At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC or "2 plus 2") meeting on 20 September 1998, the director of Japan's Defence Agency and the US Secretary of Defence resolved to proceed with further work toward cooperative research on missile defence. In October the Security Council of Japan convened, and the JDA announced that it would begin internal coordination with the Cabinet on an additional budget request. In December, prior to the compilation of the government's budget for the fiscal year 1999, relevant ministers met in an attempt to reach consensus on the importance of BMD. Subsequently, on 25 December, the Security Council of Japan was convened, and it approved the initiation of Japan-US...
cooperative technological research on Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD). This was later reorganised as the Sea-based Mid-course Defence (SMD) system. Simultaneously, the government announced its views in the ‘Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding Japan-US Cooperative Technological Research on Ballistic Missile Defence’.

The JDA appropriated 26.2 billion yen (218.3 million dollars) over fiscal years 1999-2005 for joint efforts with the United States on requirement analysis and design (RA&D) for four components of NTWD. The joint program was later modified, and the current state of joint development is illustrated in Figure 1.

In December 2003, the Japanese Security Committee and the Cabinet Meeting of the Japanese Government approved the introduction of BMD into Japan’s defence posture. Japan then officially shifted its position from joint study to development and deployment. These decisions on BMD did not attract much public attention nor received major media coverage. However, they signalled a step toward a major shift in strategic thinking on security policy and showed the Japanese Government's willingness to defend Japan with its own missile defence shield, moving away from dependence on US deterrent forces to its own active defence.

Japan's BMD System

The Japanese Government put forward several reasons for establishing its own missile defence system. First was the international proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Above all, the dictatorship of North Korea poses an imminent threat to Japan. It is reported that North Korea has deployed 200 Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missiles. With an estimated range between 1000 and 1300 kilometres, they bring the entire territory of Japan within range. The recent death of Kim Jong Il and rise to power of his son, Kim Jong Un, makes the future course of this country even less predictable. The inexperienced new leader could initiate a more provocative security policy to assert his position in the outside world. Although North Korea has recently agreed to restart the Six-Party Talks on abandoning its nuclear weapons program, in light of past experience, a peaceful resolution is far from assured. Despite the miserable failure, the North Korean missile test on 13 April 2012 reminded the Japanese of the danger of the new regime.

Second, Japan had no system of defence against ballistic missile attack in the past, and there is currently no viable alternative to the development and deployment of the BMD system. Third, the government claimed that

---

Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties

Japan’s BMD system would not pose a threat to other states, and would only be deployed in strict compliance with Japan’s senshu boei (exclusively defence-oriented defence) policy. These claims are supported by the fact that Japan deploys neither ballistic missiles nor WMD, and possesses no intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, or offensive aircraft carriers.

In addition to these three rationales, BMD supporters have seen several other merits in Japan’s missile defence program. First, BMD supplements the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence strategy for coping with threats from rogue states, allowing Japan to participate in its defence without need for its own nuclear deterrent force. This argument has to be assessed carefully. BMD constitutes “deterrence by denial”, quite different from the “deterrence by punishment” effect of the US “nuclear umbrella”. If BMD is positioned as a supplement to the umbrella, the combined forces will represent a significant war-fighting capability for Japan and the United States.

Second, some contend that BMD development could have positive “spin-off” effects on the Japanese economy. While not a major point, technologies developed for missile defence programs can be applied in the private sector, and should contribute to Japan’s technological and economic development. For instance, in the latter half of the 1950s Japan was licensed to produce Lockheed F-104 fighters. Production essentially relied on Lockheed technology, but the Japanese learned many things in the process; for example, techniques for converting and moulding aluminium led to innovations in disc brakes for bullet trains.

Third, numerous individuals and entities, including the Ministry of Defence (MOD), point out that the development of a BMD system will promote defence and security cooperation with the US. A major reason for Japan’s joining the US TMD program was that “if such a system were to be put in place, participation would strategically link Japan even more tightly with the United States”. In fact, the two governments closely agree in their assessment of imminent ballistic missile threat and on the necessity of building a defensive capability. Cooperation has been consistent and deliberately maintained. The current joint development and deployment of missile defence systems may contribute to further strengthening of the

---

7 JDA was promoted to a ministry status in January 2007.
8 Japan Defence Agency, Boei Hakusho, p. 134.
alliance. Japanese advocates of BMD with this viewpoint have tended to fear "abandonment" by the United States that might injure the alliance, and the possibility of the United States looking to other powers in the region, such as China. On the contrary, critics of BMD fear that Japan could be "entrapped" by the alliance with the United States and dragged into military conflicts elsewhere.\(^{10}\) In any case, BMD will be, in essence, "a weapons system that cannot function without the active cooperation of the United States".\(^{11}\)

Missile defence issues have been raised in the Diet more often since 1995, particularly after North Korea launched its three-stage missile over Japanese territory on 31 August 1998. However, they have frequently been overshadowed by other sensitive and more immediate security issues such as the rape incident in Okinawa in 1995, the debates in 1997 and 1999 on the Japan-US Security Treaty's "guidelines", and the collision of the US submarine, *Greenville*, with the Japanese fishing trawler, *Ehimemaru*, in February 2001. For some time following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there appeared to be little interest in Japan in discussing BMD. Although missile defence issues had been in the forefront since President Bush took office and announced his strong commitment to "deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and stability",\(^{12}\) these issues disappeared both from the Japanese Diet and the media after 11 September 2001. The primary issue then was whether and how Japan should dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to support retaliatory US attacks on the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and subsequently in the Iraq War. Nonetheless, cooperation with the United States on missile defence has been steadily maintained. Joint study on NTWD was succeeded by SMD mid-course defence research, and it has remained intact in the current US missile defence program. Debate on missile defence issues was eventually revitalised after the Japanese Government decided to move toward development and deployment of BMD in December 2003.

Japan's current BMD system comprises a mid-course phase (upper-tier) Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Bloc IA system deployed on four Aegis ships, and a 16-unit terminal phase (lower-tier) Patriot PAC-3 defence system deployed to four sites in Japan (see Figure 2).


Diet debate on BMD issues has pitted proponents—the government, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—against critics—the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. But as the Social Democratic Party has lost numerous Diet seats since 2000, critical voices have been progressively muted. Generally, these debates had been tedious and unproductive, due to repeated assertions by ministers and government officials that "missile defence issues are still under investigation". 

Missile defence was regarded as a specific military posture on a strategic level, so it was essentially a matter of choice for the MOD and SDF, not for politicians or the general public.

The most remarkable feature of the domestic BMD debate since 1993 is the long-term consistency of the government's policy toward BMD. This consistency has been maintained despite frequent regime changes following the demise of the “1955-system” which dominated the Diet. These include the following post-LDP coalitions:

- The Hosokawa and Hata administrations (August 1993–June 1994)

---

• The LDP coalition with the Socialist Party, including the Murayama and Hashimoto administrations (June 1994-July 1998)

• The LDP coalitions without Socialists, including the Obuchi, Mori, Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda and Aso administrations (July 1998-September 2008)

• And even after the major change from the LDP to the DPJ, including the Hatoyama, Kan, and current Noda administrations (September 2008-present)

Whatever the justifications, Japan’s strong bureaucracy has played the key role in maintaining the long-term consistency of the government’s policy toward BMD throughout Japan’s frequent regime transitions. More specifically, the government’s long-term position on the BMD program can be attributed to Japan’s security policy-making process, in which bureaucrats from the MOD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) take charge in making concrete decisions and crafting policy. It is also a manifestation of the stable relationship between Japan and the United States, despite occasional political tensions and "drifting" of the alliance, and the smouldering issue of moving the Futenma US air base out of Okinawa.\footnote{Funabashi, Yoichi, Domei Hyoryu (The Drifting Alliance) (Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).}

The Debate on Technology

Behind the recent missile defence debate, there has been recognition that technological development has finally made "shooting a bullet with a bullet" possible. One missile defence advocate simply declared, "the technology is ready".\footnote{Baker Spring, ‘The President’s Important Choice on Missile Defense’, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1355, The Heritage Foundation, 31 March 2000, <http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1355.html> [Accessed 16 July 2008].} The feasibility of "hit-to-kill" missile technology "was proven in a series of successful intercept tests in 1999".\footnote{Baker Spring and James H. Anderson, ‘Missile Defense: Ending America’s Vulnerability’, Stuart M. Butler and Kim R. Holmes (eds), Issues 2000: The Candidate’s Briefing Book (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2000), <http://www.heritage.org/issues/chap15.html> [Accessed 16 July 2008].} Following the reportedly successful first intercept test on 15 July 2001, the Bush administration conducted missile defence experiments in an incremental manner. Opponents of missile defence contended that it was a "rush to failure" to decide on deployment of such systems without enough testing.\footnote{Joseph Cirincione, ‘Rush to Failure’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1998), pp. 23-5, 68.} They argued that even the widely deployed short-range missile defence system, the Patriot system, had a remarkably low success rate in the Gulf War despite the fact that it had a perfect test record (seventeen hits in seventeen
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties

tests) before the war.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, it was pointed out that ballistic missile
defence would be far more difficult than shooting down a bullet with a bullet.
The speed of a typical bullet is about Mach 2.5 while "an incoming warhead
moves at Mach 6 and more",\textsuperscript{19} though a warhead is far larger than a bullet.

In general, there are three phases in a missile defence system; boost phase,
mid-course phase and terminal phase. First, boost phase defence is
designed to intercept ballistic missiles while their rocket engines are still
burning in the midst of acceleration, which are slow, emit high heat, with
booster rockets still attached, and offer the largest radar target,\textsuperscript{20} so they are
easily detected and targeted. Moreover, the intercept occurs within the
enemy's territory, so that there is less worry about debris fallout. Another
merit of boost-phase defence is that it can be carried out before enemy
missiles launch decoys and other countermeasures. Supporters of this
system also argue that a boost phase interceptor system involves mainly
proven technology. But a serious problem with boost phase systems is that
operational time-constraints become acute; for instance, a \textit{Nodong} missile
would reach Japan about ten minutes after launch. Therefore detection and
communication technologies are crucial. A boost phase system would
require deployment of Aegis warships in the Sea of Japan, and the decision
to intercept would have to be made within minutes of detecting a launch.
The Japanese Government has been criticised due to its delayed information
gathering and disclosure of the recent missile launch by North Korea, and it
has raised more questions about the credibility of human than technological
aspects in Japan's BMD system. Despite its merits, the Japanese
Government has not developed a boost phase missile defence system for
domestic reasons, to be mentioned later.

As for the mid-course defence system that Japan has deployed, the Aegis-
launched SMD system succeeded in fifteen out of eighteen flight tests,
including three launched from Japanese Aegis ships. However, plans for
mid-course interception have drawn the most technological criticism,
centring on the availability of countermeasures. Critics argue that even if
missile defence were now technically feasible on the test range, the attacker
"would be able to take straightforward steps to defeat this system".\textsuperscript{21} Writers
have pointed to a variety of possible countermeasures: submunitions,
decoys, cooled shrouds, chaffs, aerosols, and so on.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{18} George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol and John Pike, 'Why National Missile Defense Won't
\bibitem{19} Alik Hermetz, 'Concluding Remarks', Ben-Zion Naveh and Azriel Lorber (eds.), \textit{Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense} (Reston, Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
\bibitem{20} Hughes, \textit{Japan's Security Agenda}, p. 184.
\bibitem{21} George N. Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, 'National Missile Defense: An
\bibitem{22} Joseph Cirincione, 'Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of
the Ballistic Missile Threat', \textit{The Nonproliferation Review}, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 125-
\end{thebibliography}
With regard to the terminal phase, the upgraded PAC-3 is nearly an entire system redesign, intended to intercept tactical ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. As of March 2005, it was reported that ten out of twelve tests had been successful, and the Japanese Government judged the system reliable enough to begin deployment in 2006. However, the utility of the PAC-3 terminal phase system against high-speed Nodong missiles is unknown. The issue of wreckage, which may cause serious radioactive fallout and threaten the area they are designed to protect, also remains to be discussed.

Furthermore, some opponents of missile defence also argue that emphasising missile defence systems is meaningless because "rogue" actors would likely deliver WMD by means other than ballistic missiles, such as suitcases, vans/trucks, small civilian airplanes, container ships, cruise missiles, subway cars, and so forth.23 Such means are less expensive, easier to covertly develop and deploy (possibly enabling attackers to evade retaliation), more reliable, more accurate, and potentially more effective than ICBMs.24 In fact, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were conducted by way of the nearly unthinkable but well prepared hijacking of four commercial airplanes full of fuel. The actual weapons of the terrorists were said to be box cutters.

Regarding the countermeasure argument, missile defence supporters respond that a properly designed system "should be able to anticipate and neutralize potential countermeasures".25 However, critics refer to the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, arguing that, "it is far easier and cheaper to deploy simple and effective countermeasures against defences than it is for the defences to respond".26 Therefore, "each move drives up the defender's costs much further than it does the attacker's."27 As for other means of delivery, missile defence advocates object to "putting all defence eggs in one basket". That is, it is not right to just give up "simply because

25; Spring and Anderson, 'Missile Defense'.
26; Joseph Cirincione, 'Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate', Foreign Policy, no. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 39-55.
missile defence is not a panacea" and to leave people utterly vulnerable to this particular type of attack.\textsuperscript{28} They once condemned the Clinton Administration's reluctance to support missile defence deployment, contending that the danger of ballistic missiles stems not only from their spread, but also from the policy of purposeful vulnerability to these weapons. As Spring and Anderson wrote: "Long-range ballistic missiles are the only weapons against which the Clinton Administration has decided, as a matter of policy, not to field any defence."\textsuperscript{29}

The Debate on Legality

The Japanese Government maintains that the missile defence issue is an operational-level matter for the MOD and SDF, and thus claims there is no need to consult the Diet or seek its approval. Still, there are numerous debates in Japan centring on the BMD program. One focuses on interpretations of the Japanese constitution's Article 9 peace clause.\textsuperscript{30} The Japanese Government currently interprets the constitution as prohibiting Japan's participation in "collective self-defence" and justifies the maintenance of the SDF by limiting their mandate to "individual self-defence". The most obvious scenario of "collective self-defence" would be Japan participating as an ally in US military operations abroad. The position publicised by the government is following:

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum necessary level of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.\textsuperscript{31}

Especially after President Bush announced the unification of NMD and TMD in favour of integrated boost, mid-course and terminal defence segments, Japan's cooperation with US efforts to shoot down ballistic missiles might be regarded as a "use of collective self-defence".\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, some argue that on a regional level the actual operation or even deployment of a missile defence system may make cooperation with not only the United States but also South Korea or Taiwan inevitable. The Japanese Government has

\textsuperscript{28} Michael O'Hanlon, 'Star Wars Strikes Back', \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 68-82.
\textsuperscript{29} Spring and Anderson, 'Missile Defense'.
\textsuperscript{30} Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
\textsuperscript{31} Ministry of Defence, \textit{Defence of Japan 2011}.
countered these arguments, contending that defending its own territory does not conflict with collective self-defence and that BMD systems will be applied within the independent right of self-defence. Meanwhile, the recent argument for boost phase defence is problematic, because it is very difficult to judge, within minutes of detection, whether the launched ballistic missile is aimed at Japan or another country. And that is why the Japanese Government has excluded a boost-phase defence from BMD options.

The second debate centres on the possibility of Japan transferring its BMD technology to South Korea or Taiwan, potentially violating the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which prohibit the export of weapons. The Three Principles, instituted in April 1967, preclude weapons exports to: (1) communist countries; (2) countries to which exporting weapons is prohibited by United Nations resolutions; and (3) countries that actually are, or are likely to be, involved in international conflict. In February 1976, the Japanese Government announced its official view on this issue, stating that in addition to the three exclusions above, Japan would abstain from exporting weapons to "any other" country. However, in January 1983, following ardent requests from the United States, Japan decided to open the way for transfer of its military technology to the United States as an exception to the Three Principles. Therefore, joint study with the United States of missile defence systems is not considered to legally violate the principles, and this issue would arise only if a project involved a third country. The Japanese Government argued that the transfer of missile defence technology is only a future possibility, which cannot be discussed now. This was the basic position of the Japanese Government before it decided to move forward with development in December 2004. The government was quite clear on the distinction between the stages of "study", "development" and "deployment" of a BMD system, and it cautiously avoided any argument regarding future stages. On 27 December 2011, the Japanese government announced that joint development with the United States of BMD would be considered an exception of the principles. Japan has certainly begun to move toward lifting the principles in favour of missile defence cooperation.

The third debate centres on the deployment of an upper-tier defence system and its potential to violate the 1969 Diet resolution on the peaceful use of outer space. In May 1969, a plenary session of the House of Representatives declared that development and use of any objects and rockets launched into space are to be limited to peaceful use. Following this resolution, Japan pledged that it would not deploy offensive weapons in outer space, although Japan has reserved the possibility of developing a spy satellite to collect and transmit information for the purpose of national security. After the "Taepodong shock" of 1998, Japan introduced "information satellites", but their operations are under the control of the cabinet, not JDA, to support the claim that they are not "spy satellites" for militarily use. Also, their visual resolution was intentionally restricted to one
square metre, instead of a militarily effective level of some square centimetres. The "peaceful use of outer space" pledge has been included in Japan's basic national defence policy. Here the term "space" is defined as the area above the atmosphere, and the Diet resolution would seem in conflict with the joint study of technology aiming at mid-course interception of incoming ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. The Japanese Government has responded to the criticisms, maintaining that, because of recent technological developments and emerging threats, the 1969 Diet resolution should be revised to permit purely defensive activities including the planned upper-tier defence system.

The Moral Debate

It should be noted that an underlying element in the debate on missile defence belongs to the philosophical or moral spheres. An important rationale for the development and deployment of missile defence systems was the recognition that the US and Japanese governments could no longer tolerate leaving their people vulnerable to ballistic missile-based WMD that have significantly proliferated in the Third World. The "Star Wars" program, started in 1983, included recognition of this danger, and post-Cold War argument for missile defence gave emphasis to Third World threats.  

The moral argument holds that, if missile defence technology is ready, it is wrong to maintain current mutual assured destruction (MAD) policy based on Cold War politics and technology. Arguing from the moral imperative of protecting life, missile defence advocates claim that even if technology cannot provide a perfect missile defence; even if expected costs of development are high; and even if other states argue against it, the public should not "be left defenceless in the event of missile attack". From this perspective, differences over threat assessment, technological feasibility, cost, international political environment, domestic constraints, and so forth, should all be weighed in light of the moral imperative of protecting the public.

The Japanese public and major Japanese newspapers used to be divided over the issue of BMD. While most major Japanese newspapers have recommended that the United States take a cautious approach in its pursuit of missile shields, particularly taking into account its relations with Russia, their responses to the issue of Japan's own missile defence have been more sharply divided. Yomiuri Shinbun, a rather conservative newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan, expressed immediate support for Japan's participation in the US missile defence program. Sankei Shinbun, known as a particularly conservative publication, also argues for BMD. Their specific emphases are on the emerging ballistic missile threat and the

---

34 Spring and Anderson, 'Missile Defense'.
advantage of basing deterrence (deterrence by denial) on missile defence systems.\footnote{Shasetsu: Jikko Agaru Kankyo o Totonoyeo (Editorial: Prepare Effective Circumstances), Sankei Shinbun, 30 August 2003.} On the contrary, Asahi Shinbun, a relatively liberal newspaper with the second largest circulation, has argued strongly against Japan’s missile program. Asahi has raised concerns about technological feasibility, costs, and a possible regional arms race, should BMD be deployed.\footnote{Shasetsu: Misairu Boei: Anshin-ryo to shite Miau ka? (Editorial: Missile Defense: Will It Deserve As Security Fee?), Asahi Shinbun, 30 August 2003.} Nevertheless, such heated debates have faded away in recent years, and it seems that the Japanese people have become indifferent, and less informed.

In any case, inhibiting factors are unlikely to slow the momentum toward development and deployment of missile shields in Japan, especially with Japan’s formidable bureaucracy throwing its weight behind the project. Developing the cutting-edge technology necessary for the BMD program also requires significant financial resources, and it appears that not even the economy’s long-term stagnation or the 2011 disasters are stalling its progress.

### A Double-Edged Sword

Despite the government’s claim of being interested only in self-defence, its BMD program could be considered a "double-edged sword". That is, Japan’s BMD program may still be seen as a threat by neighbouring states and cause a regional arms race that could lead to conflict. It was reported that the Japanese Government explored the adoption of US Tomahawk Missiles with a range of 1700 kilometres, which were used for pinpoint attacks in the Iraq War. The government has explained that in the case of an enemy’s obvious intent to carry out an imminent missile attack, it was within the limits of self-defence to conduct preemptive attacks against the enemy’s missile bases at the missile launch stage.\footnote{Hajime Ozu, Misairu Boei no Kiso Chishiki (Missile Defense Background) (Tokyo, Japan: Shinkigensha, 2002), p. 209.} In July 2006, after provocative ballistic missile tests by North Korea, leading politicians, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who later became prime minister, explicitly argued for a preemptive attack on North Korean missile sites. Justification for preemptive attack for defensive purposes has been official since the 1950s, but the introduction of long-range offensive missiles like the Tomahawk will clearly exceed Japan’s national pledge of senshu boei policy, and other states may even regard it as a cover for Japanese militarism.

Critics of BMD abroad have hypothesised that BMD should destabilise strategic relations in the East Asia region. First, they believe that a defence
A Japanese missile shield will make Japan more confident and more militarily ambitious. Second, they suggest that BMD can be both defensive and offensive. The essential elements of ballistic missiles and most TMD systems are similar, and the differences between them are only in their warheads. The point is that it should not be difficult for the Japanese to turn their defensive anti-ballistic missiles into offensive ballistic missiles. The difference between defence and offense therefore depends on the intentions of the Japanese. Third, because Japan and the United States are close allies, critics may connect Japan’s BMD system with the offensive capabilities of the United States, thus reinforcing the impression that combined Japanese and US forces could constitute a significant war-fighting capability in the region. A Japanese missile shield could be regarded as offensive even though Japan does not possess obviously offensive weapons, if one considers its connection with the offensive capability of the United States, which is the largest and most sophisticated in the world. Considering the United States’ ability to launch a massive first strike against an enemy in the region and the ability of Japan's BMD to absorb the opponent's retaliatory ballistic missile attacks (already depleted by the first strike) could lead a potential enemy in the region to more readily contemplate a preemptive and preventive attack of its own.

The Chinese Government has repeatedly objected to the BMD program, which it regards as a revival of Japanese militarism and a part of the strategic expansion of US forces in East Asia. The missile defence plan would seriously undermine China's current nuclear deterrence strategy because even a limited missile defence system would compromise the effectiveness of China's relatively small number of strategic nuclear missiles. In fact, though no government has clearly mentioned the "China threat", some scholars have been explicit about the probable efficacy of missile defence against the threat from Chinese ballistic missiles. "Despite its well-established ballistic missile program, China is apparently less confident in its ability to overcome future defences." Viewed from Beijing, missile

---

defence cooperation in East Asia "looks like a new multilateral security alliance against China".\textsuperscript{44}

China is particularly sensitive to the issue of missile defence in the region because of the possible involvement of Taiwan, which may lend an illusion of safety and provide a strong incentive for the Taiwanese to pursue independence. China will not tolerate this, since Taiwan is of supreme national interest to China. Consequently, missile defence critics, especially Chinese scholars, believe that US-Japan missile defence would upset the regional military balance and undermine existing arms control regimes.\textsuperscript{45}

One Chinese missile defence specialist recently pointed out that SM-3 Block IIA, which is being jointly developed by Japan and the United States and is planned for deployment in 2018, will be capable of largely neutralising China's retaliatory nuclear forces.\textsuperscript{46} It is reported that China has already been preparing countermeasures such as electronic jamming equipment and decoys for its ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{47}

Some missile defence proponents have argued that a defence-oriented military posture with missile defence systems, rather than an offense-oriented one, will contribute to global and regional stability.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless, with all the assurances that the US-Japan missile defence plan is not aimed at Russia or China, both Russia and China are deeply sceptical about the intentions of the United States and Japan. In such circumstances, a decision to pursue a missile defence system, especially when made unilaterally, could destabilise the strategic relationship with Russia and China and trigger renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile arms race.\textsuperscript{49}

If Japan is to continue pursuing BMD, its defence orientation must be shared with other states in the region, including China, so that they will not perceive

\textsuperscript{44}Peter Van Ness, ‘Hegemony’, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{49}Mendelsohn, ‘Missile Defense’; Lewis and Postol, ‘Future Challenges to Ballistic Missile Defense’.
a threat and regional stability can be maintained. The current international political environment is not in favour of BMD. For the time being, it will be difficult for Japan to achieve national security through deployment of a BMD system. But Japan’s BMD system could potentially lead to regional arms control and possibly even nuclear disarmament if neighbouring states believe it to truly be a logical continuation of Japan’s senshu boei policy.

To promote this perception, Japan must make a careful distinction between offence and defence, and clearly emphasise the program’s defence-oriented intentions. Japan should also promote its cooperation with the United States as a means of moving toward a global reduction of offensive weapons, including nuclear weapons. US president George W. Bush saw the world in black and white terms in which rogue states and terrorists could threaten democracy and freedom. The current president, Barack Obama has advocated a “world without nuclear weapons”. In February 2011, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia came into effect. There may now be an opportunity for the world to turn to arms control and limiting nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. For the time being, Japan will have to continue to rely on US deterrent forces in light of the perception among major powers—principally the United States, Russia and China—that their nuclear weapons offer sufficient deterrent effect to maintain peace and stability. Nevertheless, if properly developed and presented, Japan’s purely defence-oriented BMD could become a model for establishing a global arms control regime that emphasises defence. While building missile defence systems against limited ballistic missile attacks, states should promote reduction of offensive weapons and reduce the utility and legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons. Australia should be a significant partner in this, as it too is an important ally of the United States, has no nuclear weapons, and has cooperated with the United States in its missile defence program and deepened its security cooperation with Japan.

Norifumi Namatame is Associate Professor at Tohoku Fukushi University, Japan. He was Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University from May 2011 to January 2012. He has published articles on Japan’s missile defence programs and on realist and pacifist approaches to Japan’s postwar security policy and national identity. namatame@tfu-mail.tfu.ac.jp
The Transformation of the JASDF's Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities for Air and Missile Defence

Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter

Over the past decade, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) has undergone an extraordinary transformation with respect to the intelligence and surveillance elements of its air and missile defence capabilities. Advanced sorts of ground-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) and radar systems have been developed and are mostly now operational around the country. Older systems have been extensively upgraded. All of the air intelligence and radar systems have been thoroughly integrated into a single complex, with the radar systems comprehensively networked, and the electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection, early-warning, and aircraft and missile tracking activities coordinated and the intelligence products correlated at several levels. Moreover, the HQ of the JASDF’s Air Defence Command has now moved to the HQ of US Forces Japan at Yokota Air Base, providing it with direct access to the US space-based missile launch detection system as well as other US missile defence assets. Many of the new facilities are clearly situated to monitor electronic activity in North Korea and to track North Korean long-range ballistic missiles that might be aimed at or pass over Japanese territory. Others, now emplaced on Okinawa and elsewhere down the Ryukyu Island chain, are part of broader efforts by Japan to expand its collection of electromagnetic signals emanating from China and to strengthen its defences against China’s modernising air, maritime and missile forces. The new capabilities should provide Japan with the ability to detect, track and intercept relatively small numbers of long-range (including nuclear-armed) missiles, such as North Korea could launch, with a high degree of confidence. In the case of China, the initial priority is to complete ELINT and radar coverage of Chinese air activities around the islands south of Okinawa. Against Chinese strategic nuclear forces, equipped with a wide array of delivery systems, the situation remains problematic.

Japan’s most recent National Defence Program Outline, approved by the cabinet in December 2010, stated that, as one key response to the complex, post-Cold War security environment Japan now faces, upgrading and expanding the Self Defence Force’s (SDF) intelligence capacities will be a priority for the government. The Outline commits the SDF in future to “ensuring information supremacy through continuous ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] in the country and its surrounding areas”.1 Yet what is most remarkable is that over the past decade the SDF has already very considerably expanded these capacities. This article examines one aspect of those developments to date: the Air Self Defence Force’s intelligence and surveillance capacities for air and missile defence.

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) maintains an extremely comprehensive architecture of ground-based radar and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems for airspace surveillance, intended to provide early warning of air or missile attacks and to provide tactical intelligence for air and missile defence systems. These systems have been—and continue

---


Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 19-56. - 19 -
to be—dramatically upgraded and expanded. Several new signals intelligence (SIGINT) stations have recently been established, stretching from Kyushu down to Miyako-jima, at the southern end of the Ryukyu Island chain, more than 2000 km south of Tokyo and about 380 km east of Taiwan. The JADGE (Japan Air Defence Ground Environment) early warning and air defence system is being modernised, with new J/FPS-4 and J/FPS-5 radar systems designed for long-range detection and tracking of ballistic missiles as well as aircraft.²

The JASDF has several organisations involved in the collection and processing of ELINT for both intelligence and early warning purposes—including Air Information Collection Units, of which Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are at Wakkanai, Nemuro and Okushiri in Hokkaido, other ELINT units associated with JADGE stations, and ELINT ground stations responsible for processing and analysis of ELINT collected by the JASDF’s SIGINT/ELINT aircraft. Until recently, the different units reported to different and poorly coordinated agencies, including the Air Defense Command (ADC) at Fuchu Air Base, the JASDF’s ELINT processing centre at Hyakuri Air Base, the JASDF’s Intelligence Division, and the Air Staff Office at the Ministry of Defense HQ in Tokyo. The process is now much more streamlined, with all the JADGE radar surveillance data and the SIGINT/ELINT collected by the JASDF’s SIGINT ground stations and SIGINT aircraft being sent in near real-time to the ADC, which relocated to new facilities currently nearing at Yokota Air Base in March 2012,³ and to the Joint Staff Office at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) HQ, formed in March 2006, for further processing, correlation and analysis.⁴

Known as the BADGE (Base Air Defence Ground Environment) until 2009, the JADGE radar system is being upgraded throughout the country, from Hokkaido (where a new J/FPS-4 system has been installed at Tobetsu) down to Okinawa (where a new J/FPS-5 system is currently being built at Yozadake). However, the JASDF’s new SIGINT stations are primarily concerned with intercepting Chinese and North Korean aeronautical and maritime communications and electronic emissions. Two of the four J/FPS-5 radar systems being constructed will be focussed on Chinese missile trajectories and the other two on North Korea.

² In Japanese language official usage the acronym JADGE (pronounced ジャッジ・システム in Japanese) stands for 自動警戒管制システム, which translates directly as "Automatic Warning and Control System", in contrast to the official English language expansion of "JADGE": Japan Air Defence Ground Environment. Similarly, the English "Base Air Defence Ground Environment" stood for 自動警戒管制組織—literally "Automatic Warning and Control Organisation".
⁴ On 9 January 2007, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was replaced by the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The North Korean test-launch of a Nodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in May 1993, and more especially the test-launch of a Taepodong inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1998, prompted Japan to embark with increasingly growing enthusiasm on the acquisition of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, consisting according to current plans of about 200 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 interceptors for terminal missile defence and eight Kongo-class Aegis destroyers fitted with SM-3 missiles for mid-course interception.

The commitment to BMD has also involved the integration of the JASDF’s early warning networks, including both its JADGE radar system and its signals interception stations, into the US BMD capabilities, including those developed for defence of the US homeland against missiles whose trajectories pass over or within range of Japan. In the case of the JADGE network, although it had originally been constructed by the US Air Force, the JASDF had through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s been strongly opposed to sharing it with the United States, only conceding around 2005. Lieutenant General Bruce Wright, commander of both US Forces Japan (USFJ) and the US Air Force’s 5th Air Force, based at Yokota Air Base, has described the rapidly growing partnership as "an Air Force alliance".5

**JASDF COMINT/ELINT/ESM Stations**

The JASDF now has at least seven SIGINT stations, the last three of which have been built by Toshiba since 2004. The stations are operated by JASDF Air Information Collection Units and organisationally form the Radio-wave Collection Group of the Air Intelligence Wing (also called the Operational Intelligence Unit), based at the JASDF’s Air Defense Command HQ at Yokota Air Base, in western Tokyo. No. 1 and No. 2 Warning Data Processing Units are also based with the Air Intelligence Wing at Yokota. Two of the Air Intelligence Collection Units, No. 1 at Wakkanai and No. 3 at Okushiri, are directly subordinate to the Air Intelligence Wing at Yokota, while the new units in Kyushu and at Miyako-jima report to the 2nd Warning Data Processing Unit at the JASDF’s base at Kasuga, near Fukuoka, the HQ of the JASDF’s Western Defence Sector, which performs second-echelon processing and analysis while relaying the information to Yokota.6

The collection stations are equipped with a variety of HF, VHF, UHF and SHF antennas for intercepting air communications, providing early-warning

---

7 Radio frequencies:
of aircraft movements by detecting and tracking their electronic emissions, and collecting electronic intelligence for the development of ESM (electronic support measures) and ECM (electronic counter-measure) systems and techniques. Some of them also have their own associated jamming and other ECM systems. The equipment suites have been called successively J/FLR-2, J/FLR-3, J/FLR-4 and J/FLR-4A ‘ground radio-wave measurement systems’. These systems are all manufactured by Toshiba, and they are all still in service.

For example, Toshiba received a contract for 14,542,500 yen in June 2005 for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-2 system. In May 2006, Toshiba was awarded another contract for 16,905,000 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-2 system. In August 2006, it received a contract for 3,731,700 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-2 “ground radio-wave measurement system”. In May 2007, it received another contract for 15,516,900 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-2 system. In February 2007, Toshiba also received a contract for 56,364,000 yen to provide twelve alternating-current motors, described as “components of the J/FLR-2 radio-wave jamming system”.

In September 2005, Toshiba was awarded a contract for 23,919,000 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-3 “ground radio-wave measurement system”. In May 2006, it received a contract for 5,565,000 yen for “preliminary surveys” of the “regular repair” requirements of a J/FLR-3 system. In August 2006, it received another contract for 25,823,700 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-3 system. In September 2006, it received a contract for 30,810,150 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-4A system.

HF—High Frequency: 3-30 MHz;  
VHF—Very High Frequency: 30-300 MHz;  
UHF—Ultra High Frequency: 300 MHz -3 GHz;  
SHF—Super High Frequency: 3-30 GHz.

15 ‘Table of Contracts, August 2006’, JASDF 3rd Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.
yen to provide 29 “maintenance ropes”, being “components of the J/FLR-3 radio-wave measurement system”.

HOKKAIDO: WAKKANAI, NEMURO, OKUSHIRI

The Air Information Collection Units at Wakkanai and Nemuro were established in the 1970s. Wakkanai is located at the northwest corner of Hokkaido, about 45 km across the Soya Strait from Sakhalin Island; Nemuro is in the northeast corner, opposite the Northern Territories, occupied by Russia since the Second World War. The primary purpose of these units originally was to collect ELINT on Soviet Air Force activities to provide both tactical intelligence for the JASDF and support for the development of ESM systems for JASDF aircraft. They also intercepted Soviet Air Force communications relating to these activities, such as pilot-to-pilot chatter and ground-to-air orders.

The 1st Air Information Collection Unit at Wakkanai had eighty staff in 1988. These are divided between ELINT operations, conducted at a site just below the BADGE station (formerly called Hill 2 by US Air Force SIGINT personnel, whereas the JADGE station is on Hill 3), and COMINT operations conducted at the JASDF’s large SIGINT complex at Hill 1, nearer the point of Cape Noshyappu. While the JADGE station tracks aircraft, the ELINT unit at Hill 2 monitors their radar and other electronic emissions, and the COMINT unit at Hill 1 intercepts their radio communications.

The 2nd Air Information Collection Unit at Nemuro is situated in lush farmland on the northeast side of the township, with the Meiji Peace Park on its southwest side. It has a staff of more than 100, and maintains a complex consisting of an administration and operations building, and six demi-circular radomes, ranging from about four metres to seven metres in diameter, housing parabolic UHF/SHF antennas; a three metre high cylindrical or thimble-shaped dome, housing a UHF antenna; a 6-element VHF DF array and a 6-element UHF DF array; and several other VHF and UHF antennas. Its collection equipment has not changed since 1991-92, when the fifth and sixth radomes were installed.

The JASDF established a third COMINT/ELINT collection station, maintained by No. 3 Air Information Collection Unit, on Okushiri Island in 1991. It is part of a large SIGINT complex located about one kilometre southwest of the JADGE station. Planning for this station began in 1983, and it opened for operations in May 1990, although construction had not yet been completed. Its purposes were reportedly “to monitor Soviet communications in Siberia”

---

and to collect ELINT.18 It was expanded in 1991-93.19 It consists of an operations building and thirteen radomes, including a cylindrical one like at Nemuro, measuring from about 3 metres to about 12 metres in diameter. According to a Japan Defense Agency (JDA) advertisement for computer mechanics in 2007, the units at Wakkanai, Nemuro and Okushiri, together with a unit at Misawa, form a Surveillance Intelligence Group.20 The Wakkanai, Nemuro and Okushiri units used to report to the Warning Data Unit at Misawa, but it was disbanded in October 2005; the Wakkanai and Okushiri units now report directly to the Intelligence Air Wing at Yokota.

**HONSHU: TAKAO-YAMA**

It was reported in 1998 that the JASDF also maintained a COMINT unit inside the JADGE station at Takao-yama, on the Shimane-hanto, across the southern part of the Sea of Japan from South Korea, and overlooking the Miho SIGINT station, with its large Circularly-disposed Antenna Array (CDAA).21 It presumably monitors air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-air communications associated with the radar findings. As with the Miho SIGINT station, its focus is on North Korean communications.

**KYUSHU: SEBURI-YAMA, FUKUE-JIMA**

Toshiba received a large contract for a J/FLR-4 ground-based radio-wave measurement facility in 1997.22 On 6 June 2005, it received a contract for 8,295,000 yen for a preliminary survey of the “regular repair” requirements for a J/FLR-4 system.23 On 27 October 2005, it was awarded a contract for 44,482,200 yen for the “regular repair” of a J/FLR-4 system, to be completed by January 2006.24 On 26 June 2006, it received a contract for 6,669,600 yen for an “RF Tuner Unit” for the J/FLR-4 “radio-wave measurement system”, and a contract for 9,267,300 yen for a preliminary survey of the “regular repair” requirements for another J/FLR-4 system.25 In September 2006, it received a contract for 105,244,650 yen for the provision of three

---

“base-band receiver units” for a J/FLR-4 system, as well as a contract for 4,223,250 yen for “regular repair” of a J/FLR-4 system.\textsuperscript{26} As would become evident from the subsequent J/FLR-4 program schedule, these contracts related to the development of the J/FLR-4 system and the installation and initial maintenance of the J/FLR-4 facility at Seburi-yama in Kyushu.

The new ELINT/COMINT station was established by the JASDF in 2004-06 at Seburi-yama, home of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Air Control and Warning (AC\&W) Group, and probably the first J/FPS-3 JADGE station to have been converted to a J/FPS-4. The J/FLR-4 SIGINT facility is operated by the JASDF’s Air Information Collection Unit No. 4.

Construction of the new facility began in the spring of 2004 and was mostly completed by around May 2005. It consists of a “huge building”, located on the western side of the mountain, measuring 20 metres high, 70 metres long, and 30 metres wide, and two large towers with the top five metres enclosed in two-tiered electromagnetically-transparent covers. In the case of the larger tower, the diameter of the lower part of the two-tiered cover is about 14.8 metres and that of the top part is about 11.3 metres; in the case of the smaller tower, the diameters of the two tiers are about 10.5 and 9.3 metres. With a collection of HF, VHF and UHF antennas, the station is reportedly concerned with monitoring Chinese and North Korean signals.\textsuperscript{27} According to a JDA press release in October 2006, the station was scheduled to become operational in early 2007.\textsuperscript{28}

Data collected at the Seburi-yama SIGINT station is processed and analysed by the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Warning Data Processing Unit (until March 2001 called the Warning Data Unit) at the JASDF’s base at Kasuga, and then forwarded to the Operational Intelligence Unit at the Air Defense Command HQ at Yokota.\textsuperscript{29}

The JASDF decided in 2006-07 to establish a SIGINT station on Fukue-jima, off the northwest side of Kyushu, 1050 km southwest of Tokyo.\textsuperscript{30} It had

\textsuperscript{26} ‘Table of Contracts, September 2006’, JASDF 3\textsuperscript{rd} Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.
\textsuperscript{27} ‘Sehuri Mountain Bases Communications Group’, <http://www.peace-fuk.net/sehuri/sefuri.html>.
\textsuperscript{30} The Fukue-jima Detachment Sub-Base is sometimes referred to as the Miraku base, after the name of the village close by. The facility sits at the top of a hill known as Higashi no Dake, which was an observation site during the Russo-Japanese War as well as the Pacific War. See Nagasaki Peace Committee, ‘京ノ岳監視所: 住民が24時間警戒’('Higashi no Dake Observation Post: Locals Kept a 24 Hour Watch'), <http://www.nagasaki-np.co.jp/peace/2005/kikaku/03/07.html>.
initially considered three candidate sites, comprising Shimokoshiki-jima and Okino Erabu-jima as well as Fukue-jima. On 4 November 2006, the JDA announced that the selection had been narrowed to two sites, Fukue-jima and Shimokoshiki. It announced the decision to proceed with the Fukue-jima site on 6 March 2007. The Sankei Shimbun reported that it was another "electromagnetic surveillance facility to monitor Chinese military activity". In January 2009, a Chinese report said that construction of the new listening station at Fukue-jima began in August 2007, and that in December 2008 the Ministry of Defense decided to "comprehensively upgrade" the new station. According to the Nagasaki Peace Committee, construction was to start in 2011. The Ministry of Defence confirmed in its fiscal year 2012 procurement plan that the Fukue-jima station is to be a J/FLR-4A facility, due to open in April 2014.

**OKINAWA: MIYAKO-JIMA**

The decision to construct another JASDF ELINT/COMINT collection station on the beautiful island of Miyako-jima was first reported in November 2004. These reports said that a "communications intelligence team" was to be dispatched to the island, and that the purpose of the station was "to intercept and handle communication signals of Chinese warships and aircraft". The same reports said that the JDA "believes that a station on Miyako Island is not enough, and another one must be added at a southwest island to intercept and decode the rival’s radio communications signals". About 100

---

38 Ibid.
million yen was included in the fiscal year 2005 defence budget for “system design expenses” relating to the Miyako-jima station.\textsuperscript{39}

Construction of the station at Miyako-jima began on 23 October 2006.\textsuperscript{40} A large area had been cleared and levelled by February 2007, and construction of the new barracks building was underway.\textsuperscript{41} It is officially called a Land Radio Wave Measurement Facility, and is located in Nobaru village in the Ueno area. The \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun} reported on 24 October that the new station would collect both ELINT and COMINT concerning Chinese air activities, and that data would be used to develop electronic countermeasures (ECM). It said that:

The facility is expected to collect electronic information such as radar signals and radio transmissions. It will analyse the data to enhance its understanding of the behaviour and capabilities of other countries’ aircraft. The government will also use the accumulated data to help it draw up effective measures to prevent other countries from using radar and other electronic devices.\textsuperscript{42}

A JASDF official said: “All around Japan we need to know what is happening and be ready to catch the information”.\textsuperscript{43}

Miyako-jima is located about 180 km east of islets claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing, called the Senkakus in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. On 25 August 1995, the JADGE radar station at Miyako-jima detected two aircraft flying close to the Senkaku Islands, in apparent violation of Japanese airspace; they were believed to be Chinese Air Force Su-27s fighters, but this was not confirmed.\textsuperscript{44}

The 2006 defence budget contained 2.4 billion yen for “building new base facilities, barracks and equipment” at Miyako-jima. The prime contract was awarded to Toshiba in Tokyo for J/FLR-4A “terrestrial radio wave measurement equipment”.\textsuperscript{45} Another 2.5 billion yen for the J/FLR-4A

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{39} ‘Radio-wave Measurement Facility at Miyako-jima: Chinese Military Intelligence-gathering’, \textit{Okinawa Times}, 24 October 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

The JASDF station at Miyako-jima stretches along a ridge, 108.6 metres in altitude at its highest point, running from northwest (where the J/FPS-2 JADGE radar is located) to southeast, roughly parallel to R 201 (between R 78 at the northern end and R 246 along the southern side), in the southern part of the island. The J/FLR-4A facility is located at the southeastern end, directly up the hill from the main entrance to the base. Construction of the new four-storey airmen’s barracks was completed in April 2008, at which time the old barracks near the top of the hill at the southeastern end were demolished.\footnote{‘Miyako Jima: Base Update’.} By April 2008, construction of the massive twelve-storey J/FLR-4A main operations building was well underway, with its length running northwest-southeast, in front of the old barracks. By January 2009, construction of this building was nearing completion, with flanking extensions facing north and south added, covering the previous site of the old barracks. Two large two-tiered antenna-bearing towers, southeast of the main building, connected by a roofed walkway, were also nearing completion.

The J/FLR-4A system at Miyako-jima is slightly different to the J/FLR-4 system at Seburi-yama. In the case of the larger tower, the diameter of the lower part of the two-tiered cover is about 17.5 metres and that of the top part is about 10 metres; in the case of the smaller tower, the diameters of the two tiers are about 14 and 12 metres. They are closer in size to the J/FLR system at Wakkanai, rather than to that at Seburi-yama. (A new antenna structure has also been built nearer the northern end of the complex, just south of the J/FPS-2 radome). A photograph of the station taken on 21 June 2009 shows that construction had essentially been completed (although there were still two tall cranes at the site). Two radomes, each about 5.5 metres in diameter, are on the roof of the main building.\footnote{‘Travel Note’, 21 June 2009, \texttt{<http://prunus.ti-da.net/e2512977.html>}.} The station was scheduled to become operational in 2009-10, and was reported operating in 2012.\footnote{「宮古島に電波測定施設 航空自衛隊分屯基地」琉球新聞 (The Radio Measurement System in Miyako-jima, JASDF Sub-base’, \textit{Ryukyu Shimbun}); 「尖閣漁船衝突事件以降、中国の戦闘機・偵察機の活動が急増」, \textit{Chosun Online}, 28 December 2010, \texttt{<http://d.hatena.ne.jp/navi-area26-10/20101229/p6>}.}

In April 2012 the SIGINT facilities at Seburi-yama and Miyako-jima monitored telemetry from the North Korean \textit{Kwangmyǒngsŏng}-3 longrange
The JASDF’s Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities for Air and Missile Defence

missile, although there were delays in passing on the information to ground and sea-based missile defence units.\textsuperscript{50}

In February 2008, the Ministry of Defense announced that it was tendering for components for a second phase of the J/FLR-4A system being installed at Miyako-jima. The components were to be delivered to the No. 4 Collection Unit’s premises at Kasuga by 26 February 2010, for subsequent delivery to Miyako-jima.\textsuperscript{51} In January 2009, the Ministry requested bids for components for Part 3 of the J/FLR-4A system at Miyako-jima, to be delivered to the new base by 26 February 2010.\textsuperscript{52} The total budget of the Miyako-jima J/FLR-4A system was approximately 2.6 billion yen.\textsuperscript{53}

Data collected at Miyako-jima will be transmitted to Kasuga for processing and analysis, and then forwarded to the Air Defense Command at Yokota.\textsuperscript{54}

A Chinese report also said that

\textit{the intelligence listening station in Miyako-jima and the one in Fukue-jima, working in coordination with each other, are able to help the JSDF to monitor the movement of the PLA in the whole East Sea and the Taiwan Strait … [and that] Japan will rely on the two large intelligence listening stations to focus on the movement of the PLA’s vessels and aircraft coming down to the East Sea from the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea.}\textsuperscript{55}

In late 2007, the Ministry of Defence requested proposals for prospective contracts for components for a new J/FLR-4A system, presumably for the facility at Fukue-jima; the deadline for submissions was 29 February 2008. The components included omni-directional antenna systems, operations panels, radio receivers, beam-scanning systems, “special purpose

\textsuperscript{50}「空自地上部隊が電波を探知　自前の情報生かせず’(‘ASDF Ground Elements Fail to Capitalise on their Own Signals Intelligence’), Sankei Shimbun, 19 April 2012, <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120419/plc12041901300002-n1.htm>.
\textsuperscript{54}‘Radio-wave Measurement Facility at Miyako-jima’, Okinawa Times, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{55} Yao Long, 日媒及专家极力渲染中国潜艇、战机威胁:日扬言可攻击中国舰船 (‘Japanese Media and Experts Try Hard to Exaggerate the Threats of Chinese Submarines and Aircraft’).
computers", and signal processing units. At the same time, the Ministry also contracted for some 165 components of a J/FLR-3 system, comprising a wide variety of antennas, radio receivers, computers and operations panels, suggesting that construction of another J/FLR-3 is also underway. Indeed, thirteen of the contracts were for components for common “J/FLR-4A -3” systems, suggesting that the new J/FLR-4A and new J/FLR-3 are located at the same facility.

In July 2008, the Ministry of Defence requested applications for contracts for another 53 J/FLR-3 components. These were all for equipping an operations room, such as magnetic tape units, disc drives, display screens, network analysers, “record controllers”, and keyboards. They suggest either that the operations room at the original J/FLR-3 station was being substantially refurbished or that J/FLR-3 elements were being installed at one of the new J/FLR-4A stations then still under construction (i.e., Miyakojima or Fukue-jima).

Through 2008, the Ministry of Defence also issued a series of “guidelines” for applicants for “service contracts” for Toshiba J/FLR-4A systems. One, issued on 21 January, involved “J/FLR-4A system development”. In December 2008, guidelines were announced for “service contracts” for an “Antenna C” and an “antenna element assembly” of a J/FLR-4A system. Further contracts for a Toshiba J/FLR-4A Ground Wave Measurement System were announced by the MoD on 29 December 2008.

AIRBORNE SIGINT/ELINT
The JASDF’s airborne SIGINT/ELINT units maintain ground processing and analysis facilities at their respective home bases. For example, the 501st Air Reconnaissance Squadron at Hyakuri Air Base, northeast of Tokyo, which operates the JASDF’s seventeen RF-4EJ reconnaissance aircraft, also maintains an ELINT ground processing station at Hyakuri. The RF-4EJs are equipped with ELINT pods produced by Mitsubishi Electronics Corporation (MELCO) and based on the Analyseur Superheterodyne Tactique (ASTAC) system produced by Thompson-CSF in France, which are capable of

---

57 Ibid.
detecting, analysing and locating modern threat radars in a dense electromagnetic environment. The pods contain a UHF data-link for air-to-ground transmission of the intercepted ELINT data to the ground processing station, which enables a very rapid build-up of the electronic order of battle of the observed area. Data are also stored in a recording system in the pod for post-flight analysis at Hyakuri.  

The JASDF JADGE System

The JADGE system was designed in the 1960s to detect, track and identify aircraft approaching Japan’s territorial airspace by means of an integrated network of 28 surveillance stations on mountains and hill-tops all around the Japanese coastline. In addition to providing early warning of air threats, they are a fundamental component of Japan’s air defence posture, linked directly to fighter aircraft bases and to Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-missile missile batteries.

The JADGE system consists of the Combat Operations Center (COC), located at the HQ of the JASDF’s Air Defense Command, four Sector Operations Centers (SOCs), the 28 surveillance stations, and associated communications and data links. Many of the JADGE stations have associated ELINT facilities which contribute to both the early warning mission and the preparations for electronic warfare in defence of Japan’s airspace. The system has been continually modernised and enhanced over the past three decades, especially with respect to its electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-counter-measures (ECCM) capabilities. Many of the sites are now connected to the command and control centres by optical fibre cables as well as satellite communications (Satcom) systems.

The JASDF’s Air Defense Command HQ and the JADGE COC are located at Yokota Air Station. However, in October 2005 the JASDF and the US Air Force (USAF) agreed, as part of the US-Japan agreement on the ‘U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’, to relocate them to Yokota Air Base, in Kanagawa prefecture, about 50 km west of the city, which also houses the HQs of US Forces Japan and the 5th US Air Force Japan, the highest US and USAF HQs in Japan, as part of plans to implement a joint missile defence system. In November 2005, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the Yokota base “will function as the control center of the missile defence system and other air defence facilities in Japan”, and that “it will also play a key role in boosting SIGINT or signals intelligence cooperation between Japan and the United States”. Construction began in 2007, and an “initial operating capability—a major milestone toward

---

becoming a full operational headquarters”, is expected by “spring 2011”, and the newly located ADC commenced operations in March 2012.64

Figure 1. JADGE air defence system map

---

The four SOCs are located at Misawa, the HQ of the ADC’s Northern Defense Sector and also the Northern Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Wing, as well as the 3rd Air Wing and the 6th Air Defense Missile Group; Iruma Air Base, about 20 km northwest of Fuchu Air Station, the HQ of the Central Defense Sector and the Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, the HQ of the JASDF’s Electronics Development and Test Group, the home base of the JASDF’s Electronic Warfare Training Unit, which operates six YS-11E and one EC-1 signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft, and the HQ of the 1st Air Defense Missile Group; Kasuga, just south of Fukuoka airport in northern Kyushu, the HQ of the Western Defense Sector, the Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and the 2nd Air Defense Missile Group; and Naha in Okinawa, the HQ of the Southwest Defense Sector, the Southern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and the 5th Air Defense Missile Group. The Aircraft Control and Warning Wings use the JADGE data “in identifying targets, allocating targets to combat aircraft or to surface-to-air guided missile (SAM) units and swiftly performing intercept control”.

The ELINT facilities at the JADGE complexes complement the radar systems in the early warning mission. Aircraft approaching Japan’s territorial airspace, if using radars, IFF (Interrogation/Identification Friend or Foe) transponders, or emitting some other electromagnetic signal, can be detected at far greater ranges by passive radar-listening facilities than by active radar searches—perhaps more than 800 km, depending on the altitude of the aircraft and the strength of its radar signal or other electronic emissions. In peacetime, the collected ELINT contributes to the maintenance of continuously-updated tables of electronic order of battle (EOB) concerning ground-based and airborne emitters of interest to the JASDF, as well as to the development of electronic support measure (ESM) systems and techniques for countering notional threat emitters. In conflict situations, these ELINT facilities would provide the electronic basis of the air defence of Japan—directing fighter aircraft to intercept attacking aircraft and guiding SAMs to destroy attacking aircraft and air-to-surface missiles, using the imitative transmitters to jam and deceive adversary radars, and winning the ECM/ECCM competition.

The locations and other particular details of the 28 JADGE air surveillance stations are given in Table 1. Nine are in the ADC’s Northern Sector, including six in Hokkaido and three in northern Honshu; eight are in the Central Sector, which covers the central part of Honshu; seven are in the Western Sector, which covers western Honshu and Kyushu, including Tsushima Island; and four are in the Southwestern Sector, stretching down

---

66 Table 1 is available on the Security Challenges website, <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/index.html>, under vol. 8, no. 3.
the Ryukyu island chain from Okino Erabu-jima in Kyushu's Kagoshima prefecture to Miyako-jima, about 300 km southwest of Okinawa Island.

Nearly all of the stations were originally established by the US Air Force in the late 1940s and the 1950s; it constructed about fifty sites.\(^67\) Some of them had been sites of Japanese radars during the Second World War, such as Nemuro, Kyoga-misaki, Kume-jima and Miyako-jima.\(^68\) They were mostly transferred to the JASDF in 1959-60. The stations in Okinawa were transferred to the JASDF in 1972-73; the last one was Yozadake, in Itoman city, just south of Naha, at the southern-most point of Okinawa Island.\(^69\) They were equipped with a variety of radar systems, including AN/CPS-1, AN/CPS-5 and AN/FPS-3 long-range search/early warning sets, and AN/CPS-4, AN/TPS-10D and AN/FPS-6 height-finding sets. They often had associated direction-finding (DF) facilities, as at Wakkanai, Mishima Island, Seburi-yama and Okino Erabu-jima;\(^70\) they were sometimes co-located with SIGINT units. The JASDF stations still use the US unit designations, such as the 18\(^{th}\) Air Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron at Wakkanai, the 45\(^{th}\) AC&W Squadron at Tobetsu, the 46\(^{th}\) at Sado-jima, and the 19\(^{th}\) at Unijima on Tsushima Island in the Korea Strait/Tsushima Kaikyo. For a decade or two they used the US radars, most of them not being replaced with Japanese systems until the 1980s. More recently, in August 2003, a US veteran who was given a tour of Kume-jima found that while the radars and radomes had been replaced, the operations and maintenance areas had hardly changed. He later wrote that “the Ops area itself is the same! I mean exactly. It’s like a time warp”. The "old plotting boards" were still operational, including “the main board with the island images, and the ADIZ drawn in; the weather board and the ‘comm’ board”, as well as “one of the

---


very old black radar scopes”. Even “the crummy old broken green tile on the [console] deck [was] still there”.71

**J/FPS-1**

The first-generation BADGE system involved the J/FPS-1 radar system, produced in Japan by NEC (Nippon Electric Company) and other sub-contractors under licence from Hughes Aircraft Company in California, which entered service in 1971. The system was one of the first major post-war Japanese defence programs to be awarded to local industry, albeit in a joint venture with a US company (but with NEC holding 51 percent of the equity). It was selected by the JDA in the Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-66) to be the highlight, worth a total of nearly 30 billion yen, of the new Japanese industry policy of promoting the development of indigenous defence technology.72

The J/FPS-1 system was installed at seven sites, including Wajima (23rd AC&W Squadron), on the Noto Peninsula, protruding into the Sea of Japan; Otakine-yama (27th AC&W Squadron) and Mineoka-yama (44th AC&W Squadron), across the eastern approaches to Tokyo; Kasatori-yama (1st AC&W Squadron) and Takao-yama (7th AC&W Squadron) in the western part of Honshu; and Seburi-yama (43rd AC&W Group) in Kyushu. They were all replaced by J/FPS-3 systems in the 1990s.

**J/FPS-2**

The second-generation BADGE system was the J/FPS-2, which was installed at eleven sites from 1979 to 1990. It was developed by NEC, but with extensive collaboration with Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba and Fujitsu.73 It is a 3-dimensional radar which employs a planar phased array with phase/frequency scanning in elevation and mechanical rotation in azimuth. It reportedly has a maximum range of about 370 km (200 nautical miles).74 It

---


72 Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 165-6. Note a Chinese military source presented a different account: “In order to raise the automated capabilities of air defense systems and their reaction speeds, when setting up BADGE systems, Japan decided to switch to a three coordinate radar. Moreover, beginning in 1962 and onward, they carried out their own test manufacturing of phase controlled arrays and three coordinate technology. In 1964, they test installed antennas. Following that, they test manufactured a successful receiving device, radiating device, and display device, etc. The Sanyo Electronics Company, in 1971, set up the solid state J/FPS-l three coordinate 3D radar. By 1977 they had equipped altogether 7 J/FPS-l radar stations. These radar stations opted for the use of computers to carry out processing. They had automatic altitude measuring capabilities, a search distance of 600 km, and were a great improvement over the previous”. Chen Xiaolin, ‘Japanese Military Radar Equipment’, Foreign Technology Division, CONMILIT, FTD-ID(RS)T-0067-91, 5 June 1991 [US military translation of original Chinese source].


uses advanced digital processing techniques for clutter rejection and ECM (electronic counter-measures)/ECCM (electronic counter-counter measures), enabling it to automatically detect and track aircraft in severe jamming environments.\textsuperscript{75} It is enclosed in a large (12-metre diameter) radome.

The first J/FPS-2 system was installed at Kamabuse-yama, the 42nd AC&W Squadron’s base above the city of Ominato, on the Shimokita Peninsula in the northeast of Honshu. The second was installed at Mount Kinpoku on Sado-jima, just off the coast of Niigata City in the Sea of Japan, noted for its extremely harsh winters. The others were installed at Wakkanai, Nemuro (26th AC&W Squadron), Yamada (37th AC&W Squadron), Omaezaki (22nd AC&W Squadron), Mishima Island (17th AC&W Squadron), Uni-jima, Shimokoshiki (9th AC&W Squadron), Yozadake in Okinawa (56th AC&W Squadron), and on Miyako-jima (53rd Squadron). Seven of the original eleven J/FPS-2 stations are still in service, while four of them have been upgraded with the J/FPS-5 system.

**J/FPS-3**

The third-generation J/FPS-3 system was developed by Mitsubishi Electronics Corporation (MELCO), with extensive participation by NEC. It comprises separate long-range (search) and short-range (height-finding) rotating phased-array radars which rotate at 6 rpm and 15 rpm respectively, housed in a pair of 17-metre diameter radomes, built by Sumitomo Denki. The long-range search radar operates in the L-band (1-2 GHz); it has a detection range of about 650 km for targets at an altitude of 20,000 metres and 390-460 km for targets at 10,000 metres. The short-range system operates at 3 GHz in the S-band, with a range of about 150 km. The system also includes two false (or imitative) signal emitters, a signal processing unit, and an underground control and operations room. Resistance to ECM is achieved by pulse compression, two wide-band frequencies, and low antenna side-lobes, while anti-anti-radiation missiles provide protection against anti-radar missiles.\textsuperscript{76} The first three J/FPS-3 systems were installed at Kyoga-misaki (Kyoto prefecture), Kamo (Oga Peninsula, Akita prefecture) and Otakine-yama (Fukushima prefecture) in 1989-91. Six J/FPS-3 stations were operational by the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{77} Seventeen J/FPS-3 stations were completed by the end of the 1990s, including the replacements of the seven J/FPS-1s. Kasatori-yama was converted from a J/FPS-1 to a J/FPS-3 system in the 1996-97 budget year.\textsuperscript{78} Seburi-yama was converted in 1998.


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. Note also Chen Xiaolin, *Japanese Military Radar Equipment*: “These radars also include a decoy radiating station approximately 400 meters away from the basic station”.


All of the JADGE stations have two VHF aeronautical-band antenna platforms mounted on large steel towers. One of these antenna sets is used to monitor aeronautical transmissions, including those of hostile or suspicious aircraft, as well as to receive IFF signals from JASDF and other friendly aircraft; the other is for transmitting to JASDF and other aircraft, including relaying of intercept vectors to air defence fighter aircraft.

The JADGE system is comprehensively networked and thoroughly integrated. Each station automatically shares its data, including its radar images, with its neighbouring stations, as well as providing it up the command chain to its Sector Operations Center (SOC) and associated fighter and missile command centres. Each station has a HF radio system, commonly involving a doublet aerial strung between two tall masts. Each station also has at least two pair of large parabolic dishes for VHF tropospheric-scatter radio communications, with an effective range of more than 150 km. The station at Kamo has three pair, directed at Okushiri, Sado-jima and Kamabuse-yama. The station at Kamabuse-yama also has three pair, directed north to Erimo, south to Misawa and west to Kamo. One pair at Yamada is directed at Otakine-yama. A pair of 6-metre diameter tropospheric dishes at Wajima is directed at Kyoga-misaki. At Kyoga-misaki, the tropospheric dishes are located at the 35\textsuperscript{th} AC&W Squadron’s HQ on the shore-line down the mountain-side from the JADGE station; one pair is directed north to Wajima and one pair south to Takao-yama. A pair at Yozadake are directed at Miyako-jima. The station at Fukue-jima has two pair of tropospheric dishes built by Nippon Denki; one pair is directed at Unijima and the other at Seburi-yama. The dishes at Kasatori-yama are J/FRQ-8 systems. The tropospheric antennas at Sado-jima are mounted on large square supports to withstand the winter weather. Most stations also have microwave dishes either for communicating directly with nearby units or connecting with the national telecommunications network.

In 1987, the JDA announced plans to establish an Integrated Defense Digital Network (IDDN) to provide reliable, secure and survivable communications links between its Central Command Post and major elements of its command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) facilities, including the JADGE stations. The IDDN involves duplicated microwave (UHF) circuits and satellite communications (Satcom) services. An important feature of the IDDN was its potential inter-operability with US digital networks.

---

In the early 1990s, the United States provided the JASDF with the Link 11 tactical data link for its JADGE system. The Link 11 uses HF radio (2 to 30 MHz, with a range of up to 300 nm) and UHF FM radio (with a range of up to 25 nm), and is used by the JASDF for exchanging data between the JADGE stations, with the air defence command centres, and with JASDF aircraft (particularly the UHF radio).

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the BADGE stations were all equipped with the US Link 16 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)/Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), which provides a secure, jam-resistant, high-speed digital data link in the L-band of the UHF spectrum for exchanging tactical pictures between the stations and fighter aircraft. Most of the JADGE stations now have UHF or SHF satellite communications (Satcom) systems. For example, there are small radomes, about 3-metres in diameter, housing Satcom antennas at Wakkanai and Kamabuse-yama. The stations on Sado-jima and the island of Mishima have larger radomes with Satcom antennas.

**THE J/FPS-4 SYSTEM**

In 1998, the JDA announced that ten new J/FPS-3 stations were operational and noted that, as the replacement of the seven J/FPS-1 sites was proceeding, it would be relatively inexpensive to incorporate improvements which amounted to a new J/FPS-4 system. Plans for the development of a fourth-generation BADGE system were announced by the JDA in its ‘Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Buildup’ statement. In August 2002, the JDA announced its decision to implement a BADGE modernisation program. It stated that:

> More than ten years have passed since the initial operation of the BADGE [-3] System in 1989, and the system now requires improvements to its capabilities to keep up with the higher performance of weapons. In order to ensure the continued viability of air warning and control capability in the future, it was decided to modernize this capability by renewing its configuration and components with advanced technologies.

> More specifically, a data processing and communication capacity as well as a function to track high-velocity targets will be improved, and the expandability of the system will be enhanced for flexible modifications in the future.

---

83 ‘Radar Site (J/FPS-2) [1980/Japan]’ and ‘Radar Site (J/FPS-3) [2000/Japan]’, Harpoon Headquarters
Figure 2. J/FLR-4 SIGINT system at Seburi-yama, Kyushu, October 2010

Figure 3. J/FLR-4 SIGINT system at Seburi-yama, Kyushu, October 2010
Figure 4. J/FLR-4A SIGINT system at Miyako-jima, January 2009

Figure 5. Prototype J/FPS-5 radar system at Chiba
Funds for installation of the first J/FPS-4 system were included in the 2002 budget.\(^{86}\)

Conversion from the J/FPS-3 to the J/FPS-4 system involves several enhancements. The most obvious feature is the replacement of the J/FPS-3 search radar and associated radome with the new J/FPS-4 search radar. The prime contract for the design and manufacturing of the new radars was awarded to Toshiba Electro-Wave Products in Tokyo, but major elements were contracted to other companies, including MELCO and Tokimec Inc.

Tokimec Inc. (subsequently using the restored company name of Tokyo Keiki) was contracted to develop a critical component of the search radar, designated the J/FPS-20, under a technical assistance agreement with Raytheon Aircraft Company in the United States.\(^{87}\) According to Tokimec/ Tokyo Keiki’s Annual Reports, it was initially mainly engaged in research and development work, which was largely completed in fiscal year 2005.\(^{88}\) Subsequently it received contracts for repair and maintenance services. Its Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2007 noted that it had received an increase in orders for “repairs and spare parts for FPS-4 ground search radar systems”.\(^{89}\) Components were still being supplied in 2010.\(^{90}\)

The J/FPS-4 radomes, designated NCW-29/GPS, are built by Sumitomo Electronic Co Ltd. In June 2006, Sumitomo Electronic in Osaka was awarded a contract for 15,960,000 yen for repair of a NCW-29/GPS “hard radome”.\(^{91}\) In July 2006, the JASDF awarded a contract to Sumitomo for 13.23 million yen for repair of another NCW-29/GPS.\(^{92}\) Another contract was tendered in October 2007 for the installation of “one [NCW-29/GPS] set”, to be completed by the end of August 2009.\(^{93}\)

The updating of the J/FPS-3s also involves the addition of a J/FYX-2 program, produced by MELCO, which receives target data transmitted directly from the J/FPS-5s to the J/FPS-3s. In March 2006, MELCO was awarded a 343.35 million yen contract for installation of a J/FYX-2 system at

---


\(^{87}\) ‘Table of Contracts, September 2006’, JASDF 3\(^{rd}\) Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.


\(^{91}\) ‘Table of Contracts, June 2006’, JASDF 3\(^{rd}\) Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.


an unidentified J/FPS-3 station. The J/FPS-4 system also has more advanced ECM and ECCM capabilities compared to the J/FPS-3.

Seven J/FPS-3 sites have been completely upgraded to J/FPS-4s. The first three J/FPS-4 stations, which became operational in 2008, were at Seburiyama, in Saga prefecture, Kyushu; Kasatori-yama in Mie prefecture; and Kamo, on the Oga Peninsula in Akita prefecture. The next four, completed in 2008-09, were Wajima in Ishikawa prefecture; Otakine-yama in Fukushima prefecture; Kyoga-misaki in Kyoto prefecture; and Tobetsu in Hokkaido, where the obsolete radar/radome ceased operations in April 2007. It has been observed that new hemi-spherical radomes have been added at Kamo, Wajima and Tobetsu.

Another six J/FPS-3 sites have also been or are being upgraded with major elements of the J/FPS-4 system, including the installation of a new radar/radome. These are Abashiri, Okushiri, Mineoka-yama, Takao-yama, Fukue-jima and Kume-jima. The modernisation of this batch will mean that all of the original seven J/FPS-1 sites will have been converted to J/FPS-4s. In the case of Abashiri, Google Earth imagery taken in 2003 suggested that new construction was underway at that time. One of the radomes at Okushiri was upgraded in 2004-07. A veteran from Site 29 who visited the base in May 2003 was told that one of the radomes "was scheduled for replacement within the next year or so". In September 2004, the JDA announced that construction of the new radome would begin before the end of the fiscal year (31 March 2005). The new radome was officially opened on 3 March 2007. On 12 March, the Public Affairs Office at the HQ of the Northern Air Defense Force at Misawa advised that the radome pictured on the Home-page of its web-site had been removed. In the case of Mineoka-yama, Google Earth imagery and other photographs taken since 2003 show only a single radome. The second, missing radome may have contained the long-range search radar, made redundant by the success of

---

96 'Air Self Defense Force Kasatori-yama Base Opening, 50th Anniversary Commemoration Event'.
the prototype J/FPS-5 at nearby Iioka. In the case of Kume-jima, 2.1 billion yen was included in the fiscal year 2006 defence budget for the installation of a J/FPS-4 system. The total cost of the Kume-jima J/FPS-4 radar over the five years of its planning and construction to 2008 was approximately 23 billion yen.

In October 2005, Toshiba was awarded a contract for 13.461 million yen to repair components on seventeen J/FPS-4 systems by 31 January 2006, suggesting that all of the J/FPS-3 stations had been or were being converted to J/FPS-4 facilities. In September 2005, Toshiba also received a contract for 36.56 million yen for “system maintenance” of a J/FPS-4 radar. In May 2006, it received a contract for 2.625 million yen for “revamping [of J/FPS-4 systems] on site”, to be completed by 30 June 2006. On 6 June, it received a contract for 39,700,500 yen for “regular repairs” at a J/FPS-4 site. In August 2006, it received contracts for 5,932,500 yen for regular repairs of a J/FPS-4 radar, 5,066,250 yen for “technical services” in relation to the J/FPS-4 system, and 3,055,500 yen for “system maintenance” of a J/FPS-4 radar. Further contracts worth 112 million yen were awarded to Toshiba for repairs, renovation and routine servicing of J/FPS-4 systems in the period from September 2006 to January 2007.

In September 2005, Tokimec was awarded two contracts amounting to 155.26 million yen to repair 108 J/FPS-20 components. In June 2006, it was awarded a contract for 25,819,500 yen for “regular repair” of J/FPS-20

---

107 ‘Table of Contracts, August 2006’, JASDF 3rd Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.
systems. In August 2006, it received another two contracts, for 73,710,000 and 17,304,000 yen, for components and repairs of J/FPS-20 radars. In September 2006, it received two contracts amounting to some 90 million yen for the repair of 103 J/FPS-20 components. In October 2006, it was awarded a contract for 28,224 million yen for another J/FPS-20 set, to be delivered by 22 December. In May 2007, Tokimec was awarded a contract for 28,150,500 yen for ‘regular repair’ of J/FPS-20 systems.

**THE J/FPS-5 SYSTEM**

The new J/FPS-5 system was developed by the JDA’s Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) to provide an indigenous capability for tracking ballistic missiles as well as high-speed aircraft. The development of a prototype J/FPS-XX system at the TDRI’s No. 2 Research Centre at Iioka, in Chiba prefecture, began in 2000, and construction was completed in 2003. It consists of a mammoth triangular structure, 30 metres high, with the sides 20 metres wide, which rotates on a circular rail. There is an 18-metre diameter radar face on each side.

Testing of the Chiba J/FPS-XX was carried out by a 28-member JASDF unit in 2004-05. It was tested against fighter aircraft, simulated ballistic missile trajectories, and dummy/deception signals generated at the ‘E-Aerial Training Range’ at Kashimanada Bay in Ibaraki Prefecture, east of Tokyo and northeast of Iioka.

According to the JDA, the Chiba J/FPS-XX radar monitored the test of a Russian SLBM launched from a submarine in the Sea of Okhotsk in November 2005. It then “tracked the missile’s flight for thousands of miles across northern Russia to the Barents Sea in the Arctic Ocean”.

The JDA announced on 31 August 2005 that it was proceeding with the construction of four J/FPS-5 stations, all at current J/FPS-2 sites. It said that 18.8 billion yen was to be included in the fiscal 2006 defence budget for the program. The first has been constructed at Shimokoshiki in Kagoshima prefecture, Kyushu, where surveying and construction started in 2006.

---

112 ‘Table of Contracts, August 2006’, JASDF 3rd Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.
114 ‘Table of Contracts, October 2006’, JASDF 3rd Supply Depot, Sayama, Saitama Prefecture.
117 Ibid.
118 Sieff, ‘New Japan BMD Radar Tracks Russian Missile Test’.
The fiscal year 2006 budget included 2.5 billion yen for the Shimokoshiki station.\textsuperscript{120} In October 2008, the Defence Ministry informed local citizens that construction of the J/FPS-5 would be completed in March 2009, when the station would achieve its initial operating capability (IOC), and would be fully operational in September 2009. Construction of the radar was completed in November 2008.\textsuperscript{121} The Ministry said that the radar would begin test transmissions in December 2008.\textsuperscript{122} The cost of the Shimokoshiki J/FPS-5 facility was 32 billion yen.\textsuperscript{123}

The other three J/FPS-5 systems, to be located at Sado-jima in Niigata prefecture, Kamabuse-yama in Aomori prefecture, and Yozadake, on Okinawa Island, were to be operational by the end of fiscal year 2011.\textsuperscript{124} In the case of Sado-jima, a request for tenders for construction of the radar foundation was issued on 16 May 2007. It specified that the foundation should be made of ferro-concrete, be 7 metres high, about 22 metres in diameter, and 1.5 metres thick, and be completed by the end of May 2008.\textsuperscript{125} A photograph taken in November 2008 shows the radar structure under construction;\textsuperscript{126} photographs in June and July 2009 show that construction had almost been completed, although the protective covers had

\textsuperscript{120} Asagumo News, 9 March 2006, \url{http://www.asagumo-news.com/news/200603/060309/06030904.html}.


\textsuperscript{123} Nakayama Naomi, ‘Gamera 09’, What about Tomorrow?!? 17 September 2009, \url{http://taiyoudesu333.blog95.fc2.com/blog-date-20090917.html}.
not yet been installed over the two radar faces.\textsuperscript{127} The Sado-jima J/FPS-5 radar station began operations in July 2010.\textsuperscript{128}

Construction of the J/FPS-5 system at Kamabuse-yama began in early 2008; it is to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2010. Photographs taken in October 2008 show that the rotatable foundation had been completed.\textsuperscript{129} By September 2009, construction of the radar structure was well underway.\textsuperscript{130} Photographs taken in July 2010 show that construction had almost been completed, apart from the protective covers over the radar faces. Photos taken on 15 October show that the covers had been installed, with workmen sealing them over the radar faces. Construction was completed in March 2011, and the Kamabuse-yama J/FPS-5 system began operation in July 2011.\textsuperscript{131}

Construction of the fourth station, at Yozadake, began in 2009, and the station opened in February 2012.\textsuperscript{132}

The Shimokoshiki and Yozadake stations are best-placed for monitoring Chinese missile trajectories, while the Kamabuse-yama and Sado-jima stations are best for monitoring missiles fired from North Korea.

The J/FPS-5 systems are able to directly exchange tracking data with the J/FPS-4 stations, and with the \textit{Aegis} radar system aboard the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) \textit{Kongo}-class destroyers.

\section*{Cooperation with the United States}

The US-Japan relationship with respect to airspace surveillance and intelligence has been radically transformed over the last few years. The formation of an ‘Air Force alliance’ has been driven by Japan’s ballistic

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}


\bibitem{Beyond} Beyond, ‘佐渡 分屯基地:基地の沿革’ 航空自衛隊 佐渡分屯基地 (Base History, JASDF Sado Sub-base), <http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/sado/02.html>.


\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid.

\end{thebibliography}
missile defence program, prompted in turn by Chinese and North Korean ballistic missile developments. In particular, it has been motivated by the JASDF’s appreciation that the necessary missile launch detection and initial tracking data could only be provided by the US Defense Support Program (DSP) infra-red missile launch detection satellite system, and that major technical and operational advantages benefits would accrue from access to US radar warning and tracking networks.

The JASDF has been much less willing to share airspace surveillance data with the US Air Force than the JMSDF has been with the US Navy with respect to their respective Aegis air defence systems. The United States had often asked Japan to share intelligence from the BADGE network. However, although “intelligence gathered by BADGE has been provided to US forces in the past on a temporary basis when conducting joint drills”, Japan had been reluctant to do so because it wanted to secure the independence of its air defence network. As a study of Japan’s command and control system for theatre missile defence noted in 2000, the Air SDF has emphasized the independent and autonomous nature of its BADGE system due to its primary role and mission to defend the Japanese archipelago by itself if necessary.

When the JDA decided on the BADGE system design in 1964, it “opted for one with no interoperability with U.S. forces”.

The JASDF has been less willing to data-link with the USAF through the Link 11 than the JMSDF has been with the US Navy. When the United States provided the JASDF with Link 11 in the early 1990s, it also offered training and the possibility of integrating US and Japanese air defence intelligence systems. In early 1993, for example, the USS Bunker Hill, a Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided missile cruiser, “conducted several Linkexs [Link 11 exercises] with JASDF BADGE sites … in a move toward further integrating the Anti-Air Defense of the Japanese Islands”. A report on the exercises noted that “the mutual cooperation and exchange of ideas and methods was beneficial to both sides”. However, although the JADGE system was data-linked with the JMSDF’s E-2C Hawkeye aircraft through Link 11, the

---

JASDF “employs its own encryption measures which make the tactical data inaccessible to the US side”.  

Air control and warning operations in the JASDF’s Southwestern Defence Sector, encompassing Okinawa and the Ryukyu Island chain, have been an important exception to the general lack of cooperation. Because flights associated with the US Air Force base at Kadena comprises a large proportion of the air traffic in the region, the USAF’s 623rd Air Control Flight has worked at the BADGE centre at the SOC at Naha Air Base in Okinawa since 1983. In August 2007, the USAF unit had thirty members.

We use four ground-based radars around Okinawa [Okino Erabu-jima, Kume-jima, Yozadake and Miyako-jima] which funnel information into the Southwest Direction Center at Naha Air Base.

The unit works ‘side by side’ with the JASDF’s Southern AC&W Wing. In September 1983, elements of the unit deployed to northern Hokkaido to assist in controlling airspace for aircraft searching for bodies from KAL-007. It currently provides support to the 44th and 67th fighter squadrons based at Kadena. In time of war, members of the unit are able to deploy to one or more of the other three SOCs “depending on the location of U.S. aircraft needing support”.

However, by 2008 the USAF 5th Air Force commander noted that by 2008 the JADGE system “represents a key improvement” in previously limited command, control, and information sharing arrangements with the JASDF. The Bilateral Air Operations Coordination System, to be headquartered at Yokota, was to be “the heart of our bilateral air and missile defense operations” and would provide “close and detailed bilateral coordination necessary when operating under unilateral and parallel lines of command and control”.

The Japanese Government began to seriously consider the development of a BMD system following the North Korean test of its Nodong-1 IRBM in May 1993. However, despite US entreaties, it was for several more years unwilling to engage in cooperative programs with the United States. Its interest in gaining access to US technology quickened following North Korea’s Taepodong-1 launch in August 1998, resulting in an agreement to conduct joint research on missile defence technology signed on 17 August 1999.

In December 2003, it announced its decision to proceed with the development of a BMD system following the North Korean test of its Nodong-1 IRBM in May 1993. However, despite US entreaties, it was for several more years unwilling to engage in cooperative programs with the United States. Its interest in gaining access to US technology quickened following North Korea’s Taepodong-1 launch in August 1998, resulting in an agreement to conduct joint research on missile defence technology signed on 17 August 1999.

---

development of a ballistic missile defence system. During discussions on information-sharing for missile defence in 2004, the United States reportedly stated that it “wants either full access to [the JASDF’s] radar data or to be allowed to build its own radar station in Japan”.\footnote{U.S., Japan Eye Shared Missile Defense, \textit{Kyodo News Service}, 5 April 2004.} A further agreement between the United States and Japan to intensify cooperation with respect to their missile defence programs was signed in Tokyo on 17 December 2004.\footnote{Japan, US Sign Missile Defense Agreement, \textit{China Daily}, 17 December 2004, \url{<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/17/content_401196.htm>}.}

The most important decisions were made by the Japanese Government around mid-2005, and codified in the report of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee on the ‘U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’ in October 2005. The key decisions were to allow the United States to deploy an X-band ‘theatre ballistic missile defence’ radar at Camp Shariki in Japan, and to move the JASDF’s Air Defence Command HQ and BADGE COC from Fuchu to Yokota.\footnote{Text of U.S.-Japan Alliance Report, \textit{Kyodo News Agency}, 1 November 2005, in ‘Forward-Based X-Band Radar-Transportable’, \textit{MissileThreat.com}, \url{<http://missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.19/system_detail.asp>}.} Subsequent discussions, in 2006-07, concerned mechanisms by which all the JASDF’s radar data would be shared with the United States, and whereby Japan would gain access to US DSP satellite launch detection and early-warning information.

In June 2005, with the J/FPS-XX system at Chiba in “the final stages of development”, at a meeting of the Japan-US Joint Command and Control Summit at USFJ HQ at Yokota, the United States requested access to J/FPS-5 data. Japanese officials said that Tokyo was expected to grant the request, and noted that the JMSDF and the US Navy were already sharing information between their Aegis-equipped cruisers.\footnote{US Wants Japan to Share Missile Defense Radar Data, \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, 20 July 2005, \url{<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-wants-japan-to-share-radar-data/>}.}

On 15 January 2006, the chief of the JDA announced that agreement had been reached to integrate information networks with respect to missile defence by the end of fiscal year 2006.\footnote{Martin Sieff, ‘US Japan to Integrate BMD IT Networks’, \textit{Space War}, 18 January 2006, \url{<http://www.spacewar.com/reports/BMD_Watch_US_Japan_To_Integrate_BMD_IT.html>}.} A Japanese press report stated that:

Both Japan’s radar network and command systems [will] be connected to the USA’s by March 2007. The information sharing is expected to enhance the two nations’ capacity to intercept enemy [ballistic missile] attacks. For
example, Japan’s advanced early warning radar system, FPS-XX, [and] the FPS-3 ‘fence protection’ system will be linked to U.S. early-warning satellites, the [X-band] radar that the US is expected to install [at Shariki] and U.S. Aegis destroyers.146

On 1 May 2007, Japanese and US Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministers at a meeting in Washington agreed to expand “information-sharing in support of their missile defence” efforts. This officially codified the fact that “full-fledged provision of information” had been instituted by the JASDF with the installation of a ‘permanent’ link between the BADGE COC at Fuchu and the HQ of the US 5th Air Force at Yokota in late April.147

X-BAND RADAR—AN/TPY-2 (FBX-T)

Collaborative work on the development of an X-band radar began in 1998 following the Taepodong-1 launch, and US officials formally proposed the deployment of an X-band radar in Japan in mid-2004. The JDA agreed in October 2005, in the report on the ‘U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’, to provide “the optimum site” for the new radar system.148 The ‘primary candidate’ was reportedly Camp Shariki, situated on a wooded bluff on the edge of the Sea of Japan, near Tsugaru city, Aomori prefecture, in the northwest corner of Honshu.149 Shariki is well-located for the detection and tracking of North Korean ICBMs on trajectories to the United States as well as IRBMs fired at Japan, and since 1980 it has hosted the JASDF’s 21st Air Defence Missile Squadron with four Japanese-built Patriot missiles.150

The AN/TPY-2 system (formerly the FBX-T: Forward-Based X-band Radar-Transportable), is a high-power phased-array radar manufactured by Raytheon in Massachusetts, reportedly costing $2 billion,151 which provides surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) for ballistic missile defence. It is designed to be integrated with the hardware systems and software programs built for missile interceptors intended for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).152 Operating at a frequency of 10

---

GHz in the X-band, the AN/TPY-2 provides longer detection range than the JASDF’s J/FPS-4 and J/FPS-5 radars, as well as a greater ability to differentiate missile shapes and distinguish between decoys and actual warheads.\(^{153}\)

The FBX-T arrived at the US Air Force Base at Misawa in May-June 2006, where it was assembled and given preliminary ‘system checks’.\(^{154}\) It was then moved to Shariki, where operational tests began in late June.\(^{155}\) The system consists of four trailers, containing the AN/TPY-2 radar antenna, computers for storing and processing data, an air-conditioning system, and an office unit for support personnel.\(^{156}\)

The FBX-T was officially activated at a ceremony at Camp Shariki on 26 September 2006.\(^{157}\) It is maintained by two US military personnel and “100 or so” contracted technical and support personnel—some from Raytheon, who operate the AN/TPY-2 radar, and the rest from Chenega Blackwater Solutions, who provide security at the base.\(^{158}\) The facility is part of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command of the US Army Pacific Command.\(^{159}\)

In August 2006, after ballistic missile test launches by North Korea the previous month, including an unsuccessful Taepodong-2 ICBM launch attempt, the Pentagon announced that a second site in the Western Pacific was under consideration for another FBX-T radar system. The four “candidate sites” are in South Korea, Guam, Kyushu, and Okinawa. It was


\(^{154}\) Svan, ‘Army Showing Off New X-Band Radar in Japan’.


\(^{156}\) Svan, ‘Army Shows Off New X-Band Radar in Japan’.


\(^{159}\) On 08 June 2005 Raytheon Company was awarded a contract by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDs) radars. The contract has a potential value of $260 million over the five-year period of performance. Under the innovative contract, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) will be responsible for operating and maintaining Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) radars as part of the Missile Defense Agency’s BMDs. The CLS contract covers all operations and sustainment of the forward based radars, including site surveys and site preparation; operational readiness certification; site operation and maintenance; mission preparation and support; radar performance reporting and analysis; depot support; and administrative and physical security. Under this contract, Raytheon will provide the warfighter with ‘no doubt’ reliability, ensuring that these radars work.” ‘Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar: AN/TPY-2 / TPS-X / Forward Deployable Radar (FDR)’, GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/spac/systems/fbx-t.htm>.
suggested that “the chances are higher for Kyushu and South Korea because they are closer to North Korea than Okinawa and Guam”.  

It was reported in August 2012 that the United States had decided to deploy the second X-band radar at “an undisclosed southern Japanese island”. In addition, the United States was evaluating sites for a third X-band radar in Southeast Asia to create an arc for anti-ballistic missile purposes against North Korea and China.  

**ACCESS TO DSP/SPACE-BASED INFRA-RED SYSTEM (SBIRS)**

The integration of the JADGE network into the US BMD system has finally gained Japan direct access to the US DSP/Space-based Infra-red System (SBIRS) missile launch detection system. The *Nodong-1* launch on 29 May 1993 and the *Taepodong-1* launch on 31 August 1998 were both detected by the DSP-E satellites and the information processed at the Nurrungar station in Australia. Warnings were quickly communicated to Buckley in Colorado and thence relayed to Japan. In the case of the *Nodong-1* launch, the JDA had been informed by the United States beforehand that the launch was imminent, and was told it had been detected by the early-warning satellites as soon as the HQ of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) at Yokota Air Base had been notified. But by this time the missile had already been detected and was being tracked by the JASDF’s radar station at Wajima, on the Noto Peninsula. In January 1995, the United States stated that it was willing to provide Japan directly with DSP data, but only if Japan agreed to cooperate in a joint BMD development program.  

In May 1996, the United States informed Japan that it had decided to provide DSP data to Japan, reportedly “in yet another attempt to encourage Japan to move more rapidly toward deployment of anti-missile defenses”. By the time of the *Taepodong-1* launch in August 1998, mechanisms had been

---

162 Note however that there were claims by the political head of the JDA at the time, Norota Hosei, that the Agency’s intelligence gathering over the launch was “humiliatingly poor”. Norota used his claim that the JDA took over 10 hours “to announce that the rocket might have passed over mainland Japan” to support his argument that “Japan should launch its own intelligence needs satellites so that the country won’t have to depend on the United States for defense information”. ‘Japan Needs Spy Satellites: Norota’, *Japan Times*, 26 November 1998.  
established for the direct transmission of launch detection information from Colorado to the JDA HQ. In mid-2003, the US Air Force Space Command activated a Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) Centralized Distribution Facility in Colorado, for which a terminal had been set up at Yokota Air Base for the direct receipt of relayed DSP/SBIRS data.¹⁶⁶

On 5 July 2006, the DSP-E satellites monitored North Korea’s test-launch of seven ballistic missiles, including a Taepodong-2 and at least four Nodong missiles. The Taepodong-2 flew for only 40 seconds before it exploded in mid-air about 1.5 km from the launch pad. The DSP data concerning the launches was evidently transmitted to Yokota; however, much of the data failed to reach the JDA HQ in real-time because the satellite communications system between Yokota and the JDA HQ “cut out several times.”¹⁶⁷

**JTAGS DEPLOYMENT**

In March 2007, the Kyodo News Agency reported that the United States and Japan had agreed on the deployment of a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), capable of receiving launch detection and limited tracking data directly from DSP satellites, at the Misawa Air Base in northeastern Honshu.¹⁶⁸ The transportable station was delivered to Misawa on 12 October 2007,¹⁶⁹ creating what a US media report described as “the world’s most complex ballistic missile shield, a project that is changing the security balance in Asia”.¹⁷⁰

The JTAGS program was initiated in the late 1990s to provide an in-theatre capability for receiving and processing raw wide-band infra-red data down-linked from the DSP satellites, with particular respect to tactical ballistic missiles, in order to obtain immediate and accurate information about missile launch locations and predicted impact areas, and to disseminate “warning, alerting, and cueing information” on tactical ballistic missiles, as well as their positions and velocity, to ballistic missile defence stations. The system is also able to process data concerning high-flying (Slow Walker) aircraft and hence track them by their infra-red emissions.¹⁷¹ (Five stations were built.

---

The others are located at Stuttgart in Germany, Osan in South Korea, Qatar in the Persian Gulf, and in Colorado. The JTAGS is able to process data from up to three DSP/SBIRS satellites. It consists of three antennas and a data processing station, and is maintained by about 24 US Army personnel. The detachment is part of E Company, 53rd Signals Battalion, under the 1st Space Brigade, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command (USAMDC/ARSTRAT). According to the detachment commander, “we spot the launch, pass the data to the radar at Shariki—or similar high-altitude radars—then they know where to aim their radar, track and send information to the high-altitude interceptors”. The data is also conveyed to Yokota Air Base and to the Japanese MoD in Tokyo. The station was operational by late October. It was “presented” to the Misawa City Mayor and “other civic leaders” at a small ceremony on 6 November 2007. It was officially opened at a larger ceremony at Misawa on 22 January 2008, at which a red ribbon was jointly cut by the deputy commander of the US Space and Missile Defense Command at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado and a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. US officers said at the opening that

JTAGS receives infrared data directly from the Defense Support Program satellites and soldiers operating the JTAGS receive and process the data from the satellite sensors to warn and alert U.S. and Allied commanders [and that] the presence of JTAGS in Japan provides a more robust theater ballistic missile defense and warning capability.

The deputy commander of the Space and Missile Defense Command added that the deployment adds “useful ‘redundancy’”.

Technical cooperation between the United States and Japan with respect to the operation of their BMD systems will be greatly expedited by the JASDF’s willingness to relocate its ADC HQ and JADGE SOC to adjoin the HQ of the USAF’s 5th US Air Force at Yokota Air Base. The ‘Bilateral Master Plan’ to guide implementation of the relocation, signed by senior JASDF and USAF officers on 15 May 2007, includes a Bilateral Air Operations Coordination

174 Sieff, ‘USAF Japan Base Gets New BMD Information System’.
175 Svan, ‘Space-based Missile Tracker Comes to Japan’.
Center (BAOCC) to “ensure robust coordination, interoperability and data sharing” between the United States and the JASDF.\(^\text{179}\) The BAOCC, scheduled to become operational in 2011, will receive DSP/SBIRS data relayed from both Colorado and the new JTAGS at Misawa.

**Conclusion**

By mid-2012, the JASDF’s four J/FPS-5 radars are all operational. The seventeen J/FPS-3 systems all have been converted to J/FPS-4s and inter-netted with the J/FPS-5s. The second stage of its new SIGINT facility at Miyako-jima has been completed, and the station at Fukue-jima will be operational. By the end of 2012, the JASDF will have been completely transformed—its modernised JADGE radar system and its enhanced SIGINT capabilities will be functionally integrated at Yokota, its airspace intelligence and surveillance information will be shared with the USAF in exchange for data from the DSP/SBIRS satellites and the X-band FBX-T radar at Shariki, and its aircraft and missile warning and tracking data will be being automatically exchanged with data from JMSDF and US Navy Aegis-class ships, all feeding into its air defence and BMD systems. With its 200 PAC-3 anti-missile missiles, together with the JMSDF’s eight Kongo-class SM-3 carriers, it should be fairly confident of being able to detect, track and destroy all of the fairly limited number of missiles that its potential regional adversaries could launch against the country. This is particularly so in the case of a North Korean nuclear threat, though the situation with respect to China is more complex.\(^\text{180}\)

This new defence capacity does not come without cost. Beyond financial strains imposed on a contracting military budget, there are strategic costs, in two directions: heightened reliance on the United States on the one hand, and on the other, as a consequence, an ongoing embedded conflict with China. In both cases, the core of the difficulty is the necessity to receive timely missile launch warning data from the United States DSP/SBIRS satellites.

From a Chinese strategic perspective, the southwestern thrust of Japanese air and missile defence warning system, necessarily integrated with the US space-based warning capacities, coupled with US and Japanese Aegis-class ships, constitutes a significant counter to Chinese missile threats to Taiwan. More importantly still, the Japanese missile defence deployment implies Japanese involvement in any US missile defence counter to China’s nuclear

---


\(^{180}\) See a detailed discussion of the possible role of Japanese missile defence capacities in the event of different threat scenarios involving China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States by Tara Kartha, *Managing the Shift: Missile Defense and Japan’s Options* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), March 2003).
deterrence capacities—potentially to the point where in Chinese perceptions the viability of the deterrent force is nullified.

The international political implications of the integrated missile defence system were recognised by the Japanese Government when it stated formally that missile defence technological cooperation with the United States constituted a recognised exception to the long-standing ban on arms exports, and in April 2003, the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau ruled that the Theater Missile Defense System then under joint study by Japan and the United States would not be prohibited by the Japanese Constitution.

Desmond Ball is a Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Canberra. He was Head of the Centre from 1984 to 1991. desmond.ball@anu.edu.au.

Richard Tanter is Senior Research Associate at the Nautilus Institute, and Professorial Fellow at the School of Political and Social Sciences, University of Melbourne. rtanter@nautilus.org.

---

181 In order to implement the abovementioned joint development, Japan needs to provide articles to the United States which fall under ‘arms’ in the Three Principles on Arms Exports. However, the statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary was issued on December 2004, saying that “if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained”. ‘Exchange of Notes concerning the Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2006, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0623-4.html>. See also the recommendations of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, in its August 2010 report ‘Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation’, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf>, pp. 22-3, 46-7.

A ‘Friendly Elephant’ in the Room?1
The Strategic Foundations of China’s Multilateral Engagement in Asia

Anna Samson

This article examines the link between China’s grand strategy and its participation in multilateral organisations in Asia. It argues that Chinese multilateralism arises because multilateral organisations provide a highly effective mechanism for China to achieve its strategic objectives and not indicative of a more fundamental commitment by Beijing to promoting multilateral engagement on transnational issues more generally. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, Six-Party Talks and the South China Sea disputes are used to highlight both the continuing importance of unilateralism/bilateralism in Chinese grand strategy and the complex nature of Beijing’s multilateralism.

This article explores the connection between China’s grand strategy and its participation in multilateral institutions. The purpose of this piece is threefold: first, to provide a more nuanced approach to the dominant discourse on Chinese multilateralism that predominantly focuses on China’s socialisation (or otherwise) into prevailing international norms; second, to provide a more comprehensive explanation for the variations in Chinese approaches to multilateral organisations within Asia; and third, to contribute to a better understanding of the links between grand strategy, state behaviour and multilateralism more generally.

The primary contention is that Chinese multilateralism arises because multilateral institutions provide one of the most effective ways for Beijing to achieve its strategic objectives. So strong is the link between multilateralism and China’s ability to meet its strategic objectives that where such multilateral institutions are absent, China finds it appropriate to create these organisations. At the same time, it is argued that China’s support for multilateral institutions in Asia should not be taken as evidence of internalisation of the values of multilateralism, or a belief in the inherent benefit of creating international structures within which to address transnational problems. When China observes that achieving core elements of its grand strategy will be too difficult under the conditions created by

1 The ‘friendly elephant’ recalls a comment made by the current Premier of China Wen Jiabao on 15 March 2004 when he stated: “Your mention of ASEAN puts me in mind of an ASEAN meeting I attended last year. I remember on that occasion that [then Malaysian Prime Minister] Mr Mahathir and [Prime Minister of Singapore] Mr Goh Chok Tong drew a vivid analogy between China and a ‘friendly elephant’. They told me the rise of China would not pose a threat to their countries”.

---

Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 57-82. - 57 -
multilateralism, then Beijing is prepared to ‘go it alone’. This is why, for instance, China continues to act unilaterally (or at best, bilaterally) in relation to outstanding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite the existence of multilateral frameworks that may provide effective collective approaches for addressing such regional issues.

In demonstrating the links between China’s grand strategy and its approach to multilateralism in Asia, this article provides a brief overview of the dominant scholarly explanations of Chinese multilateralism. The purpose of this section is not to provide exhaustive accounts of these prevailing explanations but rather to show how shortcomings in these analyses have led to incomplete understandings of China’s participation in multilateral institutions because they do not adequately acknowledge the role of China’s grand strategy. This is followed by an outline of China’s strategic objectives in Asia that shows how China has found its achievement of these goals limited by unilateral and bilateral approaches. It then explores the ways in which multilateralism within the Asian context can help China meet its strategic goals and identify some potential constraints. Following this theoretical examination, the article uses four multilateral institutions in which China is an active member—the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, and the Six-Party Talks—to show how multilateralism provides a highly effective mechanism for China to achieve its strategic objectives. By way of contrast, and to demonstrate that Chinese multilateralism is driven more by strategic focus than institutional commitment, China’s resistance to supporting multilateral solutions, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum, to manage the South China Sea territorial disputes is discussed. Finally the article highlights some possible implications of a new understanding of Chinese multilateralism for international engagement with China.

Contemporary Chinese Multilateralism and its Explanations

The second half of the twentieth century saw China gradually shift away from an isolationist foreign policy stance towards more active engagement in international organisations and multilateral forums. As China's interest in multilateralism increased, scholars begin to search for clues that China's forays into multilateral forums may hold as to Beijing's strategic motivations. Some researchers suggested that China's increased enthusiasm for multilateralism was based on purely rational considerations and cost-benefit calculations. Increased economic prosperity through trade and access to resources could only be achieved by China pursuing greater global integration.2 Other researchers argued that rationalism could not explain the

---

full spectrum of China’s multilateralism. These analysts pointed out, for instance, that China’s decision to join the global nuclear non-proliferation regime had more to do with its adoption of international norms regarding weapons proliferation than simple strategic calculation. Within both camps there were individuals who argued that multilateralism might prove to be a short-lived phenomena for China. So long as Beijing did not have sufficient power to impose its will through other, unilateral means, it would rely on multilateral organisations to achieve its objectives.

China’s power has continued to rise in the early years of the twenty-first century and its support for multilateral institutions has not faded; if anything, China’s interest in multilateralism has deepened. Beijing’s support for multilateral organisations has expanded beyond active participation in existing institutions to initiating new institutions and promoting multilateralism more generally. This phenomenon has led some commentators to suggest that China is being socialised into the prevailing norms of the international system. Other analysts go further, concluding that China is not only heeding calls to become a responsible global power, but that Beijing’s strategic objectives have been modified such that they accord more closely with maintaining the international status quo. While the motivations and behaviour of states do change over time, these explanations regarding China’s socialisation (or otherwise) into the international system are inadequate because they obscure the mediating impact of institutions on state behaviour and risk incorrectly equating outcomes with intentions. At a

---


4 Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, Adelphi Papers 302 (London: IISS, 1996). Leifer suggests that the wariness with which ASEAN members view China’s growing multilateralism is warranted.


policy level, they can prompt confusing or contradictory responses such as that articulated by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd: “Calling himself ‘a brutal realist on China’ Rudd argued for ‘multilateral engagement with bilateral vigour’”\(^1\). Similarly, China’s strategic objectives cannot be deduced from its activities within multilateral institutions. Such a conclusion belies the complexity of the relationship between China’s grand strategy and its multilateralism in Asia. A state's performance in multilateral institutions offers, at best, a partial insight into the strategic goals that may have led it to contemplate participation in these institutions in the first place. An arguably more useful approach for explaining Beijing’s multilateral engagement is to begin with an analysis of China’s strategic objectives in Asia and use this as the basis for considering the role that multilateralism may play as part of China’s grand strategy in the region.

**China's Strategic Objectives in Asia**

Put briefly, Beijing’s aims are to:\(^1\) reduce Taiwan’s international space; protect China’s territorial integrity; establish conditions to facilitate continued domestic economic growth and development and secure regime stability; ensure regional stability; and promote multi-polarity. The purpose of this section is not to reproduce the detailed analysis conducted elsewhere of each of these strategic objectives.\(^2\) Rather, the intention is to identify those

\(^{10}\) Confidential US Embassy Cable, sent 28 March 2009.

\(^{11}\) It is important to note that there is some disagreement in the scholarly community as to whether China does in fact possess a grand strategy; see, for example, Feng Zhang, ‘Rethinking China’s Grand Strategy: Beijing’s Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era’, *International Politics*, vol. 49 (2012), pp. 318-45. It is also important to acknowledge the complex relationship between China’s grand strategy and its policy-making apparatus. Despite the overwhelming power of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the development and implementation of China’s grand strategy has some parallels with the contested nature of policy-making that occurs in other states. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the discourse on the existence or otherwise of a Chinese grand strategy or the impact of struggles within arms of the Chinese bureaucracy and polity for policy supremacy. Suffice to say that there remains broad agreement among elites as to China’s strategic objectives, even as disagreement persists as to how best to achieve them and whether they constitute a coherent or deliberate ‘grand strategy’. Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 2 (April 2011), pp. 68-72. For an historical overview of the development of Chinese grand strategy see: Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2000).

persistent elements of Chinese foreign policy that, when taken together, can be reasonably considered to comprise China’s overall strategic focus in Asia. 13

Reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland has endured as a key objective for Beijing and is consistently articulated by Chinese leaders as such. 14 China’s military capabilities have developed with a predominant focus on, at a minimum, effectively challenging any moves by Taiwan (supported by the United States) to assert its independence more robustly. 15 At best, China’s aim is to maintain the circumstances where a military annexation of Taiwan is technically possible, even if it may not be necessarily politically desirable. In addition to its military efforts, Beijing also seeks to isolate Taipei economically and diplomatically, thereby reducing the international space within which Taiwan can operate. 16

Defending territorial integrity is a strategic objective that had its genesis well before the borders of the current People’s Republic were established. China’s vast size, its ethnic diversity, and the fourteen land borders it shares with neighbouring countries, have all contributed to Beijing’s interest in eliminating both perceived and actual threats to its territory. Defending borders is, however, more than just a matter of principle. China’s western provinces are rich in natural resources and also provide an overland trade route to the oil- and gas-producing Central Asia and Middle East that avoids maritime chokepoints. With respect to its sea border, China’s objectives are the protection of sea lines of communication and resisting potential encirclement or containment by foreign powers. 17

---

13 It should be acknowledged that there is some disagreement among some scholars as to the appropriate categories into which China’s strategic objectives should be divided. Suffice to say that my identification of these elements of China’s grand strategy reflect the general consensus in the academic and policy-making communities both within and beyond China. For ease of analysis, each of China’s strategic objectives is identified here as discrete goals, however it remains the case that at different points in history and in different forums, objectives are sometimes conflated or given varying degrees of emphasis. The following analysis makes no comment on the relative importance of each strategic objective or the timeframe within which China seeks to achieve each of these goals.


Closely related to the goal of territorial integrity is China’s strategic objective of maintaining the domestic and international conditions under which the nation can continue its economic growth and development. Sourcing natural resources to support local production, creating markets for Chinese exports and facilitating international trade are central to this goal. Securing economic prosperity is not, however, just an *idée fixe* or an end unto itself. It also underpins the legitimacy of the Chinese political leadership and the stability of the regime by dampening potential domestic discord. So important is internal stability (often equated with national security) that in 2007 the constitution of the ruling Communist Party of China (CCP) was amended to include four new ‘missions’ for the People’s Liberation Army forwarded by President Hu Jintao, three of which are associated with ensuring domestic harmony and defending the CCP.

In addition to maintaining domestic stability, China also aims to ensure stability in its neighbourhood. In a region characterised by unresolved border disputes, insurgencies, poverty, irregular migration flows, environmental pressures, transitional democracies, the presence of nuclear weapons, and autocratic regimes largely ostracised by the global community, the risk of a strategic shock occurring for China is very real. For Beijing, regional stability is necessary because it allows interstate trade to be conducted smoothly, which facilitates domestic growth and avoids resources being diverted away from national development towards addressing external threats. China is also keen to limit extra-territorial support for domestic opposition forces that could undermine regime stability.

China’s final core strategic objective is the establishment of multi-polarity both in the Asian region and across the globe more generally. This vision for an alternative world order challenges the present predominance of the United States and, in the longer term, necessitates the recognition of China as a comparable power. The Chinese aim of multi-polarity also rests on

---

*Diplomacy: China’s Central Asian Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).


19 The new missions are: “(1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position, (2) providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development, (3) providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and (4) playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.” Cited in James Mulvenon, ‘Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions”’, *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 27, Winter 2009, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf> [Accessed 17 August 2012], p. 2.

20 Clarke, “Making the Crooked Straight”.


22 Sheng Ding, ‘To Build a “Harmonious World”: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South’, *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2008), pp. 193-213. The goal of
entrenching state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international relations that cannot be violated by what Beijing perceives as pecksniffian interventionism on the part of the United States and its Western allies.23

The objectives broadly outlined in this section have persisted in Chinese strategic thinking and policy-making with respect to the Asian region for at least forty years, if not since the formation of the People's Republic.24 Of course, the extent to which individual objectives are publicly acknowledged, conflated or viewed as distinct has shifted over time, as has the way in which the objectives are framed by each generation of Chinese leaders. These differences aside, China has so far not considered it necessary to significantly alter or remove any of the strategic objectives identified above. This fact alone should lead to closer consideration of any suggestion that growing Chinese participation in multilateral institutions provides strong evidence of fundamental changes in Beijing's strategic aims in Asia. A more likely conclusion is that China sees the usefulness of multilateralism for achieving particular strategic objectives only in certain circumstances. Multilateralism is therefore not a principle that China will champion when doing so would require tempering of its ultimate strategic goals, regardless of the potential effectiveness or efficiency of multilateral mechanisms. Multilateralism is also only pursued by China when unilateral and bilateral attempts to secure these objectives are considered limited or unduly costly.

The Limits of Unilateralism and Bilateralism

In the absence of an identifiable, ideological commitment to multilateralism, part of the explanation for China's recourse to multilateral institutions to achieve some of its strategic objectives must rest on the comparative inefficiency or ineffectiveness of alternative strategies. With respect to its aims of isolating Taiwan, safeguarding domestic and international stability, sustaining economic development, and promoting multi-polarity, China does appear to have maximised the strategic dividend that can be attained through unilateralism and bilateral arrangements.

Although the balance of forces across the Taiwan Strait is moving in favour of the PRC, mainland China's ultimate goal of unification does not appear to be realistic in the immediate future, even with Taiwan under the relatively sympathetic leadership of President Ma Ying-Jeou. While the United States remains the dominant military power in the region and maintains its support for Taiwanese independence, military confrontation brings costs that are at

power is not merely an end unto itself; rather attaining power and status will enable China to influence the trajectory of international relations. For China, regional power also requires that it is not surrounded by states that could readily threaten it or reduce its ability to manoeuvre.23 Daniel Lynch, 'Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?', The China Quarterly, vol. 197 (March 2009), pp. 87-107. 24 Jisi, 'China's Search for a Grand Strategy'; Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.
present highly undesirable.\textsuperscript{25} International isolation of the Republic of China (ROC) has also arguably reached the limit of what can be achieved by China acting alone. Taiwan currently enjoys diplomatic relations with only twenty-three states and since 1980 the PRC has successfully convinced twenty-four nations to cease their recognition of the ROC. China has pushed for international, \textit{diplomatic isolation}\textsuperscript{26} while simultaneously pursuing \textit{economic} integration of Taiwan with the mainland. China is thus attempting to make its annexation of Taiwan increasingly inevitable in the eyes of the international community, if not the Taiwanese.

One of the paradoxes with which the Chinese leadership must contend is that the legitimacy of its rule is based on the delivery of remarkable rates of growth and development through economic integration; at the same time, growth and globalisation have exacerbated domestic pressures that threaten to undermine the undisputed authority of the current administration. Although China’s growing middle class is not yet mobilising \textit{en masse} around a coherent agenda, expressions of dissatisfaction with the current regime have risen substantially over the past twenty years, despite the crackdown on the Tian’anmen Square protests in 1989.\textsuperscript{27} Industrialisation of China’s outer provinces is also occurring in the face of persistent independence movements in Xinjiang and Tibet that are supported politically and financially by diaspora communities and self-determination activists.\textsuperscript{28} Meanwhile, Beijing has observed the contagion effects of financial crises against which China cannot be insulated as it seeks greater market penetration.

The transnational nature of separatist movements, ‘terrorism’, natural resource demands and economic opportunities are beyond the ability of China to address by itself. To achieve favourable outcomes that reach across a number of nations requires a significant investment if done bilaterally and even then such outcomes are not guaranteed. In addition, China’s closest friends in the region, Burma and North Korea, have been the subject of continued approbation on the part of the international community and these bilateral relationships have brought more political costs than economic or diplomatic benefits to the Chinese regime. In the case of North Korea, in particular, China is repeatedly called upon by the West to use its


\textsuperscript{28} Karrar, \textit{The New Silk Road Diplomacy}; Shichor, ‘China’s Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection’.
presumed influence to stave off Pyongyang’s brinkmanship.²⁹ The continued effectiveness of China’s unilateral or bilateral efforts to maintain domestic legitimacy, sustain economic growth and ensure international stability is clearly under challenge.

The creation of a multi-polar world is perhaps the most difficult strategic objective for China to achieve unilaterally or through bilateral relationships in Asia. The United States has actively built its status in the region over the past sixty years through trade and investment agreements, extension of its ‘nuclear umbrella’, deployment of military assets, foreign aid and cultural exchanges.³⁰ While it is possible that China could challenge this primacy by simply focusing on building its economic and military capabilities and waiting for other states to be drawn to a Beijing alternative, it is difficult to conceive how United States’ primacy could be challenged effectively without China similarly engaging in overt, sustained efforts to build a network or ‘community’ of states around it. If the final goal is one of political influence that can give effect to an alternative international order, then this is best achieved when Beijing’s opinion as well as its power is respected.³¹ Acquiescence with China’s opinion on global issues and support for its vision for a new international order can be attained piecemeal via bilateralism, or more convincingly secured through multilateral organisations.

Although unilateralism and bilateralism have played a useful role helping China achieve some strategic objectives to date, in many respects they have fallen short or proved not to be the most efficient way of securing the ends that China seeks. This is not to suggest that China has relinquished its belief in unilateralism. There are certain instances where China continues to hold that unilateral action is its best strategy, for example in dealing with its maritime territorial disputes. Nevertheless, where China has almost exhausted the possibilities of what is achievable through unilateral/bilateral action, multilateralism is filling its strategy gap.


The Promise of Multilateralism for China in Asia

In attempting to explain why China chooses to pursue multilateralism, this section suggests some of the ways in which achievement of China’s strategic goals can be facilitated by multilateral organisations. There are certain, almost universal characteristics of multilateral institutions, as well as some unique features of international organisations within the Asian context, that can be harnessed to China’s strategic advantage. The benefits for China that arise from participating in multilateral institutions include: reducing the level of strategic uncertainty that characterises China’s immediate neighbourhood; bolstering the legitimacy of the Chinese regime; internationalising China’s internal problems, thereby normalising what may otherwise be considered draconian domestic responses; creating opportunities for policy flexibility and trade-offs that maximise overall favourable outcomes for Beijing; avoiding resolution of controversial issues by taking advantage of the collective action dilemma; and diluting US power while expanding Chinese influence.

Participation in multilateral institutions necessitates acceptance of some common principles for governing behaviour and support for a framework within which issues of mutual concern can be managed. Institutionalisation of norms increases predictability regarding state behaviour and can improve the transparency of decision-making processes of different governments. Information flows that accompany multilateral engagement also allow for more efficient and effective strategic planning than could be achieved through bilateral arrangements. In addition, institutions can promote stability when they are used diplomatically to corral more volatile states into acting within established frameworks rather than pursuing unilateral action that might precipitate strategic shocks. Multilateral organisations can therefore act as ballast for regional relations in Asia. They smooth differences between states by appealing to commonalities and act as a check on state behaviour. Multilateral institutions create a safety valve for airing interstate tensions and provide timely information so that states can take effective pre-emptive action to shield themselves against potential external threats.

For China multilateralism can improve its ability to help prevent international crises, deal with belligerent allies and implement domestic policies that better respond to changes in the increasingly integrated international environment.

In addition to reducing strategic uncertainty, a mutually reinforcing sense of legitimacy is created when states join multilateral institutions. Members of a

---

multilateral organisation confer general (although not blanket) approval for the behaviour of other states deemed worthy of inclusion within the institution. The benefits of membership also incentivise continued appropriate behaviour by member states. In addition, membership brings with it rewards, such as trade opportunities, that are shared across all members and which otherwise may be only obtainable unequally or via a more time-consuming process. At the same time, the credibility of a multilateral institution itself is partly based on whether key nations consider it worthy of their attention. Take, for example, ASEAN Plus 1, ASEAN Plus 3 and ASEAN Plus 6, or the proposal to create an Asia-Pacific Community, which ultimately failed due to the lack of interest on the part of major players who were slated for membership.  

In the establishment of a new institution, the prerogative of founding states to make membership decisions sends a message about which states are worthy of inclusion when solutions to collective problems are needed. Membership decisions also signify which states share a normative framework as well as delineate who can access certain benefits and who will be excluded. China can thus use multilateral organisations to unlock trade and investment opportunities as well as gain a diplomatic and economic edge over its regional competitors: the United States, Japan and India.

Multilateral institutions are created to respond to issues of transnational concern. But the definition of what constitutes a transnational issue is fluid; states can choose to see the links between problems that arise within their territorial boundaries and similar challenges confronting other states, or they can determine that such problems are best tackled domestically. In this way, multilateral institutions can be used to internationalise otherwise domestic concerns, elevating the importance of problems to a level where collective responsibility is assumed and strong approaches by individual states to address these concerns are considered appropriate. For example, by recasting its domestic problem of independence movements as terrorism, China can use multilateral institutions to call on neighbouring states to help it deal with a problem that is taken to undermine both national and international security. The collective interest that states have for eliminating


terrorism also increases international tolerance for China using draconian measures to quash terrorist threats and promote internal stability.  

Not only do multilateral institutions have the potential to help China achieve its strategic objective of domestic stability and regime legitimacy, but these institutions provide a way for China to manage its growing prominence in the international arena. Institutions allow Beijing to maintain policy flexibility rather than be pressured into behaving as others expect it should behave on account of its increasing economic, military and diplomatic power. For China, participation in multilateral institutions means that great power need not bring with it great responsibility. Instead, Beijing can use its membership of institutions as a proxy for its commitment to international norms without having to demonstrate how those norms have in fact been internalised or incorporated into a domestic policy program. Beijing can also use the international enthusiasm for ‘engaging China’ and encouraging its participation in multilateral institutions to trade off policy gains made in one arena against concessions made in others. China can further capitalise on the collective action problem that arises in multilateral organisations by using them as a place to ‘park’ controversial issues, such as domestic political reform and territorial disputes, which would otherwise require China’s immediate attention.

Finally, multilateral institutions contribute to China’s multi-polar vision because they can dilute the power of the United States. This occurs when Washington is explicitly excluded from decision-making forums or its ability to act is constrained by the need to secure collective support. By limiting policy options for the United States in multilateral organisations, the pressure on Washington to rely on its bilateral relationships or behave unilaterally, rises. This not only increases China’s ability to manoeuvre but also for Beijing to contrast itself as an embodiment of alternative norms and an alternative centre of power around which other states can coalesce. Multilateral organisations thus enable Beijing to seek gradual international acceptance for the norms it would like to see prevail. For China, multilateral institutions provide a mechanism for socialising like-minded states and

---

creating external reinforcement for those values that underpin the Chinese regime.  

Implementing Chinese Strategy through Multilateralism

Having established the potential benefits that multilateralism has for China to achieve its strategic objectives, this section examines China’s role in four multilateral institutions in Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asian Summit (EAS) and Six Party Talks (6PT) have been chosen because they provide a good cross-section of the institutions in which China is currently actively involved. These multilateral forums were established at different times, comprise different memberships and vary in their levels of institutionalisation. Despite these differences, all four have proved important mechanisms for China to achieve its strategic objectives. It is not the intention of this section to cover the history or inner workings of these multilateral organisations in detail as these institutions have all been studied extensively in isolation. There is, however, very little scholarly work that examines these multilateral organisations in comparative perspective and assesses the role they play in China’s grand strategy. This section attempts, through an overview of these organisations, to compare China’s approach to various multilateral forums and assess this participation as an expression of Beijing’s grand strategy.

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION

The SCO was established in 2001 at China’s behest. It is a multilateral organisation that builds on the earlier Shanghai Five mechanism, as well as the bilateral relationships China has been fostering with Central Asian republics since their independence from the USSR in 1991. The SCO’s current member states are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with observer and dialogue status afforded to a further six states. The United States is excluded from the grouping. The self-professed goals of the SCO are as benign as they are broad and include “promoting effective cooperation” and “moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order”. The normative framework underpinning the organisation is the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ encompassing values of mutual trust and benefit, equal rights, consultation, respect for diversity of cultures, aspiration towards

---


common development, non-alignment “non-targeting anyone” (sic) and openness.  

For China, the impetus for establishing the SCO was intimately linked to its strategic objectives in Asia. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China saw a need to develop a more efficient and effective strategy for addressing its concerns regarding access to natural resources and trade routes that were now under the control of a number of different states. In addition the SCO could also potentially support economic development, eliminate threats to domestic stability, remove the risk of independence movements gaining strength, promote regime legitimacy, and establish multipolarity and new international order. This does not, of course, deny the agency of the other members of the SCO. As powerful as China is, it cannot force multilateralism when it is not supported by other states. However, although there may be a confluence of interest among SCO members, this alone does not explain why China has so vigorously pursued the formation of the SCO. Rather, it is the utility of the institution for achieving Beijing’s objectives that drives its push for multilateralism in central Asia.

The SCO’s focus on mutual cooperation and economic development is granting China access to natural resource suppliers and trade corridors that allow Beijing to diversify its supply chain and trade routes away from reliance on contested maritime avenues and chokepoints. The SCO’s aim to tackle the ‘three evils’—terrorism, separatism, and illicit drugs—mirrors the concern that China has to promote domestic and regional stability by neutralising separatist movements and establishing firmer control over its outer territories. The most heavily institutionalised aspects of the SCO are thus its anti-terrorism programs. China has also used the SCO to lubricate its efforts to resolve its outstanding land border disputes with member countries. China has relinquished some of its territorial claims in return for support for Beijing’s anti-terrorism initiatives and commitment to eliminating

---

44 This appears to be the argument of writers such as Chien-Peng Chung, see: Chien-Peng Chung, ‘China’s Approaches to the Institutionalisation of Regional Multilateralism’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 17, no. 57 (2008), pp. 747-64.
47 The first agreement adopted by SCO members was the Shanghai Convention on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. Jing-Dong Yuan, ‘China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 19, no. 67 (2010), pp. 855-69. Note also the SCO’s Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent.
any nascent transnational independence movement on their side of the new border.\textsuperscript{48}

China is actively using the SCO in three ways to promote multi-polarity. First, the Organisation is setting a very different example from Western coalitions such as NATO with respect to how to respond to aggressive action taken by states to quell domestic uprisings. Upholding the mantle of state sovereignty, non-interference has characterised the SCO’s approach to the colour revolutions and similar pro-democracy/anti-regime mobilisations in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{49} The SCO also serves to strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and China with Russia undoubtedly occupying the junior position in the relationship.\textsuperscript{50} China has used the SCO to negotiate highly preferable trading arrangements for natural resources with its neighbour as well as to draw Russia further within its sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{51}

Second, although some analysts argue that the SCO is merely a forum for promoting economic development and trade or at most a coordinating mechanism for anti-terrorism activities, there are strong hints from China that it is considering broadening the military cooperation between member countries beyond existing military exercises\textsuperscript{52} and intelligence sharing.\textsuperscript{53} The SCO continues to exclude the United States while granting observer status to Pakistan, India, Iran and Turkey. By doing so, the SCO has extended its geographical boundaries and populations covered by the SCO across the whole of Central Asia. It has also established a multilateral security institution that includes states that Washington has to date been unable or unwilling to engage with on more than a bilateral level.\textsuperscript{54} The SCO is thus


\textsuperscript{50} For a good overview of the dynamics of the China-Russia relationship, see Bobo Lo, \textit{The Unbalanced Triangle: What Chinese-Russian Relations Mean for the United States Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics} (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{51} Significant levels of Chinese migration across the border into East Russia, exacerbated by Russian depopulation of this area is also serving to solidify the ties between Russia and China primarily on China’s terms. For an exploration of this and other indicators of growing Chinese influence in Russia, see Robert S. Ross, \textit{The Rise of Russia, Sino-Russian Relations, and U.S. Security Policy} (Copenhagen: Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, 2009).

\textsuperscript{52} Michael Clarke, ‘China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a “Silk Road” to Great Power Status?’, \textit{China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly}, vol. 6, no. 2 (2008), p. 100. Chinese military activities to date include provision of military aid (e.g. US$3 million to Kazakhstan in 2002 and US$1 million to Kyrgyzstan in 2003, joint military exercises in Kazakhstan in 2003, and ‘Peace Missions’ in 2007 and 2009).


\textsuperscript{54} For an interesting look at the impact should Iran be offered full membership of the SCO see: Matthew Brummer, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Iran: A Power-Full Union’, \textit{Journal of International Affairs}, vol. 60, no. 2 (2007), pp. 185-200.
positioning itself to become a counterweight to both NATO to its west and the United States' traditional military alliances to its east and south. For China, this serves an additional purpose of constraining Washington's excursions in the Middle East, as well as United States' bases in Central Asia, from encircling China or compromising Beijing's freedom of action within this region. This is particularly important given that China has not yet developed the naval capacity to challenge the United States' regional maritime dominance effectively.

Third, under the rubric of encouraging 'diversity' in development, and the 'Shanghai Spirit', the SCO not only accepts the legitimacy of present authoritarian regime structures among its members but creates the circumstances in which such regimes can be further entrenched. The SCO has embraced those governments that the United States has afforded pariah status, such as Iran, because of their violations of human right standards or failure to abide by the international norms Washington claims to promote. Membership of the SCO does not require a commitment to domestic political reform; if anything, it allows for repressive domestic practices to be externally reinforced by more powerful authoritarian states. For China, the SCO represents a coalescence of states amenable to following the Chinese model of development, thereby legitimising Beijing's approach to domestic and foreign relations.

The shrewdness with which China approaches its activities in the SCO demonstrates how Beijing adjusts its policy mix so as to achieve overall optimal strategic outcomes. China has made concessions on its territorial claims in return for obtaining support for local and cross-border anti-terrorism operations, opportunities to exploit natural resources and unparalleled access to land trade routes in Central Asia. Domestic stability is thus promoted through economic growth and de-legitimising independence movements. China’s promise of non-interference establishes mutual support for authoritarianism and further reinforces the legitimacy of the CCP’s leadership, promoting a new Beijing consensus to rival the predominance of the Washington consensus.

ASEAN PLUS THREE AND THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT

The APT was established in 1997 and includes the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea. Creation of the APT was prompted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis as well as the growing feeling of interconnectedness between ASEAN countries and their economically significant neighbours. In 2001 the APT convened an East Asian Vision Group that suggested that the APT should institutionalise its vision for an East Asian Community by evolving into the EAS. The first EAS was convened in 2005. Although the initial plan was that the APT be superseded by the EAS, division among APT members over who should participate in the EAS has resulted in both institutions persisting despite their now largely overlapping functions and activities.

China is a member of both the APT and the EAS. Beijing’s participation in these organisations, and even its efforts to keep the two institutions operating alongside each other, allows it to further its strategic objectives in Asia. The establishment of the APT and EAS aligns with Chinese goals of economic development, regime legitimacy and the promotion of multipolarity. At the same time, participation in the APT/EAS has brought its own challenges for Beijing, not least its ultimately unsuccessful efforts to keep the United States, Australia, India and New Zealand out of the EAS. The way in which China has managed these difficulties—by continuing to participate in both multilateral organisations but in very different ways—is in itself indicative of how China’s strategic objectives find expression through multilateralism in Asia.

The economic impetus for the APT and EAS was consistent with Chinese attempts to develop closer economic ties with ASEAN states, seen most clearly through the signing of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2000. Strengthening trade connections with ASEAN states was not only economically beneficial for China, but these links were later brought to bear in the negotiations for the establishment of the EAS. China used trade incentives for instance, to encourage Laos—the country

---

60 Although the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS) continue to function as separate multilateral institutions, it was intended (and widely anticipated) that the EAS would eventually replace the APT. As such, the remits of the two organisations overlap substantially. Most analysts tend to see the APT and the EAS as essentially parallel institutions and that is also the approach I adopt in this article (see, for example, Adam Ward and James Hackett (eds) ‘The East Asia Summit: Towards a Community—or a Cul-de-sac?’, n.d.); Benny Teh Cheng Guan, ‘Japan–China Rivalry: What Role Does the East Asia Summit Play?’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 52, no. 3 (December 2011), pp. 347-60; Jae Cheol Kim, ‘Politics of Regionalism in East Asia: The Case of the East Asia Summit’, Asia Perspective, vol. 34, no. 3 (2010), pp. 113-36. As argued in this section, it is China’s approach to the APT and EAS that has been a major (if not the) contributing factor to the duplication between the APT and EAS.

61 China beat Japan in securing such an agreement with ASEAN and reports at the time indicated a sense of Tokyo’s uneasiness regarding the implications of a closer trade relationship between those states over which Japan had traditionally been economically dominant, and China. Guan, ‘Japan–China Rivalry’.
convener for India in ASEAN—not to campaign for the inclusion of India in the EAS.⁶² China was insistent that EAS membership be limited, rather than follow the more expansive definition of ‘Asia’ supported by Japan and Indonesia. China’s vociferousness was about more than a semantic disagreement over the construction of regional identity and the formation of an ‘Asian community’; the utility of the EAS to further Beijing’s broader strategic objectives was at stake. If the EAS included the United States and other middle powers, then China’s relative power within the institution would decrease. This in itself was not especially problematic but for the fact that as an institutional mechanism for establishing an East Asian ‘community’, China was concerned that the EAS may broach issues of democracy and human rights. These issues were raised by Indonesia for possible inclusion on the agenda and are intimately connected with China’s preoccupation with domestic stability and regime legitimacy. Exacerbating this risk for China was its unsuccessful bid to be one of the rotating chairs of the EAS, which would have given Beijing the opportunity to occupy a leadership and agenda-setting role.⁶³ China thus became concerned that it may be forced to face-off against the United States and emerging democracies in the region on sensitive issues in an institution over which Beijing could only exercise minimal (if any) control.⁶⁴

Even though the EAS was not the successor to the APT that China envisaged, Beijing refrained from (officially) relinquishing its membership of the EAS. Beijing not only continued to participate in the institution, but it became an advocate for broadening EAS membership beyond the ‘ASEAN+3+3’ formation to include Russia and other states with an ‘interest’ in East Asia.⁶⁵ China did this for three reasons, none of which are associated with an inherent political commitment to multilateralism. First, as an active proponent for establishing the EAS, China could not suddenly opt out without having to explain its about-face and risk reversing the strides it had made in boosting ASEAN confidence in China as the ‘friendly elephant’

---

⁶³ The chair of the EAS is a rotating one, but only among the ten ASEAN states. The current chair of ASEAN is also the chair of the EAS.
⁶⁴ To some extent, Beijing’s fears have been realised. During the 2011 East Asia Summit, the United States and other EAS members cajoled a very reluctant China into discussing the South China Sea dispute. China’s Xinhua news agency reported that Premier Wen Jiabao said: ‘I don’t want to discuss this issue [of the territorial disputes] at the [East Asia] Summit, however, leaders of some countries mentioned China on the issue. It’s impolite not to make a return for what one receives.’ ‘East Asia Summit Takes Up S. China Issue at US Urging’, Agence France Press, 20 November 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/20/east-asia-summit-takes-up-s-china-issue-at-us-urging.html> [Accessed xxxx 2012].
in the region. Second, even though China may have lost the ability to drive the agenda of the EAS, as a member of the institution based on consensus decision-making, China can still influence this agenda. Even if China fails in its attempt to prevent the EAS from canvassing certain matters, it can influence how contentious issues are ultimately collectively framed. Expanding EAS membership to all corners of the Asia-Pacific also means that China can rely on the problem of collective action to limit the practical effectiveness of the EAS as a regional security mechanism. China can use the requirement for institutional consensus to constrain the United States and its allies from acting in a manner directly counter to China’s interest.

Finally, China understands that there is a far more potent way to limit the utility of the EAS and minimise the risk that the EAS may compromise China’s strategic interests. Instead of allowing the EAS to supplant the APT, China has pushed for the APT to continue. In this way, the EAS has become a superfluous addition to the regional security architecture and a place where China can park controversial issues such as the South China Sea or East China Sea disputes, while still appearing to be committed to regionalism and multilateral engagement. By maintaining its prominence within the more exclusive APT, China is making a clear statement about which states it considers to have interests in the region that bear consideration. By keeping the APT versus EAS tussle alive, Beijing is also encouraging states in Asia to privilege a regional forum that excludes the United States and its allies, thus promoting China’s goal of establishing multi-polarity.

The different behaviour exhibited by China in the APT and EAS arises because of the different contributions that the two multilateral organisations make towards China achieving its strategic objectives. Beijing has supported the APT and EAS insofar as they have assisted China to augment its trade relationships and establish itself as a regional power. When the institutions began to develop in a way that may compromise China’s goal of regime legitimacy, Beijing has been careful to use its multilateral participation to better manage this risk. It has also used its support for multilateralism in Asia to establish an alternative model for regional engagement with South-East Asian states that excludes the United States and promotes multi-polarity more generally.


67 The APT and EAS illustrate the challenges that confront all states that attempt to use multilateral organisations to further their strategic objectives. As mentioned earlier, multilateral organisations often mediate or otherwise shape individual state behaviour. This fact does not change, however, the importance of strategic objectives in motivating states’ efforts to behave in particular ways or pursue particular outcomes within multilateral organisations.
THE SIX-PARTY TALKS  

The 6PT commenced in 2003 to address international concern regarding the potential development of nuclear weapons’ capability by North Korea. The talks were prompted by Pyongyang’s announcement in 2003 that it was formally withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The six states participating in the talks are China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia. Although the 6PT has been the primary multilateral organisation for addressing the question of a possible nuclearised Korean peninsula, it is characterised by a relatively low level of institutionalisation owing to the ‘stop-start’ nature of the negotiations. Talks were suspended in December 2008; however all parties appear to support the continued use of the 6PT to address this security concern. This is despite the agreement brokered between the United States, China and North Korea in February 2012 for suspension of Pyongyang’s nuclear program in return for food aid.

China has remained one of the key drivers of the 6PT. China’s pro-active role—hosting rounds of negotiations and conciliating between participants—is considered by many analysts to be indicative of Beijing’s developing commitment to multilateral engagement. As one of the first states to develop a nuclear capability and the first to adopt a ‘no first use’ policy, international norms of nuclear non-proliferation have long been supported by China. While participation in the 6PT is consistent with Beijing’s broader stance regarding non-proliferation, given that China has an alliance relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Beijing’s assessment of the ‘nuclear threat’ posed by Pyongyang is not as grave as Washington’s, this is not the fundamental reason for China’s support for this

---

68 This is excluding, of course, the six UN Security Council Resolutions that call for North Korea’s compliance with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and imposition of sanctions. (Resolution 825 calls on North Korea to return to the NPT and permit weapons inspectors to tour their nuclear production facilities; Resolutions 1695, 1718, 1874, 1928 and 1985 impose sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)


73 China first adopted this policy in 1964, although some scholars have questioned the credibility of this commitment, suggesting that it is increasingly flexible. See, for example: Baohui Zhang, ‘The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear Policy’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 27, no. 2 (2008), pp. 164-82.
multilateral organisation.\textsuperscript{74} Rather, the 6PT is a very useful instrument for China to achieve its strategic objectives of regional stability, economic growth, domestic stability and multi-polarity.

Although it exercises a degree of influence over the North Korean regime, China has (privately) expressed frustration with the limitations of its bilateral relationship for effectively preventing provocative behaviour by North Korea.\textsuperscript{75} Military action by Pyongyang would have the potential to destabilise the region, as would the use of armed force by Washington to neutralise what it perceives to be an unresolved global threat. Multilateral organisations thus provide a framework within which China can maintain regional stability by increasing the predictability of the North Korean regime and constraining the United States from acting unilaterally. China is not only seeking to avoid the possibility of being drawn into a nearby armed conflict, but to prevent an influx of refugees or the fallout from a failed state across the Yalu.\textsuperscript{76} Any of these scenarios would drain China’s financial resources and compromise continued economic development.

Analysts including Jaewoo Choo argue that it is premature to consider China’s role in the 6PT as part of a broader plan to develop a new multilateral security arrangement in East Asia.\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless the broader strategic benefits for China with respect to achieving its goal of multi-polarity cannot be ignored. China has received international kudos for the leadership role it has played in the 6PT despite the institution failing to deliver on its aims of verifiable and irreversible disarmament by North Korea, or a security guarantee by the United States. China has also been able to demonstrate commitment to multilateral engagement while continuing to maintain an alliance relationship with a state considered a global pariah, supplying it with weapons and circumventing international sanctions.\textsuperscript{78}

In addition, the 6PT has enabled China to keep the issue of North Korea largely outside of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). For China this has four benefits. First, Beijing avoids having to choose publicly between the United States and North Korea. Engaging in behind-the-scenes diplomacy in the 6PT, Beijing can keep providing assurances to both sides in

\textsuperscript{77} Choo, ‘Is Institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks Possible?’.
a forum where merely coming to the negotiating table is considered a success. Second, although there is nothing preventing the UNSC from trying to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the existence of the 6PT makes it less likely that the UNSC will seek to intervene. Thus China has taken an international security issue in which it has an acute interest away from the purview of an established UNSC process that Beijing does not dominate and can only influence through the blunt instrument of its veto power, and placed it within a forum where Beijing meets the United States as an equal partner, if not a superior force in the region. Third, the 6PT creates an avenue for China to influence the tenor of any future reunification of the two Koreas, avoiding the prospect of a unified Korean peninsula falling entirely within the United States’ realm of regional influence. Finally, by taking a strong lead in the 6PT, China is demonstrating a practical alternative to the UNSC. For China this is an important step along the path to multi-polarity. This is especially so in a post-Cold War world where the UNSC has been one of the main multilateral institutions the United States and its Western European allies have used to obtain international legitimacy for their foreign policy initiatives.

It is therefore not possible to construe China’s active involvement in the 6PT as indicative of a broader, newfound commitment to multilateral engagement. The primary aim of China’s participation in the 6PT has been to achieve its goals of regional stability and domestic harmony, not necessarily denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. This explains not only China’s support for the institution, but how its bilateral relationship with North Korea has been mediated by (and in turn has mediated) Beijing’s approach to the 6PT.

The four case studies discussed above show how important China’s strategic objectives are in driving Beijing’s participation in multilateral organisations in Asia. Whether China is creating a new multilateral institution or attempting to influence how an established institution operates, it is focusing on securing outcomes that further its strategic interests. As the following section demonstrates, when China finds that unilateralism is proving effective in allowing Beijing to achieve its strategic goals, then China readily bypasses multilateral forums. In the case of the South China Sea,

---

79 For China, this is a preferable outcome to public stouges where its obligations as an ally may conflict with its image as a multilateralist. See, for example, Beijing’s attempts to suppress a UN report that found North Korea is violating the sanctions regime by selling weapons to Iran. Dan Bilefsky, ‘China Delays Report Suggesting North Korea Violated Sanctions’, The New York Times, 14 May 2011, sec. World/Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/asia/15nations.html> [Accessed 17 August 2012].
80 It is interesting that when discussing the North Korean nuclear issue, US government representatives repeatedly emphasise the centrality of China to resolving the matter. In part this may reflect Washington’s desire to positively reinforce China’s multilateral efforts but it also reflects a perception of the importance of China as a player in matters of international security; Washington could act unilaterally but it recognises that China’s interests in the region must be respected. ‘Foreign Policy Bulletin—Interviews Regarding the Six Party Talks’, January 2006.
China prefers to ‘go it alone’, even as it continues to participate in a multilateral institution that could resolve these disputes.

**The South China Sea Territorial Disputes: A True Case of Chinese ‘Multilateral Engagement with Bilateral Vigour’?**

The South China Sea (SCS) covers an area of approximately 648,000 square nautical miles making it one of the largest semi-enclosed seas in the world. Its sea lines of communication link the Pacific and Indian Oceans with over half of the world’s merchant fleet passing through the Sea each year.\(^{81}\) Twenty-one of China’s thirty-nine sea lanes pass through the SCS as do 80 percent of the Chinese ships transporting oil from the Middle East and Africa.\(^{82}\) The SCS has extensive fish stocks and it is also believed that the Sea holds significant deposits of oil, gas and hydrocarbons. Control of these waters and, to a lesser extent, freedom of navigation through them, is therefore of acute strategic importance. It is not surprising that territorial disputes have arisen between the six littoral states of the SCS as they each assert their sovereignty over parts of the Sea.

There is a wealth of scholarly contributions that outline the background to the SCS territorial disputes, assess the merits of the various territorial claims, and propose possible avenues for adjudicating between the competing interests.\(^{83}\) The rising power of China has led to almost universal agreement that in order to prevent the dispute from escalating to the point of open armed conflict, such a solution must be multilateral in nature. There are three reasons for this conclusion: first, the claims themselves are overlapping and have conflicting bases, even when they emanate from the same state. Second, uncertainty regarding sovereignty rights has exacerbated the security dilemma for states in the region prompting increased militarisation in and around the SCS. Third, without a widely-accepted agreement in place, simple miscalculation (as opposed to a deliberate provocative act) could result in a serious military incident occurring.\(^{84}\) This risk is heightened by states being required under

---

international law to act forcefully to assert their claims or risk being considered to have abandoned those claims.\textsuperscript{85}

At the same time, there has been limited discussion as to why such a multilateral solution has not manifested,\textsuperscript{86} save for lamentations about the collective action problem and expressions of optimism that a solution will develop in the fullness of time.\textsuperscript{87} This is curious given the relatively long-standing existence of multilateral institutions in Asia that include all the disputant states and the conventional wisdom that Asian states are increasingly willing to address transnational issues through multilateral means. Most commentators suggest that the reason for the impasse has been China’s preference for bilateral negotiations, but it is not explained why this preference exists or how it squares with China’s supposedly growing enthusiasm for multilateralism. Nor is it explained why this particular maritime territorial dispute remains unresolved when China has successfully negotiated an end to almost all of its land disputes.\textsuperscript{88} This analytical gap can be broached if one looks at China’s overall strategic objectives in the region and the role that the SCS and multilateral organisations play in achieving these goals. Taking this approach, it is possible to see why Beijing remains confident in the utility of unilateral action and bilateral negotiations to achieve an outcome in the SCS disputes that meets its objectives. It is also possible to better understand the complex relationship that China has with the multilateral organisations of which it is a member.

The ambiguity that exists regarding sovereignty over the SCS is useful for China to the extent that it plays well with the nationalist fraction of its domestic audience. To date, Beijing has only taken limited steps to clarify its


\textsuperscript{86} To the extent that a multilateral solution has emerged, it is one of mutual restraint. The various documents—such as the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the 1992 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Declaration on the South China Sea, the 1999 ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct—and Track 2 initiatives by ARF have not touched on the fundamental question of sovereignty.


\textsuperscript{88} One notable exception is Fravel who argues that China’s current approach to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute is to adopt a delaying strategy. Fravel falls short, however, of exploring Chinese motivations for adopting this strategy or situating Beijing’s approach in the context of China’s broader strategic goals in the region. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, vol. 33, no. 3 (2011), pp. 292-319. Weissmann also argues that rather than an example of an unresolved dispute, the behaviour of affected states regarding the SCS is an example of effective conflict prevention: Mikael Weissmann, ‘The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building’, \textit{Asian Perspective}, vol. 34, no. 3 (2010), pp. 35-59.
so-called ‘nine-dotted-line claim’ to almost the entirety of the SCS.\footnote{M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Clarification of China’s Claim?’, \textit{China Power: A New World Order}, The Diplomat, 5 March 2012, <http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2012/03/05/clarification-of-china%E2%80%99s-claim/> [Accessed 17 August 2012].} In the absence of any explicit diplomatic concessions to possible sovereign rights of other states, China is able to maintain a position that is consistent with its strategic goal of protecting territorial integrity. This appeases both the nationalists who have the potential to threaten domestic harmony, and the more hawkish elements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.\footnote{For an analysis of the diversity of opinion in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) regarding China’s SCS strategy, see: Lyle Goldstein, ‘Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire’, \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, vol. 33, no. 3 (2011), pp. 320-47.} For these groups, assertiveness on the SCS claim reflects positively on China’s other outstanding territorial claim in the East China Sea.\footnote{Opinion on this matter in the PLAN is not universal. Goldstein points out that some in the PLAN believe that focus on the SCS may detract from China pursuing its claim on Taiwan. In these instances, ambiguity over China’s claim may still prove useful. Ibid.} Unresolved competing sovereignty claims require parties to forcefully assert their claims through military/law enforcement action; with its comparatively superior naval capabilities, China can (militarily at least) afford to meet direct challenges to its sovereignty claims with armed force. Not only does it bank on winning a military confrontation, but Beijing is presuming that weaker competitor states would prefer to retreat or even concede their claims, rather than pursue costly military action.

As the gap between China’s military capabilities and those of its neighbours grows, China has the upper hand in bilateral territorial negotiations. China’s economic power can also be brought to bear in bilateral forums, while it risks being outweighed in multilateral organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The SCS maritime dispute differs from China’s territorial land disputes, where China was prepared to relinquish some of its claims in exchange for support to counter separatism and access to resources.\footnote{Ramachandran, ‘China Plays Long Game on Border Disputes’.} In the case of the SCS, China has very little to gain, and much to lose, by allowing a multilateral process to potentially water down its claim. Economic imperatives are unlikely to motivate China towards a multilateral solution. The ability to tap the natural resource deposits in the SCS is presently more important to the other littoral states than China,\footnote{Fravel, ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, p. 301.} which has already enjoyed some success in diversifying its resource base. At the same time, China’s strategic objectives of maintaining territorial integrity, preventing encirclement/containment by a hostile power, and achieving multi-polarity all intersect in the SCS and will be compromised if Beijing withdraws or negotiates away its SCS claims.

The only foreseeable way that China’s unilateral/bilateral strategy for managing the SCS dispute could be undermined is if the United States
becomes involved and weighs in on the side of the other littoral states.\(^{94}\) China has so far prevented this from occurring by allowing the ARF—a forum that excludes the United States—to begin discussing aspects of the SCS. China has thus been able to demonstrate a commitment to multilateral engagement, fostered optimism for the emergence of a multilateral solution, and discouraged United States involvement, while simultaneously avoiding settlement of the issue of sovereignty which remains at the crux of the disputes.\(^{95}\) This fundamental question of sovereignty, tied as it is to China’s broader strategic objectives in Asia, remains a matter that China prefers to address through unilateral/bilateral means rather than through multilateral organisations.

## Conclusion

Contemporary Chinese multilateralism in Asia is best understood by looking at Beijing’s enduring strategic objectives. China’s current multilateral engagement is a means for it to achieve its strategic goals and not, as some commentators argue, indicative of a more principled transformation in China’s approach to international relations. China only pursues multilateralism when unilateral or bilateral mechanisms prove limited in their ability to secure China’s ultimate aims. When China’s strategic objectives are used as the analytical starting point, the differences observed in Chinese participation across multilateral organisations are not just consistent, they are largely predictable.

In the practice of grand strategy, the Chinese pursuit of multilateralism in some respects is far from exceptional. After all, Beijing has long criticised multilateral institutions for (unfairly) benefiting those powerful states that oversaw the establishment of the current global order and crafted what are now considered international norms. But just as multilateral organisations have sometimes constrained major powers such as the United States, China has already experienced how multilateralism may not always deliver the strategic dividends Beijing seeks. As China becomes increasingly enmeshed in multilateral organisations, the costs of unilateral/bilateral action rise. Achievement of Beijing’s core strategic objectives, however, will remain the key driver of its future decisions regarding multilateral engagement, not the reverse.

Anna Samson recently completed her MA (Strategic Studies) at the Australian National University where she is currently undertaking her PhD on armed humanitarian interventions.


\(^{95}\) Fravel, ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, p. 301.
Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011: A Deepening but Cautious Partnership

Claude Rakisits

Last year (2011) marked the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China. This relationship has deepened significantly since 1951. However, Pakistan would like to deepen it even further, while China—with an eye on its growing relationship with India—is more pragmatic and cautious. There are irritants, notably the killing of Chinese citizens, the presence of Uighur militants in Pakistan and different interests in Afghanistan, which could put some stress on the relationship. While the relationship will continue to grow, China is not about to displace the United States as Pakistan's major external patron.

On the eve of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in December 2010, the Pakistani Ambassador in Beijing, Masood Khan, stated in an interview that China was “the most beloved nation for Pakistanis”. Given these warm sentiments towards the Chinese, it is not surprising that 2011 was officially named the ‘Year of China-Pakistan Friendship’ by both countries. The Pakistani media has added to the hype about the depth of the relationship, regularly suggesting that China could soon replace the United States as Pakistan’s most important bilateral partner. This media angle is especially evident when Pakistani-American relations are not going well, with 2011 having been a particularly bad year in that regard.

I will argue in this article that, while China has indeed been deepening its relationship with Pakistan for the last sixty years, this relationship has been a marriage of convenience for both parties. But as with most bilateral relationships, one party needs it more than the other, in this case, it is Pakistan. Notwithstanding Pakistani rhetoric about China being the “all-weather friend”, Beijing has only supported Islamabad in a pragmatic fashion. Accordingly, while Pakistan is very keen to get even closer to China, Beijing will continue to deepen its relations with Pakistan but it will do so only along the same realpolitik lines it has done for the last sixty years.

This article has been divided into two parts. The first part highlights the major events in the first fifty years of the bilateral relationship which opened the way for the deepening of the relationship in the last ten years. The

---

second part examines in depth the bilateral relations in the last decade. Accordingly, it focuses on trade, economic and energy relations, development assistance and military ties. The last two sections examine some of the irritants in the relationship and where we can expect the relationship to go from here.

The First Fifty Years

Six events in the first fifty years had significant ramifications for the bilateral Pakistan-China relationship: the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani and Indian 1998 nuclear tests, and the 1999 Kargil clash.

The brief but decisive 1962 Sino-Indian War was a major turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy. Notwithstanding President Kennedy’s promises to Pakistani President Ayub Khan that Pakistan would be consulted before any military aid was given to India, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, sent US$120 million of emergency aid to India. As far as Ayub Khan was concerned, not only had the Americans rescinded their promise to first consult Pakistan before giving military aid to India but they had failed to link the delivery of arms with a permanent and acceptable solution of the Kashmir problem. It was in the wake of Washington’s support for India in the 1962 border conflict that Pakistan began to look elsewhere for international support, notably China.

By 1963 the two countries had signed a border agreement, signed trade and barter agreements, and concluded an air transport agreement. During President Ayub Khan’s trip to Beijing in March 1965 the Chinese leaders promised him that “if India commits aggression into Pakistan territory, China would definitively support Pakistan”. Thus by the time the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War erupted, Pakistani-Chinese relations were well established because both countries' national interests coincided. Pakistan’s and China’s peripheral positions on the sub-continent and their mutual antagonism against India facilitated this rapprochement. And while it would take a couple of decades, their deepening relationship would later help both countries counter-balance India’s growing military power and complicate its desire to dominate completely the sub-continent. Moreover, they each benefited from closer ties with one another: China was seen as an alternative source of military and diplomatic support, and Pakistan was a potential outlet for Chinese desire to improve relations with Asia and the Muslim world. China’s growing relationship with Pakistan was also seen as

---

a good counter-balance to the USSR’s increasing influence in India and particularly after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

Accordingly, it was not surprising to see that Beijing was the most supportive of the Pakistani position in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. China was very critical of India’s decision to expand the war into the Punjab, giving them a three-day ultimatum to dismantle all their military works on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese boundary or else “bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising there from”. The United States, on the other hand, instead of assisting Pakistan terminated all military aid to Pakistan and India. Washington justified its failure to meet its obligations under the 1959 Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation by stating that the “US view is that the situation is somewhat confused and belligerence is not justified on either side”. This was a devastating blow to Pakistan, since it was almost totally dependent on American weapons for its defence. It was in the wake of that war that China became Pakistan’s main supplier of arms.

However, while China was very openly supportive of Pakistan’s position in the 1965 war, it was certainly not the case in the subsequent 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. This is despite the fact that President Yahya Khan had agreed to be the courier between the United States and China and had unequivocally declared that “friendly relations with China were the cornerstone of Pakistani policy”. The fundamental reason for this difference in support for Pakistan in this instance was that the root cause of this war was domestic Pakistani differences. And given the twenty-five years of often irreconcilable differences between East and West Pakistan, China probably realised that the situation in East Pakistan was not salvageable. Accordingly, as Choudhury succinctly stated, “China did not wish to be involved in a suicidal civil war among the peoples of the two parts of Pakistan”.

Strategically, the signing in August 1971 of the India-USSR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had also changed the equation on the sub-continent; there was no guarantee that the Soviet Union would remain neutral in case China decided to intervene militarily to assist Pakistan. Accordingly, while China made some strong statements during the whole crisis, it nevertheless limited its assistance to the delivery of military hardware and to the dispatch of 200 military instructors specialised in

---

7 Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p. 120.
8 Ibid., p. 193.
9 Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, p. 362.
counter-insurgency.\textsuperscript{11} This came as a big disappointment to the Pakistani leaders who, until the very end, incorrectly interpreted China’s rhetorical support as meaning that China would intervene militarily if India attacked Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12}

Not surprisingly, bilateral Pakistan-China relations were strained after Pakistan’s loss of its east wing. However, President Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who as Foreign Minister under President Ayub had been the major architect of Pakistan’s tilt toward China, realised that Pakistan had few reliable friends in the world and, therefore, did not wish to jeopardise the relationship by entering into a series of pointless recriminations.\textsuperscript{13} However, when Bhutto suggested to the Chinese leaders in 1972 that both countries enter into a formal military alliance, Beijing promptly rejected the idea.\textsuperscript{14} This confirmed once again China’s pragmatic approach to the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, by May 1974, the year India detonated its first nuclear explosion, bilateral relations were back on track. For example, it was only China which responded to Pakistan’s call for nuclear protection from the five-member “nuclear club”, by promising “full and absolute support to Pakistan against foreign aggression and interference including nuclear blackmail”.\textsuperscript{15} By 1974, China had sent Pakistan sixty MiG-19 fighter jets, 150 tanks and other weapons as part of a $300 million economic and military aid agreement.\textsuperscript{16}

The next major event in the bilateral relation was the fall out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Although bilateral relations had been slightly strained at the beginning of General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988),\textsuperscript{17} these stabilised again following Pakistan’s decision not to negotiate with the Soviet-supported Afghan Government and instead allow the mujahideen (‘freedom fighters’) to use Pakistan territory as a base for their insurgency operations in Afghanistan. This was evident in the field of trade, in the opening of the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram Highway in 1982, and in China’s financial and military support for the Afghan rebels.\textsuperscript{18} While China’s support for the mujahideen could be difficult to understand given

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} M. H. Sisky, ‘Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in Indo-Pakistani Relations’, \textit{Asian Survey}, vol. XVI, no. 10 (October 1976), pp. 973-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Hasan Askari Rizvi, \textit{The Military and Politics in Pakistan} (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976), p. 251.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} L. Ziring, ‘Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities and Foreign Policy’, \textit{Asian Survey}, vol. XVIII, no. 7 (July 1978), p. 726.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Choudhury, \textit{India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers}, p. 240.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Burke, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy}, p. 405.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Beijing did not view kindly Zia’s attempt to include the pro-Moscow National Awami League leader, Wali Khan, in the government and his suggestion that he was considering striking a deal with the USSR on the issue of Afghanistan.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} The Chinese supplied about US$200 million worth of weapons to the mujahideen. Shahzad Akhtar, ‘Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment’, \textit{Strategic Studies} (The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad), vol. XXIX, no. 2 and 3 (Summer and Autumn 2009), p. 74.
\end{itemize}
Beijing’s harsh treatment of Muslim Uighurs in the western Xinjiang province who oppose Beijing’s rule, it was China’s concern in seeing the Soviet Union establishing a firm presence in Afghanistan, close to China’s western frontier, and potentially threatening Pakistan, which was paramount in its decision to support the mujahideen.

Interestingly, although General Zia, remembering the events of 1971, did not want to rely solely on one military source, following his departure from the political scene in 1988, Pakistan signed two agreements with China which increased Islamabad’s military dependence on Beijing. In 1989 the two countries signed a military cooperation agreement which envisaged, *inter alia*, “the purchase of military goods, mutual research and cooperation along with the manufacturing of arms and the transfer of technology”. This agreement was supplemented in 1993 with one that made China “the most important military seller” of weapons or systems to Pakistan. The substantial sale of Chinese arms to Pakistan in 1971-2001, which was $9.8 billion compared to US sales totalling only $3.4 billion, confirms that Islamabad then already was heading towards heavy reliance on one source.

In the late 1990s there were two important Indo-Pakistani events which would have ramifications for China as well as beyond the region. First, there were the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998. Given the years of bilateral cooperation in the nuclear field, going back to the time of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s testing of its nuclear devices would have come as no surprise to Beijing. This extensive nuclear cooperation reached its peak in the 1980s and early 1990s, and included a secret blueprint for a nuclear bomb, highly enriched uranium, tritium, scientists and key components for a nuclear weapons program complex. This had been “well documented in Western media and intelligence reports” and according to these reports, China was the first country to supply Pakistan with weapons grade uranium to make at least two nuclear bombs, much to India’s consternation. However, China did not abstain or veto United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (6 June 1998) condemning the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests. Of course, Beijing had little choice given that the resolution equally condemned India and Pakistan.

---

The second important event was the armed clash at Kargil in May-July 1999 which began with the infiltration of militants and Pakistani soldiers across the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. While China did not openly support Islamabad, it did not blame Pakistan either for initiating the conflict. Instead, it took a neutral stance and insisted that the two countries pull their forces back to the pre-conflict positions along the LOC and settle this long-standing dispute peacefully and bilaterally. This was an approach which was closer to India’s than Pakistan’s but also one which Beijing had been urging both countries to take since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, given its veto power, China likely played an important behind-the-scenes role in the non-issuing of a UN Security Council resolution or a presidential statement condemning Pakistan’s role in this armed clash.

Notwithstanding China’s role at the UN, its position on the Kargil issue confirmed the progressive Sino-Indian rapprochement which had been developing since the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, this shift in China’s approach to South Asia meant that the old paradigm of always supporting Pakistan when it came to Indo-Pakistan differences was increasingly becoming outdated and, more importantly, no longer necessarily advanced Beijing’s strategic interests. Moreover, another important factor in China’s more selective support for Pakistan, particularly, but not solely, on Kashmir, is the concern that its open-ended strategic relationship with Islamabad facilitates the growing Indian-US relationship. And the deepening of the New Delhi-Washington relationship is a development which goes counter to its strategic interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean which is to ensure that India’s influence does not grow at the expense of China’s.

2001-2011: Consolidation

As noted above, Pakistan-Chinese relations were already developing firmly in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This relationship has deepened in the last decade, particularly in the fields of trade, economic relations, energy, economic assistance and defence. However, as I will examine, all decisions taken by the Chinese with regard to cooperating with the Pakistanis have always been done pragmatically and with Beijing’s long-term strategic interests in mind.

RENEWAL OF THE SILK ROAD

Trade and economic relations between the two countries is an area which has seen a dramatic increase in activity during this period and in particular since the 1990s. One of the cornerstones of this increased economic relationship was the signing in October 1982 of the China-Pakistan Joint Committee on Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technology Cooperation.

---

Accordingly, bilateral trade grew rapidly from a low of about $50 million annual bilateral trade in the mid-1970s to one where China is now Pakistan’s second largest trading partner.\(^{25}\)

In early 2006 the two countries signed the five-year Development Program on Economic and Trade Cooperation which set down the major fields and programs for bilateral economic and trade cooperation.\(^{26}\) This trade link was further deepened in November of that year during an official visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Pakistan when the two countries signed a free trade agreement which came into effect on 1 July 2007. That year the leaders agreed to aim to increase bilateral trade from US$5.2 billion to US$15 billion by 2010. And while bilateral trade had indeed grown significantly over the last ten years (US$964 million in 1996, i.e., 444 percent), their target was over-ambitious, reaching only around US$9 billion by 2010.\(^{27}\) Accordingly, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in 2010, the two countries revised their target date and agreed to aim to reach US$15-18 billion by 2015 instead.\(^{28}\) Finally, it is important to note that the bilateral trade is very much in China’s favour, with Beijing enjoying a surplus of over US$8 billion in 2011.\(^{29}\)

Complementing bilateral trade are several big infrastructure and investment projects which have been finished or are in the process of being completed. For example, the two governments signed a US$300 million agreement in December 2010 to reconstruct the approximately 25 kilometres of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) which was submerged by a major landslide in January 2010.\(^{30}\) This important and complex project, which will take approximately two years to complete, will allow the resumption of normal traffic between the two countries.\(^{31}\) The rehabilitation of the KKH will also

---

\(^{25}\) IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2011
\(^{26}\) This agreement was renewed during Chinese Premier Wen’s visit to Pakistan in December 2010.
\(^{27}\) ‘Sweet as can be’, *The Economist*, 14 May 2011.
\(^{29}\) Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Beijing, 31 January 2012, <http://www.pakbj.com/more_media.php?cont=%2033> [Accessed 15 April 2012]. While there has undoubtedly been growth in the volume of bilateral trade, it is, however, important to remember that China-India bilateral trade is some US$60 billion, which dwarfs the Pakistan-Chinese trade. James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, ‘China and Pakistan: An Alliance is Built’, *Financial Times*, 30 June 2011.
\(^{30}\) The Karakoram Highway was co-built with the Chinese over a twenty-year period (1959-1979).
enable Pakistan to more easily tap into the economic development of Xinjiang province. There are plans to build a 600 kilometre railroad between Havelian in Pakistan and Kashgar, the westernmost city in Xinjiang province. Complementing the road link is a direct 90 minute air link between Islamabad and Kashgar. In 2006 Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf had a grand bilateral plan which would entail multiple trade, transport and energy corridors between the two countries that would stretch from the deep sea port of Gwadar—whose construction (2002-2007) was 80 percent financed by the Chinese—to the border with Xinjiang in the north. This ambitious plan would neatly fit with the 2006 Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation which would cover the construction of oil refineries, gas terminals, oil and gas storage and transit facilities.

However, this grand vision plan has run into problems and may quite possibly only remain a pipe dream. In 2009 the Chinese Government decided to shelve its multi-million dollar costal oil refinery project at Gwadar which was launched in 2006. Publicly, the principal reason for China's decision to cancel the Gwadar project was the economic fall out of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. However, another more important factor in the pull-out—and one which should not be underestimated—were concerns with the security situation in Baluchistan, the large province where Gwadar is located. Baluchistan has been in the throes of a low-level insurgency since the early part of the twenty-first century. Non-Baluch residents, including Chinese workers, have increasingly been the targets of the Baluch insurgents who are opposed to large developmental projects which they feel do not benefit the Baluch. Since the decision not to proceed with the oil refinery in Gwadar, there has been no suggestion of reviving this massive project in any of the joint statements emanating from the high-level meetings between the political leaders of the two countries. Nevertheless, there are still ambitions in China and Pakistan that a pipeline from western China to Baluchistan would be laid to link up with much-talked about oil and gas pipelines that would originate from Iran or Turkmenistan and terminate in Pakistan. Needless to say such a project, if it came to be realised, would have very significant geo-strategic implications for the region. However, despite the fact that importing gas from Iran would be more efficient, cheaper, assured and safer than importing gas from Turkmenistan, and
transiting through Afghanistan, Washington has made it very clear that it opposes the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.\footnote{It would appear that, as a result of the threat of US sanctions against companies dealing with Iran, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has decided to no longer provide financing for this project. Rebecca Cornway and Qasim Nauman, ‘ICBC Appears to Back Away from Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline’, \textit{Reuters}, 14 March 2012, \url{http://reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/pakistan-iran-pipeline-idUSL4E8EE2V220120314} [Accessed 14 April 2012].}

The Gwadar oil refinery project setback has not deterred the two countries, however, from cooperating in other areas of the energy sector. Given that Pakistan’s energy deficit is increasing—it already has to import two-thirds of its oil needs—it is no surprise that the two countries have been putting a lot of effort into addressing this major weakness in Pakistan’s economy. At each high-level bilateral meeting and in joint statement the issue of cooperation in the energy field is always discussed.

According to then Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, the annual energy requirements of Pakistan will increase from the present 20,000 megawatts (MW) to more than 160,000 MW by 2030.\footnote{‘PM Urges Pakistan, Chinese Businessmen to Work Together for Shared Prosperity’, \textit{Associated Press of Pakistan}, 18 December 2011, \url{http://ftpapp.app.com.pk} [Accessed 4 April 2011].} Moreover, not only will energy requirements grow exponentially over the next two decades but, according to the Pakistani Government, the present chronic power shortage reduces economic growth by between two and two and half percent of gross domestic product every year.\footnote{Zafar Bhutta, ‘Iran Gas Pipeline: Pakistan Uses US Opposition as Bargaining Chip’, \textit{The Express Tribune}, 19 September 2011.} In order to assist Pakistan with its increasing energy needs, China has offered financial and technical assistance to develop hydro and wind power and upgrade the existing transmission system. For example, in 2010 the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on building twelve small- to medium-sized dams.\footnote{Yan Wei, ‘Successes in South Asia’, \textit{Beijing Review}, 4 March 2010, p. 13.}

But much more controversial in the bilateral relationship—at least as far as the international community is concerned—is the nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries. China has helped Pakistan build a nuclear plant in Chasma, which began operation in 2001, and a second nuclear plant, Chasma II, which is scheduled to be completed very soon. Under a 2003 agreement, China has agreed to supply Pakistan with an additional two nuclear reactors which should provide Pakistan with an additional 680 MW of energy. There have been discussions, however, that China may be considering supplying a much larger reactor, perhaps as big as one gigawatt, rather than the 300 MW reactors in the initial agreement.\footnote{Geoff Dyer and Farhan Bokhari, ‘China-Pakistan Reactor Deal to Open Fresh US Rift’, 23 September 2010, \url{http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83db2ac8-c72d-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a.html} [Accessed 14 September 2011].} Regardless of the final size of the reactors, the latest deal has concerned the
46-country Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which bars nuclear commerce between Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members, including China, and non-members like Pakistan. However, China has dismissed those concerns by pointing out—quite correctly—that Washington had signed a civil nuclear deal of its own with India, also a non-member of the NPT club, in 2008. There is an important difference between the two deals, however. The Americans sought (and were granted) an exemption by the NSG for the India deal to go ahead. China, on the other hand, is not seeking a similar exemption for Pakistan; it is going ahead regardless of the NSG’s position. Moreover, Beijing has pointed out that the nuclear agreement with Pakistan was signed before China had joined the NSG in 2004 and that in any case it is only for peaceful purposes.  

But in a reassuring move, the International Atomic Energy Agency has agreed to the Pakistani Government’s request to safeguard these two reactors to ensure that the nuclear material from the reactors is not diverted to make nuclear weapons. However, while the deal will probably be ultimately approved by the NSG, one of the big worries about the plan to build these two nuclear plants is the outdated technology that will be used in this project. According to Mark Hibbs, an atomic energy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the technology the Chinese are using is some thirty years old. And given the recent nuclear incident in Japan, there is heightened concern about older nuclear plants around the world.

**ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE**

Turning to the development assistance component of the bilateral relationship, it is difficult to measure precisely how much aid China provides Pakistan. There are two reasons for this. First, there is a lack of transparency in the Chinese Government’s disbursement of aid funds. Second, estimates of China’s foreign assistance, which consists mainly of low-interest loans and government-backed or subsidised investments in infrastructure and natural resources, vary widely due to the different definitions of aid. Only a relatively small portion of Chinese aid includes what typically is characterised as “official development assistance” (ODA) by the world’s major aid donors, such as development grants, humanitarian

---


44 Cited in Ho, Ibid.; It is important not to confuse the civilian nuclear reactors at the Chasma facilities with the weapons-grade nuclear reactors at the Khushab facility where it was discovered earlier this year that a fourth reactor was being built. While there are suspicions that the Chinese may be assisting the Pakistanis in the construction of Khushab-4, Mark Hibbs does not believe this to be the case. See Mark Hibbs, ‘Chinese Help on Khushab-4?’, <http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/162/chinese-help-on-khushab> [Accessed 14 September 2011]. T. V. Paul believes otherwise, see Paul, ‘Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power’, p.4.
assistance, social welfare programs and food aid.\textsuperscript{45} However, even with these measurement limitations and the lack of reliable data, it is estimated that the total financial assistance could come up to about US$600 million annually.\textsuperscript{46} If this is the case, this would be quite substantial given that, according to the World Bank, the total ODA given to Pakistan in 2009 was US$2.8 billion and just over US$1.5 billion in 2008.\textsuperscript{47}

However, while China appears to be providing substantial aid to Pakistan, surprisingly it did not disburse much assistance in the wake of the devastating 2010 floods. For example, the United States gave US$688 million, representing 26.8 percent of total international donations, compared to China’s $18 million, or 0.7 percent of the total.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, in October 2008 during his first trip to overseas, President Zardari sought concessional loans from China but Beijing did not oblige. Accordingly, Pakistan was obliged to turn to the IMF for a loan of $7.6 billion to stave off a balance of payment crisis. It was only later that China lent Pakistan $500 million.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{GROWING MILITARY TIES}

Bilateral military links—Chinese exports and joint projects—is another area where cooperation has grown significantly. Between 2000 and 2010, China exported $3.195 billion worth of weapons to Pakistan, compared to the United States’ $2.417 billion over the same period.\textsuperscript{50} Or, put differently, China’s arms exports to Pakistan in 2000-2010 represent 48 percent of China’s total arms exports during that period. The next closest recipients are insignificant in comparison: Iran—12 percent; Bangladesh—4 percent and Myanmar—3 percent.\textsuperscript{51} In 2010 alone, Pakistan was the destination for 60 percent of China’s total arms sales to the world.\textsuperscript{52}

Turning to some of the specific bilateral arms transfers, in the past decade the two countries have jointly developed their first fighter plane for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), known as the JF-17, or ‘Thunder’. The first aircraft were manufactured in China in 2009 and flown to Pakistan as air freight

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
before they were reassembled. However, as production progresses the indigenous component of the fighter will increase. The PAF intends to buy up to 250 of the JF-17s over the next four to five years, making it the largest ever purchase by the PAF of a single type of aircraft.\textsuperscript{53} Interestingly, Beijing agreed to expedite the delivery of a second batch of fifty J-17s during a visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani in May 2011 just a few days after the American raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{54} The plan is that the JF-17 will eventually replace the A-5C, F-7P, Mirage III and Mirage 5 combat aircraft.\textsuperscript{55} The significance of this aircraft is that it is equipped with beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) capability—a capability which Pakistan was denied with the US sanctions of the 1990s which embargoed the transfer of seventy-one F-16s and their AIM-7 Sparrows.\textsuperscript{56} The Pakistani Government has also encouraged the Chinese to induct the JF-17 into their air force to encourage overseas sales of the relatively cheap, multipurpose fighter jet.\textsuperscript{57}

In August 2011 China, for the first time, offered to sell to Pakistan thirty-six of its most advanced frontline fighter jets, the Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon. According to officials, this deal is worth US$1.4 billion, and will be financed by China via a soft, long-term loan.\textsuperscript{58} The availability of the Chinese-made J-10 and JF-17 means that Pakistan is less reliant on American and Western aircraft for its air force requirements. In addition to fighter deals, the two countries signed in December 2008 a US$278 million deal for four Chinese KJ-2000/ZDK03 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. This purchase also has an element of technology transfer which gives the Pakistanis an opportunity to refine the performance of this system.\textsuperscript{59}

The two countries have also been busy developing their naval relations. Early in 2011 China formally began the construction of two state-of-the-art fast attack missile crafts for the Pakistan Navy, in addition to the US$750 million deal for four F-22P Zulfiqar class frigates it ordered from Beijing in 2005. One of these frigates will be constructed by Pakistan Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works under a technology transfer agreement.

\textsuperscript{54} Page, ‘Beijing Agrees to Operate a Key Port, Pakistan says’.
\textsuperscript{55} Usman Ansari, ‘First Pakistan-Built JF-17 to Fly by Year’s End’, \textit{DefenceNews}, 29 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{57} Page, ‘Beijing Agrees to Operate a Key Port, Pakistan says’.
\textsuperscript{59} Ansari, ‘Pakistan Surmounts Sanctions to Revive Airpower’. Another area where China and Pakistan have been working together is in the manufacturing of the Al-Khalid Main Battle Tank in Pakistan with Chinese technical cooperation which began in the 1980s. Kondapalli, ‘Testing China’s Rise’, p. 188.
The plan is that the construction of one of the frigates in Pakistan will help strengthen the indigenous ship-building capability of the country. However, not everyone is convinced that the building of only one frigate will help achieve that capability. While the version of the frigate being built for Pakistan, the Jiangwei II-Class, is a sophisticated and very capable ship equipped with anti-submarine helicopters, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles able to carry nuclear warheads which China does not generally sell to other nations, it is nevertheless relatively small at 2250 tons.

Another important defence area where China has been providing technological assistance is in the development of Pakistan’s missile arsenal. It is widely believed that China’s solid-fuelled M-11SRBM and North Korea’s liquid-fuelled No Dong missiles have formed the building blocks of Pakistan’s missile program. It is worth noting that Pakistan and North Korea began developing a military relationship in 1971, one which matured in the 1990s. Such a relationship would not have been possible without Chinese acquiescence. This triangular relationship was confirmed with the three countries signing a formal technical assistance agreement in January 1994 that officially dealt with cooperation in missile and guidance systems. As a flow-on from this collaboration, Pakistan has developed a range of solid-fuelled short-range ballistic missiles to target air-fields, headquarters, troop concentrations and ammunition and supply depots. The less-than-300 kilometre-range Ghaznavi resembles closely China’s M-11, a number of which Pakistan reportedly received in the 1990s. According to press reports in 1997, the CIA assessed that China helped Pakistan establish a factory to manufacture M-11 SRBMs in addition to supplying thirty ready-to-launch M-11s. In March 2011, Pakistan test-fired a nuclear-capable short-range surface-to-surface missile, Hatf-2, which it co-developed with the Chinese. The missile, which has a range of 180-200 kilometres, is similar in size and shape as the Chinese TY-3 research rocket. In a related development, China and Pakistan are collaborating to launch a joint communications satellite, PAKSAT-1R, in the near future.

But while military ties are very good and have deepened over the years, the Chinese Government has made it clear that it is not interested in building a naval base at Gwadar—at least for the moment, confirming yet again their

---

64 Paul, ‘Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power’, p.5.
cautious approach to the bilateral relationship. This was made abundantly clear by the Chinese leaders when they promptly denied publicly the Pakistani Defence Minister’s statement made upon his return from a trip to Beijing in May 2010, that he had invited the Chinese to build a naval base at Gwadar. The Chinese were unimpressed with the Defence Minister’s clumsy and un-diplomatic remarks made without prior consultation with the Chinese and which amounted to forcing Beijing’s hand on this issue. So while China may be interested in building such a naval base in the future, for the moment it would not want to frighten the international community with the construction of such a base on the Arabian Sea as this would strengthen the “string of pearls” theory—China’s supposed plan to establish naval bases in the Indian Ocean. However, according to media reports—later retracted—the Chinese Government, having completed the first phase of the development of Gwadar in 2007, had agreed to take over the operation of Gwadar from Singapore’s PSA International when the latter’s contract expired.

Finally, while Pakistani-Chinese defence relations have indeed progressively deepened in the last decade, anchored with the launch of the high-level annual China-Pakistan Defence Security Talks in 2002, China has shown no interest in a bilateral defence accord. This is despite a report by Pakistan media that Islamabad had been secretly lobbying for such an agreement. This Chinese refusal to do so, along with its rejection of considering building a naval base at Gwadar for the moment, would be in line with China’s broader strategic interests in South Asia, which include its growing relationship with India, which a defence accord and a naval port at Gwadar could potentially jeopardise.

**Nagging Irritants**

But while Pakistan-Chinese relations have been deepening on several fronts, there have also been a number of issues that have somewhat dampened the relationship, notably attacks against Chinese citizens, the presence of Muslim Uighur militants in Pakistan, who wish to establish an independent Islamic state in the western part of China, and policy differences over Afghanistan. While none of these issues is going to seriously affect the relationship, they have nevertheless created notable stress in otherwise relatively trouble-free bilateral relations.

---


67 The string of pearls ‘theory’ was given prominence in Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century’, *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2009), pp. 16-32.

68 Ansari, ‘Pakistan Gets More China Aid as U.S. Ties Fray’

69 ‘China to Keep Pakistan Embrace at Arm’s Length’, *The Dawn*, 4 October 2011.
First, turning to the attacks and threats against Chinese citizens, these have increased over the last few years. While the first significant attack against Chinese citizens was in May 2004, when three engineers were killed in a car bomb at Gwadar,\footnote{Kardon, ‘China and Pakistan’, p. 13.} the most well-known of these cases was during the June 2007 Lal Masjid “Red Mosque” siege in Islamabad in which a number of Chinese “massage workers” were kidnapped, but later released. According to reports, it was Chinese pressure which forced the Pakistani Government to take military action against the Muslim militants who had taken over the mosque complex and who were holding the Chinese hostages. Militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province) retaliated by executing three Chinese engineers the following month and by attacking a convoy of Chinese workers with a suicide attack.\footnote{Andrew Small, ‘China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan’, \textit{The Washington Quarterly}, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 2010), p. 90.} As a result of these anti-Chinese incidents, a joint bilateral task force was established in August 2007 at the national and provincial levels to address the numerous threats to the 13,000 Chinese nationals working in Pakistan, including providing direct military protection.\footnote{The Chinese work for about 150 Chinese companies engaged in over 120 economic projects representing possibly up to $20 billion in Chinese investment. Kardon, ‘China and Pakistan’, pp. 16-7; Small, ‘China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan’, p. 91.} However, this task force has not been sufficient to stop all attacks and threats against Chinese workers. Accordingly, and as noted above with regard to China’s decision not to proceed with the construction of an oil refinery in Gwadar, the attacks against Chinese nationals is beginning to affect some of Beijing’s decisions with regard to investment and bilateral economic cooperation.\footnote{Kingho, a large private Chinese miner, reportedly abandoned a proposed $19 billion investment in an energy and chemical project in Sindh province after reassessing the security environment. Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘China’s Pakistan Conundrum’, \textit{Foreign Affairs (Snapshot)}, 4 December 2011.}

The second irritant, the presence of the Uighur militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is, however, of a bigger concern to the bilateral relationship.\footnote{For an informative article on the issue of Uighurs in the bilateral relationship see: Ziad Haider, ‘Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang’s Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway’, \textit{Asian Survey}, vol. 45, no. 4 (July-August 2005), pp. 522-45.} Following the ousting of the Taliban from power in Kabul in 2001, many Uighurs fled to Pakistan along with al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. While there are no precise figures as to how many Uighur militants are present in Pakistan, it is unlikely that the actual number would be very high, probably only about 100.\footnote{Small, ‘China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan’, p. 87.} Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities have not wanted to take any chances. Beijing wants to ensure that there is no spill over of Islamic extremists, terrorists and criminals now located in Pakistan’s tribal region into western China and stirring up
Accordingly, China and Pakistan set up an anti-terror consultative mechanism up in 2003, conducted joint Sino-Pakistani counter-terrorism exercises in Xinjiang in 2004, and signed a counter-terrorism agreement in April 2005. The two countries have been conducting joint anti-terror exercises every year since 2004, with the latest being in November 2011, when the two armies held joint anti-terror exercises near Islamabad.

However, despite these counter-terrorism agreements, the Chinese have not been completely satisfied with the Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate’s performance in pursuing the Uighur militants. While there have been some high profile extraditions, there are indications that perhaps the ISI has been less than fully enthusiastic in its pursuit of Uighur militants. Some analysts even suggest that ISI elements may be tipping them off before an operation. In a rare display of displeasure with Islamabad’s approach towards this issue, Beijing accused Pakistan-based Uighur militants of the Al-Qaeda-linked East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) of being responsible for a deadly attack in Kashgar, a city in the north-western Xinjiang region, in July 2011. Pakistani officials denied having anything to do with these attacks. Wishing to ease the tension, President Zardari promised to step up counter-terrorism cooperation with China. Still, Beijing remains dissatisfied with Islamabad’s inability or unwillingness to eliminate these Uighur militants. Accordingly, in April 2012 the Chinese authorities asked Islamabad to extradite six “core members” of the ETIM which have been accused of having been involved with last year’s attack in Kashgar.

In light of the continued presence of ETIM fighters in Pakistan, Beijing is now reportedly interested in establishing bases either in FATA or in the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) which border Xinjiang province. This was revealed in an article posted on the official website of the Chinese Government in January 2010. China believes that the ETIM’s ten-year presence in Pakistan is a significant threat to the state. Presumably, if China were able to post soldiers in Pakistan close to the ETIM’s camps, Beijing would be in a better position to deal with this threat. The suggestion that China is interested in establishing bases in northern Pakistan has further fuelled an already touchy Indian neighbour which is uncomfortable with the...

---

78 Small, ‘China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan’, p. 91.
alleged presence of 7,000-11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army in FANA. Given that the northern part of Pakistan is closed to the outside world, one can only speculate as to the reason for their presence. But it has been suggested that they are there to work on the Karakoram Highway, on dams, and other projects.  

The third irritant in the relationship is their different positions on the departure of the NATO-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Given their different long-term interests in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that Beijing and Islamabad would approach the western forces’ departure from Afghanistan quite differently. But because Pakistan is so intimately involved in, and crucial to, future developments in Afghanistan, these differences will need to be carefully managed. It is important to remember that Pakistan’s interest in developments in Afghanistan goes back to 1947. The military has always considered it critical for Pakistan’s security in case of another conflict with India that Afghanistan provide it with the “strategic depth”—defined as meaning a “peaceful and friendly” country, which it currently lacks.

Importantly, Beijing knows that, given the Pakistan military’s ties with some of the Afghan militants and other jihadist groups sheltering in the tribal areas, it will have a critical role to play in maintaining stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region post-2014. Accordingly, China, as opposed to the United States, does not press Islamabad to take action against terrorist groups with which Islamabad may have a good relationship or which pose no threat to the Pakistan state—for the moment. Nevertheless, Beijing will be keeping an attentive eye on any possible jihadist spill-over from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas into China’s restive Muslim-majority areas in the west of the country.

While not stated publicly, the Chinese will not be pleased to see Western forces leave Afghanistan, especially if they most likely leave behind an unstable and poorly governed country. Their departure would leave a power vacuum which the Afghan Taliban and fellow travellers would exploit and could ultimately fill. In such a scenario, a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan would mean that the Uighurs would have a natural and sympathetic ally, one which could offer a convenient and logical military training ground for these militants. So China’s displeasure with a post-2014 Afghanistan possibly dominated by the Taliban would be another potential irritant in the Pakistan-China relationship down the road.

86 Swaine, ‘China and the “AfPak” Issue’, p. 3.
On the other hand, the departure of the US-led forces from Afghanistan will be welcomed by Islamabad. Given the historical, intelligence and operational links which the Pakistani military, and in particular the ISI, has had with the Afghan militants this is not surprising. However, a Taliban-run or dominated Afghanistan would be, in the long-term, a threat to the Pakistan state, in that the Pakistani Taliban would now have a friendly government in Kabul. It would make it easier for the Pakistani Taliban to attack the Pakistan state in its quest to overthrow the government and impose sharia law throughout the land. Needless to say, a Taliban-friendly Pakistan would not be a welcome development for China, particularly given the impact this would have on its own Muslim population. Moreover, such a Pakistan would want to recalibrate its relationship with China, and Beijing would undoubtedly wish to do likewise. However, the fundamental strategic reality on the ground would not have changed: both countries would still want to counter India’s rise.

**Conclusion: Where to from Here?**

From the beginning, the sixty-year old Pakistan-China relationship has been an odd partnership. There has never been a binding ideology, such as communism or Islam, only the common desire to contain or counter India’s power and influence. For the first fifty years, the core focus of the relationship was how the two countries could work together to counter the rising power of India. Almost two decades ago, John Garver astutely observed that the Chinese knew that Pakistan was its “last and best bet” to prevent Indian dominance of southern Asia from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. And in many ways this remains the case. However, China has also progressively become more pragmatic with regard to its relationship with Pakistan. There are two reasons for this. First, Beijing is keenly aware that Pakistan has a whole raft of serious domestic problems which are making it a less attractive ally and potentially a liability if these are not dealt with effectively. Second, while Beijing wants to ‘box in’ India by developing relationships with Pakistan and other South and Southeast Asian countries, it also has a growing, albeit competitive, relationship with India. Moreover, it also knows that the more it tries to contain India in South Asia, the more it pushes New Delhi into a closer relationship with Washington. This is a development that is not in Beijing’s long-term interest.

Put differently, China will continue to deepen and broaden its relationship with Pakistan, but it will not go as far as Islamabad would like it to go. Accordingly, Beijing will not—at least in the near term—replace Washington as the main provider of economic and military aid to Islamabad. And given the many domestic problems Pakistan has to confront and the nagging irritants in the bilateral relationship, China would not want to play that role.

---

At the same time, Islamabad knows that Beijing is not in a position to replace Washington as Pakistan's main patron. But it also knows that the Obama administration does not want to 'lose' Pakistan to China. If Pakistan were to go completely into China's orbit, this would facilitate but not guarantee China's unfeathered land access to the Indian Ocean, given the existing insurgency problems in Baluchistan and northern Pakistan. Notwithstanding these limitations, land access to the Indian Ocean would be a crucial geo-strategic asset for China in the long-term, particularly when coupled with Beijing's increasing involvement in Afghanistan and its friendly relations with Iran. Such a development would not necessarily promote stability in the Indian Ocean, but rather it would fuel the strategic competition between India and China. This would be a development that would not be welcomed and would be in no-one's interest, including Australia.

However, it is unlikely that Pakistan will break with the Americans even though Washington's conditions for military and economic aid to Pakistan under the 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill are stringent. These conditions include the Pakistani authorities having to demonstrate transparency in their governance and in their nuclear program and ending all ties with terrorist groups. Even though these are conditions the Chinese do not impose on Pakistan, Islamabad is not about to jettison the United States as its major strategic partner. The Pakistanis would have too much to lose in doing so. The United States is the only power which can afford to give it such large amounts of economic and military aid.

So building on the 2005 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations, China will continue to carefully and cautiously nurture the bilateral relationship as it has in the past. And regardless as to whether it is a civilian or a military government in power in Islamabad, it will also manage it pragmatically, as it has done for the last sixty years. Beijing values its relationship with Pakistan, but as China has gradually taken a more important and constructive role globally, it needs to increasingly balance its traditional ties with its future interests. And while this approach may not always be to Islamabad's liking or meet its perceived interests, it is good news for the future stability of the Indian Ocean region.

Claude Rakisits is Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Deakin University's School of Humanities and Social Studies. Claude is a regular commentator on political and security developments in Pakistan for the Australian and international media. The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions. claude.rakisits@deakin.edu.au.

---

88 On the whole, bilateral relations were warmer under General Pervez Musharraf than under President Zardari.
An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches

Peter Layton

There is a growing global interest in formulating national security strategies but their form, nature and usefulness depends greatly on the conceptual approach policymakers choose to base them on. The three different national security approaches of grand strategy, opportunism and risk management have different purposes, parameters and implications. The first major issue to be considered when devising an Australian National Security Strategy is which organising construct to adopt.

Globally there has been a recent surge in interest in states producing a national security strategy document.\(^1\) Australia has not been immune from this with the publishing of a National Security Statement\(^2\) and recent calls for this to be developed further into an Australian National Security Strategy.\(^3\) This genre has been strongly influenced by the American National Security Strategy that each American Presidential administration has been required to regularly publish since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The purpose of the American National Security Strategy is “for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security”.\(^4\)

The American National Security Strategy consciously adopts a grand strategy conceptual approach, but many others do not.\(^5\) Indeed some


\(^3\) Carl Ungerer, The Case For An Australian National Security Strategy (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011).


\(^5\) Examples include: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010); Dutch National Safety and Security Strategy (2007); The
documents titled as a ‘National Security Strategy’ are not strategies at all in the conventionally understood sense that a strategy is a 'way' by which 'means' are used to achieve desired ‘ends’. While perhaps colloquially titled as a ‘national security strategy’, these documents are based on organising constructs quite different to the ends-ways-means relationship of grand strategy. In such cases the term ‘national security strategy’ is simply a name not a statement of the document’s fundamental conceptual approach.

A national security strategy document does not have to follow the grand strategy conceptual approach. For some nations in particular circumstances there may be more suitable organising constructs to use. The conceptual approach a national security strategy takes however, greatly determines the nature and the utility of the document so this seemingly esoteric matter requires some thought.

There are three broad conceptual approaches—grand strategy, opportunism, and risk management—that policymakers can potentially use when formulating national security strategies. Such a separation may at first glance appear flawed as the alternatives of opportunism and risk management could be deemed to be grand strategies in themselves. The principal issue however, is the policy that animates these three distinct conceptual approaches. A grand strategy has a defined objective—a specific desired end—whereas opportunism and risk management instead await external events; they do not deliberately progress to some particular endpoint. Opportunist or risk management policies still require resources to be developed and allocated, but the purpose for which this is done is imprecise and generic; the emphasis is instead on the means. Opportunism and risk management are means-centred; grand strategy is ends-centred.

---


6 In this elegant, widely used formulation of strategy that Art Lykke devised the ‘ends’ are the objectives of a strategy (the “what” is to be accomplished), the ‘ways’ are the courses of action (“how” the ends are to be accomplished) and the ‘means’ are the resources used. See H. Richard Yarger, ‘Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model’, in J. Boone Bartholomew (ed.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy, 4th Edition* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), pp. 45-51.

7 It can reasonably be argued this is a somewhat arbitrary selection of alternatives and that there may be more. In countering this argument, empirically there are historical examples of grand strategy, opportunism and risk management, as this article will illustrate. More abstractly, this article later employs Foucault’s ‘ship of state’ metaphor and in this there seem only three alternatives for a metaphoric ship of state: sailing to some port (grand strategy), sailing to take advantage of fair winds (opportunism) and sailing to avoid difficulties (risk management). The remaining option of sailing to return to the port that was left seems illogical. While simple, such a high-level abstraction does suggest there are only a limited number of organising constructs possible.
Whichever option is chosen has significant implications that need to be considered before policymakers develop a national security strategy. This article examines the three alternative conceptual approaches of grand strategy, opportunism, and risk management and proposes that, on balance, the grand strategy option is preferred for the first Australian National Security Strategy.

**Grand Strategy: An Ends-centred Conceptual Approach**

The modern understanding of ‘grand strategy’ arose in the 20th century and reflected the complexities of preparing for, and waging, large-scale modern wars. The attribute that makes strategy ‘grand’ is that grand strategy concerns not just the “use made of means … to achieve desired ends”\(^8\) but also the development of the ‘means’ used. Grand strategy is concerned with assembling and marshalling the material and non-material resources needed to build and sustain the means needed to implement the grand strategy. These resources can be accessed domestically or internationally, from private or government sources, or in some complex combination but the manner in which this is accomplished can appreciably influence the grand strategic outcome.

In the Cold War, the Soviet Union chose a grand strategy that made it into a ‘garrison state’ with emphasis given to military preparation but at significant detriment to society and the ultimate collapse of the state.\(^9\) Conversely, the United States struck a better balance between military preparedness, long-term economic growth and societal prosperity. The United States became a ‘contract state’, limiting extraction and mobilisation to very specific areas of the economy and becoming reliant upon private enterprise for the necessary research, development and manufacture of armaments.\(^10\) The American grand strategy as it evolved imposed progressively less of a burden on its society and this gave the United States greater resilience and robustness than the increasingly brittle Soviet Union. America better balanced grand strategy demands and power creation, and in due course prevailed. Including the development of the means used makes grand strategy distinctly different to not only strategy, but also to foreign policy and statecraft.

Grand strategy has additional concerns in ways that further delineate it. Firstly, in grand strategy the means used are comprehensive, embracing a diverse array of instruments of national power rather than as strategy does, focusing on a single type of instrument. In particular, a grand strategy directs the instruments of national power, usefully categorised as:

\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 341-51.
“information, diplomacy, economics and military (words, deals, goods and weapons.)”\textsuperscript{11} These instruments of national power are much wider than whole-of-government (also called inter-agency). Rather grand strategy takes a whole-of-nation approach that includes domestic and international private, commercial and governmental resources.

Secondly, grand strategy integrates the application of these diverse means with their development and allocation into a coherent, cohesive whole. In a conceptual sense grand strategy is a system: a set of interdependent elements where change in some elements or their relations produces change across the system, the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours different from the constituent parts, and “outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations”\textsuperscript{12} Inherently, a grand strategy can only be understood in its totality not as set of disaggregated elements or units.

Lastly, the expansive and integrative scope of grand strategy is necessary given its ambitious purpose; a grand strategy seeks to impose a preferred state of order on some aspect of the future. It is about taking a planned series of successive actions with the intent of constructing a favoured future by attempting “to impose coherence and predictability on an inherently disorderly environment composed of thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities”\textsuperscript{13} States use grand strategic approaches deliberately and with forethought to try to build their desired futures.

Grand strategies are thus an instrument of modern governments used to achieve particular ends; they are in a broad sense a form of governance states can decide to use in certain circumstances. In discussing such matters, the French political thinker Michel Foucault wrote of the ‘ship of state’ and this metaphor remains useful when thinking about abstract matters like grand strategy and its alternatives. Foucault wrote of capturing a ship that having left a safe harbour with cargo is bound for a distant port; he wrote of its governance that:

It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also the boat and the cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port…”\textsuperscript{14}

Captaining involves purposefully steering the ship of state, and all the people and material of the ship, through various travails to a known and desired destination. In this metaphor government has a defined end in mind when managing the state but if the end is unknown or uncertain, can the ship of state then be properly steered? If an ends-centered approach is impractical, the use of a means-centered conceptual approach may be necessary.

Means-centred Conceptual Approaches

**RISK MANAGEMENT**

Under a risk management conceptual approach the intent is not some specific objective but instead to lessen the impact of any of the chosen security risks that actually eventuate.¹⁵ Foucault’s ship of state is not being steered towards any particular destination, instead attention is directed towards minimising any harm done to the sailors, the cargo and the ship by the sea’s elemental forces. With a risk management approach the ship as it exists is simply being safeguarded from the intrinsic risks involved in sailing the sea. There is no well-crafted grand strategic plan guiding the ship of state towards a safe harbour, and neither is the captain taking advantage of favourable opportunities to make the crew more secure or more prosperous.

Security studies academic Karen Petersen has identified three different ‘cultures’ of risk management: the first is informed by actuarial and economic theory and argues that risk can be measured and consequently controlled; the second asserts that risk is a social construct with the choice of risks to be managed based on cultural perceptions and values; while the third contends that risk represents a modern discursive construction, continually changing because of political struggles and decisions.¹⁶ The risk management approach discussed in this article is derived from the first: the economic culture that weighs the vulnerability, the consequences and the likelihood of a risk eventuating against the cost-benefits.¹⁷ The risk management approach of the economic culture has an investment logic, although this is not an end-means relationship in a resources prioritisation or allocation sense as risk management assumes no likely future or desired end.

Under the risk management approach, the contemporary international and domestic environment is seen as complex with multiple interdependences and cross-linkages that make the future inherently non-linear and

---


¹⁷ The alternative actuarial culture based on the historical analysis of previous calamities and the spreading of costs across many underpins insurance calculations, but is inappropriate for national security where risk events are unique, relatively rare and hard to predict.
unpredictable. As this complexity increases more unexpected consequences arise from actions taken; society generates its own risks.\textsuperscript{18} This reflexive nature of risks means problems need to be managed as they become apparent, rather than solved. Knowing new unexpected risks will arise, and that there is always a certain level of residual risk from known factors, governments must retain the flexibility and the resources to deal with a succession of unforeseen events. Security studies scholar Mikkel Rasmussen observes that:

\begin{quote}
politics is no longer about initiating a social, economic or political process and bringing an end to a particular problem, as Foucault’s ship metaphor implied. Governments no longer master ends, only means. Politics is about managing the process. In Foucault’s metaphor, the rationale of government is to keep the ship of state afloat.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Risk management is therefore all about loss control; if risks eventuate there will be losses and associated costs but risk management is intended to control these to tolerable and manageable levels.\textsuperscript{20} This is quite different to governments using grand strategies to achieve defined and specific ends, as the Dutch National Safety and Security Strategy and recent Australian Defence White Papers demonstrate.

The Dutch National Safety and Security Strategy aims to prepare the country to manage internal and external threats that could potentially cause serious social disruption. Wide-ranging human security threats are considered including climate change, transnational crime, Muslim radicalisation, societal polarisation, cyber-disruption, economic crises and terrorism.\textsuperscript{21} These threats are assessed in terms of risks to vital interests, prioritised in terms of possible consequences and assessed likelihood, and incorporated into a national risk assessment. The Netherlands Government then determines which particular risks will be addressed through building and sustaining the necessary national capabilities to manage these risks should they eventuate.\textsuperscript{22} The overall intent is to reduce the impact of the selected risks, if they eventuate, down to a level considered both acceptable and controllable.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
Recent Australian defence policies have also adopted risk management approaches as a way of selecting specific Australian Defence Force investment options. The 2000 Defence White Paper handled uncertainty in the strategic environment by employing a strategic risk management concept which determined that Australian Defence Force capabilities would be developed for the risks of a direct armed attack on the country and internal “lower-level” conflicts in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. The 2009 Defence White Paper continued this approach explicitly noting that given uncertainty, “the key problem in defence planning is strategic risk”. In implementing risk management, this later White Paper carefully selected to concentrate available resources on addressing only one risk: a direct armed attack on the country. These two White Papers focused on building means and did not actively seek to develop a future order in which the nominated risks would not eventuate. Instead the risks were seen as enduring, and against which the only option was to be able to limit the damage inflicted to a manageable level should they occur. What the acceptable damage levels were was not elaborated upon, rather the stress was on developing military means.

The major outcome of risk management is consequently resilience. Foucault’s ‘ship of state’ at some time will hit the rocks but taking specific actions before this could help the passengers, cargo, crew or ship to function post-shock. From an organisational perspective, resilience objectives can vary from building capabilities and capacities to survive shocks, to continuing operation in the presence of shocks, to recovering from shocks to the original form, or to absorbing shocks and evolving in response. Countries will always be sensitive to some stresses but resilience seeks to reduce

---

23 The White Paper noted that the military forces developed to meet these two chosen risks could be used selectively and carefully for other tasks but force structure decisions were to be driven by these two risks. For the rationale behind adopting a Strategic Risk Management approach see: Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, October 2000), pp. 6-7.


25 Ibid., p. 41, paras 5.1 to 5.6. There were though some occasional glimpses of a grand strategy approach in brief discussions of preferred future international orders e.g. Ibid., p. 96, para 11.20.


states’ vulnerability, in terms of ongoing costs and impacts, to the shocks that do occur.\textsuperscript{28}

**OPPORTUNISM**

An alternative means-centred national security conceptual approach is opportunism where a state’s policies change, shift and evolve as circumstances require. The intent is to seize opportunities and address challenges as they arise. The ship of state is simply sailing on the sea; it has not left a known port nor is it headed towards a desired landfall but rather the captain—the government—is simply seeking to take advantage of any favourable winds. Echoing Foucault in an apt description of this approach, Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, observed near the highpoint of the British Empire that: “English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions.”\textsuperscript{29} It is important though to realise that in opportunism there is an element of carefully and deliberately exploiting others.

Japan is a country seemingly able to succeed through opportunistically adapting to changing international circumstances and exploiting evolving situations to the nation’s advantage. Asian historian Kenneth Pyle believes that since the Meiji Restoration Japanese leaders have been reactive to the forces shaping the modern international system, referring to these as *sekai no taisei* (trends of the world), *jisei* (trends of the time) or *hitsuzen no ikioi* (inevitable force of circumstance).\textsuperscript{30} Japanese leaders are expected to judge the trends, react to events and to seize the opportunities presented. International relations academic Kosaka Masataká concludes that:

> the task for the Japanese is to adapt wisely to the international situation to secure its national interests, and not try to change or create the mysterious framework.\textsuperscript{31}

Journalist Paul Kelly saw former Australian Prime Minister John Howard similarly eschewing grand strategies and instead adopting an approach of responding to rapidly changing events and devising Australian foreign policy accordingly. The Howard Government (1996-2007) took advantage of many of the international challenges and opportunities that unexpectedly arose after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Kelly sees the deepening of the Australia-US

\textsuperscript{28} Keohane and Nye usefully conceived as sensitivity being the liability to costly effects imposed by external events, while vulnerability was the ability to make timely changes that reduced the impact of these shocks when they occurred: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd edn (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), pp. 12-6.


alliance that occurred not as the result of a long-term Australian plan but rather as a “study in political opportunism”.  

At its extreme though, opportunism can become simply events-driven with little consideration given to exploiting others. In analysing the apparently incoherent grand strategy the United States followed in the Persian Gulf during 1972-2005, strategic studies academic Steve Yetiv decided that American actions in fact represented the absence of a grand strategy. He called the approach ‘reactive engagement’ observing that while some may see in the random and erratic approaches the United States has followed evidence of some master plan, closer inspection reveals simply a continuing reaction to unexpected events and surprises.  

The Key Differences

The three conceptual approaches have distinct differences that are significant when thinking about formulating a national security strategy. Firstly and most importantly, the grand strategy approach tries to take you where you wish to go; the grand strategy embraced may not succeed but the intention in using this approach is to reach a particular desired objective.

By comparison, with opportunism you only go where others take you. As noted earlier Salisbury described British policy as “floating lazily downstream” but this immediately raises questions of whose stream, taking the nation where and how fast? Although seeking to exploit others, the state using opportunism does not initiate events and must accept the boundaries set by others; the opportunist state becomes a part of another state’s project and is responsive to that. The other more activist state sets the agenda and determines the framework of the debates cognisant of its own goals and capabilities. The opportunist state can only be ready to react as circumstances dictate; the ship of state in this approach is actually captained by another.

Risk management is different again in that the state awaits expected events. A risk management approach guides actions to moderate the impact of calamities deemed unavoidable. All countries at some time suffer misfortunes but making preparations can reduce their impact. Under a risk management approach a state waits for the adverse events anticipated to occur. Of course an advantage of the risk management approach is that the feared risk may never eventuate, no action is then needed and thus

---


determining the approach’s success in any qualitative or quantitative sense is impossible.

Secondly, using the grand strategy approach some form of resource prioritisation is possible. There are defined ends thus an attempt can be made to rationally develop, distribute and allocate the means in a coherent manner. This is not just for the tangible resources such as manpower, money and material but also for the intangibles like legitimacy and a state’s related soft power. A grand strategy can moreover shape means beyond the state in the wider society, in non-governmental organisations, in commercial businesses and practices, and internationally. Over time a state can have the most useful and appropriate means available and mobilised to support its chosen goals. A further resource prioritisation benefit in the grand strategy approach is that in having defined ends there is a benchmark against which to judge progress; over time the efficiency and effectiveness of the grand strategy can be evaluated, unlike the other two approaches.

With opportunism being means-centred, but with the future utility of these means being unclear, resource prioritisation is inherently problematic. There are two potential options: either develop the means in a manner that gives the most flexibility of who to join at some future time as events evolve, or determine early whose specific grand strategy will be taken advantage of and develop the means appropriate to that.

In the first option the means developed would stress diversity and variety to give the greatest flexibility; a broad set of capabilities would be sought but each means would not need to be quantitatively large. When the moment arrived these means could be further developed in terms of scale as proved necessary. This is similar to Australia’s core force structure approach of the 1970s where a diverse but small defence force was maintained with the intention that those parts that actually proved useful in some future contingency would be expanded as needed at some future time. The 1975 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy declared that: ‘The core force should be a force ... with relevant skills and equipment capable of timely expansion to ... meet a developing situation.” Such an approach allows considerable flexibility in choosing whose grand strategy to join, allowing decisions to be delayed until events necessitated and the circumstances were clear.

---

34 The concept was criticised at the time on the grounds that in applying its logic the future, fully expanded, force structure was inherently unknowable and so the concept was unusable for determining resource priorities. Paul Dibb, ‘The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds.), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), p. 16.

In the second option of an early decision being made on the foreign grand strategy to be embraced, the means could be developed and optimised for inclusion in the chosen over-arching design. The precise time of when to formally and materially join the other’s grand strategy would be the key remaining judgement and be determined by assessments of when the greatest opportunities presented themselves. The means in this model while qualitatively narrow and selective could become numerically larger if necessary. In some respects this seems to have occurred in the evolution of the Australian Special Forces’ force structure in the last decade when the Howard Government decided to adopt an opportunistic approach to defence matters. As the Special Forces, that had been developed to be interoperable with US forces, were proving operationally useful in the American-led Iraq and Afghanistan Wars they were significantly expanded. This did not reflect the requirements of the risk management approach that the government’s formal Defence White Paper articulated, but instead the demands of the extant American grand strategy.

Resource prioritisation is also problematic in the risk management approach. A risk management table that guides the development of national means can simply be a long list of possible threats that could occur at some future, indefinite time. The likelihood of any particular event occurring is a matter of judgement and when assessing the impact of a disaster the tendency is for a ‘worse case’ analysis to be recommended. As Lord Salisbury further observed: “If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the military, nothing is safe.” The selection of risk is accordingly a political decision; it is inherently a matter for judgment not quantitative assessment. This is fertile ground for debate, disagreement and bureaucratic manoeuvring; less likely risks that all can agree on may be selected almost by default. The risk from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was chosen as the most threatening and needed precautionary action purportedly because it was the only risk all the main actors in the US government and bureaucracy could agree on.

There also remain inherent problems in resource prioritisation that arise from organisational arrangements and bureaucratic imperatives that the risk management approach concept intrinsically does not address. The use of the Dutch National Safety and Security Strategy based on the risk management approach has improved inter-departmental awareness but translating this into coordinated funding decisions that develop new

capabilities has been problematic. Security studies scholars Sharon Caudle and Stephan de Spiegeleire observe that:

The [risk] assessment itself is broadly accepted, but translating priorities into capability requirements remains difficult—for reasons of methodology and bureaucratic politics. … The Netherlands ministries are independent, but security requires their interdependent action, even though they may secure national security funding for their issue areas. An overall need is for each ministry to trust the other as the Work Programme is implemented and be able to see the connections they all have to security instead of stove-piped responses to their own responsibilities. 39

The British National Security Strategy that also uses a risk management approach was similarly determined to have problems in the setting of resource priorities. 40 With only limited Ministerial buy-in to the National Security Strategy and budgets held by individual ministries, a major “debate is how to relate resources to the strategy”. 41

Inertia may be the easiest option. The balance between the various risks is difficult to determine in any quantitative way and for many states it may be politically, economically and socially easier to simply retain the status quo resource allocation. The extant resource distribution reflects past difficulties and bureaucratic battles and thus the onus of proof is on those who would propose that new risks are more likely and more terrible than the old proven harms. Disrupting an old order can lead to bureaucratic dissension and inside experts marshalling domestic constituents. Moreover, being by its nature scenario-based, a risk management approach can be bureaucratically gamed with the probability and impacts of a risk eventuating adjusted to give the departmentally desired resource allocation. In a risk management approach staying with the current prioritisation may be the easiest and—given no one knows if a risk may eventuate or not—the most appropriate of all.

Thirdly, the three conceptual approaches have different implications for the overall quantum of resourcing. The concept of grand strategy is built around the assumption that a state has limited resources that need to be focused on specific and articulated needs. This suggests it is most appropriate for

40 Mark Phillips, ‘Policy-Making in Defence and Security’, The RUSI Journal, vol. 157, no. 1 (February/ March 2012), pp. 32-3. Note that this discussion here relates to prioritising scarce resources not to the size a budget should be. The UK Government’s assessment that the principal threat to national well-being was economic led to a decision that the British Defence budget would be reduced by 7.5 percent in real terms from the previous year. This guideline shaped the 2010 National Security Strategy but did not in itself determine the priorities for the reduced funding. Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Smart Muddling Through: Rethinking UK National Strategy Beyond Afghanistan’, International Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2 (2012), p. 215.
states with constrained resources including, some have suggested, states with declining resources.42

Risk management on the other hand implicitly assumes a well-resourced state. The conventional approach is to make a list of threats, rank them and then fund the mitigation of those risks for which there is sufficient resources. All risks inherently cannot be addressed as US Defense Secretary Bob Gates in addressing how large the US defence budget would need to be to mitigate every risk observed: “Nobody lives in that world … you are never going to get to zero threat. You could spend $2 trillion and you’d never get to zero threat.”43 At the other extreme, without significant resource availability most risks will go unaddressed making the logic of this approach tenuous. In this, risk management does not actively seek a better future order where these risks are eliminated and so they will reoccur, or at least reappear on the risk list indefinitely. The approach of not taking positive action to eradicate the identified risks—continually treating the symptom not the cause—is inherently resource intensive. In the matter of how much is enough, in risk management there is, almost by design, never enough.

Opportunism though can have the least resource requirements. The state can leverage off another’s efforts and contribute only what it wishes to from what it has available. Opportunism is inherently a matter of choice so an opportunistic state can do as much or as little as it wishes in some particular situation depending on the outcomes it seeks.

Fourthly, there are differences in the degree of coherence across a government or a society that the three conceptual approaches can bring, with grand strategy inherently offering more than opportunism and risk management can. A grand strategy is purposefully constructed as “the overall mosaic … [that] provides the key ingredients of clarity, coherence, consistency over time”.44 As a grand strategic concept cascades downwards though a governmental hierarchy, objectives and goals become progressively more narrowly and more precisely defined as a way of directing and controlling the subordinate levels.

In a grand strategy the ways and the ends are elaborated upon; opportunism and risk management though have no ‘ways’ and no defined ‘ends’, they simply address the means. This is not to say that given a national security approach of opportunism or risk management that coordination between the various Departments of State in terms of how they manage their respective means is not possible. Such coordination though being bottom-up and

based around pre-determined resource allocations is at the more tactical level of administration and may be relatively ineffective. A recent assessment of current national security coordination activities between Australian federal departments determined that high-level guidance and ministerial buy-in was essential. This guidance and buy-in is gained potentially more readily from the grand strategy approach with its top-down and prioritised resource distribution method of imposing coherence.

The vexed role of the Australian defence industry can further illustrate this difference in imposing coherence. A grand strategy determines where local industry fits into the overall scheme and how it should be exploited and developed; defence industry for better or worse is driven by the grand strategy, as are the Departments of State. Under opportunism though that involves fitting into others’ plans, the stress is either on having a broad set of means (albeit thin) and so favouring the lowest cost solutions available globally, or in having a smaller set of capabilities (albeit deeper) able to easily plug-and-play with another’s force structure and therefore favouring purchases from the state whose grand strategy is being exploited. Risk management is somewhat similar in that if extensive risk lists are chosen, then low cost solutions globally sourced may be favoured, but if few risks are identified and there are some particular aspects unique to Australia, local industry may be selectively engaged. In comparing the alternatives, under a grand strategy approach local industry is driven by the articulated national objectives whereas in the opportunist and risk management approaches industry is driven more by the concerns of the individual sub-national strategies of the lower level Departments of State. Imposing coherence across government and society is easier under a grand strategy organising construct.

Lastly, there is a marked difference in intellectual requirements. Grand strategy is intellectually taxing, not just in the formulation stage but also in the on-going implementation as this is continuously reviewed and adjusted to keep ‘the ship of state’ tacking towards the desired landfall. In putting grand strategies into practice the initial thinking needs to continually evolve as circumstances change; a grand strategy should always be considered a work-in-progress as it progresses towards its goal. Strategic analyst Frederick Kagan observes that:

> [A] grand strategy is … not a plan, but a process of … developing clear objectives, understanding available resources … and then putting resources against tasks in an iterative fashion, adjusting objectives, approaches, and

46 Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, ‘Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent’, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 6 (1985), p. 271. Importantly, though this progressive evolution is different to opportunism, which has no specific ‘ends’. Changes made to a grand strategy as it is implemented over time reflect improvements made to the ‘ways’ (the courses of action) employed, not a change in the desired ‘ends’.
Few states however, have readily available the educated and skilled staff able to achieve such a protracted intellectual effort.

By comparison opportunism is simpler in relying upon other states to provide the intellect although the opportunist state needs to be mentally and politically agile when the time comes to both be in sync with the other state's grand strategy and to try to achieve some of its own desires as well. Risk management is easier again needing only the periodic compilation of possible risks, no need for continual strategic adjustment to keep on-course and a simple focus on means almost independent of external factors.

**Which Should Australia Choose?**

The three different national security conceptual approaches have different purposes, assumptions and implications. The choice of which to apply depends on the context and the judgment of the policymakers involved however this is a real choice with real consequences. The three distinct organising constructs each have differing objectives, usefulness in prioritising resources, overall resource requirements, ability to impose coherence across government and society, and necessary levels of skilled people to formulate and implement.

In the Australian context the present development of a White Paper on how to respond to the economic growth of Asia is instructive. The terms of reference of this forthcoming paper suggest it will take an opportunist conceptual approach; these terms state that:

> The focus will be on opportunities to increase the economic and other net benefits to Australia from the global economic and strategic shift to Asia in the short, medium and long term.\(^4\)

Asia, in particular China, is gaining significant economic power relative to Western nations and Australia is seen as needing to position itself to maximise its benefits from this. Chinese growth is seen as no accident rather being a deliberate, purposeful transformation.\(^5\) The Asian White Paper therefore seeks to determine the policy settings that will allow Australia to take best advantage of the successful Chinese grand strategy.

---


In reacting to China’s economic growth the stress, as the opportunist approach would recommend, is on developing the means through deepening and broadening them. The Issues Paper advises that for Australia the task is to reinforce our strengths, while also expanding our areas of comparative advantage in new sectors and markets. We will need to adapt and innovate … as well as building new skills and capabilities.  

This is very much a means-centred organising construct where Australia is responsive to the actions of others.

The Issues Paper notes that the Asian White Paper will in time be complemented by other reviews including the Cyber White Paper and the next Defence White Paper. Certainly it would be advantageous for any future Australian National Security Strategy to be similarly compatible with the Asian White Paper, rather than working at cross-purposes to it. Opportunism would then seem to be favoured in a future National Security Strategy. Pragmatically, opportunism offers great flexibility as no far-reaching, long-term policies need be adopted, instead policymakers can wait and make quick, short-term decisions when the facts are more fully known; intrinsically difficult decisions on ends and ways can be deferred to later times and other policymakers.

In seeking to take advantage of events and exploit the grand strategies of others though a central decision is who to join? Such decisions could be left open to evolve and emerge as circumstances dictate; in other words to adopt British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston’s position of “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests”. Alternatively, the national security strategy could choose another state’s grand strategy in the near-term thereby gaining some certainty, but at the cost of perhaps not being able to switch and make use of some different state’s grand strategy later. To extend Foucault’s metaphor, changing ships of state while tacking could be perilous. Making a decision either way though has significant implications for the development of the means to be either a broad, thin set of capabilities or a narrower, deeper, set.

There is an implicit sense that Australia has already made this choice and determined to join America’s national security strategy in particular as this relates to the core matter of China. This could be difficult as the Chinese grand strategy is held to be at odds in many respects with the emerging American national security strategy. Aligning the Asian White Paper with China and the Australian National Security Strategy with the United States looks intrinsically problematic while a nascent ‘security dilemma’ is building.

---

between the two nations.\textsuperscript{52} There are real tensions in simultaneously seeking prosperity from China and security from the United States using two disconnected opportunistic approaches that seek to exploit both nations. Adopting this type of organising construct for a future Australian national security strategy seems to present real difficulties in terms of incoherence with other national objectives. There is a viable opportunist approach sub-option however, in deliberately choosing a middle ground between China and the United States while awaiting events that make it clearer whom to exploit and then orienting opportunistic national prosperity and security strategies around that decision. Australian strategic and political culture would though find this sub-option quite challenging to conceive and implement.

Considering the other approaches, a risk management solution may appear the easiest, depending on the risk chosen. From a national security strategy viewpoint, choosing the single risk of attacks on Australia is the least controversial although it strains credibility in some dimensions. While some attacks such as those using cyber means may be a realistic risk to address, for many years a military attack has been seen as barely credible; with the steady deepening of democracy in Indonesia it has become even more so.\textsuperscript{53} Such a risk management approach may expend significant resources on developing unnecessary means and provide little tangible benefit; is this the best use of scarce national resources? Risk management approaches are difficult to evaluate and to hold decision-makers to account unless the risk is realised, making this approach politically and bureaucratically attractive, albeit suffering from a democratic deficit.\textsuperscript{54}

By default then a grand strategy approach is favoured however, as has been discussed this is a complex endeavour that makes some substantial, ongoing intellectual demands. An advantage though in using this approach is that a national security strategy could be developed that was compatible with both the Asian White Paper and the emerging American national security strategy. Importantly, the goals of prosperity and security are actually complementary and interrelated and should not be in conflict; a grand strategy approach could resolve this contemporary dilemma. There is also a possibility that Australia may end up where the country wishes to be in the future, an outcome that would only be serendipitous using either of other

\textsuperscript{52} The term’s originator John Hertz explained that in a security dilemma situation states “Striving to attain security … are driven to acquire more and more [military] power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, \textit{World Politics} vol. 2, no. 2 (January 1950), p. 157.

\textsuperscript{53} Australia is now ringed by democratic states and, while some may be fragile, almost the only ‘truism’ of international relations theory is that democracies do not attack other democracies.

two approaches. While the formulation and ongoing development of a grand strategy would face political and bureaucratic headwinds, the potential returns on the investment may be worth the trouble.

The first major issue to be considered when devising a national security strategy is not the strategy but rather which conceptual approach is to be adopted: grand strategy, opportunism or risk management. In deciding on an organising construct, the key question for policymakers is whether they see the Australian ship of state as being captained towards some desired landfall, exploiting favourable winds, or simply avoiding damage from the sea’s elemental forces. Upon this fundamental decision rests the form, nature and usefulness of the first Australian National Security Strategy.

Peter Layton is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales researching a framework for use by policymakers when formulating new grand strategies. In 2011 he completed a fellowship at the European University Institute and has taught grand strategy at the US National Defense University. Peter has extensive experience in defence matters. grandstrategy@rocketmail.com
Notes for Contributors

The focus of the journal is primarily on future security challenges rather than on current politico-military analysis. Security Challenges aims to contribute to innovative and practical thinking about security challenges of major importance for Australia as well as the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The journal's website can be found at www.securitychallenges.org.au.

Possible topics of interest include but are not limited to: emerging security threats and challenges in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean; the security role of the major powers in 2010-30; the management of Australia’s security relationship with the United States and other allies in 2010-2020; strategies for Australia’s relationships with its neighbours; Australia’s and the region’s resource and economic security in 2015, the challenge of defence transformation in Australia and other countries; the potential for concepts such as Network-centric Warfare and Effects-based Strategy to enhance security; and strategies for managing and combating international terrorism.

Security Challenges welcomes submissions from any source. Early career scholars and new strategic thinkers are particularly encouraged to submit. Authors are strongly encouraged to submit manuscripts via email to editor@kokodafoundation.org, preferably in MS Word format. The receipt of manuscripts will be acknowledged within 7 days.

Security Challenges contains comments and opinions as well as regular articles. Recommended length for comments and opinions is 1000-3000 words, for articles 4000-7000 words. Articles exceeding 8000 words are unlikely to be published. An abstract of no more than 100 words and an ‘about the author’ note of no more than 50 words should accompany the submission.

Each manuscript must be accompanied by a statement that it has not been published elsewhere and that it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. Authors are responsible for obtaining permission to reproduce copyrighted material from other sources.

The refereeing policy for articles requires that the anonymity of the author of the article is preserved. The anonymity of referees, whose comments may be forwarded to the authors, is likewise preserved. The review process normally takes about 4-8 weeks. The editor is responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; the opinions expressed in articles published and the accuracy of statements made therein are solely the responsibility of the individual authors. The editor disclaims responsibility for statements, either of fact or opinion, made by the contributors. The editor retains the right to condense articles.

Authors receive three free copies of the issue in which their article/comment/opinion appears as well as an electronic version of the issue in PDF-format.

All parts of the manuscript should be type-written and double-spaced. The manuscript pages should be numbered consecutively throughout the paper. Authors should follow the style used in this issue. A detailed style guide can be found on the journal’s website at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCStyleGuide.pdf. It is the author’s responsibility to ensure that the submitted manuscript complies with the style guide. The editor reserves the right to reject manuscripts which do not accurately follow form and style requirements.
Publications Order Form

All prices include GST and postage and handling within Australia.
For overseas postage costs please contact the Kokoda Foundation manager.

Kokoda Foundation Annual Membership
Kokoda Foundation annual membership entitles you to copies of Kokoda publications as they are released. Full membership is $100.00, online membership is $80.00 and student membership is $50.00. Corporate membership and Chairman’s Circle membership is also available. For more information see our website or contact the Kokoda Foundation manager.

Kokoda Foundation Publications
☐ Yearly subscription AUD $180.00
(includes 4 issues of Security Challenges and 4-5 Kokoda Papers)

Security Challenges
☐ 4 x issues (yearly subscription) AUD $100.00
☐ 1 x issue AUD $ 27.00
Vol. No. Yr.

Kokoda Papers
☐ 3-5 papers (yearly subscription) AUD $ 90.00
Individual Papers AUD $ 22.00
☐ KP 15-Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030 (2011)
☐ KP 14-Optimising Australia’s Response to the Cyber Challenge (2010)
☐ KP 13-Australia’s Place in Space: Toward A National Space Policy (2011)
☐ KP 11-Australia’s Future Surface Combatants Force 2030 (2010)
☐ KP 9-Wealth of a Nation: Preparing Australia’s Human Capital for 2030 (2009)

Papers 1-8 are out of print and are available to download on our website at www.kokodafoundation.org

Payment Details
Name………………………………………………………………………………….
Address……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
Email…………………………………………………………………………………
Phone (M)…………………………(W)…………………………(H)………………
I wish to make payments by ☐ cheque ☐ credit card ☐ money order

Credit Card Details
Card Type ☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard ☐ Amex
Card No.……………………………………………………………………………….
Expiry date /
Amount AUD………………………………………………………………………..
Card Holder Name…………………………………………………………………
Signature of Card Holder…………………………………………………………..

Kokoda Foundation Fax: +61 (0)2 6169 3019
Email: info@kokodafoundation.org
Contents

Norifumi Namatame
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence: Debates and Difficulties .............. 1

Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter
The Transformation of the JASDF’s Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities for Air and Missile Defence ........................................... 19

Anna Samson
A ‘Friendly Elephant’ in the Room?
The Strategic Foundations of China’s Multilateral Engagement in Asia ................................................................. 57

Claude Rakisits
Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011:
A Deepening but Cautious Partnership............................................. 83

Peter Layton
An Australian National Security Strategy:
Competing Conceptual Approaches.................................................. 103

About the Kokoda Foundation

The Kokoda Foundation has been established as an independent, not-for-profit think tank to research, and foster innovative thinking on, Australia’s future security challenges. Visit our website at www.kokodafoundation.org

ISSN  1833-1459

Cover Picture: J/FLR-4A at Miyako-jima, courtesy of Desmond Ball.