Effects-Based Operations: An Underpinning Philosophy for Australia’s External Security?¹

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One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapons, the finely honed blade.

Carl von Clausewitz

Introduction

It would seem from history that conflict, in its broadest sense, is an intrinsic part of the human condition.² We seem to thrive on it. Documented history reflects our predilection for it. Conflict is a consistent theme flowing through the multi-dimensional matrix of human affairs, and one that enmeshes both the individual and the group. Conflict shapes belief systems, and time permits the evolution of old enmity to new forms. None of this is meant to imply that people actively choose conflict through preference, although some do. But whatever its form or context, conflict is something that occurs between people, acting singly or collectively.

While it is people that instigate and maintain the will to fight, at the level of state-based security, external conflict is generally prosecuted by channelling power through the shared norms of the international system. This is done by the state under the guise of external affairs. Typically, national power is

¹ The piece was written as an essay as part of my Master of Defence Studies program at the University of Canberra in 2001. At the time, I was a strategist in Headquarters, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and I was working on a series of projects directly for the Chief of Air Force. These projects were intended to ensure that the RAAF entered the 21st century fit for purpose, that is, relevant to Government’s needs with regard to the emerging security environment. That work is still underway today, but has been extended across the Australian Defence Force and into the national security arena. It is interesting to consider the piece in the context of the War on Terror, as it was written before 9/11. It still stands up and, indeed, while there is still a way to go, the Australian Government is steadily integrating national security through defence and security actors to achieve its preferred ends. Today, the term Effects-Based Strategy has been replaced by the term a ‘National Effects-Based Approach’ but the intent remains as postulated in my piece.

exercised through the political, economic, diplomatic and military dimensions.\textsuperscript{3} These are exercised by Government to ensure the security of the state and its citizens. However, in exercising power, practitioners of strategy can tend to focus on the mores of the compartment in which they are expert, rather than on the overall effect sought.\textsuperscript{4} Often, this bias is intrinsic to the practitioner’s culture, and not intentionally malicious. But the bias is there, and it can blur a state’s external focus and disperse its energy.

There is an ostensibly simple way to address the problem of compartmental bias toward the conflict space: change the culture and its sustaining mechanisms away from a focus on compartments and their associated tools and toward a focus on the larger intent, on the effect sought. In this paradigm, effect is underpinned by the tools of power, but is not a slave to them. Because if there is one thing that has not changed throughout the history of conflict it is this: conflict can only be terminated as it was started, and that is by people. Specifically, the overarching goal in all conflict is to have the adversary cease the behaviour you find unacceptable, preferably on terms favourable to you. Those dimensions of national power exercised in external affairs are the means by which a state achieves objectives, but they are not the ends of themselves.

From the perspective of state-based external conflict, the target for effect is ideally the will of the adversary. This represents classical political warfare theory.\textsuperscript{5} It is also the essence of an emerging paradigm for state-security and war-fighting: Effects-Based Operations (EBO). As discussed, it is people who direct the systems and operations employed to represent conflict. The imperative behind EBO then is to attack the will of the adversary by targeting, directly or indirectly, his physical, reason and belief domains. If strategy is ‘the development and use of all resources in peace and war in support of national policies to secure victory’,\textsuperscript{6} then EBO is a philosophy to focus the use of state resources to pursue national goals and secure national objectives.

Much of the work in EBO and its related disciplines is US-originated, and most of it has been generated by military or quasi-military agencies. All of the work is nascent; the subject area is being vigorously explored. While

\textsuperscript{3} The Air Power Manual, (3rd ed.), Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998, para 2.3. This is a simple representation of a national power model, but it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. There are many other perspectives on national power that can be explored in the literature.


\textsuperscript{6} M Handel, op cit, p. 36.
broad agreement about EBO and related concepts is coalescing, no authoritative definitions or relationships have been decided upon. However, none of that impacts on the basic validity of EBO as a concept, nor its applicability to the Australian context. As well, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has been developing EBO from the Australian perspective as the basis for national security and joint war-fighting. This work is being undertaken in partnership with other actors within the Australian Defence Organization, and it will inform some of the analysis undertaken in this article.

A public domain literature search reveals a significant and growing body of credible, contemporary work on EBO, on the debate as to whether a new security paradigm is emerging, and on information age rather than industrial age conflict. This article will explore some of the ideas and intentions that underpin this subject matter. Specifically, it will assess the applicability of EBO as an underpinning philosophy for Australia’s external security. To do that, it will explore the imperative for a more holistic approach to security in Australia to address the broadening threat and vulnerability base. A model of power germane to state security operations will be presented that is sympathetic to an effects-based philosophy. The concept of EBO and its antecedents will be discussed, and finally an assessment of the utility of EBO as a philosophy to guide the development of Australia’s national strategy, security policy and security operations in will be made.

National Security and National Strategy

From the perspective of national security, the definition of strategy has been long debated, probably because strategy is contextual. Murray and Grimsley argue that, implicitly, strategy is an emergent process, ‘a constant adaptation and shifting to shifting conditions and circumstances where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate.’ While the original interpretation pertained to ‘generalship’ - the art and science of planning war - modern interpretations are far broader. Murray and Grimsley go on to argue that contemporary strategy serves a wider purpose; that of orchestrating the elements of national power to achieve national goals and further national interests.

Handel has a succinct definition that reflects the modern idiom: ‘strategy is the development and use of all resources in peace and war in support of

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national policies to secure victory.'

This is the generally accepted contemporary view of what is termed national strategy. Handel's view is reflected within current Australian joint military doctrine. Australian Defence Force Publication 9: Joint Planning (ADFP 9) states that 'the Government identifies Australia’s security interests and develops strategies to attain or protect them. These strategies coordinate the political (including diplomatic), economic and military elements of national power to best further Australia’s national interests.'

The quotation from ADFP 9 acknowledges the primacy of the body politic in determining national interests, goals and objectives. This enduring tenet has been reflected in strategy from at least the time of Sun Tzu and through the ages.

The primacy of the polity in making national strategy underpins the structure of the modern state and the relationship between legitimate states within the international system.

Strategy-making should be a rich process. By that, I mean it should be inclusive of both the objective and the human dimension. The human dimension includes things such as values, beliefs and emotion, which are difficult to quantify but are the drivers of outcome. In making national strategy, polities apply the belief system of their state to decide upon what ends will be sought; the objective elements of strategic assessment, such as the economy, the military, geography etcetera are the means that can be applied to secure those ends.

The primacy of people as the architects of strategy, and the implication that their mindset should be the target in conflict is a simple idea, and the philosophy that underpins EBO. As well, the re-emergence of the human element in strategy through EBO is nothing more than an acknowledgment that contemporary strategy, at least from the perspective of conflict, is a reflection of industrial age thinking where mass was the coin, and destruction the transaction.

**SUBORDINATE POLICY AND STRATEGY**

State policy and strategy is stratified. Describing a definitive policy/strategy matrix is problematic because different states have different views. Generally though, in the context of the modern state, national strategy is overarching and reflects national policy. Some states codify the external affairs or security-related element of national policy in an inclusive national security policy, and develop national security strategy to affect it.

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10 M Handel, *op cit*, p. 36.
security policy is the purview of the polity and should address a state’s vital interests: survival, safety and vitality.\textsuperscript{16} Essentially, national security policy includes the military, diplomatic and economic dimensions of national power. National security policy should be promulgated within the state’s elite so that policy makers, strategy makers and practitioners can work from a position of common understanding towards shared, inclusive ends. Aspects may be promoted outside the state if that accords with state policy regarding engagement, reassurance and deterrence. Ideally, at least in a liberal democracy like Australia, the broad thrust of the policy should be public, even if the detail is classified.\textsuperscript{17}

In a secular liberal democracy like Australia, the military, diplomatic and economic dimensions of national power are founded upon the social dimension and its norms, such as Government being accountable to an elected Parliament, the rule of law, social and cultural pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and commitment to a ‘fair go.’\textsuperscript{18} Of course, while the same dimensions of power exist in non-democratic or non-secular states, the social substrate can be very different. It could be fear, mutual benefit (cronyism) or religion that underpins social mores. This important differentiation should be kept in mind when EBO are considered later in the paper, because what is important in the mind of the adversary, and exactly who the adversary is, is not the same within every state, nation or nation-state. The proliferation of non-state actors in the contemporary security environment complicates the matter further for state-actors.\textsuperscript{19}

In Australia’s case, there is no explicit, overarching national security policy. Military strategic policy is reflected in Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force,\textsuperscript{20} and diplomatic and trade (that is, external economic) strategic policy is reflected in In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy (INTI).\textsuperscript{21} Some of Australia’s national interests and objectives can be teased out of Defence 2000 and INTI - such as the need for: sovereignty, national security, national defence, strong alliances, solid multi- and bi-lateral links, national decision making without coercion, engagement with international and regional actors, support for the international system and human rights, economic well-being, free trade through the absence of conflict and market liberalization - but a list of interests and objectives gleaned from subordinate policy does not make an inclusive and overarching national security policy.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Elements of an Australia’s National Security Policy exist within \textit{Defence 2000} (military strategic policy) and \textit{In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy} (diplomatic and external economic policy).
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy}, \textit{op cit}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy}, National Capital Printing, Canberra, 1997.
Australia’s National Security Policy: Time for a Re-think?

There is a growing lobby within Australia for a broader and more inclusive approach to security, with calls for that to be formally reflected in an explicit national security policy. The most comprehensive contemporary work from Australia’s perspective is that of Ian Wing, who has just completed a PhD thesis and published a paper on the subject. What Wing and many other credible strategic thinkers are saying is that, from Australia’s perspective, the likelihood of state-on-state warfare is steadily diminishing. The need for conventional armed forces to act unilaterally to protect Australia from another state is assessed as remote, albeit not impossible. At the same time, the diversity, or breadth, of threat to state security is increasing. Some examples of ‘new’ security tasks that Defence could or should contribute include: border management (aimed at controlling refugee flows, trans-national crime and illegal resource exploitation), non-military challenges to national sovereignty (from terrorist or other interest groups exerting pressure economically, politically or culturally) and asymmetric challenges (information warfare, biological warfare, environmental conflict and the like). Wing describes a methodology for the Australian Defence Force to explicitly engage in a whole-of-nation approach to security by building sustainable partnerships with other security actors.

In support of the contention that Defence has to do more for security outside conventional deterrence and war-fighting, and that the security base was broadening, Admiral Chris Barrie, Australia’s Chief of Defence Force (CDF) said in his Crawford Fund address in August 2000 that:

We [Defence] must be prepared to do more, rather than less, to maintain peace and security. I believe as our appreciation of the new, broader base for security grows, Governments will be more inclined to explore opportunities to create a closer relationship and mission between defence forces, aid organizations and development agencies … there were often easier and less expensive solutions than using armed forces to respond to immediate crisis, as well as the opportunity to nip some situations in the bud.

On balance, the requirement for what has traditionally been a stove-piped Defence capability is decreasing, while the requirement for integrated security responses is increasing. This same conclusion is reflected in INTI and Defence 2000. Of course, risk needs to be considered and managed when developing policy to meet the changing balance, but there is little disagreement that the balance is changing.

23 Wing, op cit, pp. 78-79.
The notion that Australia’s strategic policy mix is inadequate to address the changing balance between defence and security is well supported. Last year Australia’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that:

Government [must] develop and maintain a national security policy. This policy should, amongst other things, guide the Defence Forces on their role in an integrated national concept for promoting and achieving international prosperity, peace and security.27

None of this is meant to suggest that Australia’s defence forces should not retain their traditional roles - conventional deterrence and war-fighting - but rather that Defence should develop concepts and capabilities that are inherently adaptable and flexible and that can be applied to a broader range of security-related tasks than has been the case. As well, Defence, along with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and others has a large part to play in shaping the strategic environment to reassure, stabilise or deter third parties, with the intention of forestalling or ameliorating the effect of conflict.

Responsible states tend to prefer stability or controlled or influenced evolution in external affairs. Conflict that is de-stabilising from the perspective of the referent state is not usually in its national interest. Undesirably, war, the extreme end of the spectrum of conflict, is a change mechanism that affects both sides in ways that defy prediction. As well, conflict in the broader sense is often counter-productive to security and so to wealth creation. Therefore one objective of a responsible state is to reassure and deter to forestall de-stabilising conflict. Otherwise, if conflict is unavoidable, another objective is rapid conflict termination with minimum upset to stability, attrition or collateral damage, preferably for both sides. The goal is for the referent state to ‘win the peace.’ An effects-based security philosophy aims to assist with these objectives by dissuading potential or practicing aggressors early, quickly and as thoroughly as is practical.

It is interesting that the requirement for a national security policy has been alluded to in public policy for many years. INTI devotes an entire chapter to describing the essentiality of a whole-of-nation approach to integrate internal and external policy around a broader concept of security,28 and INTI also alludes to the problem of, and propensity for, compartmentalization within Australian policy development.29 Similarly, Defence 2000 calls for [military] strategic policy which is integrated with wider diplomatic and political policy.30 These publications reflect the growing need to address the

28 In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, op cit, Chapter 5.
29 Ibid, p. 73.
broadening threats to security in a holistic way. The CDF is frequently on the public record promoting the same issue. Here is one example:

… security must be addressed at least on a whole-of-government approach, but preferably on a whole-of-nation approach. And I contrast this position with what we used to do, that is deal with security problems separately through the traditional defence, diplomacy and aid stove-pipes.

There is a real imperative for an integrated approach to security operations for three reasons. Firstly, and as discussed, the threat base is broadening and cannot be met if we take an unsophisticated, stove-piped approach. Secondly, Australia is a relatively small nation in fiscal terms, which puts a practical limit on our investment in security. Moreover, as a democratic, benevolent and non-aggressive state, Australia is unlikely to choose to devote a large proportion of GDP to security/military forces except in extremis. Instead, Australia has chosen the softer approach. That is, Australia’s intent is to shape the environment to its overall benefit and to prevent conflict arising. But Australia still needs efficient and effective response options to call upon if needed, and as a deterrent to aggressive actors. Given the reasons listed, it is simply not good strategic management to ignore the synergies and efficiencies implicit in an integrated approach to security. Thirdly, a well developed integrated security system should enable Government to select from a more diverse and sophisticated basket of security response options than does a stove-piped system. A national security policy designed to integrate and focus Australia’s national power effectively and efficiently would demonstrate mature commitment to the contemporary concept of security and the security context. A national security system would bolster deterrence across the spectrum, as well as our capacity for conflict resolution.

But, by itself a national security policy to direct a national security system is not enough. How would such a system be commanded, controlled and exercised? Who would bring non-departmentally biased advice to Australia’s National Security Committee of Cabinet? Where is the expertise to cut across disciplines and compartments to provide Government with holistic, balanced security advice and design integrated operations with Australian, allied and coalition partners, including Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)? There is no single agency within Australia’s security community with the charter to integrate security operations at the strategic and upper operational levels of national command. Such an agency would be a natural

31 Defence 2000, op cit, pp. 9-10, 13; In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, op cit, p. 3.
33 Ibid, p. 3.
adjunct to a national security policy whose aim was to integrate security responses, drawing from the national base.\textsuperscript{35}

Since 1990 the development of a National Security Agency (NSA) has been mooted by Ross Babbage, Alan Wrigley, Gary Brown, Ian Wing, the RAAF’s Aerospace Centre et al.\textsuperscript{36} And in 2000 Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade said that:

\begin{quote}
We further recommend that the Government explore the feasibility of creating a National Security Council \cite{36} to oversee the development and maintenance of national security policy.
\end{quote}

Without a national security policy and an NSA to enact and manage it, the entire focus and coordination of state security activities and their alignment to broader national goals and objectives is problematic. The issue of effecting state-security is not trivial. It is the first responsibility of the p looty to its citizens. The Australian Government, with the security community, needs to focus on implementing a way to build a more efficient security model than Australia has, and one relevant to the contemporary and foreseen security context: the Cold War ended a decade ago. Is EBO the mindset needed to deliver a solution?

My intent to this point in the article was to lay a foundation from which to assess the applicability of EBO as an underpinning philosophy for Australia’s external security. So far I have described strategy, national strategy, its subordinate strategies and their associated policies, and argued the need for a national security policy focussed on integrating Australia’s security actors into a security system. I have also argued for an NSA to advise Government on whole-of-nation options without bias, and to lead integrated security operations. To round off the foundational work, I will present a brief analysis of the mechanisms of power, describe political warfare, and then move on to EBO.

**The Dimensions of Power**

The study of the dimensions of power is a fundamental precept when considering state-based conflict. For the purposes of this paper I will present a simple model of power that can be used to link strategy with the concept of EBO. The model has been developed by the RAAF’s Aerospace

\textsuperscript{35} Wing, op cit, pp. 97-98.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{loc cit.} This reference covers the recommendations by Babbage, Wrigley and Brown. Babbage suggested the subject agency be called the National Security Council; and Air Force Concepts for 2015, \textit{op cit}, pp. 29-30. Air Force suggested the subject agency be called the National Operations Centre.
\textsuperscript{37} Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, \textit{op cit}, p. 181.
Centre, sourced primarily from the work of Bachrach and Baratz, as part of its work concerning security issues and war-fighting. The model was developed from the perspective of state-based external affairs for dealing with a range of adversaries: state or non-state, group or individual.

The Aerospace Centre’s model of power has three dimensions. The dimensions concatenate to an inclusive system from which the external application of power by a state can be considered: the assumption being that a state wise and capable enough to work in the third dimension is using all of them in concert to further its ends.

The first dimension of power is called Overt Conflict. It concerns the prevalence of A over B through superior bargaining resources, including the capacity to command and control them. The first dimension involves the mores of coercion and seduction to achieve the state’s desired ends. It is often, but not always, overt, relatively crude, and well understood in external affairs; from the coercion side, British gun-boat diplomacy is a good representation. Attrition-based war is another, as are sanctions and blockades. On the seduction side, examples are the offer of assistance, or to turn a blind eye, and so on. While from the contemporary context this dimension can be seen as representing industrial age conflict, it has been widely and perhaps overly exercised throughout history. In this dimension, B is defeated by A because of either a real or perceived lack of resources.

The second dimension of power is called Shaping. It concerns the prevalence of A over B by constructing barriers to B’s participation, and by A mobilising B’s bias to make it believe it cannot win. The intention is, essentially, to exclude B from the decision making process through A’s control over the rules of game: not to allow B any say in the decision. B is forced into a position where its capacity for self-determination is undermined, where it is relegated to making ‘decision-less decisions.’ Shaping need not necessarily be damaging to B; it can produce a positive outcome for both parties. But irrespective, B has ceded the initiative to A.

Achieving this level of control can be a subtle or blunt process. B can be excluded because it believes it cannot win, and that belief can be

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38 Work on EBO development for the RAAF has been conducted by WGCDR A. Forestier, WGCDR L. Noble, WGCDR D. Thiele, Dr J. Mordike and Mr Alex Tewes to support doctrine development and aerospace perspectives on future conflict and war-fighting.
43 Ibid.
engendered through many forms of manipulation. Or, building from the first dimension, B can be excluded by coercion or seduction. In this second dimension, B is defeated because its participation is denied, either due to barriers or because it is made to believe it cannot prevail. By way of tacit acknowledgement of this dimension of power, Australia has explicitly recognised that it needs the power for self-determination if it is to hold a position of strength within the international system. The reader will recall that ‘decision making without coercion’ was one of Australia’s national objectives from INTI.  

As well, Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997 alluded to shaping the strategic environment as one of its strategic objectives. The same objective is also implied in Defence 2000 under the headings ‘Contributing to the Security of our Immediate Neighbourhood’ and ‘Supporting Wider Interests.’ This is an example of Australia exercising national power to seize the strategic initiative to help shape the environment for the common good. But, irrespective of the common good, Australia is a trading state dependent on open lines of communication. Consequently, the principal determinant underpinning the objective ‘shaping the strategic environment’ is that stability is in Australia’s interest. Understanding precedence is central to understanding power, and so to understanding strategy, policy and action, with the effect representing the intended outcome.

The third dimension of power is called Manipulation. It concerns the dominance of A over B through A affecting B’s belief systems for its own ends. This is a subtle and perhaps dangerous dimension of power, and one which at the national strategic level would usually require long-term commitment and focus to produce the desired outcome. This dimension essentially requires the control of information to alter the adversary’s belief systems. It requires skill and patience to wield power in this dimension. This dimension is most applicable when conflict is latent, although it can also be used during conflict if the recipient is open to such manipulation. By way of example, it could be argued that this dimension of power played a part in the final collapse of the USSR; the western capitalist democratic system’s ‘story’ was more compelling to the Soviet population and to some elements of its leadership (notably Gorbachev) than was the story being offered by the USSR’s existing system of state. In this third dimension, B is defeated by A because it is susceptible to manipulation, and because A has the wherewithal to determine that fact and exploit it. Sun Tzu put it this way: ‘For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’

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44 *In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy*, op cit, p. 1.
45 *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, Department of Defence, DPUBS, Canberra, pp. 31-32.
48 *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*, p. 77, cited in Handel, op cit, p. 73.
Each or all of the dimensions of power described in the Aerospace Centre’s model can, theoretically, be exercised by a state across the national power spectrum in pursuit of its national interests. However, the reality is that the international system does control, to some degree, what dimensions of power are used, and how they are used. International law and convention are generally observed to preserve a state’s position as a legitimate actor. As well, a state’s societal mores will constrain how power is exercised. The moral aspect is an interesting and complex one, because it is contextual. A state will apply strict limits on its behaviour in some circumstances and relax them in others. Plausible deniability is one determinant, perceived vulnerability another. There are many more. In a total war, history shows that there are few limits exercised by a state fighting for its existence, particularly within evil or coercive regimes such as Nazi Germany, although even then there are things that moral citizens will not do, or would not willingly do. All of this must be considered in utilising the dimensions of power if targeting an adversary for effect.

While all the dimensions of power must be supported by intelligence if they are to be exercised wisely, as you move from the first through to the third the demand for intelligence and sophistication in decision-making increases. So does the likelihood of misjudgement and unintended consequence. In taking a decision about how power should be applied against an adversary you move from the realm of theory to that of operations. Recently, the sophisticated exploitation of power has been associated with the emergence of the so-called information age and the concomitant up-welling of interest in the use of information in conflict, ‘Information superiority’ is the term the US uses to describe the capability,49 ‘information exploitation’ the term used by the RAAF. Applying power across the three dimensions presented in the Aerospace Centre’s model is part of the ‘new’ effects-based paradigm, or, if you prefer, the ‘old’ appellation political warfare.

**POLITICAL WARFARE**

This section on the dimensions of power would be incomplete without discourse on who commands it, and to what end. The subject is political warfare. The term could be broadened to ‘political conflict’ to fit the context of this paper, but the philosophy remains the same, so I will stay with the original taxonomy. Of course, when moving from conflict short of war to war proper there are implications for the employment of state-sanctioned violence to attain ends.

Seabury and Codevilla, in their lauded *War: Ends and Means*, make the point that, from the perspective of the state, political warfare has two dimensions. The first is that it encompasses the complete domain of conflict

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and war, and that leading in that domain is the province of the polity. The second dimension is that the object of political warfare is political goals through political means, irrespective but obviously not exclusive of any physical dimension.\(^{50}\) Seabury and Codevilla also make the point that political warfare is not to be confused with psychological operations or perception management. These are subordinate operational tools like any other.

Seabury and Codevilla go on argue that the very essence of war or conflict is ‘affecting ideas’: that the central aim of every decision must be to strengthen your supporters while weakening those of the adversary.\(^{51}\) Sun Tzu puts clearly: ‘Those skilled in warfare move the enemy, and are not moved by the enemy.’ Seabury and Codevilla also argue that entering conflict without these intentions is at best incompetence and at worst suicidal. They also argue that overt and enduring commitment to prosecuting a credible policy in conflict or war is the most powerful tool that can be employed. The tool is psychologically positive for you and yours and negative for the adversary. That commitment should be delivered through strategy and policy that orchestrates a state’s national power and channels it to actions that target, either directly or indirectly, the mind of the adversary.\(^{52}\)

To put it simply, the ‘new’ philosophy of EBO is political warfare re-labelled. Seabury and Codevilla cite examples where war was undertaken without clear commitment to such a strategy - Vietnam, Somalia, and others - and argue that a state is not truly engaged in war unless its commitment is such that it is prepared to commit its followers to death, and that they are willing to make the same commitment in pursuit of the polity’s goals. Of course, this latter point is the differentiator between war and other types of conflict. But, they also make the point that if you are not committed to bending the will of the adversary, then you are not fully engaged. Ergo, you lose. Memories of Vietnam.

Seabury and Codevilla present an exquisite example in Genghis Khan’s Mongols as to how war should be conducted. The context can also be broadened to that of conflict short of war without compromising the point. The example illustrates that psychology, not necessarily mass, becomes the final arbiter in conflict if a considered and appropriate level of commitment sustains it. In war, Seabury and Codevilla argue that that commitment should be total; in other types of conflict, a decision must be made as to the level of commitment contingent on quality intelligence, wise analysis and sound judgement. Timing is also important. As well, decisions must be taken as to what is in the national interest. Precisely how far is a state prepared to

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\(^{50}\) Seabury and Codevilla, \textit{op cit}, pp. 160-161.  
go to ensure that it prevails in a particular conflict? What risk is acceptable?
But let us have the Mongols make the point with their own brutal eloquence:

The Mongols developed such a reputation for torturing to death any one who put up the slightest resistance to them that the appearance of a single Mongol horseman in a Russian village would provoke inhabitants to line up, docilely, offering their necks to be decapitated. Imagine then the psychological effect of Genghis Khan’s Golden Horde riding out of yellow smoke generated by hundreds of pots of burning sulphur, while the great war drums sounded out doom … War is a contest for human hearts and minds.  

Genghis Khan seemingly understood political warfare (or the effects-based philosophy) and exercised it with ferocious application through all of the dimensions of power. He controlled the mind of the adversary to the point where one lone Mongol represented the virtual Horde. Virtual power had subsumed physical, but only because Genghis had created a context where it could. That was no accident - that was the effect he sought. He won the hearts and minds of his followers, and broke those of his adversaries. 

If a state is to wield power across the dimensions described, it must understand the nuances of the Aerospace Centre’s model and have developed the wherewithal to exploit them. Understanding comes from education and experience, and experience is gained through practice. However, it is national strategy that dictates the requirement for a state to exercise power, policy that describes how and by whom it will be exercised, and coordinated multi-disciplinary operations that deliver the effect. Without a national security strategy and an NSA, Australia cannot effectively and efficiently deliver national power targeted for effect. Could EBO be the vehicle to produce the strategy and policy focus Australia needs to develop an integrated approach to external security?

Effects-Based Operations

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS

The literature reflects that the work on EBO per se is relatively immature. Essentially, EBO, if it is considered as a new idea, is at the concept development stage. Experimentation and war-gaming around the concept is nascent. Regardless, there is clear and broad agreement as to the intention that underpins EBO.  

From the perspective of military war-fighting, EBO has been comprehensively described by the US Naval War College, and the intention presented is echoed consistently throughout the literature.

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53 Ibid, p. 162.
Effects Based Operations seek to defeat our enemy’s strategy and resolve vice merely attrite [sic] his armed forces, and although this idea is not new, new information technologies are enabling us to know our enemy, our enemy’s strategy and operational doctrine, and our enemy’s centers [sic] of gravity better. Our increased understanding of the complex inter-relationships that exist between our adversary’s military, economic and political realms, will enable the development of an operational plan that will produce effects that can manipulate our opponents belief and reason domains in addition to defeating our enemy’s physical forces.\textsuperscript{55}

Much of the literature on EBO emanates from the US War Colleges because they are interested in exploring and ‘operationalising’ information age war-fighting, and EBO is perceived, rightly in my view, as a focal mechanism. The bulk of the literature deals with exploiting information intelligently and codifying EBO within US military command and control, rather than at the national level as discussed in this paper. EBO and the concepts of conflict related to it (network-centric warfare, rapid-decisive operations etcetera) are the product of a nascent belief that ‘information dominance’ will enable more conventional forms of conflict to be prosecuted more effectively and efficiently, and perhaps ultimately that the breadth of conflict will be expanded to include information as a direct weapon in its own right.

That may be so, but there is no escape from the fact that, from the perspective of national strategy, nothing being discussed under the appellation ‘EBO’ is philosophically new. If EBO is centred around the idea of targeting the adversaries will to continue the actions you oppose,\textsuperscript{56} then it is nothing more than a re-packaging of the art of political warfare as practised through the ages, as already argued. Reinforcing that is the fact that EBO reflects the approach to conflict and war espoused by some of the most acknowledged strategists from history: Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{57} I am forced to wonder that perhaps the real issue is that, at least at the military operational level of command, political warfare is a forgotten or misunderstood concept? That is certainly my experience with Australian staff colleges.\textsuperscript{58}

Regardless, the fact that EBO is not new does not undermine its fundamental philosophical validity. And, of course, repackaging ‘old’ ideas into new forms is one way of making them appear fresh for new audiences. Perhaps there is an especial imperative for repackaging when the contemporary (Generation X) culture seems to be that ‘history is more or

\textsuperscript{55} Global 2000 Playbook, 2000, US Naval War College, a briefing package prepared for the Global 2000 war-game, p. 1. One aim of the war-game was to experiment with the operational aspects of effects-based operations
\textsuperscript{56} Air Force Concepts for 2015, \textit{op cit}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{57} See Handel, \textit{op cit}, for an excellent analysis of strategy and strategic themes over the ages.
\textsuperscript{58} The author was a member of the Directing Staff at the RAAF’s Staff College in 1998 and 1999, and was also involved in the early reviews of the syllabus for the new Australian Command and Staff Course that was stood up in 2001.
less bunk.\textsuperscript{59} Repackaging enduring and proven tenets to meet an educational need merely reflects a valid and valuable institutional cultural adaptation to the social norms of the day.

From the US perspective, the work on EBO is centred around a simple and admirable goal: to ameliorate the need for the large, bloody wars of attrition that have hallmarked much of recorded human history.\textsuperscript{60} Of course, there is the promise of the attainment of other desirable objectives: a refocusing of intent and commitment, rapid conflict termination, economy of effort, reduced physical destruction, moral authority and so on. All of these things are, ultimately, ‘in the national interest.’ At the same time, nobody is arguing that the wise use of information is going to negate the need for traditional military force, as reflected in the first dimension of power described in the Aerospace Centre’s model. The capacity to generate and the will to exercise power in the first dimension is often necessary to demonstrate the commitment to conflict that Seabury and Codevilla argue is so essential to the political victory which defines success.\textsuperscript{61} That is, the aim is to win the conflict or the war at the political level; the battles along the way are only a means to an end. However, winning battles is of critical psychological importance to morale. Everything is inter-related in the security game! Conflict will always remain part art, part science.

In Australia, a sympathetic but broader view of EBO is being explored by the Aerospace Centre and others. Elements of the Australian security community see EBO as an underpinning philosophy for both national strategy and its subordinate strategies. The work is centred on the broader view of security already presented.

Turning briefly to taxonomy, the term ‘EBO’ is not an overly useful one in considering the intent of national strategy. In fact the ‘operations’ element of the term is downright misleading if applied at the national strategic level. I suggest a better term from the Australian perspective would be ‘Effects-Based Strategy’ (EBS). This term is starting to make a few (rare) appearances in the literature.\textsuperscript{62} This taxonomy has EBS effected through EBO, which is logical. Obviously, more work needs to be done in exploring and then codifying national effects-based systems (NEBS) to deliver national strategy to ensure that the metaphorical ‘conversation’ can proceed without people being confused by the terminology.

\textsuperscript{59} This aphorism is credited to Henry Ford
\textsuperscript{60} Lynch, \textit{op cit}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{61} See also C Crane, \textit{Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States}, Conference Report, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, 2000, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{62} See, for example, L Champagne, \textit{Effects-Based Strategy in Support of Full Spectrum Dominance: A New Capstone Concept?}, 2000.
CENTRALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?63

Antoine Henri Jomini

Defeating the adversary in his mind is the correct object of conflict. But the mind of the adversary is his most closely held secret. A wise adversary will use every trick and deception to protect his strategy and plans. Piercing the fog with which the adversary will surround himself is the key to success. To prosecute an adversary if your intelligence or analysis is poor is folly of the first order. A good example of a fundamental error in strategic policy is the ‘strategic bombing’ of Germany in the early years of WWII.64 The aim was to break the will of the German people and cripple German war production. The policy failed on both counts. The essentially stupid part was that it continued for nearly four years before a change of tack. Where was the feedback, the analysis? How could Britain make such a poor judgement regarding the will of the German people, with whom they had close relations for generations? Germans were even part of Britain’s Royal Family. The misjudgement is even more remarkable when you consider that Britain knew from its own experience of the Blitz that bombing a stoic civilian population tended to harden the will of the people, rather than weaken it. Irrationality finds many forms in conflict. In this instance, the Allied intelligence/policy cycle, from assessment to feedback, had clearly failed.65 In those early years of WWII, the strategic bombing of Germany did not accord with a systematised EBS/EBO paradigm.

Securing intelligence about the adversary to enable the selection of physical and psychological targets that, if prosecuted, will change his mind to your ends is the central issue for operationalising an EBS into an EBO. Knowing yourself and your own mind is just as important if you are to balance your judgements and cover your own vulnerabilities. And, rightly, the inquiry into information age warfare is focussed to this arena. As well, intelligence about an adversary is not of direct benefit to just effects-based security operations. Information can be applied across the national power spectrum to the benefit of the state in peace, transitional phases, conflict or war. It is all part of securing the ‘knowledge edge’ which Australia claims as a principal lever in conflict.66 Developing measures of effectiveness around the process of

63 Quoted in Seabury and Codevilla, op cit, p. 185.
64 In this example, I am specifically referring to the inaccurate carpet bombing of German cities and town, particularly that practised by Britain in the early years of WWII, that culminated in the fire-bombing of Dresden. I am not referring to the later, more precise bombing campaign that was used reasonably successfully to disrupt German manufacturing and transport infrastructure.
65 Seabury and Codevilla, op cit, p. 186. The reader may like to consider the fact that, in the modern idiom, individuals who prosecute the mass slaughter of non-combatants without credible strategic or operational justification face the possibility of prosecution for war crimes.
66 Australia’s Strategic Policy, op cit, p. 56.
obtaining the right intelligence, knowing when you have it, and developing from it the physical and psychological target sets that, if prosecuted, will change the mind of an adversary is the key to EBO.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to assess the applicability of EBO as an underpinning philosophy for Australia’s external security. My assessment is unequivocal. An effects-based strategy is the only philosophy we should consider. A bold statement perhaps, but as I have illustrated in my discourse, the philosophy of Effects-Based Strategy (EBS) and its subordinate delivery mechanism, Effects-Based Operations (EBO), is healthily rooted in the well-spring of strategy. That is, the central target in prosecuting war, or any other type of conflict within the security arena, is the mind of the adversary. As consistently argued by the best strategic thinkers from history, and from the text-books on political warfare, if you are not committed to changing the mind of your adversary such that he chooses to cease the actions you are opposing, then you are not truly engaged, you are not focussed, and you will probably lose.

With that weight behind it, I cannot but think that EBS is the philosophy we must adopt if the Australian Government and its subordinate agencies are to focus on building a national security system that is both effective and efficient, irrespective of any current or future security context. The effects-based philosophy is effective because it demands a focus on ends, and not ways or means. It is efficient because, if EBO is properly executed, the desired outcome should be achieved with minimum national effort. Intellectual prowess and knowledge of the environment (effort of mind) provide the lever that, in the EBS paradigm, minimises - but does not and will never negate - the requirement for physical effort. The aim is to produce a synergistic outcome greater than the sum of the parts by focussing on securing the preferred end-state at least cost.

Such an approach intrinsically fits Australia’s strategic circumstances. Australia has to produce a significant effect with respect to shaping, deterrence, and reassurance with the intention of ‘nipping security problems in the bud’. It also has to demonstrate real commitment by backing that up with the capability to prosecute security operations up to and including war. And Australia has to make the adversary believe that it has that commitment. All of this has to be generated from a relatively small national base. Because while our friends and allies should help in extremis, Australia’s security/defence policy is one of limited self-reliance.\(^\text{67}\)

\(^\text{67}\) Defence 2000, op cit, pp. xi, 46.
EBS is delivered through EBO, and that means developing the capability to prosecute the adversary’s belief systems: to attack the mind of the decision-making elite. That capability arises from wisely exercising the dimensions of power I presented in the paper - overt conflict, shaping and manipulation - through the national security machinery. The capacity to synthesise a campaign using an effects-based philosophy comes from investing in intelligence. Australia needs to know its adversaries and itself so well that it is confident of prosecuting the right targets while protecting its own vulnerabilities. Australia will have selected physical and psychological targets important to the adversary with the specific purpose of affecting the adversaries mind to bend it to Australia’s end.

Australian security practitioners must be educated and trained for EBO, and they must practice it so that an effects-based approach is the modus operandi. Capable practitioners are the key to realising an effects-based philosophy, and will not be found exclusively in the military. They must be drawn from a broad spectrum of expertise if Australia is to consider its security in the broad contemporary context. To construct EBS and conduct EBO Australia will need to draw on experts in, at least, economic, environmental, diplomatic, military, psychological, societal and religious disciplines, and have some of them trained in strategy and security operations. Australia will have to invest in people if it is to sustain the capability to target for effect. Surely, this is all part of the sustaining and leveraging from the ‘knowledge edge’.

The imperative to embed the philosophy of EBS and EBO into Australia’s security culture can come from only one place. Government must be committed to developing a national security policy to direct the change. To focus national power for effect, that policy must also instigate whole-of-government or, preferably, whole-of-nation approach to security. As well, a National Security Agency is needed to effectively coordinate national security policy and orchestrate national security operations, as argued by Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade et al.

Few other activities capture the human psyche like conflict and war. We have never stopped practising both, and never stopped analysing both. Perhaps it is fair to say that ‘peace is an extension of war by other means.’ The wisdom gained from millennia of experience in conflict is captured in the effects-based philosophy. Using it to underpin Australia’s external security for the 21st century seems to me to be a pragmatic and wise thing to do.

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