
Learning Each Other's Language: Doctrine and AFP-ADF Interoperability

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With militaries and police comprising the majority of personnel deployed during increasingly complex and diverse multinational interventions, there is a need for significantly improved cooperation and interoperability. Focusing on Australia's police and military forces in the international arena, this article considers doctrine as a tool to enhance collaboration. It points to progress made towards cooperation and interoperability, areas requiring development, and areas where coherent practice is neither achievable nor desirable. The authors argue that both agencies need to review and realign their doctrine to form a common conceptual foundation to guide the interagency aspects of their operations, and that this will be vital to enhancing police and military collaboration and performance, particularly in emergencies.¹

In recent years the number of agencies involved in multinational interventions, particularly peacekeeping, has greatly expanded. This is due largely to a broadening of the objectives of such operations, which today encompass state-building and government-sector reform, as well as the more traditional objective of security provision. Similarly, the context for these operations is becoming increasingly complex, often with high levels of residual conflict or volatility. While militaries comprise the highest proportion of United Nations peacekeeping mission personnel, civilian police are now the next highest number.² As a result there is now a need for a much higher level of military-police cooperation and interoperability during these operations than has previously been the case.³ While cooperation has generally been satisfactory, it could be further improved by enhancing the structural framework for cooperation. The mechanisms for improving interoperability—which represents much closer collaboration—could also be further developed.⁴

¹ The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and are not necessarily those of the Australian Defence Organisation or any part thereof, or of the Australian Federal Police or any part thereof. The authors express their sincere thanks to the two anonymous reviewers, whose thoughtful and critical engagement with the earlier version of this article has led to significant improvements in this final version.

² United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, "The Brahimi Report", October 2000, <www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm> [Accessed 2 August 2010].

³ The subtle difference between cooperation and interoperability is important, and is elaborated within the Theoretical Approaches section.

⁴ See, for example: Andrew Goldsmith and Vandra Harris, 'Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions: Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands', in F. Lemieux (ed.), *International Police Cooperation: Emerging Issues, Theory and Practice* (Willan: Collumpton, 2010), pp. 221-37; Mahesh K. Nalla, Joseph D. Johnson and Gorazd Mesko, 'Are Police and Security

Starting with a brief overview of theoretical approaches to fostering cooperation between police and militaries in multinational interventions, this article then turns to the case of cooperation between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the international arena. As will be expanded below, the AFP and ADF are presently at the forefront of innovation in the areas of interagency cooperation and interoperability and therefore present an excellent case study. In examining the nature, requirements and history of cooperation and interoperability between these two agencies we focus first on arrangements for cooperation during peacekeeping and intervention operations such as those in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. Discussion then turns to mechanisms to enable broader structural and policy-level cooperation and interoperability.

This article argues that the AFP and ADF need to review and realign their doctrine, in order to form a common conceptual foundation to guide these agencies' respective operations.⁵ Although limited steps have already been taken in this regard, they represent a starting point rather than achievement of an enduring solution. Finally, the article points to areas where coherent practice is neither achievable nor desirable, identifying strategies for enhancing communication and collaboration around such issues.

Intervention, Cooperation and Interoperability: Theoretical Approaches

International interventions are enacted in a wide variety of contexts. The complexity and dynamism of the environment in which interventions take place is being increasingly recognised by commentators and practitioners, and it demands both flexibility and an enormous range of skills from the men and women who serve in police and military forces. As Eaton notes:

the complex physical, human and informational terrain of modern peace and stability operations is often engulfed by a humanitarian disaster that is perpetuated by the collapse of indigenous government, law enforcement, security, judicial and administrative frameworks.⁶

Under normal circumstances the role of police is to “reinforce a legal authority that is [already] in existence”, while in contrast the role of the military includes operating “at times when that authority is being contested”.⁷

Personnel Warming up to Each Other? A Comparison of Officers' Attitudes in Developed, Emerging, and Transitional Economies', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2009), pp. 508-25.

⁵ We also argue that while the AFP does not have *written doctrine manuals*, it does have practices and conventions that constitute a form of doctrine, as will be discussed below.

⁶ Damian Eaton, 'The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability on Peace and Stability Operations', *Australian Army Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Autumn 2009), p. 59.

⁷ Beth Greener, *The New International Policing* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 105.

The changing security environment signified in part by the end of the Cold War and subsequently by responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, has eroded the separation between police and military roles, as demonstrated in the reality of concurrent deployments of these forces during international interventions.⁸

In recent decades, Australia has contributed police and/or military personnel to a range of international interventions, including stabilisation, capacity building, emergency response, peacekeeping, state-building and active conflict operations. In most of these environments, Australian police and military personnel have worked alongside forces from other countries, as well as a range of other agencies and organisations. International and interagency cooperation constitute significant challenges for the parties involved.⁹

Cooperation and interoperability might appear both logical and straightforward for highly ordered organisations such as these, especially in light of the tendency for police forces to be organised similarly to militaries.¹⁰ In reality, however, there are significant differences between these organisations that can interfere not only with cooperation but also with basic communication. Organisational differences are particularly important with regard to mandate and practice: while the military has an external (beyond the state) orientation, authorisation to use deadly force, and is organised around “hierarchy, discipline and teamwork”, police have an internal (intra-state) orientation, are tasked with preventing and responding to crime, and operate individually or in small teams in environments that allow (and require) the exercise of discretion.¹¹

While the environments of international interventions are often referred to as “post-conflict” by the time police-military cooperation becomes an operational consideration, the level of violence often remains significantly higher than that normally encountered by Western police,¹² although lower than the war

⁸ Peter Andreas and Richard Price, ‘From War-fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State’, *International Studies Review*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001), p. 32.

⁹ See for example Andrew Goldsmith and Vandra Harris ‘Out of Step: Multilateral Police Missions, Culture and Nation-building in Timor-Leste’, *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 2009), pp. 189-212; Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, pp. 221-37.

¹⁰ Janet B. L. Chan with Chris Devery and Sally Doran, *Fair Cop: Learning the Art of Policing* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 1-36.

¹¹ Beth K. Greener-Barcham, ‘Crossing the Green or Blue Line? Exploring the Military-Police Divide’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 90-112. For further discussion of the organisational differences see also: Alice Hills, ‘The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 79-98; K. Marten, ‘Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries’, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 2007), pp. 231-47.

¹² Andrew Goldsmith, “‘It Wasn’t like Normal Policing’: Voices of Australian Police Peacekeepers in Operation Serene, Timor-Leste 2006’, *Policing and Society*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2009), pp. 119-33.

zone of traditional military engagement. This means that both forces encounter the liminal spaces described by Alice Hills. The first of these is a “deployment gap”, in which “the severe breakdown of law and order characteristic of post-conflict situations” may prevent or severely inhibit police deployment, with the result that military “troops are expected to enforce basic order ... at least until CIVPOL [multinational civilian police] are able to operate effectively”.¹³ The second space is an “enforcement gap”, which is the “relative and controversial” space between those tasks that are easily differentiated as police or military tasks.¹⁴

Despite suggestions that police and militaries are becoming more alike,¹⁵ few commentators suggest that these post-conflict tasks can be performed by a single force—whether police or military—recognising instead that the transition from serious conflict to stable peace requires diverse skills and approaches.¹⁶ Police and military forces in international operations must therefore negotiate the transitional zone and the spaces that characterise it, as well as cooperating in enacting their more clearly distinguished tasks. This is further complicated by the fact that international deployment is a relatively novel and challenging context for most national police forces.

Furthermore, the difference between cooperation and interoperability is subtle, but important. Cooperation refers to instances where the police and military work together to achieve a common goal. Interoperability refers to the ability of the two organisations to work together as a result of aligned, integrated or exchangeable processes, systems or services. Interoperability measures are generally implemented officially and as a result are more likely to have enduring effects. Cooperation, on the other hand, may be *ad hoc* and examples are often local and task orientated. Exploring this issue in relation to AFP-ADF cooperation during the international intervention in Timor-Leste, Goldsmith and Harris note that integrative cooperation—“pursuing the same goals by different (or even not so different) means”—and complementary cooperation—“to achieve their distinct, respective goals”—are both important to achieving interoperability.¹⁷

¹³ Hills, ‘The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations’, p. 80.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁵ See, for example: Edward R. Maguire and William R. King, ‘Trends in the Policing Industry’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 593 (May 2004), pp. 15-41; Alan J. Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky and John Stillion, *Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other than War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), p. 2.

¹⁶ An exception is Mortlock, who claims that military training fully provides the capabilities necessary for transition to peace. Roger Mortlock, ‘The Role of the Military’, in J. Henderson and G. Watson (eds.), *Securing a Peaceful Pacific* (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005), pp. 205-13, esp. p. 209.

¹⁷ Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 225.

Arrangements for AFP/ADF Operational Cooperation and Interoperability

While the ADF has traditionally been geared towards international deployment, as previously noted this is a relatively new area of operation for the AFP. The establishment of readily deployable national police groups was recommended in the UN Report on Peacekeeping Operations ("The Brahimi Report") and Australia has played "a pioneering role" in responding to this by establishing the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG).¹⁸ Thus, the IDG has had to create its own path in terms of developing effective mechanisms for overcoming the various challenges of international policing, including collaboration with militaries.

Australia has provided a small number of police (currently fifteen) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continually since 1964.¹⁹ However, it was not until the establishment of the IDG in 2004 that international policing was recognised as a core component of Australia's policing commitment and Australian police found themselves "operating in a foreign policy space".²⁰ With 900 staff (of an authorised 1200), the IDG has three core components: an Australia-based component; a mission component; and an Operational Response Group (for rapid deployment to critical situations).²¹ The mission component accounts for 81 percent of IDG resources, and its work includes commitments in eleven foreign countries, as well in Australia's remote external territories and emergency response in Australia's Northern Territory.²²

In this context, the AFP and ADF have a well-established track record of cooperation during intervention operations, with both organisations being deployed as part of the same operation on several occasions. The most prominent examples of these operations are those being conducted in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, which are illustrative of the nature and extent of AFP/ADF operational cooperation and interoperability to date.

Australia's police and military involvement in Timor-Leste followed the 1999 referendum in which citizens voted for independence from Indonesia. The Australian military was deployed there in 1999 pending the commencement

¹⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*; John McFarlane, 'The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police', *Security Challenges*, vol. 3, no. 3 (2007), pp. 91-108, esp. p. 104.

¹⁹ Australian Federal Police, *Annual Report 2009-10* (Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2010), p. 95.

²⁰ Mick Keelty, 'Operating in a Foreign Policy Space', *Platypus: Journal of the Australian Federal Police*, no. 93 (December 2006), pp. 7-15.

²¹ Australian Federal Police, *International Deployment Group*, <<http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx>> [Accessed 5 September 2010].

²² Australian Federal Police, *Annual Report 2009-10*. The countries are Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Afghanistan, Nauru, Vanuatu, Cyprus, Sudan, Cambodia, Samoa and Tonga.

of a series of UN missions.²³ From February 2000 until May 2006 the ADF contributed personnel as part of the UN Joint Task Force. Operations then transitioned to the International Stabilisation Force, which is ongoing under ADF leadership.²⁴ The AFP deployment has been primarily within the bounds of the UN Police (UNPOL) deployment, supplemented by a bilateral program of police development (the Timor-Leste Police Development Program, or TLPDP).²⁵

Australia has contributed to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since 2003.²⁶ Together with fourteen other Pacific nations, Australia's contribution includes police in the Participating Police Force (PPF) and military personnel in a Combined Task Force (CTF). As with the missions in Timor-Leste, RAMSI has evolved through a series of stages and has experienced periods of major civil unrest, however the RAMSI leadership and structure have been more consistent than that in Timor-Leste (it is noteworthy that the AFP is currently the lead agency in RAMSI; this is an unprecedented role for a police force). Although the police and military deployments have been mostly parallel there have been periods of much closer collaboration, including conducting joint patrols during periods of major unrest.²⁷

During periods of significant conflict in these (and other) countries, the military has usually taken the lead in the conduct of operations. As conflict has settled and police have begun to be able to undertake their role without military protection or augmentation, leadership arrangements have often been more *ad hoc*.²⁸ Although it has been argued that the success of this approach is largely due to a clear understanding by both agencies of the distinction between police and military roles,²⁹ the reality is that these distinctions are blurred in operations conducted in the liminal spaces of

²³ Bob Breen, *Mission Accomplished East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET)* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2000), provides an account of the Australian military's pre-UN mission deployment to East Timor (from September 1999 until February 2000).

²⁴ Grant Edwards and Tess O'Donnell, 'Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP): Lessons in Capacity Building Approaches', in Vandra Harris and Andrew Goldsmith (eds), *Security, Development and Nation-Building in Timor-Leste: Cross-sectoral Perspectives* (Routledge: London, 2011 forthcoming).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ RAMSI, *RAMSI—Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, <www.ramsi.org> [Accessed 22 October 2010].

²⁷ Goldsmith and Harris, 'Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions', pp. 221-37; Greener, *The New International Policing*, p. 113; Greener-Barcham, 'Crossing the Green or Blue Line?', pp. 90-112.

²⁸ Goldsmith, "'It Wasn't like Normal Policing'", p. 123; Abby McLeod and Sinclair Dinnen, 'Police Building in the Southwest Pacific—New Directions in Australian Regional Policing', in A. Goldsmith and J. Sheptycki (eds.), *Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform* (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 295-328.

²⁹ Elsa Wainwright, *Police Join the Front Line*, Strategic Insights No. 1 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004), p. 6.

transition. Furthermore, at the more formal level there is much work yet to be done to ensure the optimisation of operational cooperation and interoperability during both combined and parallel activities.³⁰

As always, there is some distance between policy and “on-the-ground” experiences. Goldsmith and Harris have discussed the practical challenges from a police perspective, reporting the experiences of AFP personnel in their attempts to work together with the ADF and with police from other nations. While AFP officers described extensive difficulties collaborating in post-conflict international missions, they described relationships with the ADF as amongst the most constructive they experienced. In spite of difficulties that emerged around different levels of force, approaches to planning, and sharing of intelligence, Australian police praised the ADF logistical capacity, preparation and ability to build relationships with local people. On the basis of such experiences, Goldsmith and Harris conclude that “the need for doctrine in this area is well-recognized and is particularly necessary if *complementary cooperation* remains the principal orientation” of missions in countries such as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands.³¹

Mechanisms that Enable AFP/ADF Structural and Policy Level Cooperation and Interoperability

As well as on-the-ground cooperation during the conduct of intervention operations in places such as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, the AFP and ADF have commenced extensive programs within Australia to enhance their cooperation at the structural and policy levels. In particular, the establishment of the IDG acted as a catalyst for bringing about the consolidation of AFP/ADF cooperation and interoperability outside of specific operational theatres.

The *IDG Future Strategy*, which was approved in August 2006, greatly enhanced the capabilities of the IDG. It directed the formation of a 150 person Operation Response Group, able to undertake rapid deployment in the event of an international crisis or emergency, authorised an increase in the IDG staffing levels to 1200, and increased the IDG funding by \$AU493.2 million.³² Most importantly from an interoperability perspective, it included the creation of an AFP “operation planning cell” to foster a close partnership

³⁰ In this context the term ‘parallel activities’ refers to instances when the AFP and ADF operate separately along their traditional division of roles, but do so concurrently and within the same sphere.

³¹ Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 235.

³² Australian National Audit Office, *Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*, Audit Report No. 53, 2006-07, p. 118.

with the ADF and “ensure consistency in application, thinking and operation planning areas reflecting ongoing learning”.³³

In the same month, the National Security Committee of Cabinet directed a review of interoperability between the Australian Department of Defence and the AFP. The review, which was conducted during 2007, was guided jointly by the AFP and Defence and focused on stabilisation operations. The focus of subsequent investigation moved to interoperability for offshore operations more broadly. This culminated in the signing of a *Memorandum of Understanding on Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police* (the MOU) in September 2008.³⁴

To date both organisations continue to adhere to the principle of enhancing interoperability that was formally established by the MOU, and this has allowed the AFP and ADF to make great inroads into achieving interoperability at the structural and policy level. For example, they have subsequently established a Joint Steering Committee (JSC), the primary role of which is to enhance their interoperability by developing and updating policies, procedures and administrative processes.³⁵

Defence personnel have previously been posted to fill temporary appointments within the IDG and ongoing interoperability is achieved by the posting of AFP officers to key positions within ADF organisations. Specifically, the AFP has committed to posting two Liaison Officers to the ADF Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) and up to three members to undertake courses run by the Australian Defence College.³⁶ The HQJOC Liaison Officers in particular are responsible for providing advice to the ADF during planning for major interagency operations such as those in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, and for organising for subject matter experts from within the AFP to provide specialist advice to the ADF where appropriate.

Recently, another key step towards achieving cooperation has been the development of the *Guide to Defence and Australian Federal Police (International Deployment Group) Interoperability for Offshore Operations* (“the Guide”). Following formal recognition by the JSC of the need to develop a common language and of the requirement to enhance joint approaches to operational planning, development of the Guide commenced

³³ Juani O'Reilly and Paul Jevtovic, 'Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific', *Platypus: Journal of the Australian Federal Police*, no. 96 (September 2007), pp. 11-2.

³⁴ Australian Department of the Defence and Australian Federal Police, *Memorandum of Understanding on Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police Force*, signed 26 September 2008.

³⁵ Australian Federal Police, *Annual Report 2008-09* (Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2009), p. 65.

³⁶ Australian Federal Police, *Australian Federal Police Submission to The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Australia's Involvement In Peacekeeping Operations* (March 2007), p. 10.

in early 2009, and is ongoing at the time of writing of this article. It is intended that the Guide will establish a framework for AFP (specifically IDG) and ADF cooperation during offshore operations. Importantly, its scope will be limited, and although it discusses several topics that relate to interoperability, it does not include any tactical guidance. Furthermore, it is made clear within the Guide itself that it is not a doctrine manual.³⁷

Conceptualisations of Doctrine

As a result of the aforementioned measures, the AFP and ADF are presently at the forefront of innovation in the areas of interagency cooperation and interoperability. Despite this, neither organisation has yet produced any *doctrine* intended to enhance interoperability, or even to provide guidance for interagency cooperation. This is despite an assertion by the National Manager of the IDG in 2007 that the AFP and ADF “need common ground in the areas of doctrine and communication”, a call that has been reinforced by members of the academic community.³⁸ Before discussing potential means of closing this gap, it is pertinent to address the nature and definition of the term “doctrine” in greater depth.

In the ADF, doctrine is officially defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives”, with the added caveat that “it is authoritative but requires judgement in application”.³⁹ Contemporary military doctrine has a lineage dating to the publication of drill manuals early in the seventeenth century and its precise character and role have since been the subject of much scrutiny, at least within militaries themselves.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding the official definition of the term, the nature and application of contemporary military doctrine is

³⁷ Australian Department of Defence and Australian Federal Police, *Guide to Defence and Australian Federal Police (International Deployment Group) Interoperability for Offshore Operations* (unpublished draft, dated January 2011). Importantly, the non-doctrinal status of the Guide is unlikely to change, even as its development progresses.

³⁸ O'Reilly and Jevtovic, 'Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific', pp. 13-14; Goldsmith and Harris, 'Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions', p. 235; Kathleen M. Jennings and Anja T. Kaspersen, 'Conclusion: Integration Going Forward', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 4 (August 2008), p. 584.

³⁹ Australian Defence Force, *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine (ADDP-D)—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2005), glossary p. 4.

⁴⁰ See, for example: Michael Evans, *Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972—Present*, Study Paper No. 301 (Canberra: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, August 1999); Aaron P. Jackson, *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies: A Comparative Perspective*, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 33 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre—Australia, 2010); Alan Stephens, *Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921 – 1991* (Canberra: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, 1992); Brian Holden-Reid, *A Doctrinal Perspective 1988-98*, Occasional Paper No. 33 (United Kingdom: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, May 1998); Markus Mader, *In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989-2002*, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy No. 13 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).

the result of several conventions of prolonged gestation, which have come to be generally if informally accepted within the military profession.

The first accepted convention is that military doctrine is written down.⁴¹ In the ADF, and in the militaries of most other English-speaking countries, each of the three Services (navy, army and air force) maintains its own series of written doctrine manuals, with the ADF maintaining a fourth series of inter-service “joint” doctrine manuals.⁴² The second convention is that doctrine is officially sanctioned, and doctrine manuals usually require endorsement by the Chief of a Service (or his/her delegate) prior to publication.⁴³ Third, military doctrine is considered to be different from strategy, principles, concepts, theories and lessons learned—a definitional separation that can be quite confusing to those unfamiliar with the nuances of military terminology.⁴⁴ This confusion can be further compounded by the routine inclusion within doctrine of a discretionary and quite deliberately chosen selection of principles, concepts and theories, supplemented by examples derived from lessons learned on previous operations.

Together these three conventions contribute to a fourth: that military doctrine provides a statement of institutionally accepted principles, concepts and theories, which together are considered to constitute accepted military “best practice”. Conversely, this convention implies that intentional omission from doctrine can constitute an indication that a particular principle, concept or theory has been institutionally rejected by the military.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Paul Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies’, *Parameters*, vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 30-31.

⁴² In the military context, the term “joint” means “activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate”. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms*, NATO-Russia Joint Editorial Working Group, Brussels, undated but promulgated online on 8 June 2001, <<https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm>> [Accessed 20 December 2008], p. 107.

⁴³ In the case of ADF joint doctrine, this approval is indicated by the Chief of Defence Force’s signature appearing on the first page of every joint doctrine manual published. Each of the three Services’ doctrine manuals includes a similar indicator (usually the signature of the Chief of the Service), as is the case for the doctrine manuals published by other English-speaking militaries.

⁴⁴ I. B. Holley, ‘Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?’, *Air University Review* (July-August 1984), <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/jul-aug/holley.html>> [Accessed 31 January 2008]; Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough’, p. 31.

⁴⁵ A recent, high profile example of this was the removal of the concept of “Effects Based Operations” from all US joint doctrine following the distribution of a memorandum rejecting the concept, which had been signed by General James Mattis, then Commander of US Joint Forces Command. General James Mattis, *Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command: Assessment of Effects Based Operations*, Commander’s guidance to US Joint Forces Command (unpublished, dated 14 August 2008), <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usjfcomebomemo.pdf>> [Accessed 11 March 2010]; Robert S. Dudley, ‘Editorial: Improvisation Won’t Do’, *US Air Force Magazine* (2 October 2008), p. 2.

Importantly, the nature of doctrine is pragmatically determined by its intended use. The promulgation of institutionally sanctioned principles and concepts to guide best practice is not considered to be an end in itself. On the contrary, doctrine serves the important function of providing guidance for the planning and conduct of a variety of military operations. To this end, doctrine manuals are usually grouped according to the level at which the guidance they provide is pitched, with the commonly accepted levels being military-strategic, operational and tactical.⁴⁶

The AFP, on the other hand, adheres to a far less developed conceptualisation of doctrine. In marked contrast to militaries, little if anything has been written about doctrine as it applies to, or within, police forces.⁴⁷ Furthermore, it has been difficult to identify a commonly accepted definition of the term within the AFP itself. While some officers state that the AFP does not have doctrine at all, others state that it does, but that its doctrine is referred to as procedures, guidelines or Commissioners' Orders. Regardless of this discrepancy it is clear that the AFP does not have doctrine in the sense that the military does. Indeed, even those officers who stated that the AFP has doctrine by other names acknowledged that this doctrine does not perform the same function as military doctrine.

In particular, the AFP does not capture and disseminate tactical and operational lessons in the way that the military does through its doctrine. Instead, operational lessons learned are captured in post activity reports, and in addition tactical lessons are often passed on informally from officer to officer. In the case of tactics, this mechanism was generally preferred over the military doctrinal mechanism due to the perception that military-style doctrine has the potential to impede the initiative and lateral thinking required to successfully conduct policing activities.

Another noteworthy difference between the AFP and the ADF is that the "levels" the ADF uses to group its doctrine do not necessarily apply to police operations: some AFP officers expressed the view that AFP activities typically have effects at each of what the military would call the tactical, operational and military-strategic levels, and that these activities are generally planned in a more integrated manner, with effects at all of these levels taken into account.⁴⁸ Importantly these officers asserted that,

⁴⁶ Gordon R. Peskett, 'Levels of War: A New Canadian Model to Begin the 21st Century', in Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs and Laurence M. Hickey (eds.), *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp. 97-127.

⁴⁷ Due to this dearth in the literature, discussion herein about the AFP conceptualisation of doctrine is based on informal interviews conducted by the lead author with selected AFP officers (records are filed with the lead author).

⁴⁸ It must be noted that although the "levels" are used by the ADF as a mechanism to assist in the conceptualisation of military activities, they are by no means viewed as rigid or universally applicable. Indeed, it has recently been acknowledged that cross-level effects are increasingly common due to the proliferation of communications technology and media scrutiny of military

regardless of this difference, doctrine that establishes broad, guiding principles (in a similar fashion to ADF operational and military-strategic level doctrine) could be useful for guiding planning aspects of IDG activities, providing that it is not overly prescriptive.⁴⁹

Doctrine as a Mechanism for Enhancing AFP/ADF Cooperation and Interoperability

How then can doctrine become a mechanism for further enhancing cooperation and interoperability between the AFP and ADF? This article contends that it will improve understanding of the jargon implicit in the day-to-day language (and, figuratively, the behavioural jargon) of each organisation, thereby minimising miscommunication and ensuing problems, as well as constituting a firm foundation on which to base further cooperation and efforts towards enhanced interoperability. In short, there is a need for the military to learn the AFP's doctrinal language, and for the AFP to learn that of the military. This will require a different approach for each organisation.

Turning first to the AFP, the development of a greater understanding of the military approach to doctrine and its application should be considered as a key starting point. By the military definition of the term, it is clear that the AFP is not a "doctrine-based organisation" in the way that the military is.⁵⁰ For the AFP, developing an institutional appreciation of the significance of this facet of military culture is vital because it will improve the organisation's ability to understand and communicate with the ADF. Efforts to achieve this will need to incorporate raising awareness, which could be achieved by incorporating briefs about the military understanding and application of doctrine into AFP training courses. It is not critical that AFP officers become intimately familiar with ADF doctrine, but rather that they understand the role and standing of doctrine within the ADF, because this will enhance their understanding of the ADF itself. Although senior members of the IDG work closely with serving and former military personnel, operational officers are

operations. The attitudinal difference between AFP and ADF officers to this concept may therefore be a function of organisational size and of the different traditional roles of each organisation. Peskett, 'Levels of War', pp. 97-127; P. W. Singer, 'Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield Micromanagement', *Air and Space Power Journal*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 78-87; Charles C. Krulak, 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm> [Accessed 12 October 2010].

⁴⁹ The officers who expressed this view noted the difference between IDG activities and those of other branches of the AFP. Their comments about the potential use of doctrine to aid operational planning were specific to the IDG.

⁵⁰ The term "doctrine-based organisation" has been borrowed from: US Army Combined Arms Centre, *Doctrine Development*, <<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/doctrine.asp>> [Accessed 8 August 2010].

less likely to have the same depth of exposure to their military counterparts, and therefore constitute a key target of this work.

Given the significance of doctrine to militaries, the development of an AFP (or IDG) doctrine manual for offshore operations could constitute a mechanism for enhancing the appreciation military personnel have of AFP operating philosophies and practices. Such an innovation would need to meet a few key criteria to be accepted by members of the AFP while also being useful to the ADF, and to ensure it is able to achieve the goal of enhancing interoperability.

While the label “doctrine” would make the significance of such a manual immediately recognisable to ADF personnel, it may not be the most useful term from a police perspective. In light of the police need for flexibility and responsiveness, terminology such as “fundamental principles” could be more appropriate to AFP usage. Importantly, this term borrows from the ADF’s definition of doctrine, and so would emphasise the nature of its standing within the AFP while still assisting ADF personnel to identify the document as an equivalent to their own doctrine. An “equivalency statement” or similar, placed prominently in the front matter of the manual, would greatly assist in this identification, as ADF personnel are generally so well accustomed to labelling such a document as “doctrine” that they may otherwise fail to recognise the equivalency in the first instance. Such a statement may also help to deepen AFP officers’ understanding of the nature of military doctrine and the role it could play in increasing cooperation.

Whatever term were used, it would be necessary to include a carefully composed statement clarifying the precise intent, function and definition of any such document. This would assist in it gaining acceptance amongst AFP officers, who are generally wary of the military conceptualisation of doctrine on the grounds that it is overly-prescriptive and therefore ill-suited to police operations. Such reservations are entirely understandable given the different nature of police and military roles and approaches, however there could be little argument that Australian policing is founded on agreed principles that could be gathered in such a volume without unnecessarily restricting officers’ freedom within this broader conceptual framework.

It is noteworthy that an almost identical concern about doctrine has traditionally existed within most English-speaking navies, and that this concern has been progressively overcome within the past two decades. Indeed, since the mid-1990s navies have increasingly embraced doctrine as a mechanism for explaining to outsiders their role and its importance as a component of national strategy.⁵¹ It may be useful if the AFP approached the development of doctrine manuals with a similar intent in mind. It is

⁵¹ Mader, *In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence*, pp. 154-76; Jackson, *Keystone Doctrine Development in Five Commonwealth Navies*, pp. 67-70.

therefore noteworthy that, in the words of Michael Codner, navy doctrine achieves its intent by offering “what is essentially a conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic theory”.⁵²

On this basis, an AFP doctrine manual could be limited to providing an overview of the fundamental principles and philosophies of international policing, and giving a description of the roles and functions of a police force in the context of multinational interventions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Providing the manual was written and formatted in such a way that it would be recognisable to ADF personnel as “doctrine”, the provision of this high-level yet limited information could go a long way towards enhancing cooperation and interoperability, as it would enable ADF personnel to digest crucial background information about the AFP in a format they would appreciate as significant. Furthermore, detailing a broad set of principles and philosophies would avoid prescription, making the manual both useful and more acceptable to AFP officers themselves.

On the flip side of the coin, ADF personnel could benefit by developing an increased understanding of the culture of the AFP and the approach that organisation takes to doctrine. From their inception, police forces have had a different focus than militaries, which Goldsmith and Harris summarised as “the *criminal-evidential* focus of the police, compared to the *war-fighting/tactical victory* orientation of the military”.⁵³ As a result of this different focus, the approach of each organisation to similar areas of endeavour has evolved in divergent ways—not least with respect to the lead-time and approach to planning for operations, and the flexibility and decision-making power available to lower level staff in each organisation.

These differences have in turn shaped the perspective from which each organisation views the other in the context of cooperation and interoperability. The issue of operational planning presents a good example of the difference: a tendency on the part of some military personnel to perceive the AFP as reactionary rather than planning-focused can be contrasted with a perspective amongst AFP officers that their organisation is planning-focused but in a less rigid manner than the military.⁵⁴

The criminal-evidential focus of the AFP has been vital in shaping the perceptions that AFP officers hold about doctrine. Although the AFP is not a “doctrine-based organisation” in the military sense, it nonetheless employs similar mechanisms for distributing information: guidelines and orders, which

⁵² Michael Codner, ‘Purple Prose and Purple Passion: The Joint Defence Centre’, *RUSI Journal*, vol. 144, no. 1 (February/March 1999), p. 38.

⁵³ Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 228 (emphasis in original). On the origins of modern police forces and the measures taken to separate them from militaries, see: Clive Emsley, ‘The Origins of the Modern Police’, *History Today*, vol. 49, no. 4 (April 1999), pp. 8-14.

⁵⁴ Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 227.

it supplements with an informal and flexible (although sometimes *ad hoc*) approach to disseminating tactical lessons learned. An enhanced understanding of the ethos of police operations and the AFP organisational culture would assist military personnel to appreciate the significance of this approach, with the potential to lead to a more flexible conceptualisation of doctrine by military personnel. This in turn would encourage attitudes conducive to fostering enhanced cooperation and interoperability.

Over the course of the past few centuries, military doctrine has become increasingly formalised and as a result the military understanding and conceptualisation of doctrine has become less flexible. A return to a previous doctrinal paradigm is therefore warranted when interacting with the AFP. For example, Gary Sheffield observed in the case of the British Army that:

While some armed forces have been famed for their doctrinal approach, until 1989 the British Army was not one of them. Largely eschewing formal, written doctrine, the Army made a cult of pragmatism, flexibility and an empirical approach ... That is not to say that the British Army entirely neglected "doctrine", broadly defined, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, doctrine tended to be semi-formal at best; was centred around one individual commander or existed in a specific set of circumstances ... and was not necessarily easily transferrable elsewhere; and in some cases it was more honoured in the breach than the observance.⁵⁵

This description could also be applied to the current practices of the AFP and, owing to its British lineage, the Australian Army—indeed the entire ADF—has previously employed this conceptualisation of doctrine.⁵⁶ Developing a deeper understanding of their own doctrinal history may thus be a key to enabling ADF personnel to develop a better appreciation of the approach taken by the AFP.

It should also be observed that this proposal risks being accused of asking the AFP to make a greater effort than the ADF to facilitate improved cooperation. This is partly due to the fact that the ADF already has doctrine manuals that other government agencies can consult to develop a better understanding of its operational planning and practices. Our suggestion is that police develop a volume similar to the ADF's highest level, or "capstone" doctrine manual, and that both organisations be encouraged to take greater account of these documents when attempting to work better together. This would complement the range of practical strategies already being undertaken (as outlined above).

⁵⁵ Gary Sheffield, 'Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview', in Directorate General Development and Doctrine, *Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations* (United Kingdom: British Army, May 2005), p. 165.

⁵⁶ Aaron P. Jackson, *Dissecting Doctrine: Military Strategic Level Doctrine Development in the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Armed Forces, 1987-2007* (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2011 forthcoming).

Doctrine and the Limits of Cooperation

An important final point is that this article by no means advocates using doctrine to further blur the distinction between police and military practices. The characteristic differences of each organisation are critical to the normal functioning of a state. Ignoring these during intervention operations would detract from positive long term outcomes for the host state.⁵⁷ As Wainwright notes, in peace operations the military has a clear role “to establish control, and to prevent warring parties and insurgents from undermining efforts to rebuild a state”, in contrast to the police roles of maintaining law and order, conducting criminal investigations, police-building, and building confidence in the rule of law.⁵⁸

This role distinction can be seen in the practical example of the approach each organisation takes to the conduct of patrols: the level of planning and control applied by the military is critical to the protection of personnel in conflict situations, while the flexibility available to police during their patrols is key to their crime prevention, investigation and arrest functions. While these tasks are mutually reinforcing and complementary, the distinctions can constitute a challenge when joint patrols are called for during international interventions.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, it is appropriate—indeed important—that military and police roles remain distinct, to maintain the separation between the two organisations that underpinned “the rise of the modern state and the modern state system”.⁶⁰

Complementary cooperation could nevertheless be enhanced by doctrine, without further blurring the roles of each organisation. At what the military would call the operational level, doctrine that establishes clear guidelines for areas such as the means of communication between the AFP and the ADF, or doctrine concerning security arrangements and intelligence sharing would be particularly useful, as these are areas in which cooperation (and indeed interoperability) has been relatively difficult to achieve in the past.⁶¹ Doctrine to enhance complementary cooperation could be produced by either organisation (or, preferably, collectively), providing that it is developed in

⁵⁷ This issue has already been raised in the context of coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Karene Melloul, ‘Accidental Partners? Listening to the Australian Defence and Police Experience of the Security-Development Nexus in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States’, research paper prepared on behalf of the World Bank, October 2010, p. 20. See also International Crisis Group, *Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform*, Asia Report No. 143 (International Crisis Group, January 2008), p. i.

⁵⁸ Wainwright, *Police Join the Front Line*, p. 6.

⁵⁹ This task requires at minimum localised cooperation arrangements, but its effectiveness is greatly enhanced by the implementation of interoperability measures.

⁶⁰ Greener, *The New International Policing*, p. 92. See also: Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Security Sector Reform—Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the Wider Security Needs’, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 1-21; Andrew Goldsmith, ‘Policing Weak States: Citizen Safety and State Responsibility’, *Policing and Society*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2003), pp. 3-21.

⁶¹ Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, pp. 221-37.

close consultation and that its content is acceptable to both. Furthermore, doctrine of this nature may have the additional benefit of helping to reinforce within the host nation the distinction between police and military roles and functions.

Conclusion

Improving the effectiveness of multinational interventions is a crucial goal for the international community. With military and police now comprising the vast majority of personnel deployed on UN missions, it is critical that they function effectively together. International peacekeeping, reconstruction and humanitarian operations take place in complex environments, and indeed constitute a complex microcosm within those environments. Building mechanisms to manage or minimise this complexity therefore increases capacity to focus on improving the environment rather than managing the missions themselves.

This article has argued that cooperation and interoperability between police and military forces, such as the AFP and ADF, would be greatly enhanced through an increased understanding of each other's language and processes. Doctrine exists in each of these forces, although in the case of the police it is neither named as such nor written in formal manuals. Formalised doctrine—as an authoritative statement of fundamental principles that guide actions but require discernment in application—represents a useful tool for cooperation, because it spells out the foundational operational ideologies of each force. The clarity provided by such a statement thus creates a clear and agreed starting point for building understanding, for collaborating, and for identifying areas where interoperability is possible.

Finally, doctrine specifically designed to enhance cooperation and interoperability would contribute to improving operational performance during times of major unrest, when immediate, coherent action is critical but timeframes allow little or no opportunity to debate roles, leadership and approaches. The nature of the countries to which the AFP and ADF are deployed means that this issue is likely to arise repeatedly in the future. Doctrine therefore constitutes a significant tool that can be used to contribute to generating better outcomes for both deployed forces and local civilians in areas where multinational interventions are required.

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