SPECIAL EDITION: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY WHITE PAPER 2017

Allan Gyngell
The Uncertainty Principle: The 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper in Historical Context.................................................................6

Chengxin Pan
Identity Politics and the Poverty of Diplomacy: China in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.................................................................13

Tomohiko Satake
Australia’s New Foreign Policy White Paper: A View from Japan................21

Huong Le Thu
Australia and ASEAN: Together for the Sake of a New Multipolar World Order..................................................................................................................26

Rory Medcalf
Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper: Navigating Uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific .................................................................33

OTHER ARTICLES

Vaughan Grant
Critical Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships: When is the Responsibility for Leadership Exchanged?.................................................................40

Amy Johnson, Celeste Lawson and Kate Ames
"Use your common sense, don't be an idiot": Social Media Security Attitudes amongst Partners of Australian Defence Force Personnel..................53

BOOK REVIEWS

Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific by Ralph Emmers and Sarah Teo..................................................................................................................65

Reviewed by Andrew Carr
Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942 by Allan Gyngell.....67

Reviewed by Chris Farnham
Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience—Stable and Successful by Michal Lubina .................................................................70

Reviewed by Gregory Raymond
Editors’ introduction

This Special Issue focuses on the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper, launched in November 2017. Immediately after its release, Australia’s national security seized the headlines: Labor Party senator Sam Dastyari was forced to resign from Parliament, on suspicions of acting under China’s influence. The era Australian scholar Coral Bell once called the “end of the Vasco de Gama era”, with non-European states on equal footing with others in the international system, was here. Since the Dastyari affair, a heated debate, fanned by Clive Hamilton’s book *Silent Invasion* alleging widespread insidious Chinese Communist Party influence in Australian society and politics, and the Government’s drafting of foreign influence legislation, has continued with little end in sight.

In this issue our authors appraise the White Paper as a response to the new geopolitics of the Asia Pacific. They situate the document within Australia’s longer traditions of foreign and security policy, offering interpretations and critiques from angles including clarity of conception, viability of execution, consistency of principle, and resourcing of objectives. We also hear from one of Australia’s key regional partners, Japan, offering another viewpoint.

Allan Gyngell in the opening essay argues that anxiety pervades the foreign policy white paper, and that this anxiety is not new. It has driven Australia’s foreign policy for decades. Gyngell picks what is genuinely new, including the emphasis on values, and the coining of a new geographic construct, the Indo-Pacific. Gyngell laments another staple of Australian foreign policy, an unwillingness to finance an expansion of the diplomatic corps.

Chengxin Pan deconstructs the White Paper from the perspective of identity politics. He argues that the paper’s embrace of values amounts to a means of distancing Australia from an unfamiliar and alarming international actor. He argues further that this is a disproportionate response, given the cavalier approach that Australia and its allies have taken to the rules-based international order in previous years.

Tomohiko Satake presents a view from Japan. He notes Japanese hopes that Australia will help check China’s rise, and also fears that Australia will not. Satake’s situates Australia’s response as a subtle, flexible and omnidirectional policy that will seek to reinforce aspects of the current order through building relationships, including through continued engagement of China.

Huong Le Thu parses the White Paper’s enthusiasm for Southeast Asia. While agreeing that Southeast Asia is important for continued efforts to promote multilateralism, she sounds a cautionary note, suggesting that the weakness of ASEAN unity means it will be an unreliable partner in efforts to
balance against China. Australia will also need patience and endurance to maintain engagement with ASEAN.

In the closing piece, Rory Medcalf summarises what he sees as the document’s strengths. He praises the document’s willingness to connect interests and values, and its unflinching but diplomatic treatment of tough strategic realities. He is also positive about its embrace of the Indo-Pacific terminology, and its layered approach to multilateralism. His chief concern is, as with Gyngell, the lack of commitment to funding.

Following the Special Issue section, we return to our normal programming. First, Vaughan Grant explains how the advent of the cyber era challenges the government and private sector in demarcating clear responsibilities for national security. Second, Amy Johnson, Celeste Lawson and Kate Ames examine social media use by partners of Australian Defence Force members. We then include three book reviews. Chris Farnham reviews Allen Gyngell’s own book on Australian foreign policy, Andrew Carr reviews Ralph Emmers and Sarah Teo’s book on middle powers in the Asia Pacific, and Greg Raymond reviews Michal Lubina’s book on the China-Russia relationship.

Gregory Raymond and Chris Farnham, Managing Editors, July 2018.
The Uncertainty Principle: The 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper in Historical Context

Allan Gyngell

For governments in Westminster political systems, White Papers are a convenient, formal way to set out for public discussion their policy positions and legislative agendas on significant issues. The 2015 White Paper on agricultural competitiveness and the Defence White Paper of 2016 were recent Australian examples.

In foreign policy, which operates in a fluid and contingent environment and seldom requires legislation, White Papers have been much rarer. Declaratory policy on international affairs has more usually taken the form of statements and debates in parliament, or speeches or reports issued by individual ministers. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is only the third of its sort in Australia, all of them the product of Coalition governments. The first appeared in 1997 and the second in 2003. The Gillard government’s ‘Australia in the Asia Century White Paper’, which came out in 2012, addressed some international policy issues but was primarily a domestic policy document.

The genesis of the 2017 White Paper was a promise by the foreign minister, Julie Bishop, to “develop a contemporary and comprehensive foreign policy strategy for the 21st century”, within twelve months of the 2016 election.¹ The paper would not try to predict the future, she said, but would look at “the kind of framework that needs to be in place so that we’re … strategically positioned to manage, maybe even shape, events”.²

Responses from scholars and commentators to the White Paper, released in December 2017, have been mixed but generally positive. The strongest

critiques have come from those who believe that its policy prescriptions should have been bolder.\(^3\)

The analytical foundation of the paper is as solid and subtle as any government could be persuaded to endorse in a public document at the present time (and more radical than the government itself perhaps recognises). Its policy prescriptions are less clearly defined. Its most unsatisfactory aspect is the absence of any commitment of resources to address the dangers and opportunities it foresees.

This article analyses the 2017 White Paper in its historical context: examining what it reveals about changes in the way the Turnbull government thinks about the international system and Australia’s role in it, and what it shows about continuities with the past.

The White Paper exhorts Australians to “approach this period of change with confidence” (p. 2). But very close to the surface lies an older sentiment, familiar to all observers of Australian foreign policy: anxiety. The prime minister declares in his introduction that these are “times of uncertainty, of risk, indeed of danger” (p. iii). The first two sentences of the Overview introduce the theme for all that follows: this is a time of rapid change and Australia will need to pursue its interests in a more competitive and contested world (p. 1).

The proposed policy responses are familiar. They align with the policies of every Australian government since the Second World War—support for the alliance with the United States; active engagement in the neighbourhood in Asia and the South Pacific; and recognition that as a country large enough to have global interests, but with limited resources, Australia is always going to be better off in an international order with clear and consistent rules which it has played a part in setting.

Another, more recent, continuity lies in the paper’s strategic framing device, the Indo-Pacific. This is defined as “the region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States” (p. 1). Very quickly, and with bipartisan agreement, the Indo-Pacific has replaced the Asia-Pacific in the major international strategy documents of all Australian governments since Julia Gillard’s.

It provides a useful way for Australia to think about the world because it embraces the two oceans around the continent and gives a central strategic place to Southeast Asia and the vital sea lines carrying trade and energy

between the Middle East and North Asia. It brings India into the Australian policy equation. In the minds of some commentators it also seems to be a way of diluting China’s centrality, although such hopes are not likely to last much longer than the first time the formulation is used by a Chinese senior official as a way of defining the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ of the Belt and Road initiative.

The only geographic area to be given a chapter of its own in the White Paper is the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste. Declarations that the region is important, that earlier approaches have not worked and that “new approaches will be necessary” (p. 99) have a long history in Australian foreign policy and are part of a reliable cycle of Australian policymaking which has alternated between policies of deep engagement and a belief that it is better to stand back and allow regional states solve their own problems. ‘New partnerships’ with the South Pacific island states have been announced by almost every Australian government since the 1980s, including, most recently, the Howard government’s 2004 Enhanced Cooperation Program with PNG and the Rudd government’s 2008 ‘Pacific Partnerships for Development’. The new element this time is the emphasis placed on greater economic integration with Australia and New Zealand. China, the unnamed source of “increasing competition for influence and economic opportunities” in the region (p. 100), is driving the urgency.

Another interesting area of continuity is the prominence given to ‘openness’ in all its dimensions. The White Paper describes a vision for a “neighbourhood in which adherence to rules delivers lasting peace, where the rights of all states are respected, and where open markets facilitate the free flow of trade, capital and ideas” (p. 4). This openness is not “an absolute”, the paper makes clear (p. 14). It is circumscribed in areas such as national security, the integrity of institutions, immigration and foreign investment. But at a time when the idea is under pressure in societies ranging from the United States to China, openness is shaping up as an important part of Australia’s international commitments. This is not because Australia has changed but because the rest of the world has. As attitudes towards economic protectionism and cultural nativism become a central dividing line in the politics of many Western countries, the bipartisan support for openness in the political centre of Australian politics is important and unusual. Opposition frontbenchers Chris Bowen, Penny Wong and

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Andrew Leigh have also used it as a theme in recent speeches and monographs.

The 2017 White Paper’s real shift from its predecessors comes not in its broad prescriptions but in its underlying analysis of the international situation. What is new here is the directness and frankness with which it acknowledges that “Significant forces of change are now buffeting” the international system (p. 21) and its uncertainty about where these changes may lead. “It is possible”, it notes, “that some of the trends identified in this White Paper will move against Australian interests in ways that will require further responses” (p. 3).

The most obvious changes relate to the speed of China’s economic growth and military capabilities over the past ten years and to emerging doubts about the strength of US commitments to the region and the international system. The paper’s discussion of these issues is cautious and some of it is allusive; a palimpsest on which you can detect the faint after-marks of anxious editorial changes.

It notes that “there is greater debate and uncertainty in the United States about the costs and benefits of its leadership in parts of the international system” and judges that “without sustained US support, the effectiveness and liberal character of the rules based order will decline” (p. 7). There are several references to Australia’s support for “US global leadership”, but the nature of such leadership is not defined.

In Australia’s own region, the paper argues, without US political, economic and security engagement, power is likely to shift “more quickly” (p. 4). It is, in other words, the speed rather than the overall direction of change that is in question.

The reality and legitimacy of China’s rise is accepted, although Australia’s differences with Beijing, for example on the South China Sea, are clearly and directly stated. The White Paper acknowledges that “Like all great powers, China will seek to influence the region to suit its own interests.” (p. 26) Australia welcomes China’s greater capacity “to share responsibility for supporting regional and global security” (p. 4) and supports for reforms that would give a “greater role in the international system” to China and other emerging powers (p. 7). Australia’s ultimate goal with regional trading arrangements is to involve China, Japan and the United States in an open, integrated, regional system (p. 62).

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The core of the Australian strategic and economic policy dilemma is expressed by two paragraphs which follow each other in Chapter 3—‘A Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific’.

The Government will broaden and deepen our alliance cooperation and encourage the strongest possible economic and security engagement by the United States in the region.

Strengthening our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China is also vital for Australia both to pursue extensive bilateral interests and because of China’s growing influence on the regional and global issues of greatest consequence to our security and prosperity. (p. 37)

Values have taken on a new centrality in this document. They hardly featured in the 1997 White Paper. They were given greater prominence in 2003, but in distinctively Australian terms: “Our fundamental values and beliefs are clear. Australians value tolerance, perseverance and mateship.”7

In 2017, however, values are expressed emphatically and defined in classic liberal forms.

Australia does not define its national identity by race or religion, but by shared values, including political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect.

Our adherence to the rule of law extends beyond our borders. We advocate and seek to protect an international order in which relations between states are governed by International law and other rules and norms. (p. 11)

In a post-truth, post-Trump world that sounds remarkably radical. For the historian of Australian foreign policy, the interesting thing here is the apparent conversion of a Coalition government from interests-based Realism—which the 1997 White Paper defined as the sort of “hard-headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy”8—to full-throated liberal internationalism of the sort usually identified with Labor ministers such as Gareth Evans (although the divide was never as sharp as is sometimes claimed).

What lies behind this shift of emphasis from interests to values is, of course, the changing power balance in the region and China’s growing influence. In what seems to be a clear message to China, however, the values are defined as part of our own identity as Australians, not as a missionary endeavour. “We do not seek to impose values on others”, the paper states (p. 11). Nevertheless, Australia will work more closely with the region’s major democracies “bilaterally and in small groups” (p. 4).

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8 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997), p. iii.
There are some notable gaps in the subjects covered by the White Paper. The Middle East, for example, is largely ignored, except as a source of terrorism. It was just twelve years ago that the Howard government's 2005 Defence Update declared that “Australia’s vital interests are inextricably linked to the achievement of peace and security in the Middle East”,9 a reminder, if it is needed, that notwithstanding Lord Palmerston’s famous aphorism that Britain had no permanent friends, just permanent interests, our perception of interests can be even more changeable than our choice of friends.

A last, regrettable, foreign policy continuity lies in the 2017 White Paper’s treatment of resources. The paper acknowledges that

> Our ability to protect and advance our interests rests on the quality of our engagement with the world. This includes the ideas we bring to the table, our ability to persuade others to our point of view and the strength of the relations we build with other countries and, increasingly, with influential non-government actors. (p. 17)

“Having the ability to influence the behaviour or thinking of others through the power of attraction and ideas is … vital to our foreign policy,” it declares (p. 109). But not so vital, apparently, that any resources need to be invested in it. It’s as if the 2016 Defence White Paper had simply described the strategic environment and ended.

The original intention seems to have been different. In November 2016 the foreign minister told journalists that “the policy paper will also outline the size and resourcing of DFAT with Ms Bishop ensuring any new proposals would go through the budget planning process”.10

Presumably that commitment fell victim to the belief, common to many politicians and commentators,11 that while the instruments of deterrence and war fighting (the ADF) and the instruments of domestic security (police and intelligence agencies) are legitimate ways of spending the taxpayers’ money, the instruments of persuasion are less worthy.

Australia still bumps around near the bottom of the OECD and G20 tables for its diplomatic network,12 and the aid program, an important potential source of influence which is largely ignored in the White Paper, remains at

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11 Catherine McGregor, Playing a Dangerous Game’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 December 2017.
historically low relative levels. The instruments of persuasion encompass far more than DFAT’s budget or the range of its overseas posts, however.

All parts of the Australian government and Australian society that operate offshore—hard power and soft power alike—need to be utilised for this task (“vital”, remember, according to the government’s White Paper itself). The options—their costs minuscule in comparison with submarine programs or joint strike fighters—include funding to drive the international agenda in ways that we want; to shape the new coalitions we will need to advance our interests—“strengthening and diversifying partnerships across the globe” in the Prime Minister’s own words (p. iii); to enable Australians, including Australian politicians, to participate more actively in the international debate.

So at a moment when, thanks to China, no observer of Australian politics or foreign policy seems to be in any doubt that influence of many different sorts can be used to shift the behaviour of key actors in other states, and its own White Paper concludes that, “For Australia, the stakes could not be higher” (p. 3), the government has squibbed an important opportunity to prepare the country more effectively for the uncertainty it rightly sees ahead.

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Identity Politics and the Poverty of Diplomacy: China in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper

Chengxin Pan

In Fear of China, Again

Australia’s long-awaited 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper came on the eve of the 45th anniversary of Australia-China diplomatic relations. As its largest trading partner and a rising regional powerhouse, China features prominently throughout this policy blueprint. The White Paper notes the need to strengthen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China, partly because of “China’s growing influence on the regional and global issues of greatest consequence to our security and prosperity” (p. 37). Yet, if the White Paper is any guide, China’s growing influence is also what worries Australian leaders the most at the moment.

On its very first page, we are told that “Today, China is challenging America’s position” (p. 1). With the United States seen as vital to Australia’s security and prosperity, one can hardly escape the conclusion that this China challenge also poses risks to Australia’s key interests. As China seeks influence in the region, Australia will “face an increasingly complex and contested Indo-Pacific” (p. 26), in which “the potential for the use of force or coercion in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait” is seen as disconcerting (p. 47). Describing the South China Sea as “a major fault line in the regional order” (p. 46), the White Paper is “particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s activities” along this “fault line” (pp. 46-47). Though not directly naming China, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull also repeatedly warns of “risk”, “danger”, and “threats to our way of life” in his brief introduction to the White Paper (p. iii).

Many Chinese commentators are puzzled by Australia’s alarist views of their country. Responding to the White Paper, an editorial from China’s Global Times opines that each year Chinese students and tourists pour a large amount of money into Australian coffers, not to mention China being the main customer of Australian minerals and beef, and yet Australia treats China in a manner like “eating the meat from the bowl, and then abusing the

13 The author would like to thank Christopher Farnham and the two anonymous reviewers for their positive and constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
14 All page numbers provided in the main text refer to the 2017 White Paper.
Certainly we may dismiss such Chinese puzzlement as a reflection of their somewhat autistic way of looking at the world and China’s role in it. Still, it is remarkable that such puzzlement exists not only among many Chinese, but also among those Chinese elites who otherwise had a soft spot for Australia. In this sense, we might as well owe ourselves some explanation about this puzzle: Why, indeed, is Australia so fearful of a country which has contributed the most to its best terms of trade in more than a century?

Identity Politics in the White Paper

I contend that Australia’s negative perception of China has much to do with the way Australia constructs itself, which features front and centre in the White Paper. Producing a foreign policy white paper, like making foreign policy in general, involves first and foremost the making of something ‘foreign’. Without the existence of the ‘foreign’, then by definition it does not make much sense to speak of ‘foreign policy’. One reliable way of making something foreign is to talk oneself up in a way that sets oneself apart from that ‘foreign’ object. This is precisely what the White Paper has done, which kicks off with a chapter on ‘Australia’s values’: “political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect” (p. 11). As soon as those values are used to define what Australia is, China’s ‘Other’ or ‘foreign’ status becomes almost assured. Understood this way, the depiction of China as a threat in the White Paper is neither a pure reflection of hard reality on the ground, nor a product of some inexplicable ‘anti-China’ mentality. It is a function of international identity politics that underpins Australian foreign policymaking.

While domestically Australian identity has been contested in the so-called ‘culture wars’ to define Australia and its history, citizens, and public policy agendas, its international face has gradually, and much less controversially, shifted to a narrative that accentuates liberal democratic

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17 Simon Dalby, ‘Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other’, Alternatives, vol. 13, no. 4 (1988), p. 419; similarly, ‘security’ is one of the three keywords appearing on the cover of this White Paper, and according to Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘security appears to be meaningless either as concept or practice without an ‘Other’ to help specify the conditions of insecurity that must be guarded against’. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 49.
values as opposed to geographical, cultural, racial or religious characteristics. A quick comparison of the 2017 White Paper with its 2003 predecessor helps illustrate this point. In the 2003 White Paper, a residual cultural flavour was still palpable in the articulation of the Australian identity, which was defined above all in terms of “tolerance, perseverance, and mateship”, as well as “liberal democracy” and “economic freedom”. But such emphasis on Australia’s “own distinctive culture” is nowhere to be seen in the latest White Paper. Instead, it states that “We come from virtually every culture, race, faith and nation” (p. 12); therefore, “Australia does not define its national identity by race or religion, but by shared values” (p. 11). Gone, it seems, are ways of defining Australia in terms of race (‘White Australia’), culture (‘Britishness’), power status (‘middle power’), or even ‘geographical’ location (‘Western’ or ‘Asian’).

This particular way of defining the Australian self comes with some advantages: it helps Australia both circumvent the uncomfortable question of whether Australia is part of Asia, and de-emphasise its ‘Western’ heritage in the Asian region and age so as to allow it to better blend in, such as joining the East Asia Summit. More importantly, this values-based identity ties Australia firmly to the so-called “rules-based international order”, which is believed to be underpinned by, as well as essential to, “the values that reflect who we are and how we approach the world” (p. 11).

**Australia’s Values-based Identity and the Othering of China**

Defining Australia’s identity and interests in terms of liberal values and the rules-based order lays the groundwork for Australia to think about and deal with the United States and China in particular ways. It is in this context that I take issue with certain aspects of the White Paper in terms of its framing of Australia’s interests, its characterisation of key international relationships, and its prescribed policy responses.

To start with, putting fixed values at the centre of Australia’s identity allows the Australian Government to take an essentialist view of the country’s identity, interests and strength. Here, not only are Australia’s interests defined almost exclusively in terms of values and the rules-based order, but

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20 Ibid.
its strength and prosperity are believed to be almost exclusively endogenously generated, as if Australia as “a stable and peaceful democracy” somehow automatically sustains and reproduces itself and its “strong economy”.

If Australia’s success does have something to do with the “more interconnected and interdependent” world (p. 1), the credit is given exclusively to the United States and the US-led order. For instance, it is argued that “The principles embedded in the post-war order have strongly supported Australia’s interests and our values”, and that “we have benefited significantly from an international order shaped by US power and global leadership” (p. 21). While it does acknowledges that China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse has contributed to “boosting our economy and increasing our living standards” (p. 22), the White Paper sees China’s economic growth itself as a product of the US-led order. Further, in the words of then Prime Minister Tony Abbott, “China trades with us because it is in China’s interest to trade with us”. Consequently, while Australia owes a lot to itself and the United States, it does not owe much to China. Through the discourses of ‘Australian values’ and the ‘US-led rules-based international order’, China’s role in Australia’s recent prosperity is explained away.

If anything, as China’s rise continues, it has come to increasingly symbolise danger, risk and threat. Given that Australia defines its identity, interests and strength in terms of liberal values, in Australia’s eye China is also inevitably values-based, except that it is almost the direct opposite of what Australia stands for. What matters most, then, is not the fact that China is by far Australia’s largest trading partner, but that this largest trading partner is for the first time “not a democracy”, but rather “a one-party authoritarian state with a fast-growing economy, a rapidly modernising military and global ambition”. Even as terrorism, North Korea and other pressing issues continue to cause unease and fear, none seems able to remotely match the scale and comprehensiveness of China’s Otherness, not to mention the much longer history of its dark presence in Australia’s national self-

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imagination since Federation. In a recent speech in Canberra, the Australian Ambassador to Washington Joe Hockey drove home this point: Chinese influence in Australia “represents a threat to what many Australians fought and died for and that’s a free and transparent, open democracy”. From the identity politics perspective, little wonder that Chinese economic and political influence has aroused increasing suspicion and trepidation in Australia.

The Poverty of Diplomacy

Isn’t China indeed “a party-state that institutionalises Leninist authoritarianism, a Communist vision for modernisation, and a hard nationalism”? There is certainly some truth to this popular China imagery, but it does not necessarily capture the complete picture of China as a complex international actor, nor does it necessarily constitute the most important or the most relevant fact as far as Australia’s foreign policy and national interests are concerned. Otherwise, Australia could never have justifiably formalised its relationship with Communist China during the height of the Cold War. Rules and values are no doubt important, particularly for a middle power like Australia. The values-based politics of identity might have allowed Australia to conjure up a clear sense of ‘who we are’, but international politics is not always a realm for clear-cut dichotomies and either/or moral choices. Foreign policy, like politics in general, is the art of the possible, not the absolute. As the 2003 White Paper makes it clear, “There is nothing inevitable about this and other rules. Their conception and enforcement are the result of long and hard negotiation among governments.” 29 In this sense, as far as its China policy is concerned, I argue that the 2017 White Paper has failed its own test, namely, “chart[ing] a clear course for Australia at a time of rapid change” (p. 1). This era of rapid change demands a more flexible and pragmatic approach to identity and foreign policy, not an absolutist values-based straightjacket. It calls for ‘old-fashioned’ diplomacy that is based on reciprocity, negotiation, and practical wisdom in navigating through complex common challenges facing the world. China, for all its failings, needs to be part of the solution to those challenges. The values-based identity politics, however, leaves little room for imagining such diplomatic possibilities.

29 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, p. 51.
Here, my point is not to let China off the hook easily. Rather, the ‘values-cum-rules’ foundation upon which Australia’s identity and foreign policy are allegedly based is from the beginning unstable at best and illusory at worst. Despite its unequivocal claims to universal values and norms, Australia has rarely allowed values to stand in the way of its perceived national interests. Canberra’s treatment of asylum seekers, for example, has been widely condemned for its breach of its international legal obligations. And its recent maritime boundary agreement with Timor-Leste, touted as “an example of the rules-based order in action” (p. 105), does not negate the fact that Australia’s dealings with Timor-Leste have been anything but rules-based or values-based.  

Meanwhile, America’s track record on following international rules and norms is no better. Arguably the biggest blow to the rules-based international order in recent memory is the US invasion, without either UN authorisation or Congressional approval, of Iraq, in which Australia also took part. In fact, on the few occasions when the phrase “rules-based international order” was invoked in the first decade of this century, it was primarily to denounce US unilateralism under George W. Bush. Today, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Iran nuclear deal is just the latest evidence of a United States which often takes a rather cavalier attitude towards rules and norms. Even as the United States implores China to respect the “rules-based order” in the South China Sea, it has not itself ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

To highlight Australia’s and the United States’ rules-breaking behaviours does not justify China’s breach of rules and norms, but it does call into question the wisdom of banking on values and rules as a marker of identity and difference. China, after all, is widely believed to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the existing rules-based order. If this is true, then it defies logic that China both benefits from and actively undermines the same rules-based order. It also demands explanation if the rules-based order greatly benefits a country which has not followed its rules. Lack of space prevents any detailed analysis of China’s relations with international law and rules, but suffice it to say here that treating China as the complete opposite of what Australia stands for distorts more than it illuminates.

In this sense, putting Australia’s values and the rules-based international order front and centre in the Foreign Policy White Paper is more about identity politics than about effective diplomacy. Importantly, Australia’s fascination with its values and the rules-based order may turn out to be merely wishful thinking when it comes to designing and executing its foreign policy. One of Australia’s key values-based foreign policy projects is the

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revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the ‘Quad’) among Australia, India, Japan and the United States, all ‘like-minded’ democracies.\textsuperscript{31} One problem with the Quad is that even though they are all democracies, they are not necessarily like-minded when it comes to foreign policy. Democracy, by definition, allows a diversity of views to coexist, and different democracies naturally hold different interests and policy agendas. For example, in countries like India, ‘democracy’ may not be seen as an end in itself, but also as a means to attract investment (as in Narendra Modi’s three Ds: democracy, demography and demand). And for that reason, there may be limitations as to how far India is willing to go along with Australia’s and the United States’ strategic policies on China.\textsuperscript{32} The different emphases in the separate statements issued individually by the four democracies after their first ‘working-level’ meeting in November 2017 are a case in point.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, democracies face regular elections and a new administration may well have different ideas when it comes to their foreign policy concerns and priorities (for example, Australia withdrew from the Quad after the election of Kevin Rudd in 2007).

Nor is democracy necessarily prone to peace and order: witness the disruptive and disastrous consequences of Washington’s regime change in the Middle East on behalf of democracy. Malcolm Turnbull himself held no illusion about democracy before he became the Prime Minister. As he wrote in 2012, “Anyone who thinks democracies are not belligerent is a poor student of history, ancient and modern.”\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Conclusion}

To conclude, this brief analysis is not to dismiss the importance of values and rules for foreign policy. Far from it. These factors have always and will continue to play a part in international relations. What is inadequate in the new Foreign Policy White Paper is that it adopts a fundamentalist or essentialist approach to values and rules, whereas both, to the extent that

\textsuperscript{31} While the 2017 White Paper does not directly mention the Quad, it hints at its willingness to work with "our Indo-Pacific partners in other plurilateral arrangements" (p. 40). For a debate on the Quad, see Euan Graham, Chengxin Pan, Ian Hall, Rikki Kersten, Benjamin Zala and Sarah Percy, ‘Debating the Quad’, \textit{Centre of Gravity} series no. 39 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 10 March 2018), <sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/5996/debating-quad> [Accessed 20 March 2018].


they are human-made, are subject to change and cannot be considered independently of their practical consequences or specific circumstances to which they are applied. This caution may disappoint those who truly believe in the superiority and universality of Australia’s values and the rules-based order Australia promotes, but it is better than blindly following one’s moral conviction only to be met with disastrous consequences (the Iraq War comes to mind). For this reason, I argue that the “national foundation” in which the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is grounded should give us more sober pause for thought than confidence.

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Australia’s New Foreign Policy White Paper: A View from Japan

Tomohiko Satake

What Makes this White Paper Important at this Particular Time?

In November 2017, the Australian Government released a new Foreign Policy White Paper, fourteen years since its last. The White Paper was widely reported by the Japanese media, including newspapers and television news outlets. As far as this author knows, it received the most coverage of any Australian foreign and security document—perhaps since the publication of the 2009 Defence White Paper. These reports generally stressed that the new White Paper takes a tough stance against China by ‘checking’ (or kensei in Japanese) its rise. The geographical concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ featured by the White Paper was also treated as evidence that Australia is enhancing its anti-China stance with other like-minded democracies in the region.

Behind such reports is a typical Japanese image of Australia as a nation that ‘swings’ between the United States and China. Given the current development of security cooperation with Australia, the Japanese public, as well as its policy community, has increasingly acknowledged the strategic significance of Australia for Japan’s security. Nonetheless, many ordinary Japanese still doubt if Australia is truly a trustworthy partner given its huge economic dependence on, and geographical distance from, China. In fact, not a few Japanese believe that Australia did not select Japan as a partner for Australia’s future submarine project out of concern over the possible Chinese reaction. From such a view Australia’s new White Paper may be seen as a ‘happy surprise’ as it demonstrates that Australia will eventually join an anti-China coalition with Japan, the United States and other regional democracies.

Such a view is, however, quite superficial, if not entirely wrong. The Australian Government and various intellectuals have commonly used the Indo-Pacific concept since approximately 2012. Canberra has gradually but surely become cautious about the rise of China, especially since the late 2000s, as demonstrated by the 2009 Defence White Paper, which emphasised China’s growing military strength and modernisation. More
recently, China’s espionage activities and its organised ‘interference’ in Australian politics, as well as its land-reclamation and militarisation of the South China Sea and growing influence in the South Pacific, have also strengthened Australia’s concerns around China’s rise. It was therefore unsurprising that the Foreign Policy White Paper took a cautious approach to China’s growing power and influence, even if not directly referencing concerns over China’s surging influence within Australia or perceived human rights abuses.

So what was the significance of this Foreign Policy White Paper? In this author’s view, it was that Australia reconfirmed its position in international society at a time when the international order has become more uncertain and unpredictable. Since the 2016 US Presidential election, many Australian opinion leaders, including a former Prime Minister, have argued that Australia should keep some element of distance from the United States and restructure its relations with regional countries including China. The famous phone conversation between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull—in which Trump reportedly cut the call short furious about the refugee swap agreed during the Obama Presidency—infated such a view among US sceptics.

Despite growing scepticism surrounding US regional and global leadership, the new White Paper reconfirms Australia’s continuous commitment to an “open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific” (p. 3). The White Paper also articulates that Australia’s security and prosperity will be protected only in “a global order based on agreed rules rather than one based on the exercise of power alone” (p. 7). While acknowledging that “China’s power and influence are growing to match, and in some cases exceed, that of the United States” in parts of the Indo-Pacific, the White Paper states that “the United States will, for the foreseeable future, retain its significant global lead in military and soft power” (pp. 25-26). The White Paper also judges that “the United States’ long-term interests will anchor its economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific” (p. 26) even under the Trump administration. At the same time, the White Paper warns against threats caused by protectionism and anti-globalist sentiment emanating from the United States, and stresses Australia’s role in maintaining an open and inclusive economic order.

In short, Australia’s new Foreign Policy White Paper demonstrates to both international and domestic audiences that, although the existing liberal order is being undermined, Australia will continue to act as a ‘guardian’ of the liberal international order. This conclusion may be unsurprising for those familiar with Australia’s foreign and security policy tradition. Nonetheless, reconfirming such a ‘common sense’ view of Australia’s foreign policy is important at a time when nothing can be taken for granted any longer. The White Paper, while not surprising, is significant because it endorses Australia’s continuous commitment to a liberal international order, for the foreseeable future, at least.
Implications for Japan’s National Security

Like Australia, Japan has recently strengthened its commitment to liberal order-building through its ‘free and open Indo-Pacific strategy’, announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in August 2016. Moreover, Japan has tried to maintain the US military presence in the region. For Abe, a strong personal relationship between he and Trump has been key for servicing and securing the alliance with the United States. Japan also shares the view that the regional economic order should be open and inclusive without relying on protectionism or an anti-globalisation movement, as demonstrated by its effort to maintain the framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It was this shared vision for a ‘desirable international order’, rather than a shared perception of material threats, that has been the foundation for a strong political, economic and security relationship between Japan and Australia since the Cold War era.

It is therefore quite natural that the White Paper mentions Japan as the most important ‘Indo-Pacific partner’ next to the United States. As stated in the White Paper, the Australian Government expects Japan “steadily to pursue reforms to its defence and strategic policies over the decade” and reiterates Australia’s position of support for “Japan’s efforts to improve its security capabilities and to play a more active role in the security of the region” (p. 41). For Australia, a more active Japan, both in terms of homeland defence and external activities, would not only contribute to a more stable regional power balance, but also strengthen the US-Japan alliance, which is critically important for Australia’s security. This is why successive Australian governments, be they Labor or Liberal, have consistently supported greater security roles for Japan for decades.

This in turn suggests that Australia’s closer defence and security engagement with Japan does not necessarily mean that Australia is taking an increased ‘anti-China’ stance. From Canberra’s viewpoint, it is better to maintain good relations with China backed by a strong US military presence in the region. Security cooperation with Japan is a kind of tool used to realise such an ideal environment in which Australia does not have to ‘choose’ between the United States and China. This may be the reason why the terms ‘semi-alliance’ and ‘quasi-alliance’, commonly used in Japan to describe the Japan-Australia security partnership, are not so widely used by Australian policymakers. This also explains why the White Paper stresses Australia’s continuous engagement with China based on the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ agreed in 2014, while being increasingly cautious about China’s growing regional influence.

Some Japanese may wonder if Australia can maintain such a delicate balancing act, even if (as the White Paper itself predicts) Chinese power and influence continues to grow. With such a question in mind, the White Paper suggests that Australia’s closer partnering with Indo-Pacific partners...
including Japan, Indonesia, India and the Republic of Korea, as well as its continuing alliance relationship with the United States, could enable Australia to maintain a strategic advantage over China. The White Paper assumes that these regional democracies will “remain strong” even while a power-shift between the United States and China continues (p. 26). The White Paper also mentions the possibility of greater engagement not only bilaterally, but mini-laterally by working within these partnership on an ad hoc and issues-based approach.

It is not quite clear, however, that Japan could meet such an expectation. Despite Japan’s increasing presence in the Indo-Pacific, most Japanese policymakers and public are preoccupied with security issues in their immediate neighbourhood. While the Abe government has boosted Japan’s defence budget for the sixth year in a row, the budget increase has remained quite modest overall compared with those of India, South Korea and Australia, for example. Furthermore, the Abe government has lost popularity due to political scandals caused by suspicious sales of state-owned land to the private sector. It is therefore important for Australia to keep encouraging Japan’s security normalisation and its extroverted posture by publicly supporting the view that a “strong Japan” not only benefits Japanese citizens, but contributes to the stability and the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

Japanese policymakers may be wary that the White Paper makes no mention of a quadrilateral grouping between the United States, Japan, Australia and India, although it stresses Australia’s continuous commitment to trilateral arrangements by the United States-Japan-Australia or India-Japan-Australia. Indeed, there has been no official response from Australia since the Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono suddenly proposed a top-level ‘Quad’ dialogue in October 2017. The Australian Labor Party, which stands a reasonable chance of winning government at the next election, bears the history of declining a place for Australia in the ‘Quad’ as proposed by Prime Minister Abe during his first term.

It remains to be seen if Japan’s proposal for a quadrilateral strategic dialogue at the ministerial level will come true in the near future. Often missed by observers, Japan views the Quad as important but only one of several means to achieve its aim of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. Even if the Quad itself takes an extended time to coalesce or fails to eventuate altogether, there are many mini-lateral frameworks that will see cooperation between Japan, Australia, India and the United States. Japan, as well as Australia and India, has increased defence engagement with Indo-Pacific countries, which could provide additional opportunities to organise mini-lateral groupings with regional countries. Whether the Quad materialises or not, momentum for closer cooperation between regional (and even extra-regional) democracies is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
In this sense, Australia’s new Foreign Policy White Paper has real implications for Japan’s national security policies, as well as for security cooperation between the two nations. In particular, the Indo-Pacific concept itself is likely to be the central theme of Japan’s coming National Security Strategy and National Defense Program Guidelines. While the US Trump administration has also declared its ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’, it remains unclear whether such a regional strategy is consistent with its ‘America first’ doctrine. The task for Japan and Australia, therefore, would be not only to coordinate their common Indo-Pacific strategy, but to expand and share such a vision with other regional and extra-regional actors, including the United States, India, Southeast Asia, and European nations. The role of Japan and Australia as ‘facilitators’ of the liberal order in the Indo-Pacific will become even more important than ever.

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Australia and ASEAN: Together for the Sake of a New Multipolar World Order

Huong Le Thu

The Australian Foreign Policy White Paper released by the Turnbull government in November 2017 was refreshing in the way it reprioritised Southeast Asia as a key focal point. Southeast Asia is an important region for Australia due to its proximity and economic potential, among other reasons. However, Australia’s recent enthusiasm over Southeast Asia needs to be accompanied by a more nuanced and patient understanding of the region, as well as its defining institution the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While imperfect and often perceived as ineffective, ASEAN remains an important actor in the evolving multipolar world order and it is in Australia’s best interests to support this multilateral institution.

The Special Summit: Late but Substantive

The Australia-ASEAN Special Summit that took place in mid-March is one of the flagship initiatives of the Turnbull government and an early realisation of a Foreign Policy White Paper prescription. A diplomatic success, the Summit showcased the current government’s unusually high sensitivity to the feelings of Southeast Asia’s leaders. The high-profile and substantive week-long activities associated with the Summit stood out from other summits held between ASEAN and its dialogue partners—including the high-profile US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit under President Obama in February 2016, the Sochi Summit with Russia in May 2016, the India-ASEAN Summit in Delhi in January 2018 and numerous ASEAN-China summits—in the way it included various interests and issue-specific discussions. As a result, the Sydney Declaration was accompanied by a number of separate meetings on counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime security, infrastructure and business that discussed concrete cooperation frameworks.

The Special Summit happened at a potentially pivotal moment when regional developments cast doubt not only around power and stability, but also upon the broader direction of the region. In March 2018 the People’s Republic of China’s thirteenth National People’s Congress amended its constitution

erasing presidential term limits.38 As a result, President Xi Jinping has consolidated power domestically and signalled a more ambitious role for China in global affairs. Meanwhile, the United States introduced a confusing mix of policies, such as retreat from free trade and a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but a more confrontational approach towards China in asserting their 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific', as detailed in the National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy.39 The Indo-Pacific concept, while still yet to be clarified by the Trump administration, has already raised questions among actors in the region over how the omission of “Asia” in the title may impact regional arrangements. Australia is a supporter and a promoter of the Indo-Pacific concept and by reaching out to ASEAN through the Summit it effectively responds to existing concerns in Southeast Asia.40 The Turnbull government successfully reassured ASEAN leaders that the Southeast Asian multilateral organisation plays a central role in its understanding of the Indo-Pacific concept. The Summit clearly demonstrated that Australia’s approach to ASEAN has evolved since former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal to establish an Asia-Pacific Community. Bearing in mind that the idea was rejected by the region because it was perceived to be a step towards sidelining ASEAN, the Turnbull government recognised in the Foreign Policy White Paper ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s economic and security institutions.41

Why Now?

The Summit symbolises Australia’s fresh approach to the region and its institutions. As of 1974 Australia became ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner, which, in fact, makes Australia’s history of formal engagement with ASEAN even longer than half of its members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam only joined ASEAN in the 1990s).42 Whilst Australia has been a strong supporter of the East Asia Summit it seems Canberra is only recently waking up to the importance of Southeast Asia and the benefits of partnering with it. In the view of many in the region this awakening has been triggered by a growing sense of instability and lessening of certainty in the reliability of its great and powerful but distant friends. Under President Trump, American

41 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017)

Volume 14 Number 1 - 27 -
foreign policy is increasingly unpredictable. Indeed, Donald Trump’s comments and actions have framed traditional US allies and partners as a burden, making Australia, arguably the United States’ most loyal ally, quite insecure as China’s increasing assertiveness manifests itself nearer and nearer Australian shores.

Australia’s relationship with China has deteriorated significantly over the past eighteen months, largely due to the debate around China’s influence in Australian politics, media and universities. As such, the growing sense of loneliness is a pressing driver for Canberra to seek a ‘Plan B’ in its foreign policy, ASEAN, being at the centre of regional architecture and geographically half-way between China and Australia, subsequently gains more of Canberra’s attention.

Opening ASEAN to Australia: A Diversion from Reason

Leading into the Special Summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) suggested, in comments to the media that attracted more attention than they deserved, that Australia could become a member of ASEAN. These comments triggered a considerable amount of consternation and discussion, such as cultural notions of Javanese politeness to explain Jokowi’s utterances. This discussion did not address the core question of why Australia would desire membership and what it would do differently if it were to become an ASEAN state. These are questions Australia would have to answer before support for membership was sought. There is little, if any, consideration among ASEAN member states regards Australia’s membership in the organisation and the actual mention of it displays how out-of-tune some current leaders of ASEAN are. Jokowi, who in the early days of his presidency disregarded ASEAN’s importance to Indonesia, has become the target of ridicule for his rather uninformed quotes, as has

45 Anthony Milner and Sally Percival Wood (eds), Our Place in the Asian Century: Southeast Asia as the ‘Third Way’ (Melbourne: Asialink, University of Melbourne, 2012).
President Rodrigo Duterte for advocating Mongolia and Turkey’s membership in the organisation.50 Rather than showing ASEAN’s open-mindedness, these comments reveal that the intergenerational communication of ASEAN’s collective interests, visions and values have not been effective.51 It is indeed an indictment on the new generation of Southeast Asian leaders that some in their rank lack the knowledge of what ASEAN is, what it stands for and what it is lacking. This is a worrying trend and it has already challenged ASEAN’s coherence and is likely to continue doing so.

**ASEAN Matters But Only for What It Is, Not What Others Want It to Be**

When considering engagement with Southeast Asia, it is necessary to bear in mind that Southeast Asia does not equal ASEAN, as Graham, Le Thu, and Cook recently reminded Australian audiences.52 Southeast Asia has many strengths, which include its relatively youthful workforce, its expanding middle class and its GDP growth rates. Challenges also exist in the region, some traditional, such as territorial disputes, and some non-traditional such as extremism. Proximity and inter-connectedness mean that Australia and Southeast Asia share these challenges. Australia must engage its neighbours to seek security with, rather than from, Asia. Closer ties with both Southeast Asia and individual Southeast Asian states should become a constant priority, uncontested by any change of governments.

ASEAN, as an organisation, on the other hand, is less dynamic. It is an intra-governmental institution that has a diplomatic function. And while renewed enthusiasm for ASEAN is necessary for Australia’s strategic outlook, as well as for ASEAN’s own fragile institutional confidence, Canberra needs to embrace the organisation for what it is, not for what Canberra wants it to be.53 ASEAN is an important regional body, with flaws and imperfections, that accommodates a very diverse set of members. Given that there is no equivalent in Northeast Asia—indeed, the only

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analogue is the ASEAN-Plus Three mechanism—ASEAN remains the only regional architecture available. The ASEAN debate in Australia needs to be informative, frank and unorthodox. The region has been overlooked for a long time and the current juncture presents a golden opportunity for Australia to embrace it.  

But we need to remember that just because we are now interested in ASEAN, it has not miraculously evolved into what we want it to be just because it has gained Canberra’s attention.  

Arguments that espouse ASEAN’s role in regional security can be misleading; crediting ASEAN with the delivery of regional peace needs to be done with caution and rigorous testing. Take, for example, the popular argument that the lack of major war in the region is a result of ASEAN. This theory is problematic on numerous levels. First, it is difficult to demonstrate any causal relationship between ASEAN’s existence and the ‘long-peace’ in Southeast Asia. Second, the occasions where ASEAN has undertaken meaningful preventative diplomacy are few in number. Sure, ASEAN’s facilitation of dialogue may have had an ameliorating effect on otherwise hostile situations, but that outcome is an indirect result of dialogue and a general recognition that peace is in everybody’s best interest. Third, even if ASEAN has displayed a capacity to ensure peace in the region the question is raised as to why it is unable to quell the recently flaring disputes over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.

ASEAN’s role in providing for regional security requires clarification. ASEAN is, and will remain, a forum for expressing concerns, and even that has been frequently challenged. ASEAN is not a vehicle to solve security related problems, nor is it a collective security mechanism. Australia would face bitter disappointment if it were to work under an assumption that ASEAN might serve as an anti-China bulwark. Seeing any nation, let alone Southeast Asian nations in a binary ‘with us, or against us’ lens is counterproductive. While there are some indicators that suggest smaller Southeast Asian states are either in pro-China or pro-US camps, as many studies frame the situation, what motivates this outcome is usually misunderstood. All nations will always prioritise self-interest and national policies that lean towards either power are just a means to satisfy that priority. To expect Southeast Asians to display a similar level of allegiance.

57 Ibid.  
to the United States as Australia does, especially considering the security the United States provides Australia, is rather unrealistic. So even if there is a pressing need to balance China’s power in the region—better understood only among a few of ASEAN’s leaders—hoping for a concerted and collective approach to China, which would inevitably elicit a retaliation from Beijing, is highly problematic. National interest as opposed to ‘ASEAN interest’ has been, and is arguably becoming more, divergent. Canberra needs to take account these nuances in order to not commit policy overstretch. Bilateral relations with strategically like-minded states, such as Vietnam, will hold the most value for both sides of the partnership. In fact, the strategic partnership agreement signed on the eve of the Special Summit is so far the most concrete and meaningful outcome of the recent embrace between Australia and its Southeast Asian neighbours.59

Australia’s interests regarding ASEAN are best served by reinforcing the meaning of multilateralism. Multilateral fora, even when facing challenges as they do today, maintain a relevant role in international and security affairs and it is more critical now than ever that the international community support these organisations. Australia and ASEAN can play important roles, both together and separately, in providing such support. Australian enthusiasm helps prevent ASEAN from falling into obsolescence. Moreover, Australian support for ASEAN communicates a view on the emerging multipolar world order, that a functional regional architecture in Southeast Asia that enjoys international support could operate as a pole of global power. Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper articulated such a view, but stronger policy communication and justification must follow, reinforce and complement the document.

**Conclusion**

There are many pressing priorities on the Australian strategic plate. Recent global power shifts have created space for consideration beyond the known and the comfortable. The question that will linger, even after a photogenic summit, is: Can Australia sustain its interests in ASEAN or will it return to its natural tendency of preoccupation with the Great Powers?

Careful thinking around long-term mutual interests and the potential of creating lasting engagement is needed. To do so, a clear understanding of the relevant policy approaches is essential. Canberra needs an ability to translate the nuances between ‘ASEAN language’—whereby declarations, plans and initiatives outline visions of harmonious, prosperous and functional community—and ‘ASEAN practices’—where the constraints on true integration remain formidable. Inaccurate expectations and assessments of

ASEAN have caused disillusionment and, perhaps needlessly, reduced confidence in what the partnership with the regional body can achieve. Expectations must be tailored to fit reality by accepting what ASEAN is and what it is not.\(^6\) Canberra would also be best advised to ponder over ASEAN’s needs and expectations surrounding a partnership with Australia, rather than solely communicating good intent and expectations in a one-way dialogue.

Australia needs a comprehensive, lasting and coordinated Southeast Asia policy. A policy that includes but does not rest on hosting special summits. The Foreign Policy White Paper started a conversation in the right direction, but a turn towards Southeast Asia needs to be a continued effort, rather than just a one-off summit.

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\(^6\) Le Thu, ‘ASEAN: Different Strokes for Different Folks’. 
Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper: Navigating Uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific

Rory Medcalf

The prevalence of peril in the world of 2018 vindicates the sober, direct and hedging tenor of Australia’s recent foreign affairs White Paper. This major policy document, released in November 2017, takes both a more cautious and a more creative approach to protecting and advancing Australia’s interests than previous such efforts. In the age of Donald Trump, any policy document reflecting continued investment in an alliance with the United States is vulnerable to certain obvious observations. Washington may never again be quite the kind of stable and predictable ally we have known. Assuming a linear future of Chinese growth and American stagnation, Australia will struggle to come to terms with a rich and powerful China with different values and different and potentially opposing interests too.

It is true that the White Paper does not even pretend to offer some diplomatic magic bullet to solve that problem. If it did, it would be a less credible document. However, that does not mean, as critics like Hugh White suggest, that it therefore entirely lacks “ideas.”61 Rather than a tract of latter-day alliance dogma, it is better studied as a guide for Australian policy in navigating uncertainty in an era where greater diversification and independence of foreign policy must be cultivated within an alliance context.

Two foreign affairs White Papers were produced under the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government, in 1997 and 2003. Despite their avowed focus on the national interest, in retrospect those blueprints reflected considerable hope that current policy settings—and the seemingly benign trends in global affairs at the time—would fairly readily enable Australia to remain prosperous, influential and safe. In 2012, the Gillard Labor government produced an ‘Asian Century’ White Paper, a document intended to define policy towards engagement with Asia, thus to some extent a de facto foreign policy White Paper. This focused heavily on the opportunities from regional economic growth, and treated the accompanying security risks with a lighter touch. For instance, from the vantage point of 2018—or even 2016, when the first rumblings of Chinese influence controversies were

echoing in the Australian public debate—it is notable that this 312-page document had so little to say about the risks to Australian institutions and sovereignty from potential foreign political interference as a side-effect of economic and societal connectedness with the People’s Republic of China.

If those three papers are the benchmark, then the Turnbull Liberal-National government’s 2017 White Paper surpasses them by balancing diplomatic confidence and strategic starkness. Certainly, it projects a high degree of faith in Australia’s values and conveys a sense that Australia knows what it is doing in the world. It emphasises, however, that these are times of unprecedented change, and that Australia must do things differently.

This White Paper is characterised by an intriguing duality. On the one hand, it reflects pride and confidence in what Australia is and what it stands for. More so than previous official statements, it offers a concise and quite compelling definition of Australia’s values: not marked by race or religion, but by “political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect” (p. 11). It then connects those values with the resilience and stability of Australian society and implies how they inform the country’s international interests and behaviour. Thus, the “resilience and quality of our democracy, institutions and economy sit at the core of our national strength … our ability to help shape events and outcomes internationally to our advantage through persuasion and ideas rather than coercion” (p. 16). It is unusual to see an official document make such progress in reconciling values and interests, factors that can often be in tension when it comes to security and foreign policy.

On the other hand, the authors of the Foreign Policy White Paper do not edit away the realities of a present and future strategic environment of uncertainty and profound change. The document emphasises the need for Australia to adapt. To be sure, its tone is generally diplomatic: this is a public document, a signal to many audiences, so it is hardly the right place, for instance, to name Donald Trump a liability or China a threat. (That has not stopped Beijing taking offence.) However, the White Paper’s delicacy of wordsmithing should not be mistaken for a failure to acknowledge the problems Australia faces in navigating a worsening horizon of risk. Thus American dominance is being challenged and the post-Cold War “lull in major power rivalry has ended” (p. 21). The subheadings in Chapter Two tell the story: anti-globalisation intensifies; global governance is becoming harder; rules are being contested; power shifts are underway in Asia; there is much at stake.

By not pretending to have all the answers or promising that everything will turn out fine, a document like this should help prepare the nation for challenging times ahead. In fact, in many places this supposed foreign policy White Paper reads more like a strategic intelligence assessment or even a national security strategy. Its subtitle is ‘Opportunity, Security,
Strength’. This is not a cynical securitisation of foreign policy but rather a recognition that in such a connected and contested world, national security policy is inextricable from international factors and touches many aspects of societal and economic well-being. It is a reflection of the tough and complicated times we are entering, and the need for a middle power to more effectively harness all its limited capabilities, that this paper has an inclusive sense of national security at its core. More than any other foreign or indeed defence white paper Australia has produced, this is a whole-of-government, indeed, whole-of-nation document. It drew on an unprecedented level of public consultation, although less effort or sustained political attention seems to have gone towards using its conclusions to build a truly national and inclusive new narrative for engagement and security in an uncertain world.

Both in its meaning and choice of words, the White Paper is pleasingly nonpartisan, which should lend it some enduring value. It has been broadly supported by the Labor Opposition. This suggests that a change of government would see broad continuity in the policy contours, perhaps even in the rhetoric, and no wasted effort in reinventing what is largely a sturdy wheel. This document should thus avoid the fate of the Gillard government’s 2012 Asian Century White Paper which, for all its bulk and substance, included enough traces of partisanship to give the Abbott government a rationale to rather churlishly cast it aside as soon as reaching office.

This is a leaner document, which strikes a greater balance between opportunity (of which the Asian Century paper identified a cornucopia) and risk (of which it did not greatly warn). One of the hallmarks of the new paper is the way it focuses on priorities. Unlike previous foreign policy White Papers, or indeed most big pronouncements on the nation’s engagement with the world, it does not attempt to list everything we do or everything that somewhat matters: a tour of lip-service to every bilateral relationship, every multilateral acronym, every issue and every job description in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Instead, it succeeds in being comprehensive while concise.

In that vein, there are a few themes worth highlighting in explaining what sets this White Paper apart, and why it can be a useful guide to policy rather than simply a political decoration. One such theme is the Indo-Pacific. This document affirms and consolidates what had been an evolving orthodoxy within Australia’s foreign policy and defence community: that our region has fundamentally changed. The idea of the Asia-Pacific—largely excluding India and the Indian Ocean—was a convenient construct for our interests and regional dynamics in the late twentieth century. But the Indo-Pacific suits Australia even better, and is here for the indefinite future. It is a two-ocean strategic system with economic origins—including the energy dependence of East Asian economies on Indian Ocean sea lanes—but strategic consequences.
All the powers that matter to Australia are either resident or deeply enmeshed in the Indo-Pacific: in a sense it is the global region and is defined by its fundamental quality of multipolarity (which also makes it the natural setting for balancing a rising power). And those countries—China, the United States, Japan, India and more—are now striving to shape the region and to define their Indo-Pacific strategies for doing so. Chinese rejection of the rhetoric of the Indo-Pacific is, well, rhetorical: through the so-called Belt and Road geo-economic initiative and its growing naval footprint in the Indian Ocean, Beijing is already executing its own Indo-Pacific strategy with Chinese characteristics.

Indeed, one of Hugh White’s more baffling criticisms of the White Paper and its expounding of the Indo-Pacific idea is his suggestion that Australia will not find much convergence with India (or presumably others) in balancing Chinese power, because China is likely to limit its sphere of interest in East Asia while allowing India to do much the same in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Already, through the Belt and Road and an expanding security footprint, China has proven the falsehood of this comforting notion, and guaranteed itself a mistrustful India. New Delhi will not be anyone’s ally, and it does not need to; it will complicate China’s calculations anyway.

Of course the Indo-Pacific has been a feature of Australian external policy since 2013, when the Gillard government began using the terminology and stamped it all over its Defence White Paper. The 2017 foreign affairs document underscores that this is now a bipartisan worldview, and begins to define the contours of diplomatic policy settings guided by this geopolitical construct. As uncertainties deepen about America under Trump, the alliance is embedded in a wider set of regional partnerships and “smaller groupings” (p. 40)—the White Paper’s code for an emerging minilateralism of self-selecting trilaterals and more. It illuminates the need for a layered approach to a regional strategy. This includes key bilaterals, with continued emphasis on the US alliance but not the alliance alone. A key line is that government will “lift the ambition of our engagement with major Indo-Pacific democracies” (p. 37) including Japan, India and Indonesia. The paper notes that the Australian Government judges the United States will remain anchored in the Indo-Pacific, but this is hardly an uncritical assumption that America will always be all in.

The White Paper is not especially explicit about the reborn quadrilateral dialogue of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, and prudently so; that arrangement is a work in progress, and intended to complement, not replace, all the other diplomatic architecture out there. But it rightly emphasises the role these new arrangements or “smaller groupings” (p. 40) can play in bolstering a “regional balance favourable to our interests” (p. 4). In my book, this passes for an idea:
To support a balance in the Indo–Pacific favourable to our interests and promote an open, inclusive and rules-based region, Australia will also work more closely with the region’s major democracies, bilaterally and in small groupings (p. 4)

This definition of small groupings neatly captures Australia’s diplomatic activism in building, not only the over-hyped quad, but also three-way arrangements involving variously India, Japan, Indonesia and France. Australia is also strengthening the longstanding trilateral strategic dialogue with Washington and Tokyo as well as the quad and an array of bilaterals with countries, like Singapore and Vietnam, increasingly uncomfortable with Chinese power. Australia’s emerging Indo-Pacific pivot—of which the White Paper sketched a beginning, not a fully fledged strategy—will also likely involve greater use of established multilateral bodies centred on ASEAN, like the East Asia Summit, to dilute and moderate Chinese power.

Perhaps all of this, alongside references to Chinese coercion, the South China Sea, and gently-worded assertions of the need to protect democratic institutions from foreign interference, is a reason why this document simply could never have been tactful enough to suit the current perspective of the People’s Republic of China.

Fittingly, another core theme of the White Paper is risk and uncertainty. It is a wilful misreading to suggest that the document’s strategy is one of blithely hewing to the old order and assuming all will be well:

In the decade ahead, Australia will seek security and prosperity in a region changing in profound ways. We are likely to face higher degrees of uncertainty and risk. We will need to be more active and determined in our efforts to help shape a regional balance favourable to our interests. (p. 27)

Nowhere does the White Paper promise that such efforts will succeed. The sought-after outcomes are “not assured” (p. 38). Nor, however, is the paper shot through with fatalistic assumptions: that a defence of the sovereign equality of nations is not worth attempting; that China’s power is as unstoppable as it wants us to think; that America’s support for allies or principles is somehow unsalvageable. Within the bounds of what can be said diplomatically—in other words, sometimes by inference rather than insult—the document makes a structured effort to come to terms with multiple plausible futures. Much of the White Paper’s wording that on first scan seems to suggest a linear future turns out to be rather more subtle, dynamic and based on contingency. Many key sentences about the future of China and the United States include the word ‘if’: if the United States continues to lead; if China’s reforms succeed. Most tellingly, on pages 38-39, the paper recognises that Australia’s objectives of an inclusive, open, rules-based and cooperative Indo-Pacific regional order are achievable “only if the region’s major powers—notably the United States and China—believe that their interests are also served by them”.
This section about the United States and China illustrates an interesting and useful quality of the overall document: it sends a message about the way in which Australia and other players in the middle would like them to define their interests. Without making a direct attack on the character of the US President, and the rule-rejecting direction in which he wants to take the United States, the paper’s numerous references to international rules, norms, laws and mutual respect among nations are in part about Australia reminding America, China and others where its interests stand and where theirs should lie. This should not be mistaken for a naive assumption that Canberra is imagining things will turn out fine.

This may seem a forlorn hope, but you cannot blame a middle power for trying. Moreover, this advocacy aspect of the White Paper refutes the claim made by Stephen FitzGerald and Linda Jakobson, months after its publication, that Australia continues to lack a narrative “explaining what kind of region we seek, rather than what we don’t want”.62 This was somewhat peculiar, given that the White Paper had recently done precisely that. It had largely met its purpose of providing a clear and comprehensive articulation of the kind of region and the kind of future Australia wants. Perhaps this serves as a reminder of the need for persistent political outreach to get the message through, to translate a government publication, however well-crafted, into a national narrative that will resonate beyond Canberra.

Of course, a public narrative about the future we want should not be mistaken for wishful thinking. In the White Paper, the real possibility of failure to attain this desirable future is repeatedly acknowledged; this helps explain why much of the paper pays an unusual amount of attention for a foreign affairs document to matters of defence and security. The desirability of upholding a (partly, nobody really means wholly) rules-based international order is emphasised, but nowhere does the paper suggest this will automatically succeed. Other pervasive risks, notably to do with technology, the environment, climate change and terrorism, are acknowledged; indeed the prospect of mass casualty terrorism affecting Australia again in Southeast Asia is seen as fairly much certain. There is also a welcome call (on page 18) for government to improve its analytical ‘futures capacity’ to test policies against possible shifts in the external environment. (This is precisely what the National Security College at the Australian National University is seeking to help achieve through its recent establishment of a whole-of-government ‘Futures Hub’.) The Foreign Policy White Paper thus suggests that officials are indeed thinking about a range of plausible futures and policy options, as they should. But there is a careful balance to be struck between prudence and panic. To declare publicly a different policy for each plausible future would suggest a lack of confidence in the option that

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has been selected. Instead, the most effective approach—which this White Paper goes some way towards—is to develop foreign and security policy settings adaptable enough for a range of futures. That is why a strategy of increasing Australia’s own strategic weight, combined with deepening and diversifying Indo-Pacific partnerships, makes sense. It will be of benefit whether Chinese power flourishes or founders, and whether Trump is aberration or harbinger.

The White Paper’s chief disappointment is its relative silence on the obvious question: if the demands on our diplomacy are getting greater, are we investing in it enough? A disturbing trend in Australia over the past two decades has been the growing gulf between increased (and generally needed) spending on defence and security and static or falling funding for foreign policy, soft power and development assistance (which of course has its own impacts for security and influence when allocated and delivered strategically). Australia has never recovered from the opportunity lost after 9/11, under then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, to increase the resources and status of our Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as an integral part of the new national security effort. Ground lost in cutbacks under Howard and Downer, not only to DFAT but also to soft power capabilities such as Radio Australia, have never been fully regained. More recent reductions to development assistance, under the Abbott and Turnbull governments, seem to have failed to anticipate the role aid now plays in the contest for influence with China, notably in the South Pacific. The main flaw in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper was the lost opportunity to fundamentally correct such errors. We find much mention in the document of how Australia is improving its capabilities in security, intelligence, defence, cyber, education, infrastructure and twenty-first-century industries. Yet for a government strategy that emphasises the importance of engagement as a value-for-money force multiplier, it says glaringly little about how to modernise, expand and fund our diplomatic network for the turbulent times ahead.

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Critical Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships:
When is the Responsibility for Leadership Exchanged?

Vaughan Grant

This paper examines the nexus between the Australia's public and private sectors regarding critical infrastructure. In the current dynamic threat environment resultant from the implementation of insecure technologies no clear point of hand over is discernible. By utilising examples and case studies this article amplifies this point. The private sector will not allow the public sector the network access required for the public sector to assume sole responsibility; therefore, the private sector must become committed beyond their first order responsibilities to their shareholders and acknowledge their fundamental involvement in collective security.

Australia’s geographic location has had a notable influence on its approach to national security. The Defence White Paper of 1987 observed that Australia’s security posture was “shaped in a unique and enduring way by basic facts of geography and location”.\(^63\) The advent of the information revolution has seen significant changes resulting in, amongst other things, the globalisation of information and increased privatisation which have had a marked effect on Australia.\(^64\) The rate with which innovation in technology has been adopted has also led to unforeseen outcomes. Previously an attack on critical infrastructure was only viable if carried out via kinetic (i.e. physical such as explosives) means; however, by exploiting current technical vulnerabilities, a cyber attack against critical infrastructure can be launched by individuals, non-state organisations and by nation-states from any location that is connected to the Internet.\(^65\)

Cyber security of critical infrastructure is balanced on the interface between the private and private sectors. Many governments rely on private companies to take the lead in delivering cyber security for critical


infrastructure, working on the principle that these assets are privately owned or operated. Governments look to establish public-private partnerships which are based on collaboration and cooperation. If malicious cyber activity should escalate to the point that damage, death and significant disruption to critical infrastructure is imminent, or has occurred, it is expected that a transfer of responsibilities should result as the State assumes control; however, like the considerations shaping this nexus, the actual mechanism to identify and manage this handover point remains unclear.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and explore some of the considerations that impact on the nexus between the public and private sectors as they relate to Australian cyber security of critical infrastructure. At what point, when responding to malicious cyber activity, does the private sector hand over responsibility for an incident to the public sector? The examination of this question will be undertaken in the following manner. The first section explains key definitions. Following this, in the second section, I compare the advantages and disadvantages arising from either of the public and private sectors becoming the sole providers for critical infrastructure cyber security. This includes comparison of the benefits and limitations each sector faces within the cyber security paradigm. In the third section, I discuss what comprises an effective critical infrastructure private-public partnership. The fourth section provides an overview of the critical infrastructure private-public partnerships of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, to contextualise the observations made in sections two and three. The final section concludes that, whilst the responsibility for collective security once resided firmly with the public sector, due to increased levels of globalisation and privatisation it is impossible for this to be achieved without collaboration and cooperation from the private sector. I further conclude that there is no easily identified single point of handover between the public and private sectors regarding the leadership responsibility to manage malicious cyber activity.

Definitions

The definitions applied to this field of enquiry remain contested. A cursory glance at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence indicates over forty different definitions of cybersecurity, cyber-security or cyber security;66 however, a comparative discussion of the merits of definitions is beyond the scope of this paper. To allow an effective understanding for the positions being outlined in this paper the following definitions will be applied.

Cyber security, as drawn from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department, is described as:

one of Australia's national security priorities—Australia's national security, economic prosperity and social wellbeing rely on the availability, integrity and confidentiality of a range of information and communications technology.\(^7\)

The term \textit{cyber attack} has been generically applied to cover any malicious cyber activity involving unauthorised access to a computer, a network, or information. Such a broad definition can include cyber theft, cyber espionage or even ‘hacktivism’. For the purposes of this paper the definition used will be as per the Australian Cyber Security Centre 2016 Threat Report, which provides the following definition of a cyber attack:

\begin{quote}
a deliberate act through cyberspace to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy computers, or the information resident on them, with the effect of seriously compromising national security, stability or economic prosperity.\(^8\)
\end{quote}

As such any deliberate act via cyber space, utilising computers and networks that control and manage critical infrastructure, can turn off or damage systems. This would result in long-term or permanent disruption to essential services and in the potential destruction of the affected critical infrastructure. Dams and power utilities could suffer irreparable damage resulting in not just a disruption of supply, but also destruction of property and loss of life. The Australian Government, according to this definition, would most likely consider such an act as an attack and a threat to national security. It should also be noted that cyber attacks rely on malicious code being introduced to a computer system that initially requires either a deliberate, or unwitting, act of a person to carry out. Once introduced, and active, the malicious code might self-propagate and infect other computers that have similar vulnerabilities. One such example is the Stuxnet virus, which was initially employed against the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, but after the attack was found to have spread to thousands of computers across the world.

Understandably each country has reserved its right to define \textit{critical infrastructure} (CI) differently to reflect regional and strategic priorities. The Australian Government has provided the following definition:

\begin{quote}
those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which—if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period—would significantly impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. Critical infrastructure can
\end{quote}


include services that provide food, water, defence, transportation, energy, communications, public health, banking and finance.\textsuperscript{69}

Critical infrastructure is now global and is no longer contained within a nation-state’s sovereign borders. Nations rely on multinational companies to provide essential services sourced from other nations. As disclosed by WikiLeaks in 2010, the US Department of Homeland Security compiled an inventory of critical infrastructure located beyond the borders of the United States. Results showed that 259 companies supplied services considered critical to US national security, which included such items and services as ordnance, pharmaceutic als manufacturing, telecommunications and foreign ownership of major ports.\textsuperscript{70} From an Australian perspective, the Port of Darwin has been leased for ninety-nine years to the Chinese company Landbridge\textsuperscript{71} and, despite being a country with large natural resource reserves, Australia remains dependent upon other nations for oil.\textsuperscript{72}

The final concept that requires defining relates to \textit{public-private partnerships} (PPP). These are designed to link public and private sectors to increase efficiency, with the private sector providing expertise and efficiency within facilities and frameworks provided by the public sector.\textsuperscript{73} Successful examples may be observed in Singapore, where government-led ICT projects such as the establishment of a government email system, or a Lifestyle Portal for the National Service Community, have been successfully outsourced to private industry.\textsuperscript{74}

PPPs within the cyber security environment are less clearly defined as each sector is comprised of a multitude of different organisations.\textsuperscript{75} In Australia, the public sector includes the federal government, state governments, industry specific departments such as Energy, Finance and Transport, as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the military. The private sector is equally multifaceted, comprising major critical infrastructure providers, private cyber security companies, Internet Service Providers and

\textsuperscript{69}ibid, p. 17.
international IT companies such as Microsoft and Apple. Whilst acknowledging the diversity of the public and private sectors, observations made for the purposes of this paper will assume homogenous private and public sectors in order to provide conclusions and observations for future discussions.

The Public Sector as the Sole Provider of Critical Infrastructure (CI) Cyber Security

**POSITIVES**

A fundamental responsibility for any government is to provide security.\(^{76}\) Prior to the impacts of cyber space, government confined this task to its people and interests, and was primarily focused within its sovereign border; however, security now encompasses a vastly different and expanded series of qualities. Cyber space has become the fifth dimension—it is manmade and in a continuous state of flux as technology is developed and adopted. Cyber space is embedded with the natural domains of land, sea, air and space\(^{77}\) and is the “nervous system running through all other sectors, enabling them to communicate and function”\(^{78}\). The security environment now includes increasing threats from actors with offensive cyber capabilities that can threaten the economy and CI. The Australian Signal Directorate detected in excess of 1,200 cyber security incidents in 2015 against military, energy, banking, transport and communications systems.\(^{79}\)

Just as it is an immutable responsibility of the public agencies of law enforcement to protect, investigate and prosecute criminals who commit crime, so it should be the responsibility of a government to defend CI from cyber attack. No one expects the owner or operator of CI to protect it against a kinetic attack.\(^{80}\) Public sector intelligence agencies have access to information that can allow them to provide advance warning of potential cyber attacks against CI. This intelligence product can and should be provided to law enforcement to be utilised as a basis for investigation and prosecution of individuals. If an attack sponsored by non-state actors or nation-states were to occur, a government can respond using a combination of diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, or cyber and kinetic options.

\(^{76}\) Ibid. p. 44.
\(^{78}\) Clemente, Cyber Security and Global Interdependence, p. v.
NEGATIVES
If the public sector became the sole provider of cyber security for CI, significant adjustments would be required by both the public and private sectors. Governments would need to increase their financial commitments to cyber security. Governments are limited by budgetary constraints and thereby have limits to the financial contributions they can make to a CI PPP. The public sector would also require unfettered access to all computer systems and ICT utilised in each facility and industry. CI operators and owners would be resistant to allowing this as they would be concerned about the government having such widespread and sweeping access to confidential commercial information. In April 2015 a security engineer discovered a data breach at the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Subsequent investigations revealed that highly sensitive documents relating the background checks and security clearances as well as millions of digital fingerprints records and complete personnel files had been stolen. During the Congressional inquiry it was noted that OPM’s security was porous and that the breach resulted due to systematic failures. Data breaches such as this provide good reason for the private sector to be concerned about allowing public sector access to proprietary information.

Finally, if the public sector was to become the sole provider of cyber security for CI, laws and regulations would have to be passed regarding the operations of the private sector to provide the appropriate frameworks in which the public sector could ensure its requirements were met. This would create a significant compliance burden and an increased cost in services.

The Private Sector as the Sole Provider of CI Cyber Security

POSITIVES
As suggested by Clark et al., the solutions for cyber security will come from the private sector as they can respond faster and adapt more quickly. The

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private sector has a greater pool of people to draw upon.\textsuperscript{85} Etzioni observes that the private sector does not have constitutional restrictions that regulate government investigations, that there are already numerous private security companies able to investigate cyber attacks, and that the private sector has confidence that it can handle their own cyber security.\textsuperscript{86} Germano provides an economic justification that as cyber crime exposes the private sector to financial and intellectual loss, it is something the private sector is best positioned to address.\textsuperscript{87} Private companies who run CI are the first responders and, together with major IT vendors and private cyber security companies, have defensive capabilities comparable to the military.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{NEGATIVES}

If responsibility for provision of cyber security for CI rests solely with the private sector a major ethical adjustment would be required. Corporate participants would need to attempt to divert their focus from profit and shareholder demands and give greater attention to the common good of national security. The social benefits derived from cyber security for CI does not readily translate into economic benefits. The private sector has always balanced the cost of a cyber attack against the cost of preventing one.\textsuperscript{89} To expand on this point it is worth considering the US nuclear energy industry, as many commonalities exist to CI in Australia.\textsuperscript{90} Cyber risks to nuclear facilities require constant monitoring and evaluation. Most nuclear power plants generally have the same process control systems as conventional power plants; however, conventional power plants generally have hardened hardware and cyber security. Although nuclear power plants have more stringent safety requirements they upgrade their hardware less frequently—usually long after the expected life span. This means that the nuclear industry is not keeping up with technological advances and is vulnerable to cyber attack.\textsuperscript{91} In other CI industries infrastructure is being modernised


\textsuperscript{88} Sean D. Carberry, ‘Why the Private Sector is Key to Cybersecurity’, FCW, 1 March 2017, <fcw.com/articles/2017/03/01/why-the-private-sector-is-key-to-cybersecurity.aspx> [Accessed 6 June 2017].


using affordable but vulnerable and insecure off-the-shelf software and hardware. The private sector is sanguine about capturing the ICT dividends (for example, banks have moved to e-commerce and reduced staff and facilities, and energy utilities companies no longer need to send staff to remote locations to manually activate valves and switches) but is not reinvesting this dividend from reduced costs in security.92

Owners and operators are also concerned about exposure to liability should a cyber attack occur. The US nuclear energy industry is reluctant to publicly declare malicious cyber activity as they do not want to damage the public perception of this industry.93 This management of public perception is also apparent in other nations. In December 2014 the DPRK (North Korea) commenced malicious cyber activity against nuclear facilities in the ROK (South Korea). Fortunately, the malware was detected and contained; however, this incident exposed insufficient monitoring of standards by the ROK authorities, and corruption regarding unreported or misreported compliance by the owners and operators of the CI.94

The private sector remains uncomfortable with information sharing and declaring data breaches as this creates opportunities for competitors to gain a market advantage, and fuels damaging publicity and lawsuits.95

**Effective CI PPP**

As illustrated in the previous sections, neither the public nor private sector are able to take sole responsibility for delivering CI cyber security without significant prohibitive adjustments. Effective CI PPPs should have four elements. One; collaboration and sharing of information and best practices. Two; facilitation of commercial incentives, such as tax breaks and low interest loans, in order to maximise private sector investment. Three; regulations that are developed in close cooperation so as to ensure cyber security standards are met in a manner that does not inhibit profit-making.96 Four; a clear understanding of when, and how, the leadership responsibility will change between the public and private sectors.

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The most important element of the CI PPP is information sharing as this develops trust and confidence. The public sector needs to ensure that intelligence is analysed, classified correctly, and that its passage to relevant parties is timely. The private sector needs confidence that information sharing will not expose companies to predatory market competitors or to unnecessary litigation.97

Incentives and regulations are vital to any CI PPP. These provide an understanding of responsibilities, expectations and standards and establish the framework in which information sharing can occur. Regulations can be created in two ways. One way is for the public sector to establish the conditions required to facilitate cyber security and the private sector to employ voluntary measures to ensure cyber security. Voluntary uptake has only public perception and approval of participating organisations as an incentive. A second way is for governments to regulate through law private sector standards for technical development, internal security controls and disaster recovery plans. The second of these methods may be encouraged through the introduction of tax breaks, stimulus grants, low-cost loans, subsidies, reduced insurance premiums and liability protection to provide financial relief to the owner and operators of CI.98

Overview of the US, UK and Australian CI PPP

By 2001, 85 per cent of US CI was privatised. With privatisation came increased discretion on the part of those managing the infrastructure to be selective if and how they moved systems and technologies from proprietary systems to generic and unsecured computer systems.99 US President Bill Clinton declared that cyber security was based on CI PPP. This description of CI PPP as a ‘cornerstone’ of national cyber security100 has been upheld by every subsequent US President. During President Obama’s administration, several Presidential Policy Directives and Executive Orders related to CI PPP were signed. These aimed to facilitate an integrated approach between private and public organisations to ensure better security and resilience against cyber attacks, acts of terrorism, pandemics and natural disasters,101 and acknowledged the importance of balancing cyber security with the competing needs to encourage innovation and economic prosperity.102 In 2015 the US National Security Strategy declared that a strong and innovative economy was one of its four national interests and a

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100 Ibid. p. 44.
catastrophic attack on critical infrastructure placed at the top of its strategic risks.\textsuperscript{103} This document elaborates that cyber security will be achieved by using a whole-of-government approach emphasising that the Internet is a shared responsibility between the states and private sector, with civil society and internet users as key stakeholders.\textsuperscript{104}

The US approach appears fragmented because different CI industries interface with different government departments.\textsuperscript{105} There has also been marked resistance from the private sector to the introduction of regulations, and proposals introduced in Congress have not been passed into laws. In 2009 President Obama stated that “my administration will not dictate security standards for private companies”.\textsuperscript{106}

The UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 articulates that cyber risks are not properly understood or managed, and that the UK Government, working with other responsible authorities, will ensure that CI is sufficiently secure and resilient. However, neither the government nor other public bodies will take on the responsibility of providing cyber security for CI. They believe that responsibility sits with the boards, operators and owners of the CI. The UK Government will provide support, in the form of information sharing, guidance and training. The UK Government will also monitor assurance via exercises to test cyber security. The private sector must secure their own systems or expect that the UK Government will intervene in the interests of national security.\textsuperscript{107}

Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2016 and its 2017 Update\textsuperscript{108} describe the foundation policy articulating the federal government’s approach to national cyber security. The ideas that are presented in this document are drawn from a classified Cyber Security Review led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet\textsuperscript{109} and are presented as part of a whole-of-nation approach to assist in the establishment of CI PPP. This strategy acknowledges that the public and private sectors will set the strategic agenda and that information sharing, collaboration and cooperation,

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{106} Etzioni, The Private Sector: A Reluctant Partner in Cybersecurity, pp. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{109} Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), <cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/>, p. 5.
facilitated by the Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Australia Computer Emergency Response Team, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and business and private security companies, will make resilient and resistant computer networks and systems.\textsuperscript{110}

While this strategy delivers normative statements,\textsuperscript{111} insufficient attention is given to the allocation of responsibility, authority, or the monitoring of standards and outcomes. Strategic statements should include tangible outcomes defined in terms of who, what, when and how.\textsuperscript{112} Yet despite this apparent shortcoming, the Australian Cyber Security Centre 2016 Threat Report provides a brief example of an AUSCERT (Cyber Emergency Response Team for Australia) coordinated response to an intrusion of a critical infrastructure network that suggests that successful collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sectors is occurring.\textsuperscript{113}

The private sector has been elevated to co-leader in the Australian Government’s Cyber Security Strategy 2016. Both sectors will co-design voluntary standards and operate new cyber threat sharing centres whilst undertaking combined cyber incident exercises. Any future success for Australian CI PPP will require the public sector to clearly articulate policy goals, otherwise the private sector will raise concerns—particularly if the costs outweigh the benefits.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Where is the Nexus?}

Successful partnership is based on clear demarcation of responsibility. Governments at all levels struggle to deal effectively with changes in technology as they are not adequately funded and can be sluggish to respond. This is why much of the responsibility to defend the internet resides with private organisations.\textsuperscript{115} Clear statements that outline legal authority, responsibility and rights are essential. CI PPPs that work do so either because they have shared goals, such as the US and Australian model, or they have regulations in place, as seen in the UK example.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid. p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Australian Cyber Security Centre, \textit{ACSC 2016 Threat Report}, p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Carr, ‘Public-Private Partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies’, p. 62.
\end{itemize}
When considering a generalised workflow of malicious cyber activity, the following division of leadership responsibilities, as it relates to Australian CI PPP, are apparent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility Lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Set standards, incentives and regulations. Collect/share intelligence.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Train Workforce. Test/Upgrade/Manage CI resilience. Notify ALL malicious cyber activity to AUSCERT. Respond to malicious cyber activity.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Monitor/Assess and provide advice. Liaise with public/private security organisations to coordinate responses.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Repair damage/Restore services.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Investigate, prosecute and respond.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that at each stage the leadership responsibility alternates and that these stages should not be considered in a strictly sequential manner. Many of these activities require concurrent support from other activities within other stages. As such this adds additional dimensions when considering at what point a hand over of responsibility occurs. This ambiguity of responsibility is further demonstrated with a linear model, see Figure 1 that positions the public and private sectors at opposite ends and employs the previous five stages.

As incidents occur and responses are developed and enacted, the nexus will, by necessity, slide towards either end of the model dependent upon where the balance of responsibility lies. At different stages, in reaction to ongoing developments, both the private and public sectors will alternate as the principle responders. The nexus for the handover of responsibility cannot be situated at a static location and nor can it be in two places at the same time.
Malicious cyber incidents include hacktivism, IP theft, espionage and attack. Unfortunately, the nature of these incidents is such that in the initial stages it is not always apparent what the intent may be. This is further complicated due to the anonymity of the attacker’s identity and a potential lack of intelligence regarding motivation, as without these details a comprehensive threat assessment is not possible. Failures of CI such as electrical black outs are usually temporary and are a part of everyday life.\textsuperscript{117} Malicious cyber incidents, such as those against the US energy sector in 2014—Energetic Bear and Black Energy—were campaigns designed not to destroy, but rather to carry out reconnaissance for future malicious cyber activity.\textsuperscript{118} Effective and timely communication of similar incidents to ACSC or AUSCERT will allow coordination with different agencies and reduce any impacts that might threaten national security.

Conclusion

This paper has presented examples and case studies that illustrate that the responsibility for the protection of CI remains divided between the public and private sector. If a malicious cyber attack develops, the actual leadership responsibility will also change from the private to the public sector, or in fact be shared. Unless regulations, laws and policies compel the private sector to allow the public sector full access to systems and networks, it is unlikely that the public sector will be capable of assuming sole responsibility for the protection of CI. The public sector’s responsibility should be to develop policy and strategy and to provide intelligence to assist the private sector in improving resilience and then to investigate, prosecute and respond as required. The Australian private sector has a critical role to play in national security but should become more willing to contribute to the common good.

I have examined CI PPPs to consider the factors that influence the nexus between the public and private sectors as it relates to Australian cyber security of CI. Relevant examples from other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have been used to assist with illustrating common themes regarding Australian CI PPP. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the nexus for responsibility of CI PPP leadership between the public and private sectors in Australia remains, at the very least, dynamic and will vary according to the threat assessment of individual incidents.

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\textsuperscript{117} Cordesman and Cordesman, Cyber-Threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending the US Homeland, p. 4.

“Use your common sense, don’t be an idiot”: Social Media Security Attitudes amongst Partners of Australian Defence Force Personnel

Amy Johnson, Celeste Lawson and Kate Ames

Partners of serving Australian Defence Force (ADF) members use social media platforms for sharing information and building communities. As privileged insiders, the interactions of partners on Facebook create unique security concerns. This paper examines partner attitudes towards social media security. This paper demonstrates that partners consider themselves security conscious, taking their role in protecting the member and the mission seriously. In the absence of direct advice from the ADF, partners receive information about social media security from peers and civilian sources. This paper offers suggestions which will increase the effectiveness of social media security education for partners.

Partners of Australian Defence Force (ADF) members have increasingly been turning to social media platforms, such as Facebook, for information and support. These groups offer the opportunity to connect with other partners in similar situations, exchange information, make friends and receive support. However, the interactions of ADF partners on Facebook present unique security concerns. This paper discusses the attitudes and behaviours of ADF partners towards social media security, as found in a recent study. International military organisations, including the US military, have attempted to offset the risks arising from the use of social media by developing appropriate policies directly aimed at military families, offering suggestions to keep both the member and their family safe. As yet, the ADF has no such policies or consistent messaging to families about online security. This paper investigates sources of social media education and found in the absence of official advice, the predominant source of information is other ADF partners and concepts of common sense.

ADF partners take social media security seriously, and this research demonstrates how they already consider themselves security aware. They indicated awareness of instances where ADF members do not display appropriate levels of social media security. In addition, partners are confused by the increasingly visible social media presence of the ADF. Partners are resistant to suggestions that further instruction is needed and participants indicated they would not accept restrictions on their social media activity. Importantly, partners want to avoid actions that compromise the safety of the ADF member and their mission. In closing, this paper offers recommendations to the ADF for how it can better engage ADF family
networks on cyber and operational security, with a particular focus on social media.

**Background**

The use of social media provides numerous benefits to military families, including social support and information gathering. However, there are concerns related to cyber, operational and personal security which must be taken into consideration by the ADF.\(^{119}\) As one US military family support network stated, “Today's military families and spouses are kept far more informed about troop movements, unit locations, unit activities and more than in years past, but have less training on how to maintain Operational Security”.\(^{120}\) Private Facebook groups, created to facilitate discussion between ADF partners, as well as individual social media pages more broadly, are forums where potentially sensitive information is shared. It can relate to operational security (OPSEC), such as information about deployment locations and dates, or personal security (PERSEC), such as the sharing of home addresses. In addition, frequent changes to privacy settings by social media platforms make it difficult for users to maintain control of their online content.\(^{121}\)

The ADF currently has no resources specifically targeted to families regarding safe social media use. One isolated article written for Defence families mentioned the importance of maintaining OPSEC and PERSEC but lacked detail on specific measures families can follow to maintain security.\(^{122}\) The approach taken by the ADF appears to focus on training the serving member in social media safety and then placing the onus on the member to share this information with his or her family. This is a complex issue for the ADF, where its members are required to submit to Defence policy regarding media interaction, but their family members are not, and yet have an


\(^{122}\) Defence Family Matters, 'Don’t be a twit when you tweet- use social media with care', *Defence Family Matters*, December 2013, p. 14.
increasing array of platforms in which to share their views. Patterson, as the author of a review into the ADF’s social media presence, highlighted the need for resources targeted to families. Patterson also considered the US example, and illustrated how the US Department of Defense, using a concept of values-based education which may be successful in an Australian context, engages military families by using “pride and security as primary drivers to inspire families to follow the values and guidelines of OPSEC, rather than a strict set of rules, which would require significant resources to monitor, and be challenging to enforce”.

The US Department of Defense, as well as associated military support networks, have created a wide variety of social media support and information resources. These resources overwhelmingly support the military family, including the enlisted member, to be active and engaged on social media networks. They provide practical and specific advice in regards to maintaining OPSEC and PERSEC. This includes cautioning against sharing important dates and explaining modern technology, such as geotagging, which may unknowingly share sensitive information. This contrasts with the experience of military families in Australia where, despite changes to social media policy which are more accepting of members interacting online, a sentiment of being vigilant remains. Concerns over the security of social media data have resulted in claims that ADF members and their families should not maintain any social media presence, however, as normalisation of social media use increases, the practicality of restricting members and families appears unfeasible.

There are currently a large number of private Facebook groups populated by ADF partners. ‘Groups’ are a popular feature on the social networking platform which facilitate discussion between users based on their shared interests. ADF partner groups are commonly created and managed by partners, who carefully screen new members to confirm their association

124 G. Patterson, Review of Social Media and Defence, Department of Defence, Australia (2011).
125 Ibid., p. 87
127 M. Mannheim, “Public Servants should get off social media’: warning after Islamic State hack, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 2015, online.
with the ADF community. While some groups have a particular topic focus, such as partner employment or housing, others are more general.

**Method**

Participants in the aforementioned research study were partners of currently serving or recently discharged ADF members. Individual, semi-structured interviews and focus groups collected the insights of thirty-five partners across Australia. Participants were asked to share their opinions of security on social media and also to respond to comments made in the media in relation to ADF members and their families not being permitted to have social media profiles during the member’s time of service. Participants primarily related their comments to the social media platform Facebook, and included interactions in private groups as well as their use of the site more generally, such as private messaging. This supports previous studies which indicated that ADF partners predominantly use Facebook for interacting with others in the Defence community. The results presented in this paper form part of the lead author’s PhD thesis, which investigates social media use by ADF partners.

**Sources of Security Information**

I don’t think I’ve ever seen a communication from Defence about social media.131

Currently, ADF members are provided with security briefings about social media as part of their annual mandatory awareness training. In an assessment of this training, the report by Patterson suggested there is a “lack of training and an overt reliance on terms such as ‘common sense’”. Patterson suggests this leads to misunderstandings on how members should interact online. The expectation appears to be that following this training the ADF member will then communicate what they have learnt to their partners and family members. Despite the importance of families maintaining OPSEC and PERSEC, there are no consistent messages from the ADF directly to partners. Participants in this study indicated they had not received any information from Defence regarding social media security, though in some locations, participants reported social media advice and training is provided to units families at family days and pre-deployment briefings. These briefings are unit specific, and participants who have previously attended a briefing noted finding them generally helpful.

129 M. Mannheim, ‘Public Servants should get off social media’: warning after Islamic State hack’, online.
131 Interview with Army partner, age undisclosed.
132 G. Patterson, Review of Social Media and Defence.
Despite this, there is no regular program of pre- or post-deployment briefings across the ADF, with a more substantial number of participants reporting they had never attended, or been given the opportunity to attend, such an event.

Participants revealed that the communication pathway from individual members to their partners is often fractured. Participants in focus groups stated their partner did not reliably pass on messages from the unit, even when those messages directly impacted the partner, such as community meetings and Defence Community Organisation (DCO) events. Few participants said their partners were good communicators, and only one participant said she talked directly with her partner about social media behaviour.

We kind of talk about it. He's told me what’s appropriate and what’s not because he's done the media course in the Defence. So we know what to do.\textsuperscript{133}

This suggests the current model of social media education for partners, which is delivered via the member, is ineffective. Consequently, because partners are not receiving messages about social media security from either the ADF or the member, partners seek out advice from other sources. Participants reported receiving information about social media security from their workplace and from friends. Participants also made their own assumptions, including adopting social media policies written for ADF members, as well as using 'common sense' when figuring out what to do.

If defence is sending out a memo asking the media to be respectful to OPSEC, naturally that applies to all of us as well.\textsuperscript{134}

You know, use your common sense, don’t be an idiot. Pretty much. We know what we can and can’t write. We are lucky to be in a position where we could write something that we probably shouldn’t have.\textsuperscript{135}

Participants in both interviews and focus groups identified ADF partner Facebook groups as a source of information on social media security.

Most of the information I get about what you can and can't post on social media, I get from the Defence wives Facebook pages.\textsuperscript{136}

In the absence of official advice, the ADF partner Facebook groups are self-moderating, although the administrators of groups said they considered it their responsibility to maintain OPSEC, and discussed sending out messages to partners who put sensitive information on group pages.

\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Navy partner, aged 34.
\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Army partner, age undisclosed.
\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Army partner, aged 38.
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Army partner, aged 23.
We will delete and then send them a message saying OPSEC. I understand you can do whatever you like [in some groups], but in our group, it’s not allowed.137

**Security Awareness and Social Media Training**

ADF partners take online security seriously. Participants discussed being careful with what they post online, and they consider themselves to be ‘security aware’. Participants were aware they couldn’t share specific homecoming dates and felt confident their profiles were restricted, giving them control of their content.

I’m quite careful with what groups I go into and what I put up there. I’m notorious for deleting old Facebook posts and old posts and things. So I do keep my privacy quite restricted, and I will go through periodically every now and then and delete old stuff.138

A lot of us went through our pages and checked and made sure it was locked down. And most of us aren’t so stupid that we overtly say, “My husband is in Afghanistan at (location) compound”, we say, “My husband has been deployed”.139

One participant explained how she used a combination of common sense and prior knowledge to ensure her activities on social media did not cause security concerns.

So we are fairly savvy, I’m not the one who sits at home and says “Oh, my husband is going away for six months, Oh when does he leave? Oh, he leaves on the sixteenth of January on this flight? Oh, where is he going? Oh, he’s going here?”. No, that's not me. I'm smarter than that. I've been schooled in the way of how things work.140

While participants spoke positively about the prospect of social media training delivered by ADF representatives, the detailed analysis of comments revealed partner attitudes relating to social media security would influence the successful implantation of social media training. Participants contended they were confident social media users who successfully manage their online activity in consideration of OPSEC principles. Participants who were active online were supportive of the concept of training, but typically indicated they would not attend themselves, believing they have a sufficient understanding of social media security. This understanding appears to be built from a combination of information from various unofficial sources, as well as common sense. This was demonstrated directly by the comments of one interview participant who identified she did not feel she had any need for instruction but understands other partners might.

137 Interview with Army partner, aged 38.
138 Interview with Navy partner, aged 34.
139 Interview with Air Force partner, aged 42.
140 Interview with Air Force partner, aged 42.
I think it would probably be good. Like personally, I don’t have any issues, I just use common sense, but some people don’t seem to have (common sense). \(^\text{141}\)

**Social Media Restrictions for Partners**

Participants were asked to comment on whether they would be receptive to requests from the ADF to close their social media profiles. This question was prompted by a media article which claimed that public servants, including ADF members, should not have active social media profiles during service. \(^\text{142}\) Participants were resistant to closing their social media profiles, though most could see why the ADF may be encouraged to instigate restrictions. The only participant who agreed that social media restrictions were necessary was in a dual-serving relationship and had already deleted her Facebook profile, citing security and privacy concerns.

Participants gave several reasons for their resistance to accepting social media restrictions from the ADF. The first of these reasons was that participants considered restrictions to be unrealistic. They explained how social media was an intrinsic part of life, and the practicality of policing restrictions would be incredibly difficult. Participants also questioned the authority of the ADF to make a request like this of civilian partners.

> I can’t see them being able to enforce that if they did it. I can’t see how they are going to enforce it; it sounds like a crazy thing even to attempt. I can see why they’d want to do it, but that would just make people make up an alias, and they’d just be online but under an alias rather than their real names, and that would just cause more issues. \(^\text{143}\)

> You are going to keep stripping them of normal life, once again. You are going just to keep creating conflicts. What we actually need to do is recognise that there are certain aspects of society we can’t control, like social media. \(^\text{144}\)

Another reason participants identified that restrictions on social media for ADF partners would not be advisable was because it would isolate partners further, and place unfair restrictions on partners who use social media for employment. One participant spoke passionately about how social media gave her a valued social and community outlet while she was caring for her young family, away from support networks.

\(^{141}\) Interview with Navy partner, aged 34.

\(^{142}\) M. Mannheim, “Public Servants should get off social media’: warning after Islamic State hack’, online.

\(^{143}\) Interview with Air Force partner, aged 42.

\(^{144}\) Interview with ex-Navy partner, aged 30.
I’d end up killing my children and myself. It’s my only form of contact with the outside world that is not my little bubble of… children and baby. They could charge my husband before they could get rid of my Facebook.  

In addition to facilitating connections with friends, family and networks, participants discussed finding social media useful for communicating with their partner, especially during deployments. Several discussed how the member was previously absent from social media but created Facebook profiles during deployments so they could interact with their family at home. Issues surrounding access to email-enabled computers and restrictions of email file sizes were also reasons that partners would communicate with the member using social media rather than email.

It was my daughter’s birthday last week, so I tried to send a photo via email, and it came back because the file was too big for one photo … Whereas with Facebook I can send hundreds, tag him in things, and he’s a bit the same, “Yeah, we just pulled in, and I’ve got Wi-Fi, how are you going?” It is awesome just to know that.

Protecting the Member and the Mission

Despite partners considering that they were already sufficient at managing social media security, a consistent theme was their concern for the safety and well-being of the member. Participants expressed their concern that their actions, or the actions of others, could have a negative impact on the mission, or compromise safety. This was the only situation in which the participants were receptive to changing their social media habits.

I don’t want to be the reason that anyone else gets hurt. I don’t want to post a picture and be the reason that, really dramatic, someone gets bombed. I don’t want to be the reason for that, so that’s why I won’t do it. Not because Defence told me to.

I sure would be [expletive deleted] if something happened to my partner because someone else’s partner from the same ship decided to go, ‘Oh my god, they are coming home at this time in three days’, and the ship gets delayed because you just ruined the whole (thing). There’s an unlikely chance that will happen, but I don’t want to run that risk.

Confusion about the ADF’s Activity on Social Media

Overwhelmingly, participants spoke positively of Defence’s recent increased activity on social media networks. Participants said they enjoyed being able to see parts of their partner’s life they might not usually. Participants with children enjoyed being able to show them the posts and used these images to strengthen the relationship between member and dependants.

145 Interview with Army partner, aged 29
146 Interview with Navy partner, aged 31+
147 Interview with Army partner, aged 33.
148 Interview with Navy partner, aged 27.
It's really good, and the kids love seeing him do stuff, in vehicles, holding weapons, whatever, the kids love seeing him, so I love that they do that here.\textsuperscript{149}

You know, seeing photos of the boats sometimes, if you can’t talk to them or whatever, you can see a picture on there and think, Oh, you’re on there, you’re alive.\textsuperscript{150}

Despite enjoying reading the posts, participants reported feeling confused about privacy and security implications. The interactions of Defence on social media, including photos of members in uniform, is in contrast to the actions they perceive as restricted on social media networks.

It would be interesting to explore a little bit the inconsistencies with the Australian Army posts, like ...they’ve posted (photos) in uniform, fighting, names. It’s very inconsistent with the expectations.\textsuperscript{151}

But then what’s the line? If they are allowed to post it, are we?\textsuperscript{152}

Participants commented on how the members themselves were not always security aware, despite being the ones who receive the training. Participants in one focus group referenced Exercise Hamel, where the planned training event was reportedly compromised by soldiers posting content on social media networks that enabled opposing forces to ascertain the location of deployed forces.\textsuperscript{153}

People post photos, and they are all geotagged, so then the other party can find them, which is what happened at Exercise Hamel. They were all posting photos, they were all geotagged, so their opposition found them.\textsuperscript{154}

In other focus groups and interviews, participants shared examples of times when members had contravened OPSEC principles online. A number of participants said they managed the members’ social media profiles, which included changing security settings, adding or removing content, and editing personal information such as display names. These participants felt they were more aware of the risks resulting from activity on social media, both from a security and a reputational perspective, than their partner, and they took an active role in managing this risk for the member.

\textsuperscript{149} Interview with Army partner, aged 33.
\textsuperscript{150} Interview with Navy partner, aged 31+.
\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Navy partner, aged 33.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Army partner, aged 23.
\textsuperscript{154} Interview with Army partner, aged 40.
Discussion and Recommendations

Partners would likely benefit from specific training, particularly as this study indicates partners can take an active role in managing the ADF member’s social media profiles. Partners being excluded from conversations regarding the current online environment may encourage false feelings of confidence in their ability to maintain online security. Despite the value of providing social media security information, the ADF faces challenges in successfully delivering this training to partners. Participants in this study were supportive of social media training; however, their support is given on the expectation that others would benefit, as most do not perceive a personal need to receive advice or instruction.

A key finding of this research is that it would be futile to place restrictions on the social media activity of ADF partners. In addition to making comments that highlighted restrictions would be challenging to enforce, participants were forthcoming in stating they were not enlisted military members, and as such did not need to comply with instructions from the ADF. Indeed, efforts to educate partners about social media could be perceived as ‘control’, and negatively impact on the relationship between partners and the ADF.

In planning and delivering social media training to partners, a more effective approach would be to align the training with partners’ strong sense of willingness to avoid danger to the member. Training focused around ‘Keeping your Defence member safe’ would align with the values that ADF partners hold. Successful advice and training would also be that which acknowledges the partners’ separate, civilian identity, and offers to improve their existing social media security knowledge. This value-based education fits with the model of partner education and training offered to US military families, where “educational material focuses on instilling pride in the family members by letting them know they are as much a part of the military community as their soldier, with their own responsibilities for keeping the soldier safe”. 155

One of the most significant challenges would be disseminating the message to partners. The Patterson report suggested that the Defence Community Organisation and associated support organisations could be responsible for distributing training and information to partners; however, participants in this research identified breakdowns in communication between those organisations and partners. For this reason, organisations like DCO may not be well positioned to deliver this training to partners. Participants who attended pre-deployment briefings found them valuable, so the extension of these briefings to more units across the ADF would appear to be beneficial. The placement of engaging and relevant social media security advice at these events would be key. In addition, information which can be easily

155 G. Patterson, Review of Social Media and Defence, p. 87.
shared on social media networks by ADF partners, who already do the majority of self-education regarding online security, would take advantage of these already strong pathways. For instance, social media graphics which give instruction on how to interact online may be well received by partners. Partners who are active in their communities could share these graphics, which encourages others to engage in better practice.

Future research which compares social media security attitudes against actual social media activity may reveal differences between partners' perception of their own social media awareness, and actual content they post online. Such research could be used to build education programs. Research comparing perceptions of behaviour would also overcome the bias present in self-reported data. In addition, investigations of ADF interactions on social platforms other than Facebook, such as SnapChat or Twitter, would increase depths of understanding on this issue.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a discussion about social media security in relation to the activities of ADF partners online. It notes that partners do not currently receive consistent instruction or advice about social media from the ADF. The current method of social media training is an expectation that members will discuss issues of security with their partners, although this is not always happening. Partners who were able to attend pre-deployment or similar briefings where social media instruction was given found these briefings helpful. In the absence of social media instruction from Defence or members, ADF partners are receiving social media advice primarily from other ADF partners, as well as incorporating aspects of training received from civilian workplaces and other sources. This paper also found that partners perceive ADF members as not being particularly security conscious, and some participants managed the members’ social media profile on their behalf.

Participants generally considered themselves security aware and generally in control of the content they place online. Many participants reported that social media safety was primarily about ‘common sense’, and suggested that the majority of operational security issues on social media happened to people of specific demographic groups, such as younger partners. Despite this, partners reported being receptive to social media training from the ADF, with one participant reporting that training should be compulsory for partners. A significant finding in this paper is that owing to the strength of conviction in their own security awareness, partners would not attend training if it was offered.

Participants were aware of the negative implications of posting sensitive information about the military online, and they wanted to avoid behaviour that would place their partner or the broader ADF in danger. Participants
also reported feeling confused about the ADF’s activities on social media and highlighted differences between what the ADF posts online, and what partners perceive they are and are not allowed to post. Participants also gave examples of ADF members posting inappropriate content on social media.

In closing, this paper identified the challenges faced by those tasked to provide training and education on social media security to partners. It has argued the restriction of partners on social media networks is futile, due to the partner’s separate identity and sense of autonomy. It has also offered a series of suggestions, firstly to align training and education to the partner’s keen sense of danger avoidance. Participants in this research strongly contended they did not want their actions on social media to be responsible for placing their partner, or the broader mission, in jeopardy. Training that aligns with this value will be effective. This paper also suggested pre-deployment briefings, which currently only take place on a limited number of unit deployments, could be supported across the wider ADF, and social media training could take place at these briefings. Finally, this paper suggested that given the evidence the majority of information regarding social media security is generated by and shared amongst ADF partners themselves, education from the ADF would be beneficial in a format that can be disseminated via social media platforms. This would take advantage of already strong ADF partner networks.

Social media security is an important issue, and there is cause for concern regarding the social media interactions of ADF partners. This study reported in this paper provides a unique view in that it identified the sources where partners received information and training, and the challenges associated with the ADF providing training on social media.

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In 2013 there was a fascinating case of life imitating theory. The G20 was increasingly driven by the dynamics of two rival groups of great and major powers, the G7 and the BRICS. Left over were five smaller 'middle powers'. What united them was what they did not share (membership of the other groups) rather than anything distinctly common to themselves. Just as scholars have long identified yet wondered what to do with the middle powers, so too MIKTA (standing for Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) has been a forum in search of a mission ever since.

Analytically, middle powers are an obvious class of states. On a spectrum of power where we can identify those great and small, some clearly fit 'in the middle'. Especially when ranked by population size, economic wealth or military capacity. Yet the real world group of states who fit into this middle category always seems defined by their heterogeneity. Some scholars have tried to wave such concerns out of the way by setting up ideal types of behaviour around the notion of 'Good International Citizenship'. Others have thrown up their hands in despair and declared there are multiple types of middle powers or suggested the whole concept should be abandoned.

Enter Ralf Emmers and Sarah Teo’s elegant new study on the Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific. In this tightly argued analysis of Asia’s middle powers, the authors offer a valuable argument for resetting our thinking about middle power diversity. Rather than the obvious differences in behaviour and outlook between these states suggesting something problematic in our category of middle powers, Emmers and Teo argue that the real world distinctions are a product of deliberate choices by middle powers. These choices, they show, are shaped fundamentally by the nature of the security environment (low–high threat) and resources (low–high availability) of each state.

When states face low threats and have low resources (for a middle power) they tend towards ‘Normative’ security strategies, involving the advocacy of “broad behavioural norms and rules, as well as promote confidence building, through multilateral and institutional platforms”. By contrast states facing high levels of threat and with access to high levels of resources tend to ‘Functional’ strategies that “utilise their limited but still relatively substantial resources to address specific issues” (pp. 6-7).

Across their four cases, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Malaysia the authors show examples of Normative (Indonesia), Functional (South Korea) and balanced (Australia, Malaysia) security strategies. The case studies are blessedly parsimonious, allowing the authors to describe each country sufficiently to justify the differences, without needing extensive histories of their foreign policy behaviour or getting too distracted by tangential details.

The other credit to the authors is that as useful as this contribution is, they don’t push it too far and are quite open about the challenges the argument faces (esp. pp. 33, 178). As Emmers and Teo stress, the two types of strategies, functional and normative are not exclusive, and none of the countries discussed follows only one approach. As good scientists should, in the conclusion the authors update their argument, refining the analysis to incorporate this diversity, while still affirming the underlying value of their framework for understanding middle power behaviour.

Perhaps part of the problem is that the two strategies are different in type, not just form. Functional strategies are defined by a particular aim the state is seeking, while Normative strategies are a method of achieving aims. As such, states can and do use both. Yet as the authors show, there seem clear areas of emphasis and the book’s insights into the sources of behaviour for middle powers are valuable.

Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific is a praiseworthy contribution to both the middle power and Asia-Pacific security literature. It helps us move beyond tired concerns that middle powers are, à la the G20, simply a leftover grouping defined only by being not something else. Rather, as Emmers and Teo show repeatedly, these states possess some capacity to shape the regional order around them, and how they do so is partly a function of their power and partly the environment in which they operate. Thanks to their framework, the diversity of behaviour we find now becomes something that we can analyse and explore, without going back to question the essential value of the class of ‘middle powers’. For regional security scholars, this book is a useful overview and reference for grappling with the impact of Asia’s middle powers as well as a reminder that these states deserve and reward greater scholarly study than they have thus far received.

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Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942
Allan Gyngell
(Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe University Press, 2017)
ISBN: 9781863959186

Reviewer: Chris Farnham

This book is an essential starting point for those who look to a career in foreign and security policy, whether that be as practitioner or academic. The author displays a deep understanding and respect of Australia’s history in the world and the ability to communicate complex issues without undue complication. Allan Gyngell walks the reader through the development of Australia’s own foreign policy from the Second World War up until early 2017 and does it without self-indulgent prose. And that makes it accessible to anyone who enjoys history or even just a great read.

The book demonstrates that Australia was, in the pre-war 1930s, forced to accept that its national interest could not be served by way of London. However, this realisation was not arrived at whilst bravely looking out over our ‘near north’. Australia’s development of an independent foreign policy came with the fear that it was leading the Empire toward disintegration. And, according to Gyngell, it is this fear of abandonment that drives Australia to rest its foreign policy on three main pillars: the need to embed with strong allies, the support of a rules-based order and engagement with Asia.

As the book travels through Australia’s relationship with the world in chronological order from the end of WWII onward it displays how often these three pillars of policy have worked to achieve Australia’s national interest. But these policies also sometimes trapped Australia’s leaders in a dilemma of interests and values.

Having strong allies affords a middle-to-small power like Australia flexibility it would not otherwise enjoy. But strong allies can also force smaller powers into making uncomfortable choices. This occurred when US President Nixon bombed the civilian centres of Hanoi and Haiphong to pressure North Vietnam for negotiations. Australian ministers labelled the act as brutal and the American administration as maniacs and murderers. As a result, Australia’s diplomatic relations with its great power ally were placed in deep freeze by Washington.
Engaging with Asia allows Australia the chance to shape a more benign environment. But it has also forced Australia to compromise on its values. With Cold War competition playing out between China and Soviet Russia, Vietnam invaded Cambodia under the pretext of the atrocities being carried out by the Khmer Rouge. To help contain Soviet Communism Australia was forced to condemn the Vietnamese invasion, thereby implicitly supporting an abhorrent government in Cambodia. Engaging with Asia allowed Australia to influence the region in support of its interests but sometimes at the cost of its national values.

A rules-based order can provide the lesser powers of the world a level of certainty and protection they would not enjoy in a world ruled by raw power. Yet in 2003 Australia was required to consider which pillar of foreign policy offered the greatest strength to the nation: the protection of a strong ally or the rules-based order. After the 2001 terror attacks the United States would not be deterred from invading Iraq to ostensibly rid it of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. Without a UN mandate and with some creative legal advice the case was made for invasion and requests were made for Australia to commit to the invading force. Australia was caught between laws that condemn the preventative use of force, and supporting our great power partner in military action.

Coming from a background in policy, diplomacy and intelligence Gyngell offers the reader an insider’s view of the drivers of Australia’s foreign policy. Gyngell reveals the people behind the policy, together with their visions and beliefs – some based on seeking the betterment of humanity, some based on the responsibility to a constituency.

For former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, Australia’s path ought to have been to become a republic and to “go to Asia as we are, not with the ghost of empire…. Or as a US deputy”. He designed the grand vision of how Australia should be in the world but left much of the actual policymaking and diplomacy to his Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. Evans, Gyngell explains, had a disproportionate impact on Australia’s support for and development of a rules-based order. Evans’ time in office coincided with a drastic change in the world order, the proliferation (and use) of chemical weapons, and a heavy focus on human rights, human security and environmental protection.

History is studied for many reasons but arguably the most important reason is to save us from repeating mistakes. This book does a wonderful job in doing that, especially so when it looks at Pauline Hanson’s first term in parliament. Her background as a (small) business person was cited as an element of her outsider credentials. Her uncomfortable fit with a traditional conservative party, her disregard for political correctness, opposition to immigration from unfamiliar cultures and her representation of Australians
who believed that they had been left behind by economic and social change
ring familiar for readers who follow contemporary US politics.

Some patterns can’t be avoided. After China’s efforts in 1996 to intimidate
Taiwan with live fire exercises Gyngell explains how Prime Minister Howard
voiced support for Taiwan and the deployment of two US aircraft carrier
groups to the area. Not long after, Australia’s primary industries minister
visited Taiwan, Prime Minister Howard met with the Dalai Lama and the
Coalition government repudiated China for its nuclear tests. Come
September China banned ministerial visits from Australia and the Australian
ambassador in Beijing could not gain access to any Chinese officials. As
Australia currently experiences a similar ‘diplomatic deep-freeze’ this book
reminds us that history is not just an exercise in nostalgia, its lessons are
often pointed, informative and directly related to contemporary experiences.

Reading the introduction and conclusion, one could feel a little short-
changed. While the discussion in these chapters is profound and the
arguments are thought-provoking, the 244 pages in between the introduction
and conclusion are primarily a log of Australia’s post-WWII foreign policy that
do not display the author’s talent for articulating the ‘so what’ discussion.
But make no mistake, this a fantastic book and will hopefully be required
reading for all budding Australian diplomats.

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Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience—Stable and Successful

Michal Lubina
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Reviewer: Dr Gregory Raymond

For many, the relationship between contemporary China and Russia is a partnership in crime between revisionist powers bent on undermining the liberal rules-based global order. Certainly it is shared opposition to the West, rather than cultural affinity, mutual respect or shared values, that sustains the Russia-China quasi-alliance.

While this insight is fundamental, it is insufficient to encompass the breadth, history and subtle dynamics of this distinctive relationship providing Michal Lubina the opportunity to work systematically through each of these. One aspect of the bilateral relationship is its 'top-down' character. The senior leadership in each country are well-known to the other, but thereafter, warmth and familiarity falls away rapidly at the middle and lower levels of officialdom. At the community level, the two countries remain as alien and unknown to each other as they are to their Western interlocutors. A second characteristic is what Lubina terms their 'sinusoid' rise and fall in relations. Some of this variance derives from changes in relative power. In the latest phase, Russia has become the subordinate partner but has decided to make a virtue out of the asymmetric win-win share of gains. Foreign policies with respect to the United States are also important; there was cooling when Russia accepted President Obama's offer of a reset in 2010, there was warming when the United States commenced its Pivot. A third characteristic is that each country is more oriented to the West than to each other; culturally, Russia is far closer to Europe than to China, while for its part China looks more to the West than Russia for technology and trade. What their partnership delivers, in the end, is a sense of safety in their rear areas, such that they can oppose the West's liberal interventions and pursue their own irredentist projects (Crimea for Russia, Taiwan and South China Sea for China).

The book traces the development of the quasi-alliance from the time of Russia's post-Cold War disappointment with the West, especially after the enlargement of NATO. Mutual non-interference on difficult problems like
Chechnya and Tibet became a source of friendship, with Russia becoming for China a ‘Tiananmen proof partner’. China returned the favour during the 2014 Ukraine crisis, abstaining on a UNSC resolution condemning Russia. Despite discomfort with the sovereignty implications of the Crimea referendum and annexation, China saw realpolitik advantages. It obtained Russian gratitude, security in its rear, and another crisis to distract the West from the Asia Pacific.

Military relations are the most important part of the strategic partnership. This was initially centred on trade in arms, with the 1990s becoming an arms trade win-win. Sale of arms to China allowed Russia to maintain its military industrial complex while China modernised its military. Military drills started after 2005, but there was little real contact between Russian and Chinese soldiers; they exercised separately at the same location. Exercises amounted to a statement against US hegemony rather than real cooperation. Naval drills since 2012, too, have been political gestures, like in the South China Sea where Russia repaid China for its support in the Ukraine crisis. Nonetheless, the joint maritime exercises in the Yellow Sea in 2012 were China’s largest ever, enabling some transfer of learning and knowledge. But trust should not be exaggerated. The Far East of Russia is the Achilles heel of the relationship, a source of Russian xenophobic fear.

A key argument of the book is that China has gradually become the dominant partner. The trajectory of the post-Cold War economic relationship is a good example. Apart from the arms trade, the 1990s was a stagnant period economically due to the legacies of the Sino-Soviet split and their command economies. In 1997 almost three-quarters of bilateral trade was still being done through barter transactions. A PRC trade spokesman noted drily that "between China and America there is cooperation without friendship; between China and Russia there is friendship without cooperation". Then in the 2000s and 2010s energy became the primary theme in the relationship. Russia became the ‘energy appendix’ of the Chinese economy, with energy making up 80 per cent of Russian exports to China while machinery comprised only 5 per cent. With global changes in patterns of energy consumption lessening the advantages of being an energy supplier, Russia’s subordinate position in its relationship with China was exacerbated. Russia’s weaker bargaining position and greater reliance on China ultimately forced it to sell its technological ‘crown jewels’, including its SA400 surface-to-air missile system and Sukhoi SU-35 combat aircraft. Overall there is a growing asymmetry in economic relations, with China far more important to Russia economically than vice versa.

In terms of theoretical framework, the book imposes a hard realist perspective in its interpretation of events and intentions. At times, this reaches points of ridiculousness. Every aspect of China’s policy is interpreted in instrumental terms—even its protest of the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade is portrayed as a cynical ploy to rebuff the West’s
critique of its human rights record. The book also flirts with strategic culture. For example, Russian elites have drawn on the story of thirteenth-century prince Nevsky who maintained a tributary relationship with the Mongols in order to be able to fight Western intruders. This enabled Russia to keep its own faith and autonomy.

The book provides useful comparisons in terms of national style and inclination. China is far less, and Russia far more, inclined to use of force. Russia is more given to short-term sharp gestures to assert itself, China focused on a long-term strategy of acquiring power quietly.

In the final analysis this is a very strong and worthwhile analysis of a very important geopolitical relationship. It is let down only by an absurd number of typographical errors that would have been picked up by a standard spellcheck.

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