Shaping Australian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Thoughts on a Reflective Framework of Analysis
Joyobroto Sanya

Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump
Thomas Wilkins

China’s Sweeping Military Reforms: Implications for Australia
Bates Gill and Adam Ni

One Man’s Radical: The Radicalisation Debate and Australian Counterterrorism Policy
Nell Bennett

The Changing Operational Security Landscape for Sensitive National Capabilities
Martin White

Australia’s First Spies: The Remarkable Story of Australia’s Intelligence Operations 1901-45 by John Fahey
Reviewed by Daniel Baldino

Global Defense Procurement and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by Bert Chapman
Reviewed by Andrew Davies

Handbook on the United States in Asia: Managing Hegemonic Decline, Retaining Influence in the Trump Era by Andrew T. H. Tan
Reviewed by Greg Raymond

Is Non-Western Democracy Possible? A Russian Perspective edited by Alexei D. Voskressenski
Reviewed by Elizabeth Buchanan
COMMENT

Joyobroto Sanya
Shaping Australian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century:
Thoughts on a Reflective Framework of Analysis 1

ARTICLES

Thomas Wilkins
Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump 9

Bates Gill and Adam Ni
China’s Sweeping Military Reforms: Implications for Australia 33

Nell Bennett
One Man’s Radical:
The Radicalisation Debate and Australian Counterterrorism Policy 47

Martin White
The Changing Operational Security Landscape
for Sensitive National Capabilities 63

BOOK REVIEWS

Australia’s First Spies: The Remarkable Story of
Australia’s Intelligence Operations 1901–45 by John Fahey
Reviewed by Daniel Baldino 75

Global Defense Procurement and
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by Bert Chapman
Reviewed by Andrew Davies 79

Handbook on the United States in Asia:
Managing Hegemonic Decline, Retaining Influence in the Trump Era
by Andrew T. H. Tan
Reviewed by Greg Raymond 83

Is Non-Western Democracy Possible?
A Russian Perspective edited by Alexei D. Voskressenski
Reviewed by Elizabeth Buchanan 85
Editors’ Introduction

Our first issue for 2019 covers many of the issues Security Challenges readers will be familiar with: Australia’s place in a changing world, the implications of China’s strengthening military, and what to do about terrorism.

The issue opens with a comment from Joyobroto Sanyal. Sanyal notes that in the light of recent geopolitical shifts, we are witnessing calls for a ‘Plan B’, but argues that with some critical reflection, ‘Plan A’ may yet be useful. Dr Sanyal then sets out five tasks that ought to be undertaken in any such reflective exercise: a critical analysis of Australia’s national power, the establishing of a national narrative on which to base foreign policy, a broadening of conceptions of security beyond a focus on hard security, a broadening of the national character to encompass greater social diversity, and the development of a new partnership between government and civil society in order to address emerging foreign policy choices.

The first article for this issue is a stocktake of the ANZUS alliance from Thomas Wilkins. Wilkins takes a hard, dispassionate look at the alliance balance sheet, identifying assets and liabilities as well as unpacking what each side expects from the other. After describing six assets and three liabilities, Wilkins considers how these have fared in the face of Australia’s deepening economic relationship with China and Donald Trump’s ascent to the White House.

In the second article, Bates Gill and Adam Ni provide a detailed exposition of the very significant reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) undertaken since 2015. Gill and Ni argue that these reforms have both increased Communist Party control over the military, and improved the capacity of the PLA to conduct joint operations away from China’s shores.

From Chinese military reforms we turn to counterterrorism policy. In an incisive examination of the conceptual foundations of the notion of ‘radicalisation’, Nell Bennet challenges commonly held views of what ‘radicalisation’ is and how it occurs. Bennett argues that while the idea of radicalisation entered the terrorism vocabulary relatively recently, it has no agreed meaning amongst researchers and while it has been brought into use to describe the post 9-11 phenomena, it is not clear how lone actor Islamist terrorism differs from previous forms of self-starter operative. Troublingly, the causal relationship between ideas and violence is unclear, with ideas often being a post-facto rationale for violent individuals to justify their attacks.

Our final article from Martin White looks at the challenges facing the Australian Defence Force in maintaining operational security in a world of proliferating electronic signatures, constant cyber attacks, social media straddling professional and personal spheres, and insider leaks. Taking two
key ADF capabilities—submarines and Special Forces—as case studies, White argues that doctrine and practice have not kept pace with changing circumstances and that a more pragmatic approach is required. This approach would concede the inevitability of information spills and the pervasiveness of signature collection, and seek to minimise the harm by steps such as rehearsing leak procedures and more deliberate signature management.

This issue also contains four book reviews. Daniel Baldino reviews Australia’s First Spies by John Fahey, praising it for the light it sheds on hitherto unexamined parts of Australia’s intelligence history. Andrew Davies reviews Bert Chapman’s new account of the troubled birth of the F-35, Global Defense Procurement and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, commenting that it is an extensive and thorough attempt to unpack the program. Greg Raymond reviews a new edited volume entitled Handbook on the United States in Asia, that overall seeks to place the impact of the Trump Administration in historical context, through a series of vignettes and deep-dives: the establishing of the US hub and spoke system in post–World War Two Asia, the significance of the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the state of bilateral relationships such as the Singapore–United States partnership and flashpoints like the Korean peninsula, to name but a few of the comprehensive volume.

Elizabeth Buchanan provides the last review, of another edited volume entitled Is Non-Western Democracy Possible? that seeks to advance, from a Russian perspective, the argument that Asian, African and Middle Eastern cultural and political differences may mean that Western forms of liberal democracy are unlikely to take hold even as modernisation occurs.

This issue also is the first with Dr Elizabeth Buchanan as part of the editorial team. It also marks a strengthening of the editorial board with Professor Megan Mackenzie, Professor Anne-Marie Brady, Dr Sue Thompson and Dr Danielle Chubb all joining the board of Security Challenges. We are sure that with the new arrangements in place, Security Challenges remains well-placed to remain Australia’s foremost journal for discussion of security issues.

Greg Raymond, Chris Farnham and Elizabeth Buchanan,
1 May 2019
In the twentieth century, foreign policies of nations have rarely evolved gradually, let alone smoothly. In fact, the present international system is more a product of shocks than design. Whereas these shocks were somewhat spread out over the previous century, the present century can claim to be more eventful than its immediate predecessor, judging by the variety and magnitude of shocks it has experienced in the first two decades. The significance of these events, the underlying trends they indicate, and the multi-level challenges they pose to Australia have been described as a state of “accelerated warfare” by the Chief of the Australian Army in his 2019 Strategic Guidance. Like other countries, near and far, Australia has to prepare in order to cope with the combined and unfolding effects of such changes and adapt to an external environment through a foreign policy that connects the tactical with the strategic in a timely and efficient manner. The blueprint of Australia’s response can be found in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.

The significance of geopolitical changes and geostrategic shifts resulting thereof have called for a rethink of Australian foreign policy. Discussions on a so-called Plan B for Australia’s foreign, security and defence policy are slowly but steadily gathering shape. However, it is worth noting that Plan A has not completely run out of steam but perhaps needs reinvigorating, reinforcing and redesigning, using a reflective framework—an attributional framework.*

---

* The views expressed here are personal and they do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.
mirror of self-reflection—that gives more agility, clear direction and higher return on investments. This comment discusses five key elements that can help shape the reflective framework and lead the way for a rethink of Australian foreign policymaking using a timely strategy that can help in dealing with increasing uncertainty, complexity and risk.4

**National Power: Perception vs Reality**

National power is the fuel that runs all national policies and shapes a nation’s destiny. The pursuit of foreign goals no matter how ambitious or important is impossible without harnessing the strengths of all the elements of national power. In this context, an approach that relies on an unambiguous and honest evaluation of Australia’s national power is more useful than that which is based on perception. What is it that Australia has and how it can be used effectively to get what it wants are key questions that need considering first. For over sixty years, political decision-makers have referred to Australia’s power ranking as one of middle power without either defining or refining the concept based on a thorough and objective analysis of the capabilities (potential and actual) that constitute national power.5 Dr Herbert Evatt, who during his tenure as Australia’s External Affairs Minister first used the term ‘middle power’ in public discourse to describe Australia’s foreign policy tradition, stressed three attributes of Australia’s middle power tradition: nationalism, internationalism and activism.6 But these attributes are more vocational in nature than an objective reflection of Australia’s power capabilities in any given period of time. Australia’s longest-serving foreign minister Alexander Downer’s use of the term “pivotal power” reflected more ambition-coated aspiration than reality.7 Some academic experts have even gone to the extent of using descriptors such as “dependent middle power” and even “awkward partner”.8 But the building blocks of Australia’s national power have so far escaped a critical analysis. Thus, the ‘middle power’ descriptor does not reflect a reality and is more a matter of perception. The ever-changing nature of power is worth stressing here. As the world changes and societies age, some old elements wither and some transform, the elements of national power evolve. It is, therefore, essential, to take stock of national power assets in any given period before aspirations are expressed, goals are set, and policies put in place. It is worth noting that whereas availability of key assets can offer more choices, their absence or inaccessibility can seriously constrain policy manoeuvring.

---

4 A shorter version of this article entitled ‘A Strategy for Australia’s Foreign Policy: A Game of Means and Ends’ was published in the Australian Outlook, 9 March 2019.
6 Ibid., pp. 542-43.
7 Cited in Ungerer, ‘The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, p. 548.
8 Allan Patience, *Australian Foreign Policy in Asia Middle Power or Awkward Partner?* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
Strategic Narrative: Fragmentation vs Integration

Australia lacks a national narrative when it comes to foreign, security or defence policy. A national narrative is a powerful self-reflecting tool that unites the nation with its institutions to help steer the state forward. Without it, a nation can lose its *raison d’être* which has implications for its policy settings not least for its foreign policy. A fragmented social consciousness developing along the fault lines of a divided society is a detriment to the fulfilment of aspirations let alone ambitions and interests. In order to face the challenges of an emerging world that is not just diverse, but also an increasingly divergent place of conflicting interests, ideas and actions, a coherent and integrated narrative is necessary. However, a serious national effort is yet to emerge. Unless there is some coincidence between national aspirations and social expectations, there is a risk of policy failure. Henry Kissinger’s warning could not be more relevant:

> No foreign policy—no matter how ingenious—has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none.

A contributing factor to the deficiency of a narrative is perhaps best demonstrated by Australia’s reluctance to define its international identity in the community of nations. Whereas the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* discusses the values Australia advocates, there is no corresponding display of political will to project its liberal democratic values in the region and beyond through which Australia can shape its strategic environment. A pertinent question to ask in this regard is how does Australia look at itself and what does it want to do with that image? Contrast this with the image that the United States built in the immediate aftermath of World War Two through, for example, the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods system, to promote a liberal international order.

Another closely related point is about Australia’s place in the Indo-Pacific. The 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* has reiterated the importance of the Indo-Pacific region as Australia’s external strategic setting but has not answered the question: how does Australia fit into this setting? There needs to be first an agreement on accepting a middle power status followed by a narrative about how this status can be sustained and strengthened and the need to do so. The next step involves bringing the rest of the nation on board. A pertinent question to ask here is about Australia’s role in Asia. Here Australia seems to be lacking in clarity, confidence and direction. For geographical reasons Australia does not belong to Asia, yet Australia seems

---

11 Patience, *Australian Foreign Policy in Asia Middle Power or Awkward Partner*
to have come to accept the view that its economic destiny—most notably the pursuit of prosperity—lies with Asia. Developing a sub-narrative about this reality using culturally appropriate references and symbology can significantly refine and strengthen the strategic narrative. As results from the 2016 Census of Population and Housing reflect growing cultural diversity, the need for a strategic narrative that not only incorporates this reality but is also used to shape Australia’s international identity and project soft power in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond cannot be stressed enough. Multiculturalism can only be the starting point in this discussion. As a nation with an ancient past and an increasingly diverse population that is shaping its present there is an opportunity to unpack this system of values in order to create a distinct national outlook and voice that are resilient to adverse social forces, for example, the persistent challenge posed by extremist forces. Australia’s foreign policy identity in the twenty-first century needs an inclusive, cohesive and forward thinking narrative to better reflect the emerging social reality and also strategically project its soft power.


The Australian thinking around national security has long remained focused on hard security. While defence of territorial sovereignty is fundamental to national security, it is not sufficient. Granted that in the post-9/11 world where violent extremism is perpetrated by predominantly sub-national actors, the physical dimension of security has taken precedence over other dimensions of security challenges. We the people have given in to the line of thinking that physical security is all that matters. And this is reflected in investments that are being made in building capability as shown by, for example, the 2016 Defence Integrated Investment Plan. But the prosperity of Australia as ‘the lucky country’ is vulnerable to the security challenges that are not restricted to the physical domain of security. In a speech, Dwight Eisenhower noted: “We do not keep security establishments merely to defend property or territory or rights abroad or at sea. We keep the security forces to defend a way of life”.  

Winston Churchill voiced similar sentiments in the Iron Curtain Speech of 5 March 1946. As strategic risks to national security have accelerated over time—particularly in the first two decades of the twenty-first century—the need for a holistic approach to security is more than ever. However, Australia is yet to develop such an approach and incorporate this into a coherent and balanced national security strategy. The call for such an

---

approach is, however, not new.\textsuperscript{15} For example, in 2004, a report tabled by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament argued for Australia’s national security objectives that encompassed business, leisure, diplomatic, economic, social and environment. The report notes:

What is needed, in addition to the NSCC (National Security Committee of Cabinet) and SCNS (Secretaries’ Committee on National Security), is a clearly articulated policy which sets out Australia’s interests and challenges as we enter the 21st century and the government institutions that we can bring to bear in promoting our interests.\textsuperscript{16}

The relevance of a ‘diversified agenda’ to national security, as argued by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, for example, has influenced the security thinking of Australia’s close neighbours and allies.\textsuperscript{17} For example, New Zealand’s 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement presents a more holistic approach to national security thinking that lays out the foundation for a more robust engagement with other countries, regionally and globally.\textsuperscript{18} It is true that Australia’s emphasis on hard security has helped in the past to build enduring alliances and partnerships which, in turn, has helped to respond to security challenges. But this approach will not be sufficient for future security challenges. Already nations from all over the world are facing security challenges from a wide range of areas. Therefore, Australia’s decision elites will be wise to appreciate the wide variety and range of risks to national security in the short-to-long term that may not affect allies in the same way. Australia’s continental status as well as its richness of biodiversity are facts to be reckoned in this context. Against the backdrop of emerging and future global strategic trends as discussed in key documents such as the UK Ministry of Defence’s \textit{Global Strategic Trends}, it is worth asking, if a somewhat exclusive focus on hard security makes the country exposed to greater strategic vulnerabilities and also stands in the way of deeper strategic international engagement.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{National Character: Toughness vs Smartness}

Australia is generally viewed internationally as a land of the fair go and its people seen as proud, dynamic and resilient. These aspects have translated


into a national image that has served Australia well particularly in the twentieth century. The Australian Defence Force’s expeditionary military operations (for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria) and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions for over fifty years, among other factors, have helped to forge this image.\textsuperscript{20} Australia is also well regarded as a partner in its security partnership with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand and in the Five Eyes intelligence community. But the image of Australia’s national character is susceptible to the significant social changes that are shaping the country in the twenty-first century. For example, Australia is facing the challenges of an ageing population that is increasingly diverse (26 per cent born overseas, according to the 2016 Census of Population and Housing) and a growing prevalence of distrust in political institutions and processes.\textsuperscript{21} When it comes to harvesting the knowledge Australia requires to meet its future economic, social and security needs, there is also some concern. For example, Australia is seen as falling behind in educational achievements particularly for STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects. On the health front it is not all promising either: just under half (47.3 per cent) of Australians had one or more chronic health conditions in 2017-18, an increase from 2007-08 when two-thirds (42.2 per cent) of people had one or more chronic conditions; and two-thirds (67 per cent) of Australian adults are overweight or obese (increase from 63.4 per cent in 2014-15).\textsuperscript{22}

The emerging social face of Australia does not reflect solely the image of a tough nation. Like other countries, Australia remains vulnerable to demographic and related challenges and is exposed to changing societal dynamics. This has implications for Australia’s national character and morale and should be taken into account while shaping the future of Australia’s foreign and defence policies. As an increasing number and variety of disruptive technologies come to shape our lives and way of thinking, it is a timely reminder that it is smartness that Australia should seek when developing solutions to its security and other national challenges. Australia needs a comprehensive strategy that is backed by whole-of-government coordination and focus, with sustained investment in critical areas of: (1) manufacturing of smart technology; (ii) its application to solving problems of public interest, and (iii) export to other countries. A foreign


policy that is fuelled by smart power seeks to be proactive in shaping its strategic interests and is also recognised for its technological know-how and rich human capital (like for example, Japan and Israel). Smart power has its asymmetric advantage and synchronises well with the trajectory of future cognitive growth. Applied smart capability in the form of futuristic technologies and thinking style will have a high premium in the knowledge-driven economies of the information age. Smart technology can also be a key enabler of at least two critical capabilities Australia will need for the future: resilience and agility. The decision-makers and policy elites should not, therefore, exclusively focus on toughness alone but also strive for smartness in all areas of national life. This does not necessarily mean relying solely on STEM capability but rather striving for cognitive diversity for greater intellectual agility to make the most of a future where all nations will have to deal with a quite complex operating environment, whether in peace, or at war, or somewhere in-between on the conflict spectrum.23

**National Approach: Incrementalism vs Big Leap**

The emerging strategic scenario inside and outside of Australia strengthens the need for a re-orientation in policy thinking. The question then is what steps are necessary and how they should be taken. Changing national practices, policies and systems is no easy task and it should be approached carefully and methodically. There is perhaps no perfect time in national affairs to make significant changes. Therefore, Australia needs to take incremental or small steps that are informed by hard facts and not rhetoric and shaped by a strategic outlook instead of an exclusive reliance on tactical considerations. Adopting this approach can be a big leap for the future of Australian foreign policy. After all, exploiting every opportunity for the nation while ensuring security through strength (as professed in the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper*) cannot materialise without some big decisions that can be implemented through small, calculated but decisive steps. As current discussions for a Plan B for Australia’s foreign, security and defence policies gather momentum, there is an opportunity for Australia to be a true middle power and not just a dependant middle power or an ‘awkward’ regional partner.24

A national approach that involves big decisions requires the whole nation to be on board. A new model of partnership with the civil society which involves not just the parliament but representatives from all corners of the society is necessary to embed the fundamentals of the policy in the public psyche. Perhaps a platform along the lines of the Australia 2020 Summit that was launched in 2008 to forge stronger ties between society, nation and

---


24 Patience, *Australian Foreign Policy in Asia Middle Power or Awkward Partner*, p. 133.
policy can have some relevance in this context. Such a process can help the nation to tune in to the emerging foreign policy choices that Australia faces in the short term and in the years beyond. Granted that foreign policy occupies a place *sui generis* among types of public policies formulated and governed by the government. But in order to shape the direction which the government of the day wants Australia to take in an environment of relentless competition between states and in view of growing scarcity of economic and other vital resources, Australia needs a new model of civil partnership. Without such a partnership, the challenge of taking small or big steps will remain vulnerable to short-term thinking and other tactical considerations. This can create gaps in the identification, analysis and understanding of, for example, strategic risks to national security.

**Conclusion: A New Style of Thinking**

As Australia’s strategic environment gets more complex and new forces shaping the actions of and interactions between states and non-state actors emerge, a new style of thinking is the first step towards defining Australia’s role in this world. This article has stressed the importance of using a reflective framework for policymakers to set the tone for Australia’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century. Investing in the creation of a distinct foreign policy identity which the nation can be proud of and confident about while facing emerging challenges should be a national priority. It is time for decisive action in order to make Australia future ready. The strategic window of opportunity does not stay open indefinitely; without a brutal and honest appraisal of the means and ends, there is a real risk that Australia’s power status will decline in relative terms; it will run out of meaningful options and be forced to come to accept a challenging reality at a cost to its national interest.

Joyobroto Sanyal, former Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at Pembroke College, Cambridge University, received his doctorate from the Australian National University for his thesis entitled: “Foreign Policy-Making beyond the State: “Theory” and Practice of Foreign Policy-Making in the European Union with particular reference to its Common Foreign and Security Policy’.

---

*25 Australia 2020 Summit, Australia 2020 Summit: Final Report (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2008).*
Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump

Thomas Wilkins*

Strategic power shifts in the Indo-Pacific resulting from the rise of China, combined with the disarray provoked by the tempestuous policies of the Trump Administration towards its allies, have created complex challenges for Australian policy-makers in managing their alliance relations with the United States. To understand contemporary shifts in Canberra’s relative bargaining power position within the alliance over time this article conducts a net assessment through the employment of a specially designed framework taking the form of a ‘ledger’ that tallies Australia’s ‘assets’ against its ‘liabilities’. Through this exercise analysts can appraise how its advantages can be strengthened and weaknesses mitigated in dealing with Washington in future bargaining encounters. It also tangentially contributes to the International Relations (IR) literature of ‘intra-alliance politics’ by illustrating how allied ‘bargaining power indexes’ may be operationalised through the empirical analysis conducted here.

Australia’s alliance with the United States was inaugurated through the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 at the foundation of what would become known as the ‘hub-and-spokes’ network of bilateral military alliances in Asia radiating from Washington. But since the exclusion of New Zealand from what was originally a trilateral alliance arrangement in 1986, as a result of its hard-line non-nuclear policy, the relationship has become de facto if not de jure a bilateral Australia-US alliance (though Wellington is still considered as an ‘ally’ by Canberra). Since the beginning of the Cold War, Australia has played the role of a ‘major non-NATO ally’ in upholding the US alliance system in Asia, as well as the broader American-led liberal international world order upon which it is predicated. It has been consistently valued by Washington as a steadfast ally in Asia, and globally.

Yet longstanding assumptions held in Canberra about the role of the US alliance system in upholding security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, upon which national defence and foreign policy are founded, have been undermined by structural trends and unexpectedly thrown into disarray by the arrival of the Trump Administration in the White House. In the first instance, the rise of China and its increasingly assertive policies overseas have challenged the presumption that the United States will remain the predominant (hegemonic) power in Asia. As Paul Dibb testifies: “China wants to be acknowledged as the natural hegemon of Asia and to see an

* The author wishes to acknowledge the kind support of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation under the ‘US allies project’, his Research Intern Dr Jiye Kim, and Professors Michael Wesley and Michael Cohen, and the anonymous reviewers for Security Challenges, who provided invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article.
end to America’s alliance system in the region, including ANZUS.”¹ In the second, the erratic and damaging policies emanating from the Oval Office since 2016 have undermined the very nature of intra-allied relations, given the President’s scathing disregard for longstanding allies and the enunciation of a range of policies that undermine US credibility and commitment to its alliance leadership. Thus, Greg Sheridan has warned of the future possibility that “Trump destroys or significantly erodes the US alliance system in Asia”.² These developments have impacted significantly upon the assumptions underpinning Australian national security and defence policy given Canberra’s enormous reliance upon ANZUS. This has consequently sparked animated debates in Australia about the state of the nearly seventy-year old alliance relationship with the United States. According to James Curran, “questions of America’s future, its role in Asia and the nature of the US alliance have once again taken centre stage in Australian public debate”.³ In addition to analysts and academics, well-known public figures such as former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, as well as former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr, have weighed in with critical appraisals of the US alliance.⁴

Nevertheless, in such uncertain times, the current Australian government’s response so far has not only been to stay the course, but to apparently ‘double-down’ on its commitment to the bilateral alliance. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper puts this emphatically, claiming that “The alliance is a choice we make about how best to pursue our security interests”.⁵ Indeed, the 2018 AUSMIN consultations listed a voluminous range of existing and newly minted areas for cooperation including, but not limited to: upholding the rules-based international order (through the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy), coordination against foreign domestic interference, regional maritime capacity-building, economic and infrastructure support, space, cyber and energy security issues, missile defence, counter-terrorism, and a stronger role for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Japan.⁶ Thus, Peter Jennings argues “It is clear that an up-gunned alliance relationship

with the United States is Australia’s primary response to the increasingly risky strategic environment emerging in our wider region. This has paradoxically committed Australia even further to its alliance relationship, just as serious questions have emerged about its continued credibility and effectiveness.

The aim of this article is to provide a new framework through which to appraise the alliance relationship from the Australian perspective, and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of Australian bargaining leverage within it. I do this through an assessment/reassessment of Australia’s overall position, and then by drawing out implications for the future of bilateral relations in the conclusions. With Canberra’s national security fundamentally hinging upon the alliance relationship for the foreseeable future it is more important than ever to get the alliance relationship right and for Canberra to give greater attention to its intra-alliance bargaining relationship with the United States, in order to defend and uphold its interests not just through the alliance, but within the alliance itself.

Assessing the Australia–US Alliance: A New Approach

Despite its contemporary focus, this article builds upon a long and distinguished literature relating to the US-Australia alliance/ANZUS. Though space limitations preclude a comprehensive listing here, this literature ranges from examining the alliance’s background and origins; specific aspects, such as nuclear deterrence, or in relation to Australian military or defence postures, for example; to a full range of critical appraisals or reappraisals over time. Furthermore, the alliance remains integral to all discussions of Australian diplomacy, security/defence policy, and military

---

9 Joseph A. Camilleri, ANZUS, Australia’s Predicament in the Nuclear Age (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1987).
affairs. Moreover, the range and nature of the US-alliance debate has evolved beyond the scope of earlier works, to focus upon the implications of the rise of Chinese power, and the changing direction of US global policy under the current Trump Administration. Concomitantly, much of the discourse on alliance affairs has occurred more recently through the medium of newspaper op-eds and particularly blog posts, such as the Lowy Interpreter, ASPI Strategic Insights and The Diplomat, as much as dedicated academic journals or books.

One recurring theme in treatments of the bilateral alliance, either explicitly or implicitly, has been the application of cost/benefit analyses to frame assessments of the relationship with the United States. Michael Wesley points to “The long history of regarding alliances in accounting terms, weighing up the costs and risks against the benefits and assurances they provide, [which] is deeply embedded in political logics and the public mind.” However, this article differs from conventional approaches by examining instead the basis of Australia’s bargaining position vis-a-vis Washington by drawing up a ‘ledger’ of national ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’. Thus, rather than appraise the value of the alliance to Australian national interests per se, it assesses and reassesses Australia’s overall bargaining position in relation to its US ally, to contribute insights into how Australia can protect and advance its national interests within the bilateral alliance. In this sense the article inverts the usual preoccupation of Australian analyses of why the country values the US alliance, to emphasise more why and how the United States values Australia (which naturally correlates with its assets), and how Canberra can capitalise upon this.

Through the employment of a practical empirically-driven framework codifying Australian bargaining strengths and weaknesses we can better understand the relative effectiveness of the ‘cards’ Canberra holds in negotiating with its US ally. Though the article is not overtly theoretical in nature, it draws upon many of the assumptions and aspects of the so-called ‘intra-alliance politics’ perspective on alliance management. This alliance

17 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Harvey Starr, War Coalitions: The Distributions of Payoffs and Losses (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972);
theory concentrates on a matrix of variables that enter into the actual intra-alliance bargaining process, examining determinants such as national interests, power, perceptions and domestic politics, and how the intra-alliance security dilemma is overcome to maintain allied cohesion. The approach taken in this article taps into these concerns, to formulate a ledger of an ally’s a priori assets and liabilities (its ‘cards’) that will come into play once an instance of intra-allied bargaining is entered into. This can then help to formulate initial negotiating positions, and anticipate likely interactions/disputes and outcomes beforehand, so that Australian policy can be adjusted accordingly to enhance assets and mitigate liabilities. This asset/liability ledger exercise thus contributes toward the codification of the bases of bargaining power—a “bargaining power index”—as Glenn Snyder dubs it. Of course intra-alliance bargaining is an interactive process, but it is also a unilateral one in which “a party seeks to minimize its own costs and risks without sacrificing benefits” while aiming at “control or influence of an ally in order to minimize one’s own costs and risks”. From this exercise it is hoped that policymakers can derive a better understanding of Australia’s multifaceted bargaining portfolio to help identify the sources of bargaining power in order to help devise bargaining strategies that leverage strengths and mask weaknesses. The article does not present case studies of bargaining encounters—this would be the next step for research in this direction—and could draw upon the models of strategic interaction provided in an ancillary literature which could potentially be adapted to alliance bargaining, such as Snyder and Morrow’s Conflict among Nations. And, though it is well-recognised that every alliance relationship is unique, the Australian experience, as revealed from the empirical analysis to follow, ought to be instructive for other US allies, such as Japan or South Korea.

The article proceeds as follows. Part I draws up an initial ledger of Australia’s assets and liabilities in relation to its bargaining position with Washington. The ledger concentrates upon the more immutable (stable) factors governing bilateral state-to-state interaction that have been accumulated over the life-span of the longstanding alliance relationship to date. Informed by this framework, Part II then engages in a detailed discussion of how the existing ledger needs reassessing since the inauguration of the Trump Administration in 2016. The comparative presentation of the established ledger in Part I is juxtaposed with the reassessment provided in Part II to reveal the transformations and adjustments that have occurred under the Trump Presidency specifically.


Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 174.

Ibid., p. 165.


- 13 -
The conclusions summarise Australia’s current bargaining position (or ‘equity’) going into the future, and offer some final reflections upon the utility of the analytical framework employed, and how it could open up new avenues for further potential research.


This framework is aimed at providing a net assessment of Australia’s overall bargaining position vis-a-vis its American ally. It takes the form of an alliance bargaining ledger divided into columns of assets and liabilities from which overall alliance ‘equity’ might be appraised. The assets and liabilities columns are presented in what the author considers a logical progression, based upon their proximate relation to one another; suggesting a loose form of (adjacent) ‘categorisation’. This reification is necessary to sidestep a number of unavoidable methodological complications, for example: the difficulty in ‘ranking’ assets and liabilities according to relative weight; their often overlapping nature; their ability to vary in intensity in accordance with situational contexts; the cross-cutting and interactive nature of many of them; and some potential inclusions on both sides of the ledger. In order to avoid unnecessarily impeding the presentation of the framework itself at this stage, such methodological dilemmas are suspended here, but will be revisited in the article’s conclusions, in light of the empirical analysis that follows.

ASSETS

1. Loyalty: From an Australian perspective, perhaps one of the foremost assets the country has held is its normative reputation for ‘loyalty’ toward its superpower ally, as demonstrated by a track record of unbroken military and diplomatic support for Washington. As Peter Edwards and William Tow note: “Loyalty to the alliance thus became the price of Australian access to the benefits that Washington could bestow, and it remains a central feature of Australia’s contemporary appeal to American policy-makers.”21 Having fought alongside the US military in World War Two, Korea, Vietnam Afghanistan, Iraq (twice) and the War on Terror (having invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time after the 2001 attacks), Washington has traditionally perceived Australia as an ally that can be counted on to “pay the blood price” when called upon.22 Such loyalty extends to consistent diplomatic support from Canberra in advancing US policy objectives on the international stage. As Nick Bisley notes “the USA requires allies and partners to support these values and policies, and Australia has been an extremely reliable partner”.23 In this respect, Australia’s normative reputation as a ‘good international

23 Bisley, “An Ally for All the Years to Come”, p. 407.
citizen’ and high diplomatic profile both globally and regionally can confer much-desired legitimacy to US policies (including ‘flying the flag’ in military interventions) when Australia participates or endorses them. Andrew Carr notes that “Australia’s self-proclaimed ‘good international citizenship’ was often to the United States benefit. Being a middle power gave Australia increased significance and credibility on the international stage to push for change”.

Indeed, Australia has expended great political capital in its support for sometimes controversial policies, such as the war on Iraq in 2003. This has marked Canberra out as an ally that can be counted on, even when other traditional allies refuse to participate.

2. Military contribution: Australian policymakers have long been aware of Morrow’s dictum that “Alliance policies cannot be considered apart from military allocation”. Though Australia rates only as a so-called ‘middle power’ overall, its military capabilities in the Indo Pacific are ranked ninth in the region. There are two interconnected aspects to Australia’s military contribution to the alliance which are highly valued by Washington. First, Australia’s expeditionary-orientated military forces, supplied predominantly with US weapons platforms and equipment, are highly interoperable and thus ensure that the ADF can act as a capable coalition partner should the need arise—a crucial asset in Washington’s eyes. Australian force posture and capabilities, and willingness to deploy them alongside the United States in coalition operations in the past, are crucial to its leverage in allied bargaining, even if only to enhance the international legitimacy of US actions, with Adam Lockyer concluding that “Australia … can use its forces to influence decision-making in Washington and make it more likely to pursue policy goals favourable to Australia”.

Second, the presence of joint facilities on Australian territory is seen as a valuable asset by the United States, closely connected to the actual force contribution above. Most notably, the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap, which is engaged in electronic intelligence collection for the Echelon (‘five eyes’) network, amounts to the “strategic essence” of allied cooperation, according to Desmond Ball. There are other minor facilities, such as the

---

29 Lockyer, Australia’s Defence Strategy, p. 96.
newly refurbished Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt in Exmouth (including installation of a space surveillance C-band radar and optical space surveillance telescope). But the ‘rotational’ deployment of US Marine Air-Ground Task Force to Australian facilities in Darwin in 2016 has greatly increased the American military footprint in Australia, supplying it with a perch from which to launch operations in the geo-strategically crucial area to Australian north, where maritime ‘chokes points’ for the crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) converge. These facilities are part of the concrete military and intelligence ‘ties that bind’ the allies. Indeed, according to Beazley:

A constant theme among Australian officials has been the critical leverage [Pine Gap] has given us in our relationship with our ally … It has deepened the value of Australia as an American partner and given us strategic weight in the relationship.31

3. Defence/economic Collaboration: Stemming from its military force structure, Australia is also a significant customer for the defence industry of the United States, which is highly influential in Beltway politics. By means of the 2007 Australia-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, Australia has been a longstanding customer for key US weapons platforms and their support systems such as the A1A Abrams MBT, F-18 Hornet and Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and especially the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, in which Australia was a development partner. This not only enhances bilateral military interoperability as noted above, but potentially provides influence on US defence contractors—a fact that is recognised through the establishment of branch offices of major corporations such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon in Canberra itself (60 per cent of Canberra’s acquisitions are sourced from the US).32 It has been calculated that Australia spends AUS$13 million per working day on US defence industries, and the significance of such arms deals surely enter into Washington’s calculations when dealing with Australia as an ally.33

Moreover, in long-term alliances the economic dimension of mutual support and reciprocity cannot be ignored. Therefore, the Australian Government has also sought to bolster and broaden alliance relations from an economic standpoint through the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA, 2005), and other economic initiatives, pressed for by alliance advocates.34 Despite the far greater level of trade with the PRC, the United States remains a

significant trading partner, and primary investment partner in Australia, and by extending the alliance relationship into the economic realm, Canberra has sought to provide ballast to the defence-heavy relationship and satisfy US desires for deeper economic integration. At the time of its promulgation, then trade minister Mark Vaile characterised the AUSFTA as the “commercial equivalent of ANZUS treaty”.35 And this certainly amounted to a deliberate ploy on the part of the Howard government to broaden the foundation of the alliance, thereby raising Australia’s profile in Washington, regardless of its lacklustre subsequent performance.

4. Regional networking: In recent years Canberra has sought to assist the United States in connecting the bilateral ‘spokes’ of its alliance system into a more integrated ‘network’, both overtly through the formation of a formal Strategic Partnership with Japan, and in a more ancillary way through its networking with Southeast Asian and South Pacific partners. In the first instance, The 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) created a direct security alignment between these heretofore “quasi-allies” of the US.36 This was strongly encouraged at the time by Washington which has been keen to ‘connect the spokes’ of its diffuse Asian alliance network in order to buttress its strength and share the burden of leadership with the allies themselves. Above all this process has been realised through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) which has created a more integrated ‘core’ of trilateral alliance relations at the centre of the broader hub and spoke system.37 Some Australian commentators have advocated further efforts toward “federated defence” to reinforce this collaboration at the operational level.38 Such Australian efforts further extend and enhance US influence in the Indo-Pacific region by proxy.

In the case of Southeast Asia (SEA), Andrew Davies and Peter Jennings argue that “[T]he role of ANZUS as a vehicle for engaging Asia-Pacific countries, and ASEAN states in particular, is a new aspect of alliance cooperation”.39 Thus, Australian efforts over time to more closely engage with a range of regional partners, especially Indonesia and Singapore individually, and through the multilateral Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), as well as the ASEAN family of institutions, has been viewed

positively by Washington. A good example of this in action was through the 2018 Australia-ASEAN Special Summit meeting. Strong Australian engagement with key partners, especially due to geographical proximity, allows Canberra to act as a facilitator or ‘hub’ for advancing US interests. Also, in the more immediate Pacific island countries (PICs) region, Washington appreciates being able to delegate a role to Canberra in maintaining stability by overseas development assistance and capacity-building, support for good governance and counter-terrorism, crisis intervention and engagement with regional architecture such as the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). These efforts, notoriously, earned PM John Howard the sobriquet of “Deputy Sheriff” during the fight against Islamic terrorism in the region.

5. Convergent threat perceptions: According to the canonical theoretical literature, an alliance is formed and sustained by mutual perceptions of a (military) threat, usually an opposing state. During the Cold War and the ‘war on terror’, bilateral threat perceptions have been in close correspondence, thus reinforcing allied cohesion and mutual dependency. However, after the Cold War no strategic threat emerged to replace the USSR and the alliance remained essentially ‘threatless’. Indeed, Ball argues that “The vitality of the alliance has been ‘threat insensitive’.” Nevertheless, an Alliance-21 report concludes that “protecting Australian and US interests ... necessitates preparedness even in the absence of an obvious direct conventional threat”. Concomitantly, the focus of ANZUS has gradually shifted toward a more ‘order-based’ rationale, with the allies cooperating against challengers to the liberal international order, including non-state actors such as terrorists, that threatened to undermine it. This has brought challengers or disrupters of the liberal (or ‘rules-based’) order into the crosshairs of the alliance, with concern among strategic analysts that a new threat could emerge that would require a joint response, such as North Korea, Russia, or China, as each of these begin to contest American primacy. Typically, then, Canberra has supported American assessments of threat and the necessity of a joint response, a factor intensified by joint military and intelligence cooperation, which further serves to inculcate a shared ‘threat mindset’ among the allies.

44 Ball, ‘The Strategic Essence’, p. 245.
6. Ideological-domestic compatibility: This forms another important normative asset to the ledger, since Snyder argues that “Expectations of support may also stem from common ideologies or similar ethnic makeups.”\textsuperscript{46} As a fellow ‘Anglo-Saxon’-dominated culture with the same trappings of liberal democracy and governance, Washington finds it easy to interact with Australian interlocutors, which smooths their quotidian relations, and reduces the chance of miscommunication and misunderstandings. Jennings notes that “The ease of exchange between the defence and intelligence personnel of the two countries has allowed cooperation to grow organically and with the minimum of bureaucratic red tape.”\textsuperscript{47} Australia can also count upon several well-placed ‘alliance managers’ in Washington and Canberra, for example former National Security Advisor Andrew Shearer, former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, and Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus, David Kilcullen, and former Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley (who has written prolifically on ANZUS), in addition to powerful bureaucratic lobbies within Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence (DoD). The US alliance also enjoys firm bipartisan support among the Liberal (Coalition) and Labor parties of Australia. People-to-people linkages, such as the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue and Friends of Australia Congressional Caucus, have also played a role. And whatever their dislike of American policies, the Australian public also remain a resolute supporter of the alliance. As Bates Gill notes, “the US-Australia alliance occasionally generates political attention, but overall it enjoys strong domestic support and is not a matter of significant dispute within the country.”\textsuperscript{48} These factors ensure that Australian considerations will be heard on Capitol Hill, thus ensuring a degree of bargaining influence. Because of the presumed shared world view and mutual respect that close cooperation with the United States over time has natured, Canberra believes that Washington will view it as an ally that will be consulted as a valued interlocutor over the larger strategic questions they both face.

LIABILITIES

1. Power asymmetry: Despite all its material and political contributions, the relative power disparity between Australia and the United States works to limit the extent of Canberra’s influence upon Washington. Australia remains a ‘small ally’ from the US perspective and competes for attention with a range of other US allies and partners. As Alison Broinowski and James Curran remind us “Australia gets access to Washington. But so do many

\textsuperscript{46} Snyder, \textit{Alliance Politics}, p. 7.
supporters of the US, with equal blandishments”.49 Moreover, since the ANZUS Treaty, through which the US-Australia alliance is operationalised, is not commensurate with other similar bilateral alliance treaties, such as Japan-US or Korea-US in terms of its unequivocal (NATO Article V-type) security guarantees, Canberra’s bargaining position is more precarious. Thus, despite optimistic declamations that “Ours is a formal alliance, and the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 is the cornerstone of our longstanding relationship” by former Foreign Minister Julie Bishop,50 the absence of an unequivocal security guarantee keeps Australia in the position of a supplicant, and has created a pathological “fear of abandonment” by the United States.51 Although it should be noted that it will always be the case in asymmetrical alliances such as ANZUS, that the smaller ally trades autonomy for security, as the work of Morrow has pointed out.52

Secondly, the absence of a formal ‘infrastructure’ of alliance reinforces this weakness, since other than the ANZUS Treaty itself, the bilateral AUSMIN annual consultations are the only official platform for specific alliance interaction. There is no combined military/defence planning forum or joint headquarters like NATO, for example. Stephan Frühling argues that what passes for institutionalisation of ANZUS today are personnel exchanges, ‘embedding’ of senior officers and informal cooperation between the five Anglophone countries, all of which are by design technical and avoid the political commitment that joint planning or peacetime operations for deterrence and other signalling would entail.53

This puts Canberra at a disadvantage. The channels open to Canberra to have its voice heard or influence US policy, outside of the normal diplomatic protocols, are quite circumscribed forcing it to overinvest energy in personal relationships (especially the Executive Branch), and constant policy initiatives to keep the United States engaged with its concerns. Typically, Washington has seldom paid close attention to Australian perspectives and “there are still very few analysts in Washington with a dedicated interest in Australian issues”, according to Carr.54 In other words, the relationship is a great deal more important to Canberra than it is to Washington and this will

51 Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment.
54 Carr, ‘ANZUS and Australia’s Role in World Affairs’, p. 81.
be reflected in the importance assigned to it, the attention it attracts, and the respective bargaining position between a middle power and a super power.

2. **Path dependency-sunk costs**: The above liabilities resulting from material asymmetry and Australian insecurity have led to a form of ‘path dependency’. Though alliance loyalty has traditionally been regarded as an asset, it takes on the form of a liability if Washington takes for granted that Australian support will be automatically forthcoming, even in cases where particular Australian national interests are not at stake, or during actions which may even be detrimental to them. As Gyngell notes “The idea of the payment of a premium on an insurance policy became the most powerful metaphor in Australian public life.”

55 This double-edged dynamic eliminates the opportunity to drive a harder bargain in return for support (as other allies have typically done). It is more difficult to say ‘no’ when you have an unbroken track record of saying ‘yes’. Curran warns that this "sentimentalism" regarding the US-alliance has become a liability for Australian policymakers in taking a clear-eyed appraisal of the changes that are occurring in the international system and in the United States itself, which are not necessarily to Australia’s advantage. He argues, “In short, we’ve perhaps become **too reliable**, and while that might bring some kind of influence and access in Washington, it also means that America doesn’t study us closely enough, and can occasionally take us for granted.”

56 Moreover, in an effort to ‘integrate’ ever-more closely into the US alliance by unqualified diplomatic support, unbridled rhetoric, and practical defence, military and intelligence connectivity (including ADF military embeddings in US forces), Canberra has also reduced its ability to resist US pressure. With the strong presence of US officials, defence personal and defence suppliers/contractors and a wide range of advocates, both American and Australian, close to the centre of political power—**American ‘domestic penetration’** is a fact of life. In this respect, some of the advantages above that create cohesion, familiarity and close working relations are potential liabilities for Australia. Indeed, in his indictment of the alliance Fraser noted that “our military and intelligence capabilities [are so] ensconced within the US military infrastructure to such a point the two have become blurred”.

57 Australia’s ‘dependence’ not only upon the presumed defence guarantee, but also upon US defence providers to maintain its military-technological edge (at tolerable cost) has not only ‘locked-in’ Australia into the US military-industrial complex, but also increased the risks of ‘entrapment’ in a conflict (e.g. Taiwan) not necessarily in Australia’s national interest (e.g. through embedded deployments or use of joint facilities in war). This path dependency risks ‘chain-ganging’ Australia into a conflict not of its own

56 Curran, ‘Fighting with America’ [emphasis added].
57 Fraser with Roberts, *Dangerous Allies*, p. 240.
choosing and that it would rather avoid, but feels pressured by the alliance to participate in.

3. Complex economic interdependence: The extended process by which China has supplanted the United States (and Japan) as Australia’s largest trading partner has created a new set of liabilities for Australia with regard to its security alliance. Despite the efforts of politicians to finesse the widening disconnect between Australia’s economic and security interests, by insisting there is no need to ‘choose’, the impact of complex economic interdependence with China, a strategic rival to its superpower ally, has grave implications.\(^58\) It circumscribes how far a middle power like Australia is willing to go in providing unqualified support for US policies when they are harmful to Beijing, largely for fear of political sanction and economic retaliation. Linda Jakobson and Bates Gill observe that “the PRC [has] the increased ability to threaten and use economic coercion with Australia”.\(^59\) While opinion is divided in Australia over whether economic punishment by China is a viable and effective tool of statecraft, it nevertheless enters political calculations on whether and how far to support American initiatives that could be seen as antagonistic by China. This dilemma is exacerbated as Beijing actively seeks to drive a ‘wedge’ between the United States and its core allies in the Indo-Pacific, with Australia apparently the primary target.\(^60\) The need to accommodate China undermines perceptions of Australia’s reliability and commitment (‘loyalty’) in Washington’s eyes, thus complicating alliance bargaining.

Part II: Reassessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Trump Era

The prior assessment of assets versus liabilities above concentrates largely on relatively predictable and constant factors in alliance relations to date, which subsequently have become ingrained assumptions over time. But the underlying shifts in regional power balances and, above all, the advent of the Trump Administration have introduced unpredictable and damaging elements into the alliance ledger. Indeed, White warns that “Donald Trump’s presidency has undermined Canberra’s confidence both in America’s future in Asia, and in Washington’s regard for Australia as an ally”.\(^61\) His poorly informed world view on alliances, according to Wesley, is as “temporary alignments of convenience, easily disposable as the circumstances dictate”.\(^62\) In light of this destabilising development, Part II now analyses

---


61 White, *Without America*.

how the original ledger must be reassessed to determine some of the shifts in the relative strengths and weaknesses of Australian position.

Firstly, it would seem that one of Australia’s traditional normative assets may have diminished in value under current circumstances. Australian loyalty to the alliance may therefore be more difficult to leverage in future, and in Trump’s mind probably counts for little, to the great detriment of Canberra’s enormous material and rhetorical investiture in this asset. Perhaps in a bid to draw the President’s attention to the reservoir of loyalty Australia believes it has stored up with the United States, in 2018 the Australian Embassy launched a campaign in Washington entitled ‘100 years of mateship’, intended to urgently publicise the sacrifices that two allies had shared over the last century and some of the key figures in US-Australian relations, though it is difficult to measure if the desired effect was achieved. Thus, in future, the allied sentimentalism that was warmly embraced under previous administrations, especially for example under Bush and Obama, will need rethinking in the age of Trump, or his successors.

Moreover, Canberra’s continued ability to demonstrate impeccable loyalist credentials, may become harder to achieve. While Australian policy documents are emphatic in their support for the United States and its role in upholding the rules based international order, Australia’s willingness to demonstrate future loyalty by ‘paying the blood price’—as it has in so many limited military interventions and the war on terrorism—may be in question going forward. Not only will Canberra find it more difficult to assent to participation in ‘America-First’-inspired military operations in which it has little stake or enthusiasm—perhaps Iran—but, more tellingly, a potential Sino-US conflict over the South China Sea or Taiwan, in which the risks would be far higher. Since the United States would demand a demonstration of Australian loyalty in such a hypothetical conflict, even if initiated by Washington (for which ANZUS would not apply), Australian refusal would eliminate this asset, and perhaps portend the termination of the alliance itself.

Another traditional Australian asset—it’s military contribution to ANZUS—is now scrutinised by Washington more than ever. Under Trump, allies have been accused of not doing enough to provide for their own defence. Prima facie, Australia’s current position looks positive. Canberra has shown a ready willingness to contribute its share to the allied ‘defence burden’, and with a defence budget target of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product has avoided castigation from Washington. Australia’s ability to contribute to

64 Thanks to Michael Cohen for pointing out this conundrum.
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) through acquisition of US hardware such as the 8A Poseidon maritime surveillance/response aircraft and MQ-4C Triton UAV, alongside existing capabilities, strengthens this asset. The future submarine program (which will operate US combat systems) also potentially contributes to American battle plans in the Indo-Pacific, known now as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC).\(^66\) Beazley notes that “The US regards the Australian submarine as a potent addition to allied underwater strength in the Pacific.”\(^67\) In terms of material contributions, Australia has enhanced this particular asset.

Likewise, in the related sphere of *defence collaboration*, Australia has preserved or strengthened an important asset in intra-alliance bargaining. With a confirmed defence budget of AU$36.4 billion for 2018-2019 Australia will remain a major customer for US hardware throughout its development, maintenance and replacement of capabilities well into the future, including the systems just noted.\(^68\) This amply satisfies President Trump’s desire to extract economic benefit from allies, since a major proportion of defence spending will go to US defence contractors. Also, as Australia seeks to become a major arms exporter, further potential for joint collaborative projects opens up.\(^69\) A good illustration of this is the *Nulka* missile decoy, installed on both US and RAN vessels. Beazley affirms that “The Nulka story is part of the ballast of our alliance relationship as we seek to influence the direction of … Donald Trump’s policy in our region.”\(^70\) In broader terms, the economic element of the alliance is strong with bilateral investment standing at AU$1.6 trillion in 2017,\(^71\) boosted by cooperation on regional infrastructure investment through the trilateral partnership (with Japan), as part of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy.\(^72\)

Notwithstanding Trump, in terms of *regional networking*, Australia has been an energetic supporter to Washington’s FOIP strategy, alongside Japan (and within the TSD), and a key proponent of the ‘Quad’ process (Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue) with India.\(^73\) Since these efforts underwrite Washington’s ambition to ‘network’ its alliance system and create an


\(^{70}\) Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *Kim Beazley on the US Alliance*, p. 17.


\(^{73}\) Huong Le Thu, ‘Quad 2.0—New Perspectives’, *Insights* 134, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 14 February 2019.
interconnected ‘mesh’ of allies and partnerships, Australia is providing a welcome support to America’s regional grand strategy, thus reinforcing its value as an ally. As an interesting addendum to this, security cooperation with Japan may supply a further bargaining asset to Canberra in relations with the United States. If Canberra and Tokyo collaborate in this minilateral context, Shearer advises that they can

make effective use of the TSD as a forum in which they can bring their combined influence to bear, [and] they can maximise their chances of shaping the Trump administration’s approach on issues that matter to both countries – including regional security and economic policies.\(^{74}\)

Additionally, key aspects of the FOIP include an emphasis on both the SEA and South Pacific regions, where it has been noted Australia is well-positioned to contribute. Michael Green argues that

Australia’s geographic location is more important to the United States today than it has been at any time since the Second World War. Australia serves both as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and as a sanctuary from China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities.\(^{75}\)

Australia’s traditional role as the ‘Southern pillar’ of the US hub and spokes system, has thus been greatly augmented. The US has direct access to the region through its military rotations, but Australia’s significant contribution also increases its power projection by proxy, and frees up US forces for deployment to other areas. In the first case, the basing of the US Marine Task Force in Darwin not only allows for combined exercises between allies, but also allows low-profile military engagement with near-neighbours in SEA by the United States or combined forces, which otherwise may attract political complications (thus also adding to military contributions by the provision of strategic real estate).\(^{76}\) In the second case, Australia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Endeavour’ naval task force “enhances relationships, builds partner capacity and improves military interoperability throughout the Southwest Pacific”, according to the DoD, thus helping to realise US goals as well (and in which the US may also participate in future).\(^{77}\) Therefore Australia’s geographic location, the access it has granted to the American military, and its proactive role in SEA regional engagement, thus magnify its value to the United States.

US attention has increasingly been drawn to the South Pacific also, in response to increasing efforts by China to establish a geopolitical


\(^{75}\) Michael Green, Peter Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack Cooper, *The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2015), p. 12.


\(^{77}\) Department of Defence, ‘Indo-Pacific Endeavour 18 Continues to Build Regional Security and Stability’, 1 June 2018.
In order to seek favour with Washington, Canberra has ramped up its efforts at political, economic and security engagement with the PICs in order to forestall a new front of Chinese influence, and uphold the rules-based order under the banner of a Pacific ‘Step-up’. A new Office of the Pacific has been established in DFAT, to coordinate the promotion of good governance, development and maritime capacity-building (such as the provision of patrol boats), with an AU$2 billion infrastructure financing facility. Plans have also been unveiled to establish a joint naval base with the United States at Lombrum in Papua New Guinea. This opens up another arena for allied engagement highly desired by American strategic policymakers.

Though the FOIP acts as a new policy-frame for allied cooperation (as per the earlier Asia-Pacific Pivot/Rebalance), it conceals some widening divergences in the allied world view, some of which are drawn into stark relief by the Trump Administration in particular. Firstly, in terms of the heretofore strong asset of convergent threat perceptions, a gap is opening up. Although Australia subscribes to the maintenance of US primacy, Canberra is less sanguine about the confrontational approach to China that the White House has been increasingly begun to advocate, as outlined in a recent speech by Vice President Mike Pence. Yet the 2017 US National Security Strategy indicates that Washington expects allies to “demonstrate the will to confront shared threat”. Hence, this exposes the fundamental contradictions in Australia’s strategic position: supporting the United States may lead to eventual conflict with China (widely predicted), but Australia must avoid this, primarily for national economic imperatives (a liability: see below). Evidence of this dilemma may be found in ambivalent Australian support for the United States in relation to the South China Sea. While Canberra supported the United States in decrying Chinese attempts to establish an ADIZ over contested waters in 2013 in the East China Sea, and conducts routine surveillance in the South China Sea (Operation Gateway), it has been reluctant to accede to American request to join the US Navy in

---

FONOPS. Thus, even as Canberra maximises its support for the US, its unwillingness to provoke China undermines its credibility as an ally. Australia’s position on facing a China ‘threat’ is further undermined by political discrepancies among domestic actors, with divisions between those that advocate “standing up to China” and those that seek a more accommodative approach, with the picture further complicated by the effect of Chinese ‘influence operations’ within Australia (see below). This further weakens Australia’s value as a heretofore unequivocal supporter of the US.

On the other hand, the ‘America First’ policies of the Trump Administration disrupt and weaken the asset of ideological and domestic compatibility. The Trump Presidency has initiated protectionism, trade wars and withdrawal from the TPP, in addition to disparagement and disruption of the WTO, NATO and G7, and withdrawal from international treaties such as the Iran nuclear deal and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Such radical initiatives greatly disturb the alignment of core values at the heart of ANZUS. Departures from American stewardship of the liberal world order by President Trump not only badly affect Australia’s own national interests, but also reduce Australia’s value to the White House as a stolid champion of this order. This means Australia’s value as an interlocutor and facilitator of the liberal world order, acting as a ‘good international citizen’, is at a discount under Trump. As Curran argues: “With Trump as President it will be more difficult for Australian leaders to appeal to the common values that unite the United States and Australia.” It also implies that Canberra will have greater difficulty lining up behind US policy initiatives that are destructive of this order and damaging to Australian interests. For example: the 2017 Australia Foreign Policy White Paper notes that “Even narrow protectionist measures could limit or disadvantage our exports and harm Australia’s economy.” Furthermore, if the US body politic has shifted away from the championship of shared values in favour of a narrower nationalist approach, the interests and opinions of its allies could be discounted, and allied cooperation therefore greatly complicated.

LIABILITIES
Not only have Australia’s conventionally held assets undergone some revaluation, but also some of its liabilities have deepened. In particular, its liability of power asymmetry has increased under Trump, who looks at alliance relations purely in transactional/material terms. First, the President has called into question the sanctity of US alliance treaty guarantees

85 Benjamin Schreer and Tim Huxley, ‘Standing Up to China is Essential, Even If Costly’, The Australian, 20 December 2015.
86 James Curran, Fighting with America (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2016), p. xiii.
elsewhere and this raises a particular problem for Canberra due its generous interpretation of the defence provisions of the ANZUS Treaty, thus exacerbating a key liability. Trump’s apparent willingness to undermine US security guarantees through his interference with South Korean defence issues or queries about whether Article V would apply to all NATO allies in all circumstances, risks puncturing the carefully crafted illusion of the ANZUS guarantee and thus sharpens the fear of abandonment.

Second, stemming from this, liabilities appertaining to the lack of alliance institutions and consequent reliance upon personal relationships among premiers are magnified under a president like Trump. The highly fractious telephone conversation between Trump and then-PM Malcolm Turnbull got relations off to a rocky start, and matters have not improved significantly since then, forcing allied leaders to acquire the new skill of ‘managing Trump’. The original ledger indicated how close personal bonds in the past between premiers such as Howard and Bush, and Rudd and Obama, served to provide the necessary political ‘halo’ for the relationship. Australian attempts to validate the alliance through their submissive and effusive rhetorical statements—such as “joined at the hip” by former-PM Turnbull—fell on stony ground with Trump, with later grudging rhetorical support failing to convince. This is deeply worrying to Canberra, since Snyder has observed “the vaguer the alliance commitment, the greater the need for validation”.88

The implosion of executive level relations has thrown Australia back upon working-level connections with the more able and stable elements of the US ‘deep-state’. That is; the State Department, Congress members, military, defence and intelligence organisations, as well as think tanks and alliance managers, among whom the alliance remains significant and valued. Beazley assures us that “The Australian-US interaction at this deep level stands aside from processes most immediately affected by elected governments.”89 In this regard, some reassurance can also be found in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy; which notes that “our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security”.90 Australian and American alliance managers alike within the deep-state are thus engaged in a fraught process of ‘bypassing Trump’ in order to maintain the core aspects of allied cooperation—a far from ideal situation—and one that the alliance relationship has never been subjected to before. In the meantime, regardless of the diplomatic neglect of Australia by the United States (Canberra was without a US Ambassador for two years), domestic support for Trump-led America had reached all-time lows according to a 2018 Lowy Institute Opinion Poll, thus undermining another key asset

88 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 11.
Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump

(ideological-domestic compatibility). Alex Oliver notes that “Support for the US alliance remains firm, although trust in the US has fallen to its lowest level in our polling history, and most Australians have little confidence in President Donald Trump.” Since values are what sustain long-term alliances over time, rather than more expedient threat-only based coalitions, these developments cast a shadow over the potential future of ANZUS.

At the same time, by seeking ever-deeper military-economic integration and strict adherence to US strategic policies, even as serious problems within the alliance have arisen, Canberra has pushed Australia into greater dependency upon the United States and further deepened ‘sunk costs’ into the alliance, thus deepening this liability. The wisdom of this approach given relative American decline in overall power and influence, and the current President’s open disregard for its key allies is questionable. This is exacerbated by the structural shift toward future Chinese dominance in the region. As former-PM Paul Keating has argued “we need to determine a foreign policy of our own—one that looks after Australia’s interest in the new order; and order which will have China as its centre of gravity”. It would seem that the Australian establishment has no way of breaking its dependency (driven by the pathology of ‘fear of abandonment’), and its bargaining power is hence further reduced on this count; a fact the United States is no doubt well aware of. As Dibb recognises, at present Australia has “no credible defence future without the US alliance”.

Lastly, the liability of complex economic dependence with the PRC has become increasing complicated over time as an aspect of intra-allied interactions. Despite Chinese economic growth slowing recently, and limited Australian efforts to diversify its reliance upon the Chinese market, it remains deeply dependent upon China for its prosperity. Tensions with the United States were exposed when Canberra defied its ally to accede to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the leasing of Darwin’s commercial port activities to a Chinese contractor (Landbridge), which is adjacent to facilities utilised by the US military. Canberra is far more cautious about joining the United States in any form of adversarial relationship towards China, and this circumscribes its support for the US (e.g. FONOPS). Vocal agitators such as Bob Carr (former) of the Australia China Research Institute declaim that “we should also let the Americans know that our alliance commitment with them does not preclude us from a positive and pragmatic policy towards China.” Additionally, revelations of the practice of Chinese ‘sharp power’ or ‘influence operations’ in Australia have also

94 Bramston, ‘ANZUS Alliance “Might Be a Danger to Australian Security”, Says Bob Carr’.
worried US alliance managers.\textsuperscript{95} Australian resolve to resist such efforts at political penetration through counter-interference legislation, and to exclude Chinese technology suppliers from participating in critical infrastructure projects (such as bids by Huawei and ZTE to supply 5G networks) have reassured the United States to a degree.\textsuperscript{96} Nevertheless, even as Canberra supports American strategic policy such as the FOIP, it constantly looks over its shoulder to determine Beijing’s reactions. This potentially calls into question the assets of convergent threat perceptions, and perhaps even the loyalty and military contribution above. Thus, because of this dilemma, White observes “One senses among US officials beneath the back-slapping boilerplate of alliance solidarity, genuine disappointment and uncertainty about where Australia stands.”\textsuperscript{97} This liability now creates perhaps the most significant challenge in managing alliance relations with the United States.

Conclusions

This article has formulated a basic framework for structuring an understanding of Australia’s overall bargaining position in relation to its US ally in the form of a ledger of traditional assets and liabilities. The framework is a first attempt to order the parameters of Australia’s bargaining position, and while the analysis is in some ways a reification, subsequent studies can potentially draw upon it in order to apply a more directed or specific case-study approach. The original list presented in Part I indicated that, numerically at least, assets have far outweighed liabilities (6:3), thus implying a relatively favourable net bargaining position (‘equity’) for Australian alliance managers (and perhaps compared to other US allies?). But the comparative re-assessment undertaken in Part II reveals a reordering of assets and liabilities, resulting from engagement with the Trump Administration from 2016 onwards, set against accelerating structural shifts in the Indo-Pacific security environment. This conclusion now draws the empirical findings together, and ends with reflections upon the utility and application of the framework itself for assessing alliance bargaining power.

From the reassessment of the bargaining ledger undertaken in Part II we can determine that Trump’s Realpolitik approach to alliances, including ANZUS, significantly diminishes such long-held normative assets such as loyalty and ideological-domestic compatibility. Rather it puts a higher premium upon the material assets of military contribution and defence/economic collaboration. In contrast, interaction with the deep-state indicates that the asset of regional networking has become much more greatly valued by the United States. Convergent threat perceptions are an asset that remains in flux, as


\textsuperscript{97} White, ‘Australia’s Choice’.
Australian caution about entering an adversarial relationship with the PRC due to the liability of complex economic interdependence, is tempered by a need to meet US expectations in supporting the rules-based international order. Now Beazley concludes, “Putting the ADF where our mouth is when it comes to ‘rules-based order’ [will involve] hard choices and political discomfort.” Australia’s liabilities on the other hand have deepened, not only due to structural trends that favour rising Chinese power, but also the need to do more to integrate with the United States to meet this challenge at a time when Trump has deeply undermined alliance guarantees. Due to the weakness of the ANZUS treaty guarantee (fear of abandonment), the liability of power asymmetry has become further exacerbated since the usual presidential assurances, so vital to Canberra, are largely absent. The fact that Canberra is investing more than ever in the alliance (paying an ever higher ‘alliance premium’) creates an inescapable path-dependence upon the United States. Moreover, with the combination of economic interdependence with China and the need to resist its ‘sharp power’, this dynamic has raised doubts in Washington regarding future Australian commitment to future alliance contingencies (i.e. loyalty). Overall, the newly recalculated bargaining index provides a mixed picture of alliance ‘equity’ going forward.

At present the ‘new’ ledger is a fact of life and a careful reappraisal of Australia’s bargaining power index is therefore required in order to leverage assets to satisfy changed US expectations. There is a strong hope among the policy community that the Trump Administration represents an aberration in the traditional US world view and strategic policy upon which Australia relies for its national security. As a corollary, when ‘normalcy’ is restored to the Executive Branch, it is expected that the bargaining ledger would revert at least partially to that initially presented in Part I, and in particular Australia’s major normative assets such as loyalty and ideological-domestic compatibility would be restored. In the interim, most of the damage to the alliance emanating from the Oval Office can be mitigated through the interaction with the deep-state (bypassing Trump), who arguably recognise that Australia value as an ally is actually increasing, despite the effusions of their President. Yet this is not a foregone conclusion, especially as key alliance supporters such as John McCain and James Mattis have disappeared from the stage. And of course, Trump may win a second term in which case the shift to the new ledger would become more entrenched, likely never to return to ex ante facto. This creates the unfortunate paradox by which Canberra has deepened its dependence upon the United States, investing ever greater political and economic capital to sustain its assets, even as America becomes structurally weaker in Asia and far less reliable as an ally. This raises questions of what a ‘Plan B’ beyond the alliance would look like?

98 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *Kim Beazley on the US Alliance*. 
Finally, the foregoing empirical analysis is also instructive for what it tells us about the construction of the assets/liabilities framework advanced in this article. The framework is not designed to explain the intra-alliance ‘bargaining encounters’ (negotiations) per se, for which a valuable ‘intra-alliance politics’ literature already exists, but rather the approach taken here shows how an ally enters the alliance bargaining process with a ‘portfolio’ of strengths and weakness that it will seek to deploy or mitigate (a pre-bargaining net assessment). In this respect, several pertinent observations can be made. First, the empirical analysis revealed the difficulties inherent in separating the dimensions of an alliance into discrete assets and liabilities. In any intra-alliance negotiations, assets will be overlapping and interrelated, (as will liabilities). That is, certain assets can be mutually reinforcing, for example, the diplomatic support provided through ‘loyalty’ is often backed by a ‘military contribution’. Second, assets and liabilities can be situational, rising or decreasing in pertinacity and potency depending upon the issues under negotiation (e.g. they would differ depending upon times of peace or war). Likewise, there will be an interaction between the assets side and the liabilities side of the ledger, meaning that what is gained in bargaining through leverage of assets may be undermined or negated by the existence of certain liabilities.

Third, partly due to the difficulty of definitively isolating them individually, an evaluation of the relative ‘weight’ of respective assets and liabilities or any effort to definitively ‘rank’ them in order of significance is therefore a fraught exercise. Fourth, assets and liabilities are poised in a delicate balance: increasing one’s assets—for example ‘military contribution’ and ‘defence collaboration’—may mitigate one liability—e.g. ‘power asymmetry’ whilst accentuating another—e.g. ‘path dependency’. Lastly, a comparison of the original framework with the current (re-assessed) framework clearly indicates that the ledger is subject to dynamic structural and political processes and therefore perhaps not as immutable as initially perceived, even in a long-term alliance relationship. The ledger must be constantly updated to reflect current realities, as opposed to long-held or cherished beliefs. Thus, while this article has paved the way towards a net assessment of an ally’s bargaining position, further research is required to develop appropriate frameworks and to relate them to the existing intra-alliance politics literature.

Dr Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer in International Security in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo. His latest book, entitled Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment, is published with Lynne Rienner Press.
China’s Sweeping Military Reforms: Implications for Australia

Bates Gill and Adam Ni*

Formally launched at the end of December 2015, the ongoing reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are the most sweeping and potentially transformative in its history.

Since early 2016, these reforms have had immediate and far-reaching effects on the PLA’s organisation, force posture, command and control structures, and internal politics. Looking ahead and over the longer-term, the successful implementation of these reforms will help build the PLA into a far more capable fighting force.1 As far as China’s top political and military leaders are concerned, these reforms are critical in transforming the PLA from a bloated, untested and corrupt military with low levels of professionalism to a force increasingly capable of conducting joint operations, fighting short, intensive and technologically sophisticated conflicts, and doing so farther from Chinese shores.

This reform effort has critically important implications for Australia, particularly in relation to China’s development of strategic capabilities to deter the United States and its allies and partners in both nuclear and non-nuclear realms. This brief study details the organisational changes afoot for the PLA, the aims of these major reforms, and analyses how—if successful—they could affect the strategy of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Structural Changes

The PLA reform effort is an ambitious program of organisational restructuring aimed at improving both political and operational outcomes. In particular, these reforms have two key and—especially in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership—mutually reinforcing objectives: (1)

* The authors gratefully acknowledge the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency and its Program on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for their support of this research.
strengthening CCP authority over the PLA; and (2) reorganising the PLA to become more effective in conducting joint operations.

Several important structural changes have been put in place to achieve these objectives. First, the PLA’s command structure has been entirely revamped. Prior to the 2015/2016 reforms, the PLA command structure was highly complicated with unclear lines of authority. Under the old system, operational units effectively had two chains of command: one from operational units to military regions and up to the PLA General Staff Department and ultimately to China’s top military body, the Central Military Commission (CMC); the other went from the operational units to their service headquarters (i.e., air force, navy) which also generally acted as functional commands. This meant that a naval or air force unit could be subject to the commands of both a military region commander and to the service to which they belonged. Further adding to the mix, the PLA Army did not have a service headquarters, a role that was instead played by the Army-dominated General Staff Department. This system was deemed far too complex and unworkable under the conditions of modern warfare with its focus on coordination and joint operations.

Under the new system formally introduced from late-2015, the command structure has simplified and flattened, with clearly delineated areas of responsibility. Several important changes took place.

First of all, the PLA’s command structure has undergone substantial change. The four General Departments under the old system (General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department) have been dismantled and their functions mostly concentrated under the Central Military Commission. This removed an entire bureaucratic layer which was dominated by the PLA Army and had become too independent from the CMC and thus could pose a challenge to Xi Jinping himself.

Post-reform, the new PLA command system is described as “CMC takes overall charge, theatre commands direct operations, service headquarters direct force development” (军委管总, 战区主战, 军种主建). Under this new system, the role of the CMC and its immediate subordinate organs is to provide strategic oversight and command over the activities of the PLA. Day-to-day and wartime operations of the PLA are to be led by joint theatre commanders who control subordinate units from different services and branches intended to operate together. The individual service headquarters generally no longer act as functional commands and are instead responsible for force development (建军)—including providing equipment and troops, training, and administrative management of units that fall under them—similar to what the US military would term ‘man, train, and equip’ missions.
Second, the PLA’s organisational structure has been transformed. Under the pre-2016 structure (see Figure 1 below), the PLA hierarchy consisted of the CMC, four General Departments, seven military regions, and headquarters for the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force (as noted above, the PLA Army headquarters was subsumed in the General Staff Department which was traditionally dominated by Army officers).

Under the new structure (see Figure 2 below), the four General Departments were disbanded and their work was mostly subsumed within fifteen new functional organs, including the Joint Staff Department, under the direct control of the CMC. These sections comprise seven departments or offices, three commissions, and five affiliated bodies:

- General Office (办公厅)
- Joint Staff Department (联合参谋部)
- Political Work Department (政治工作部)
- Logistic Support Department (后勤保障部)
- Equipment Development Department (装备发展部)
- Training and Administration Department (训练管理部)
- National Defence Mobilisation Department (国防动员部)
- Discipline Inspection Commission (纪律检查委员会)
- Politics and Law Commission (政法委员会)
- Science and Technology Commission (科学技术委员会)
- Office for Strategic Planning (战略规划办公室)
- Office for Reform and Organisational Structure (改革和编制办公室)
- Office for International Military Cooperation (国际军事合作办公室)
- Audit Office (审计署)
- Agency for Offices Administration (机关事务管理总局).

The heads of the Joint Staff Department (General Li Zuocheng), the Political Work Department (Admiral Miao Hua), and the Discipline Inspection Commission...
Commission (General Zhang Shengmin) concurrently have seats on the CMC.

Figure 1: PLA organisational structure prior to 2016 reforms


Figure 2: PLA organisational structure post-2016 reforms

In addition, as part of the reforms, the seven Military Regions were dismantled and replaced with five Joint Theatre Commands (see Figure 3 below):

- Eastern Theatre Command, headquartered in Nanjing
- Western Theatre Command, headquartered in Chengdu
- Southern Theatre Command, headquartered in Guangzhou
- Northern Theatre Command, headquartered in Shenyang
- Central Theatre Command, headquartered in Beijing.

The restructuring also resulted in a new Army headquarters and the elevation of the Second Artillery Force to a full service co-equal to the Army, Navy and Air Force and renamed the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). A new service branch, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), was also established as part of the restructuring.³

Losers and Winners in the PLA Reforms

The upshot of this restructuring was to centralise command, control and military modernisation authority within the CMC and to the CMC leader, Xi Jinping. In doing so, the reforms set up a flatter command structure by removing the four general departments which had become an overly-powerful added layer of authority between the CMC on the one hand, and the military regions and services on the other. The power and functions of the dismantled four general departments have been largely handed over to the fifteen organs under the CMC. The reorganisation also led to downsizing the PLA by 300,000 personnel, mostly from non-combat essential Army units.4

In assessing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from these massive changes, it appears the PLA Army has suffered the greatest loss. From a strategic operational perspective, it is clear the Army’s traditional mission of deterring land-based threats and homeland defence has dramatically diminished in favour of those parts of the PLA which can provide offshore power projection in air, maritime, space, nuclear and cyber domains: the Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force. Possible land-based threats—such as border disputes with India or risks posed by insurgencies in Central and Southwest Asia—have not risen to the same level of urgency as challenges from other domains.

Dismantling of the four formerly-powerful Army-dominated general departments is another signal of reduced status for the Army as was the creation of a new Army headquarters co-equal in rank to the other services—in essence a ‘demotion’ for the Army from its leadership status in running the former general departments to the status of a ‘mere’ service arm.

The Army has also seen the largest cuts to personnel, with one official report stating that the force would now number less than 1 million, a continuation of its downsizing over the past two decades and a move that would “evenly proportion the PLA army and the other services”.5 The reforms also cut the number of PLA Army group armies from eighteen to thirteen, a streamlining resulting in a loss of officers, troops, administrative positions and resources.

Part of the Army ‘demotion’ and downsizing was about political control. Under Xi Jinping’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the PLA overall, and its Army leadership in particular, had become deeply corrupt and resistant to much-needed reforms, including structural changes, streamlining and the divestment of commercial activities. Once in office, Xi Jinping moved to clean up the Army, remove it as potential political challenge and obstacle to military reforms, and re-assert CCP authority over China’s

5 Ibid.
sprawling military. In addition to the formal reform and reorganisation effort launched at the end of 2015, Xi took the bold step of arresting and disgracing PLA Army generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, previously China’s two most-powerful military officers as Vice Chairmen of the CMC, on corruption charges. This occurred alongside the removal of hundreds of other Army officers.

That said, the PLA Army remains highly influential within the military hierarchy. For example, the leadership of most of the newly-formed Joint Theatre Commands are from the PLA Army. One prominent exception was the appointment of PLA Navy Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai to head the Southern Theatre Command in early-2017, replacing PLA Army General Wang Jiaocheng. But Yuan’s appointment is the exception which proves the rule: he is the first and only non-Army officer ever to lead a PLA Military Region or Theatre Command.\(^6\) In addition, despite troop cuts, the Army still accounts for more than half of total PLA personnel. Some scholars argued that the Army may try to use the new command and control arrangements at joint theatre level “to reassert the service’s strategic relevance and political muscle by gaining the ability to command assets controlled by the other services”. However, if that is the case, these authors argued, such measures would come “at a potential cost in overall operational effectiveness” for the PLA.\(^7\)

The biggest ‘winner’ of the reforms—and intentionally so—is the CMC under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Under the current structure, the CMC has wrested enormous authority away from former PLA general departments and placed it directly under CMC control in the form of the new fifteen functional organs which it oversees.

In addition, the non-Army services have also largely benefited from the reforms. According to official PLA media, “the number of troops in the PLA Navy, PLA Strategic Support Force and the PLA Rocket Force will be increased, while the PLA Air Force’s active service personnel will remain the same”.\(^8\) The PLA Navy is also slated to increase its platforms and resources, including the infusion of Army personnel repurposed to serve in the Navy’s rapidly expanding Marine Corps.\(^9\) The PLARF was elevated to a full service arm and its personnel will be increased. The PLASSF has been


\(^8\) Yang, ‘Reform to Downsize PLA Army, Boost Navy Numbers’.

newly established and its personnel and resources will likewise increase. With the creation of the PLASSF and its space-related mission, the PLA Air Force was apparently foiled in its hopes of gaining control of China military aerospace activities.10

**Operational Aspirations of the Reforms**

Underlying the structural reforms and inter-service competition is the strategic operational aim for the PLA to become more effective at “winning local wars under conditions of informationization”.11 This has been a longstanding aim of the PLA for well over a decade. However, Xi Jinping has brought far more pressure to bear on the PLA to live up to this expectation operationally and not just rhetorically.

Within weeks of assuming power as the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the CMC in November 2012, Xi made a three-day inspection visit of PLA troops based in southern Guangdong Province. His message was clear: “being able to fight and win a war is absolutely necessary for a strong military” and as such the PLA needed to intensify its “real combat” awareness.12 More recently, in his work report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, Xi candidly presented his expectations for the PLA:

> [W]e will upgrade our military capabilities, and see that, by the year 2020, mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way, and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement. … We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces. …

A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to win when it is called on. We will take solid steps to ensure military preparedness for all strategic directions, and make progress in combat readiness in both traditional and new security fields. We will develop new combat forces and support forces, conduct military training under combat conditions, strengthen the application of military strength, speed up development of intelligent military, and improve combat capabilities for joint operations based on the network information system and the ability to fight under multi-dimensional

---


conditions. This will enable us to effectively shape our military posture, manage crises, and deter and win wars.¹³

These calls were followed by a live speech, broadcast to thousands of military facilities across the country, in which Xi urged the PLA to “create an elite and powerful force that is always ready for the fight, capable of combat and sure to win in order to fulfil the tasks bestowed by the party and the people in the new era”. He added the troops needed to “enhance their military training and combat readiness”.¹⁴

But how to get there and what role will the restructuring and reform of the PLA play? Authoritative strategic documents such as the PLA’s Science of Strategy and Chinese defence white papers make clear the areas where the PLA must focus in order to prepare for, fight, and win wars. They stress the growing importance of maritime domains (both ‘offshore defence’ and ‘open seas protection’), stronger capabilities in the nuclear weapons, outer space, and cyberspace realms, the need to project power further away from China’s borders and protect the country’s expanding overseas interests, and improvements in informationised warfighting.

With these strategic goals in mind, the reforms set in motion in late-2015 aim to achieve several critical operational outcomes. First, the PLA is to be restructured in way more suited to the types of combat it will likely encounter in the future. Transforming the PLA from an Army-centric force and placing priority on the other services is a key step in this direction. Reorganising the Military Regions—each of which traditionally had a standalone, largely defensive mission to perform—into five Theatre Commands increasingly capable of wartime joint operations and cross-theatre coordination would be another important structural outcome. Clarifying the fundamental responsibilities of the PLA hierarchy—with the CMC in overall command, theatre commands directing warfighting and the services headquarters handling force development （军委管总，战区主战，军种主建）—would streamline command and control and smooth any necessary transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

A second intended operational outcome is improvement in the PLA’s joint warfighting capability. This has been a traditional challenge for the PLA. However, creation of the Joint Theatre Commands ostensibly allows for control and coordination across the services in theatre in a way the PLA has not operated before. More in the way of realistic joint training will be needed,


¹⁴ Christina Zhao, ‘China: President Xi Jinping Tells Army Not to Fear Death at Enormous Military Assembly’, Newsweek, 4 January 2018.
as will improvements in integrated command, control and communications across the service arms in theatre. With the creation of the PLASSF, it appears the PLA will make progress toward such integrated information sharing. It also appears the PLASSF will be central to developing and supporting greater PLA capacity for an integrated strategic deterrence posture. This posture would involve the integration of various military means for maximising deterrence effect, including nuclear, conventional, (counter)space, information, and other new and emerging capabilities.\textsuperscript{15}

A third key operational outcome would be a greater ability to project Chinese military power offshore for offensive and deterrence purposes as well as to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) to secure Chinese interests around the world including counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, civilian evacuation and humanitarian relief operations. The reform and reorganisation of the PLA will see the increasing importance and expanding capabilities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force, PLARF and PLASSF, all of which would play critical roles in achieving all or most of these operational goals. In addition, the re-subordination of the People’s Armed Police under the CMC at the start of 2018 highlights the streamlining of paramilitary capabilities for domestic operations as well as for ‘grey zone’ activities, such as those conducted by China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, it is also clear that the reforms are intended to bolster the PLA’s ability to conduct warfare under modern, informationised conditions and to do so in conventional forms of combat as well as within the nuclear, outer space, advanced aerospace and cyber domains. Hence, the creation of the PLASSF and the consolidation of most of the PLA’s space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities within this new body aims to address the PLA’s longstanding aspiration to fight more effectively on the information battlefield. Likewise, boosting the standing of the PLARF within the PLA, investing in its nuclear arsenal, and integrating its growing and diverse conventional ballistic and cruise missile force within joint theatre operations are all aimed at strengthening the PLA’s range of offensive and deterrent options on the twenty-first-century battlefield—what many Western analysts might term an “anti-access, area denial” (A2AD) capability.


Implications for Australia

As the 2015-2016 reforms take effect, the PLA will advance as a modern military force. This will include strengthening its strategic nuclear deterrent, expanding and modernising its conventional missile arsenal, and developing other strategic capabilities in other realms, including in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. With these advances, the Chinese political leadership and PLA are in a better position to impose costs on the United States and its allies, both in wartime and peacetime.

For Australia, some of the most important implications of the ongoing reforms relate to the ‘new’ strategic organisations of the PLA. While not truly ‘new’, the establishment of the PLARF and the PLASSF clearly signals the priority Beijing intends to give to conducting more effective deterrence operations and warfare in nuclear, space, cyber, aerospace (missile), and electronic domains. The anti-ship conventional forces of the PLARF, as well as the PLASSF’s intended facilitation of joint air-, land-, maritime-, space-, and cyber-based operations, should be of particular concern to the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) operating within range of these Chinese capabilities.

As the PLA—and particularly the PLARF and the PLASSF—continue to advance in their reform and reorganisation, this will likely pose significant new challenges to the United States and US allies, including Australia, affecting strategic stability and deterrence, extended deterrence, conventional force operations, information dominance and security, critical infrastructure, and other key aspects of national security. Given China’s diversifying array of nuclear and strategic conventional capabilities, Canberra should seek continued, clarified, and reliable extended deterrence guarantees from the United States, to include nuclear attacks as well as non-nuclear Chinese threats and attacks which could have strategic effect as in the space- and cyber-domains.17 Admittedly, this will be a complex task given the pace of technological change in cyber and space technology as well as the relatively underdeveloped thinking on extended deterrence with respect to the new strategic domains. Nevertheless, given its importance and pressing nature, it is an area where these two close allies must aim to collaborate.

In addition, with China’s growing array of advanced conventional capabilities, especially in the advanced aerospace (missiles), outer space, and cyber domains, Australia should work with the United States and other trusted allies and partners to enhance defensive countermeasures and offensive

---

capabilities in these realms in order to maximise operational manoeuvrability and strategic deterrence effects. These investments must include capabilities that would improve the capabilities of the United States and its allies to pre-empt, disrupt, suppress and defend against Chinese conventional missile, cyber and counterspace attack.

Moreover, as the PLASSF solidifies its position as the PLA’s cyber force, Australia should enhance its capacities to prevent, deflect and respond to more sophisticated information operations. As with their predecessors, PLASSF operatives will seek access to sensitive information from US allies and learn how to disrupt joint allied communications and operations. Moreover, the PLASSF will likely conduct information operations against a variety of Australian-based targets, including government organisations, education institutions, and local and multinational companies. Hence, the Australian Government will need to work with a variety of non-government actors in protecting Australia’s information security interests.

Finally, as the PLA becomes more reliant on space- and cyber-based systems to achieve its strategic aims and modernise its military operations, Australia should join the United States and other allies to focus on China’s space- and cyber-related assets to assess the PLA’s progress toward more effective joint operations and to identify potential targets for pre-emption and disruption. A focus should be brought to bear in particular on the evolution of PLARF and PLASSF roles and capabilities.

**Conclusion**

The ongoing reform of the PLA along with the rapid modernisation of its military hardware will improve the warfighting and deterrence capabilities of China’s military. While it is still too early to tell whether the current round of ambitious PLA reform can achieve its intended goals, there is little doubt that China’s growing military muscle will be able to impose increasingly higher costs on the United States and its allies in the years ahead. This is especially so in any scenario involving US and allied intervention in areas close to China’s mainland periphery, for example, in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.

For military planners in Washington and Canberra, the rapid evolution of PLA’s strategic forces in the nuclear, space and cyber space domains should be of particular concern. PLA reform has focused heavily on joint operations, and on increasing China’s operational and strategic options in these new domains.

Operationally, the development of new capabilities by the PLA, such as advanced conventional missiles and (counter)space platforms, will pose new challenges to the effectiveness and survivability of ADF assets in case of conflict. Strategically, China’s improved deterrence capabilities across
multiple domains will make it costlier for Australia to be involved in such a conflict, especially if reliable extended deterrence guarantees are eroded as the relative balance of deterrence power continues to tilt towards China.

Importantly, the operational and strategic challenges for Australia stemming from PLA reform efforts will become more pronounced in the years ahead. As the PLA transforms towards a more professional and modern fighting force, it will have a more diversified array of force projection platforms with which it can hold the ADF and Australian targets at risk. It is critical that military planners and strategists in Canberra are up to date on the rapidly developing PLA and the attendant challenges, risks and opportunities it poses.

Bates Gill is Professor of Asia-Pacific Strategic Studies at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University. From 2012 to 2017 he held positions at the Australian National University and the University of Sydney. He was previously Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an independent think tank recognised as one of the world’s top ten research institutes in international affairs.

Adam Ni is a China researcher, and a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. His areas of interest include China’s international relations, strategy and security issues. Adam has worked in various China-related positions in academia, government and the private sector. He is a frequent commentator on China-related issues for international media.
One Man's Radical: The Radicalisation Debate and Australian Counterterrorism Policy

Nell Bennett

Australia’s counterterrorism policy is often justified publicly by the perceived threat of radicalisation. The purported rise of radicalisation, however, is based on conflicting academic opinion and limited empirical evidence. This article examines the radicalisation discourse and argues that there is no consensus in the field as to how a person can become radicalised, or even what the end point of radicalisation should be. Furthermore, scholars are yet to formulate a persuasive explanation for how ideas can actually lead to violence. The radicalisation debate may result in the securitisation of unconventional views, which could threaten the freedom of political discourse that underpins the Australian democratic system.

Much of Australian counterterrorism policy is based on the perceived threat of radicalisation. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has called “radical, violent, extremist Islam” the greatest threat to Australian national security.¹ This article will examine the term ‘radicalisation’ and argue that it fails to capture the complexity of contemporary terrorist violence. However, its limited explanatory value has done little to dampen its popularity.² Radicalisation has become the buzzword of the post 9/11 era. This is problematic for Australian policymakers for two reasons. First, counterterrorism policy is being developed in reliance on a concept which is the subject of myriad definitions, many of which are not substantiated by robust empirical evidence. Secondly, the focus of radicalisation discourse on extremist ideas can easily lead to the securitisation of minority beliefs and compromise the freedom and plurality that underpin the Australian democratic system.

This article will begin with a discussion of some of the various understandings of radicalisation, which will demonstrate that there is no agreement as to what a radicalised individual looks like. It will then examine the underlying assumption of the radicalisation discourse that ideas lead to violence, given that recent research has suggested that it may in fact be the desire to engage in violence that leads to extreme ideas and not the other

way around. The article will continue with an analysis of the alienation-radicalisation hypothesis, and show that some studies have found that it is not isolation or marginalisation but strong social ties that are a precondition for violent activism. It will then be argued that even the least controversial aspect of radicalisation, the fact that it is a process, is the subject of so much debate that it provides very little assistance to policymakers or law enforcement. It will conclude by arguing that Australia needs a broader counterterrorism research agenda that encompasses interdisciplinary methods of understanding the complexities of violent extremism.

What is Radicalisation?

While definitions vary, radicalisation is broadly understood as a process through which an individual comes to accept a worldview that is contrary to mainstream thought, and may support the use of violence to realise his or her ideas. Prior to 2001 the term radicalisation was a reasonably obscure academic term that was rarely used in the media. It came into popular usage after the 2005 London bombings and the murder of Theo van Gogh. These events shifted public perception of Islamic terrorism. Previously it had been perceived as a purely external threat. The revelation that the perpetrators of the London bombing were British residents who had been raised in a liberal democratic state raised the spectre of a new kind of threat, that of ‘homegrown terrorism’, and the notion that residents of peaceful Western nations could become terrorists through exposure to radical ideas.

The term radicalisation is frequently used to describe a kind of process through which individuals come to accept the use of extreme means to pursue their objectives. At its most basic, radicalisation has been defined as a process by which people become extremists. A pamphlet entitled ‘Living Safe Together’, produced as part of an Australian Government counterterrorism initiative explained that when a person’s beliefs “move from being relatively conventional to being radical, and they want drastic change in society, this is known as radicalisation”. This definition is similar to that proposed by Tarik Fraihi, who called radicalisation “a process in which an individual's convictions and willingness to seek deep and serious changes in society increase”. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen defined it as “a growing readiness

---

to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order.\textsuperscript{8} The problem with such broad definitions is that while they may be well-suited to the dynamic nature of terrorism, in effect they merely describe an increased commitment to unspecified ideas which may be benign and even transitory.

Many definitions of radicalisation do include an acceptance of violence as an essential characteristic. A recent report for the European Commission defined it as a process whereby an individual becomes “more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is an intent towards or support for violence”.\textsuperscript{9} Wilber and Dubouloz proposed that radicalisation is a personal or interpersonal process by which an individual adopts extreme political, social and/or political ideas that justify the use of indiscriminate violence for attainment of their goals.\textsuperscript{10} These definitions distinguish violent radicalism from other forms of extremism, such religious fundamentalism, environmentalism or survivalism.

One of the most fundamental divides in the Australian radicalisation debate is between advocates of cognitive and of behavioural radicalisation. Peter Neumann defended the validity of the term radicalisation in a 2013 article; however, he admitted that it is an ambiguous concept which needs to be clarified. Neumann ascribed much of the confusion to the fact that there is no consensus as to what the ‘end point’ of radicalisation should be.\textsuperscript{11} Many analysts regard radicalisation as a cognitive process through which an individual comes to hold ideas about society and governance that are commonly regarded as extreme. Thus, radicalisation is an attitudinal/emotional phenomenon which can, in certain circumstances, lead to acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{12} Others, however, believe that radicalisation should be characterised by the actions individuals undertake to realise these ideas. Therefore, ‘violent radicalisation’ is the process through which a person prepares to take actions to realise his or her radical worldview.\textsuperscript{13}

The problem with the cognitive approach is that radical thought is measured against mainstream opinion. This poses the risk of criminalising legitimate


\textsuperscript{11} Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalisation’, p. 875.


political opinions that are merely different from normative social thinking. In a recent report commissioned by the Department of Defence it was argued that there is a real danger that cognitive radicalisation can delegitimise minority views. The report observed that cognitive definitions of radicalisation merely state that a person is “radicalised because they have radical ideas and therefore are radicals”. Not only does this do little to advance the debate about the causes of terrorism, it can result in the securitisation of views which do nothing more than run counter to societies’ norms. Michele Groppo has posited that the reason for the controversy around the concept of radicalisation is that societal attitudes about what is ‘radical’ change throughout history. Radicalism is a relative concept, which is dependent on social and historical context. Thus, the legitimacy of an idea or belief is only assessed in relation to the mainstream belief structures of a particular time and place.

Therefore, radicalism is an essentially relative concept which will constantly shift as conventional thinking changes. Sedgwick observed that radical views are typically regarded as those which are positions at the extremity of a continuum of organised thought. Thus, radicalisation can be understood as the process of moving up the continuum. The uncertainty regarding the point at which ideas cross over into extremism provides little comfort to the minority communities. Victoria Sentas, in her analysis of the social effects of Australian counterterrorism law, found that in Victoria “Muslims are largely positioned as the subjects of future dangerousness, and responsible for preventing terrorism through ‘civic participation’, including interaction with state agencies and programs”. Australian Muslims have been encouraged to practice ‘moderate’ Islam through programs such as the 2005 Muslim Summit and the 2006 National Action Plan Against Extremism. Australian politicians constantly reassure Muslim populations that they recognise the different between legitimate Islamic doctrines and the distorted teachings of militant clerics; their inability to specify which ideas are the ones which inspire violence has led many to believe that the War on Terror is in fact a war on Islam. Such sentiments were recorded in a recent analysis of Muslim Sydneysiders’ responses to online campaigns designed to counter violent extremism. Some respondents found certain government-sponsored

17 Ibid., p. 89.  
resources to perpetuate negative stereotypes of Muslims and appeared to suggest that terrorism was a predominantly Islamic phenomenon.  

A New Kind of Threat?

When a new word is brought into popular usage it is typically to describe a phenomenon which the existing vocabulary is unable to adequately capture. The surge in the popularity of the term radicalisation in popular, academic and policy discourse reflects the widespread perception that these attacks were the result of a dramatically new kind of threat. These homegrown, or “self-starter” terrorists, as Aidan Kirby described them, did not rely on formal recruitment structures or initiation for their ideological grooming. This new type of terrorist was seen as a product of the Internet age, able to access materials and online communities that facilitated their deadly designs.

However, it is not entirely clear how the terrorists of the post 9/11 era are different to the terrorists who have come before. Andrew Silke has observed that terrorism has a long and complex history which is often overlooked by those who choose to view the Age of Terror as a product of the modern world. Some who believe that the terrorists of today are qualitatively different to those of previous centuries argue that the terrorists of the past had hierarchical command structures and organised recruitment methods. However, this argument ignores anarchist terrorism of the late 1800s which encouraged lone actor attacks because of their ideological opposition to hierarchical order. This understanding of terrorism further overlooks foreign fighters who organised themselves to travel to the Greek War of Independence and the Spanish Civil War without the assistance of any official network. It also fails to take into account certain twentieth-century European terrorist organisations which relied on the actions of self-starter operatives, like the Basque separatist group Euskal Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which operated in Spain between 1959 and 2018. Much like contemporary Islamist organisations, ETA also published and distributed propaganda materials such as their magazine Zutik, which were designed to mobilise disaffected Basques and direct them against approved targets.

---

21 Ibid. p. 426.
Religious terrorism is typically understood as being fundamentally different to secular terrorism because it is motivated by transcendent, utopian, even eschatological views rather than limited social and political objectives. Thus, it has been argued that Islamic terrorists are not ‘mere’ radicals, but the vanguard of a millenarian movement with ambitions for global dominance. However, it is easy to overstate the difference between religion and ideology. Many of the young Communists of the interwar period held their views with a fervour that could only be compared with religious zeal. For many young people of the time, who had lived through World War One and the Great Depression, Communism took the place of the religion of their parents and allowed them to forge a separate identity. Nationalism can become a quasi-religion for identity groups who desire to create a utopian homeland, and religion can serve an instrumental purpose to young Muslims seeks to rebel against secularism. Therefore, the operative question is not what views these people are hold, but what purpose the views serve in their lives.

Perhaps the most difficult theoretical challenge for the radicalisation regime is how to explain the mechanics by which ideas lead to physical violence. Manni Crone has argued that the problem with cognitive radicalisation is that it intellectualises action. Crone argues that ideas rarely instigate violence but are more commonly used as ex post rationalisation of violent acts. People who choose to engage in violence produce the necessary worldview to justify their actions. Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen drew similar conclusions in her study of jihadi counterculture. Her study also revealed that the notoriety of jihadism attracts recruits who are seeking action and adventure. These studies could provide an explanation for the fact that many jihadists have only a limited understanding of Islamic doctrines, or have adopted what Rik Coolsaet has referred to as “cut and paste Islam”. Of course, the fact that ideology may not be a primary motivating factor in all cases does not mean that it does not play an important role in the mobilisation process. The philosophical justification for political violence is crucial to its legitimation. Thus, counter narratives are still a useful tool in

countering violent extremism, though even their most fervent advocates would not view them as a panacea.\textsuperscript{32}

Schmid has observed that in spite of the surge in interest in radicalisation little attention has been paid to the actual experiences of current and former terrorists, as recounted in their own words.\textsuperscript{33} Terrorist memoirs and interviews often show that even those engaged in deeply ideological struggles enlisted for more personal reasons. One example is that of Iñaki Rekarte, who was convicted of killing three people in a bomb attack while he was a member of ETA. Rekarte later regretted his actions, stating that he had joined the terrorist group because his best friend encouraged him to sign up and he thought it would be fun to play with guns.\textsuperscript{34} Another, Kepa Pikabea Uganda, who went on to become a leader in the organisation, recalled that as a child he had witnessed the hero’s welcome that ETA members who were freed under the amnesty laws of the 1970s received when they returned to his village. He admitted that he joined the movement to overcome the insecurity that he had felt over his humble upbringing on a rural farm.\textsuperscript{35}

The variety of motives that current and former terrorist operatives ascribe to their decision to mobilise throw doubt on the notion that it is necessarily, or even primarily, radical ideas that lead to violence. Indeed, Manni Crone has inverted the relationship between ideas and violence by examining whether a prior acquaintance with violence is in fact a precondition for adopting extremist ideologies. Crone conducted an analysis of the individuals who perpetrated terror attacks in Europe between January 2012 and January 2015 and found that 80 per cent of them had criminal backgrounds and approximately 60 per cent had been in prison. It is also notable that the perpetrator of the Lindt Cafe Siege in Sydney also had a known criminal background. Crone argues that the question should not be why some people turn to violence, but why they choose to engage in violent acts in the name of an ideology. The answer, she posits, may be the combination of a fascination with war, weapons and violence and a sense of a just cause.\textsuperscript{36} Rather than being brainwashed by radicalisers, these people may in fact seek out role models who have prior experience with terrorism.\textsuperscript{37}

The debate over the religion-violence nexus has important implications for Australian counterterrorism laws. The definition of a terrorist offence under

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{34} Iñaki Rekarte, \textit{Lo Dificile es Perdonarse a uno Mismo} (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2015).
\textsuperscript{36} Crone, ‘Radicalisation Revisited’, p. 594.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 600.
section 100.1 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) requires an action be done or a threat made “with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”. This definition includes motive as a fault element of terrorism offences, which is a significant expansion of substantive criminal law.\(^{38}\) Phillip Ruddock defended these legislative changes by reasoning that these new offence address “the combination of violent destruction and politics or ideological motivation that is unique to terrorism … The underlying motivation of terrorism provides a compelling, nihilistic drive to terrorists that often trumps their value of the perpetrator’s own lives”.\(^{39}\) This may well be accurate in certain terrorism cases, however often the motivation is of a much more personal nature. One recent example is that of Sevdet Besim who was convicted in 2016 of planning to attack police officers at the Melbourne Anzac Day celebrations. Although there was substantial evidence of his engagement with radical ideas, it was found that Besim was largely motivated to plan this attack because his best friend, Numan Haider, had recently been shot dead by police. The trial judge held that it was the death of his friend which led to Besim’s “profound alienation from mainstream society”.\(^{40}\)

In Australia, the fact that an offence is prosecuted under terrorism laws, as opposed to the general criminal law, has important consequences for sentencing. Not only are sentences for terrorism offences significantly higher, with view to deterrence, but under section 19AG of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) the non-parole period must constitute a minimum of three-quarters of the head sentence. In the years since Faheem Khalid Lodhi became the first person to be convicted under Australia’s new counterterrorism laws the majority of persons who have been found guilty under these law have been Muslim men.\(^{41}\) Sameer Ahmed has raised concerns about the application of anti-terror laws in the United States, which he found to disproportionately target young Muslim men on the grounds that they are “uniquely dangerous: because they cannot be deterred or rehabilitated”.\(^{42}\) One concerning aspect of the radicalisation debate is a tendency to depict individuals who engage in or aspire to terrorism as fundamentally different to other types of criminals. This notion could lead to more punitive responses and a greater acceptance of preventive and even indefinite incarceration.


\(^{40}\) *The Queen v Besim* [2016] VSC 537 (Croucher J), [146].


Alienation and Radicalisation

The concept of radicalisation emphasises an individual journey towards extremism, and as a result, much attention has been paid to personal circumstances which could function as indicators for potential radicals.\(^43\) The consequences of terror attacks are so devastating that one could easily assume that they must be the product of a deviant or disturbed mind. However, attempts at creating a psychological profile for actual or potential radicals have been unsuccessful.\(^44\) Studies that have examined demographic or socioeconomic factors for radicalisation have also failed to identify effective predictors for violent extremism.\(^45\) Analyses have shown that young males are more likely than any other demographics to engage in political violence, a fact which appears to be appreciated by the Islamic State. Sharyn Rundle-Thiele and Renata Anibaldi conducted an analysis of IS propaganda and found it to be directed primary at twenty- to thirty-year-olds.\(^46\) This information, however, is insufficient to guide policymakers and experts who are seeking to design and implement counter-radicalisation programs. Poverty does not appear to lead to radicalisation in and of itself, yet some work has demonstrated that under-employment may be a motive for joining a terrorist organisation. As Schmid has observed, the poor are often too concerned with survival to be receptive to ideologies. However, they may join an extremist group to partake of the benefits offered to members.\(^47\)

Studies that have examined social and psychological factors which could predispose an individual to extremism have given rise to numerous hypotheses. One such is that radicalisation is a consequence of an identity crisis of Muslim youths in the West. Second or third generation Muslims may find themselves disconnected from the country of their parents or grandparents, and yet not wholly belonging to their nation of residence due to discrimination and/or socioeconomic disadvantage. This marginalisation, it is proposed, may render them vulnerable to the lure of a community and ideological framework through which they can express their sense of injustice.\(^48\) A recent study by Angela McGilloway, Priyo Gosh and Kamaldeep Bhui highlighted the importance of identity in radicalisation. It


\(^{44}\) Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation’, p. 21.


found issues of identity to be a dominant theme in qualitative studies of individuals who had been affiliated with extremist organisations. This took different forms, including religious practice and the adoption of culturally specific attire. External markers of religious or ethnic identity can enable an individual to both demonstrate membership of an identity group and to emphasise his or her opposition to mainstream society.\textsuperscript{49}

Social isolation has also been shown to lead to radicalisation in some cases. The recent case of \textit{The Queen v MHK} detailed the personal circumstances of a Melbourne youth from a Syrian immigrant family who was convicted for attempting to create explosive devices for the use in a terrorist attack. The judgment stated that the young man known as MHK suffered from social anxiety and depression at school which led to him to seek out information about his country and faith. However, in addition to his social problems, one of the key causes of his radicalisation was viewing videos of atrocities committed against his fellow Sunni Muslims. This caused him to view the Islamic State as the defender of his kinsmen.\textsuperscript{50}

The idea that social alienation and discrimination are a precondition for radicalisation has a substantial influence over Australian counterterrorism policy. The Attorney-General’s Department has stated that a primary objective of its countering violent extremism program is “to prevent radicalisation from emerging as an issue by addressing the societal drivers that can lead to disengagement and isolation”.\textsuperscript{51} This goal is premised on the belief that discrimination and disadvantage are preconditions for radicalisation. This argument has many influential advocates, including Oliver Roy, Farah Khosrokhavar, and Coolsaet and Swielande.\textsuperscript{52} One key limitation with this hypothesis is that a substantial proportion of the world’s population experiences some form of discrimination or disadvantage, yet only a very small percentage of people seek political change through violence. Schmid has argued that grievances may not be a predictor of extremism, but a mobilising factor.\textsuperscript{53} While this may not make it any easier for law enforcement personnel to identify individuals who may be susceptible to radical ideas, it does suggest that punitive and disproportionate international and domestic counterterrorism policy could play a role in promoting extremism.

In spite of its popularity, the alienation-radicalisation hypothesis has some theoretical and empirical weaknesses. From a theoretical perspective, one of the issues with this assumption is that the concept of alienation is applied in a broad and inconsistent manner with little attention paid to just how it

\textsuperscript{49} Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation’, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{The Queen v MHK} [2016] VSC 742; [42-44], (Lasry J).
\textsuperscript{52} Egerton, ‘Alienation and Its Discontents’, p. 462.
serves as a springboard to extremism. From an empirical standpoint, these studies typically lean heavily on anecdotal accounts, autobiographical materials and speculation.\(^{54}\) All studies of human motivation suffer from methodological constraints, because the inescapable difficulty is that the inner lives of individuals are not as easily analysed as more tangible phenomena.\(^{55}\) However, counterterrorism studies are conducted under a unique disadvantage due to paucity of available data. Scholars have attempted to circumvent these difficulties by using open source information. However, radicalisation literature has been criticised for being particularly weak on empirical studies. Peter Neumann and Scott Kleinmann conducted a review of radicalisation literature, and found that despite a cluster of high-quality research, radicalisation studies are typified by a heavy reliance on secondary sources and questionable qualitative methods, such as opportunistic interviewing.\(^{56}\)

However, much valuable research has been conducted, and there is a growing body of empirical studies which indicate that people engage in violent political activism because they have strong social networks, and not because they are isolated or marginalised. The work of Marc Sageman and Scott Atran has shown that strong social bonds are a precondition for violent activism.\(^{57}\) Similarly, Robert A. Pape has argued that strong social cohesion, and a commitment to the goals of the community provide the necessary support for suicide terrorists.\(^{58}\) In a similar vein, Schmid argued that social networks are essential for drawing potential recruits into extremist organisations.\(^{59}\) In his recent book on deradicalisation, John Horgan observed that one cannot attempt to understand terrorist involvement without an appreciation for group and organisation dynamics; however, there is still much confusion about how to situate the individual within a multi-level analysis.\(^{60}\)

Extremist culture is not necessarily found in a formal organisation or in cells of fanatics who are disconnected from mainstream society. Extremist cultures are better understood as loose networks of friends and family which individuals can pass in and out of.\(^{61}\) This view is supported by Sageman,


\(^{60}\) John Horgan, Walking away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. xxi.

\(^{61}\) Crone, ‘Revisiting Radicalisation’, p. 598.
who found social network analyses to be too rigid to capture the ‘fuzziness and fluidity’ of extremist communities. Sageman stated that these networks are more like amorphous collections of people or a ‘social blob’ than a formal organisation. In her fieldwork on the Danish Muslim community, Hemmingsen found that jihadis are unified by a common culture. Group members perceive themselves as challengers to mainstream society. They are united by a sense that there is something wrong with the status quo, a distrust of those in positions of authority, and a shared vision of utopia. Mauricio Florez-Morris found that Colombian guerilla recruits generally led active lifestyles before enlisting, and were involved in diverse social groups including political groups, sporting teams and theatres groups. This made them more likely to come into contact with recruiters. It was also a characteristic that the organisation looked for in potential members, as it decreased the likelihood of infiltration by government security forces.

Researchers are still devising methods to capture the intricacies of extremist networks. Frank Hairgrove and Douglas M. McLeod have argued traditional social movement theory is incapable of properly explaining how individuals join Islamic terror cells. In their analysis they argued that radicalisation within Islamic groups is a unique phenomenon that cannot be compared with Western movements because of the cultural importance of small religious study groups. Within these groups, participants can undergo a conversion experience that alters their cost benefit analysis. Yet a similar phenomenon is observable in the Basque Country where small friendship groups—the ‘cuadrilla’—form the basis of social life. These groups are typically formed in childhood and remain constant throughout the lifetimes of their members. The cuadrilla has been identified as a key means of induction into the Basque separatist movement. Jerome Ferret examined its importance in kale borroka, the politically inspired street violence which took place in the region in late 1990s and early 2000s. In his interviews with former borrokistas Ferret found that the cuadrilla provided young people with a space in which they could develop their political consciousness and a network which enabled them to mobilise.

66 Ibid. p. 408.
Process Work

Scholars generally agree that individuals do not typically turn into extremists overnight, or in response to one isolated trigger. The literature typically finds that radicalisation takes place over months or even years. Much of the literature on radicalisation has attempted to conceptualise the radicalisation process. Steps and stairs have been proposed along with pathways, puzzle and pyramids. In an influential report prepared for the New York Police Department, Silber and Bhatt devised a four-stage process, beginning with pre-radicalisation, during which the individual lives his or her ordinary life. This is followed by self-identification, during which period the individual explores Salafi philosophy in response to some kind of personal or political crisis. The individual typically associates with like-minded people, while loosening the bonds with their previous life. The third stage is indoctrination, during which the individual intensifies their new beliefs. The final step, jihadisation, involves an acceptance of the duty to participate in jihad.

This model has been repeated in subsequent reports and numerous studies. Yet, in spite of its popularity, it suffers from various problems. Firstly, it was designed in response to Islamic extremism and overlooks other manifestations of domestic radicalism, such as right-wing extremism and ecoterrorism. This could be because it is based on the assumption that religious terrorism is a unique and deadly threat which needs a dedicated response. In essence, Silber and Bhatt's four steps model is a reformulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Therefore at a theoretical level its main contribution is the four-step structure. However, its description of how individuals move between the different stages is not based upon empirical evidence. Similar criticisms have been made of Moghaddam's staircase model, which illustrates the psychological process leading an individual from sympathiser to perpetrator.

Although Sageman has avoided the term radicalisation in his recent work because of its tendency to confuse, he has proposed a multi-factorial

---

69 Schmid, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation', p. 23.
70 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: The New York City Police Department, 2007), pp. 19-44.
72 Nasser-Eddine et. al., Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review, p. 15.
73 Gunning and Jackson, 'What's so 'Religious' about 'Religious Terrorism'?', p. 371.
explanation that includes moral outrage, an enabling ideology, personal experiences of injustice, and mobilising networks.\textsuperscript{75} Sageman’s fundamental elements are more in alignment with John Horgan’s ‘pathways’ approach. Horgan has advocated for a rejection of terrorist profiling in favour of an analysis of the processes by which a diverse range of people choose extreme means of pursuing political goals. In spite of his belief in the importance of pathways, Horgan doubts that it will ever be possible to predict with certainty who will and who will not engage in violent political activism. However, he suggests that some form of emotional vulnerability, such as anger or alienation, is a likely precondition, as well as identification with the conflict victims, as occurred in the case of MHK.\textsuperscript{76}

The difficulty with paths and staircases, as Hafez and Mullins observed, is that they imply that there are steps towards radical activism that can be taken in an ordered and logical fashion. However, it is precisely the lack of a discernible pattern that is frustrating scholars and policymakers. Instead, Hafez and Mullins proposed a ‘puzzle’ metaphor to emphasise the gaps in current understandings of radicalisation.\textsuperscript{77} This may be an accurate representation of the state of the research, but its deliberate uncertainty does little to advance the debate. Another methodological issue with process analysis was highlighted by Schmid who noted that the problem with many of these studies is that they have been based on information about individuals who became extremists and have not accounted for the many who may have experienced one or more of the earlier stages but did not progress to radicalism.\textsuperscript{78} These models also fail to account for the cases of individuals who have chosen to engage in political violence without adopting an extreme ideological position, like thrill-seeking Iñaki Rekarte. As Dina Al Raffie found in a recent analysis of Egyptian militant leaders, support for violence is often the result of numerous factors which may have little or nothing to do with ideology.\textsuperscript{79}

**Future Directions**

Radicalisation is generally understood as a process through which an individual internalises extreme ideas. Yet, not only do analysts disagree as to what ideas should be considered radical, they are also unable to determine at what point a person becomes a radical. Sageman has observed that a lot of people say very violent things, but very few follow their

\textsuperscript{75} Sageman, ‘The Turn to Political Violence in the West’, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{77} Hafez and Mullins, ‘The Radicalization Puzzle’, p. 959.
\textsuperscript{78} Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation’ p. 23.
\textsuperscript{79} Dina Al Raffie, ‘Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: Explaining Deradicalisation Claims of Former Egyptian Militants’, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2015), p. 28.
words up with violent acts. Yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that extremist ideologies are enticing many people to support and participate in violent political and religious movements. The key to understanding this phenomenon is to encourage empirical research that examines the causal mechanisms through which a person comes to support violent activism. The fundamental challenge to this agenda is how to study the inner life of another human being. The answer may be that more interdisciplinary research is required. Insights from psychology, behavioural economics, anthropology, history and ethnography can help to construct a more nuanced understanding of this internal process.

As Schmid has observed, despite the surge in interest in terrorist motivation insufficient attention is being paid to terrorists’ own accounts of their decision-making processes. While first-person recollections may be unreliable, and people often ascribe loftier justifications to their actions than they may in truth have merited, they are still a good place to start. Another approach is to examine the instrumental representations of mental and emotional processes of potential, actual or former terrorists. Narratives, gestures and other forms of communication could provide a fruitful subject for analysis, because they are typically the only exterior manifestations of closely guarded interior processes. They can also be used to assess the accuracy of first-person accounts. Literary analysis and hermeneutics are uniquely suited to this task. Similarly, art and media criticism can be employed to interpret meaning from aesthetic displays. Bleiker and Hutchison have argued that artistic representations of individual opinions and emotion may provide more accurate data than that which can gleaned from “habit-prone verbal communication”. Indeed, Thomas Hegghammer has encouraged more scholars to pay attention to the culture of extremist groups and its influence on recruitment. Hegghammer has stated that the socio-cultural activities of high-risk activists are one of the last major unexplored frontiers of terrorism research, and one that merits an entirely new research program.

Conclusion

This article has questioned the utility of the concept of radicalisation for Australian counterterrorism policy. It has argued that the term is at best confusing, due to conflicting interpretations and limited empirical studies. At worst, the radicalisation discourse poses a dangerous threat to freedom of political discourse by securitising ideas that fall beyond the ambit of mainstream thought. These criticisms do not seek to downplay the threat of

---

80 Sageman, ‘The Turn to Political Violence in the West’, p. 117.
81 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation’, p. 3.
82 Bleiker and Hutchison, ‘Fear No More’, p. 129.
83 Ibid., p. 132.
terrorism, which poses a real challenge to Australian policymakers and law enforcement. However, effective threat mitigation requires accurate risk assessment. This in turn relies on rigorous empirical research and analysis that will assist in constructing a more complex and realistic understanding of what causes people to engage in violent political activism.

Nell Bennett is a doctoral candidate with Macquarie University where she is investigating insurgent decision-making. She has a Bachelor of Arts specialising in Counterterrorism Studies, a Master of Research and Diploma in Law. She is also a lawyer and the managing editor of the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism. Her research interests include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and civil war studies.
The Changing Operational Security Landscape for Sensitive National Capabilities

Martin White

The Australian Defence Force and Australian security community maintain many sensitive national capabilities that are subject to extensive security protections to prevent information disclosure. Often, the operational models of these capabilities are based on the assumption that they will not be discovered. This assumption is becoming tenuous. The frequency of public information disclosures of sensitive national capabilities is high, and technology has evolved to give Australia’s strategic competitors greater ability to gain intelligence on these sensitive national capabilities. This article will consider the shared operational security features of two of Australia’s most sensitive military capabilities—submarines and Special Forces. It contends that Australian policymakers must be more specific in designating the information they wish to protect, and take additional measures to do so, noting that operational security is becoming a more transitory concept rather than something that can be achieved into perpetuity.

National security information disclosures or ‘hacking’ incidents are an almost weekly occurrence in Australia and elsewhere, even against the most sensitive and highly protected military capabilities. A serious ‘compromise’ of highly sensitive submarine data in 20161 was just one of many previous and subsequent disclosures of Australia’s most sensitive national secrets. Hacking is just one means through which information is becoming more accessible, and protecting specific information from unintended disclosure is now an enormous challenge.

Various Australian defence commentators have assessed that ‘unconventional’ forces, particularly submarines and Special Forces, will offer a relative advantage against sophisticated potential adversaries in future conflict.2 This is because these unconventional forces may be harder

---


2 Ian Langford, Australian Special Operations: Principles and Considerations (Canberra: Australian Army, 2014), 10, argued that Special Forces must use unorthodox methods that are unsuitable for other parts of the military. Also see Andrew Davies, Peter Jennings and Benjamin Schreer, A Versatile Force: The Future of Australia’s Special Operations Capability (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2014), 5.
for an adversary to detect and subsequently defeat.\(^3\) When it comes to operational security, submarine forces and Special Forces appear to have similar challenges. Both have traditionally sought high levels of operational security and information protection, through sophisticated communications security, identity protection for personnel, cover stories for missions, and compartmentalisation of capabilities and operations.\(^4\) However, protection is becoming more difficult. Operational security measures must now mitigate threats and vulnerabilities including ‘insider threats’, deliberate leaks to media, signals intelligence interception and more sensitive collection sensors, poor security practices, use of social media by families and friends, and hacking. Aggregation of routine data or access to metadata can exacerbate vulnerability.\(^5\) Information protection for nationally significant military capabilities is now more difficult and may now only be temporary. Levels of vulnerability may vary across different theatres of operation and across different missions. Strategic competitors have many ways to obtain such information. The most operationally secure organisations will be those that consciously identify and protect their most important information. These organisations must also be prepared for deliberate and inadvertent information disclosures, since failure to prevent all information disclosures can no longer be considered an appropriate or realistic benchmark.

This article calls for the Australian Defence Force and the broader Australian security community to adopt more deliberate and collaborative efforts to ensure operational security in the face of these increasing challenges. This article will contend that for the most sensitive national security capabilities, Australian policymakers must prioritise clearly what information is of greatest importance and which can be effectively protected. In the future, not all information can be protected, and the security community must be prepared for information and operational security disclosures. This article will further argue that nationally sensitive military units must understand the range of threats that can be used to disclose key information—as technological advancement has opened more vectors for the compromise of operational security.\(^6\)

---


Not All Information Can Be Protected

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.13 describes operational security as:

A command function (that) denies the adversary access to Essential Elements of Friendly Information. This prevents effective analysis of friendly activities, dispositions, intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities.7

Most military doctrinal definitions of operational security are consistent with this one. But such definitions may now lack the nuance necessary in an Internet-enabled and information-overloaded environment. For example, ADDP 3.13 does not highlight that sophisticated cryptographic security may not reduce the likelihood that a military unit may be geolocated through their communications, or may not fully mask the identity of the unit. Further, operational security doctrine rarely refers to the transient nature of operational security. As uncomfortable as it may be to admit, it is likely that at many points in the future there will be more information compromised or publicly released. Indeed, the previously classified ADDP 3.13, which was released through a freedom of information request, is itself an example.8 If a sophisticated strategic competitor or an opportunistic insider prioritises the collection or release of information on a specific Australian national security capability, a significant amount of data might be compromised.

Australia’s submarines and Special Forces capabilities arguably represent two of the nation’s most sensitive military-related capabilities. Understanding their shared challenges offers a view of contemporary operational security issues.

Submarines are central to Australia’s defence policy, and the future submarine project is one of Australia’s most expensive procurements. One commentator argued, “it is hard to imagine a more precious national security secret than the performance parameters of Australia’s new $50bn submarine fleet”.9 Former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral David Shackleton, argued:

Submarines and their crews depend on secrecy for their survival. They represent an extreme expression of what it means to be clandestine … Our submarine secrets had better be kept safe.10

There are few military capabilities that are more nationally sensitive than submarines. However, Vice Admiral Shackleton seems to place impossibly high criteria on information protection and operational security for the future submarine, at a time when information relating to the submarine capability

7 Ibid.
8 Department of Defence, FOI 330/13/14, Canberra, 22 April 2014, pp. 1-2.
has already been shown to be at risk and when information disclosures have been historically frequent. Others have predicted emerging risk for submarine operational security.\(^{11}\) Indeed, there are many examples in history of submarine information being compromised, often publicly—for example, the World War Two intelligence collected on Japanese submarine locations,\(^{12}\) US intelligence analyst Ronald Pelton selling information relating to US submarines and their operations to the Soviet Union,\(^{13}\) and Able Seaman William McNeilly’s public disclosures associated with the safety and security of the Royal Navy’s Trident capability.\(^{14}\) The 2017 Chinese seizure of the US underwater drone off the Philippines demonstrated a new vector to gain submarine intelligence.\(^{15}\) Further, actions of ex-military personnel seeking recognition of operational service have resulted in other information disclosures; the admission of an Australian submarine intelligence gathering mission against Soviet targets being one example.\(^{16}\) It is not unusual for submarine operational information to be conceded or lost.

The disclosure of information on Special Forces is similarly not historically unusual. It is hard to imagine that there was any important information from the British Special Air Service resolution of the 1980 Iranian embassy siege in London that was not released into the public domain soon after the incident.\(^{17}\) In 2012 newspapers published an article purporting to be about Australian Special Forces’ operations in Africa.\(^{18}\) In the same year, US Navy SEALs were reportedly punished for providing technical details of Special Forces methods to a video game developer.\(^{19}\) Photography on social media

\(^{11}\) Davies, ‘The Strategic Role of Submarines in the 21st Century’.


The Changing Operational Security Landscape for Sensitive National Capabilities

from an assumed United States mission in Libya was reported.20 Significant information was disclosed by participants in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.21

Special Forces and submarines are not the only highly sensitive national capabilities that are at risk from information disclosures, both deliberate and unintended. The ‘Five Eyes’ signals intelligence and electronic warfare enterprise is another sensitive area at persistent risk. Signals intelligence has been highly classified for many decades, but compromise has been regular. The Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning information releases through Wikileaks and other sources were recent instances in a history of signals intelligence disclosures. The Snowden and Manning cases made specific capabilities, collection priorities and reports public.22 Desmond Ball’s renowned Australian book from the 1980s, The Ties That Bind, offered extensive assessments of highly sensitive facilities such as Pine Gap.23

Simply put, sensitive information compromise cannot be characterised as unusual.

In the submarines and Special Forces cases, security measures (including legislative protections), limited but did not prevent ongoing disclosures. Beyond these examples, it is common for information to be compromised or released without authorisation, including by external organisations supporting operations, personnel management or capability development. The challenge of protecting military secrets in an Australian culture where transparency is valued comparatively highly is an added pressure.

This article will now turn to information compromise without the knowledge of the information owner—perhaps an even greater risk to operational security.

---

Technology, and the Art and Science of Keeping Secrets

Australian defence policy has long articulated the goal of the Australian Defence Force maintaining a regional technological advantage. Submarines and Special Forces are at the forefront of this long-standing policy, operating some of the most sophisticated military equipment available on global markets. This has clearly been an advantage in recent operations, and the maintenance of technologically sophisticated submarines and Special Forces will undoubtedly remain a high priority for the Australian Government.

Military technological sophistication and a broad range of missions required of Australian submarines and Special Forces has brought some less desirable technological attributes, with an increased electronic signature being a prime example. Electronic signatures represent additional vulnerabilities that strategic competitors can exploit to compromise sensitive Australian security information. This could in future reduce the viability of traditional mission types such as Special Reconnaissance. Technological evolution should be comprehensively and deliberately considered in determining the Australian Defence Force approach to operational security.

In his extensive commentary on submarines, Dr Norman Friedman regularly reminded readers that covertness is relative, particularly when submarines operate in waters that are closely observed. Clandestine operations by Special Forces are similarly relative. Submarines and Special Forces have a growing number of equipment types with a prominent electronic signature, particularly for communications. Personnel from both capability areas also rely on communications in a private capacity. But there is no ‘peacetime’ for the most sensitive capabilities, with strategic competitors collecting signatures from satellite and radio systems, counter-improvised explosive device technology, military information technology systems, mobile telephony and Internet use, beacons, and social media without interruption. Use of some or all of these electronic systems will be necessary for submarines and Special Forces elements to achieve their designated mission, particularly when operating in conjunction with conventional forces, or when decision-makers need information such as high resolution imagery.

---

25 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05—Special Operations (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 16 July 2014), II-5 – II-6, x, describes Special Reconnaissance as “surveillance and reconnaissance actions normally conducted in a clandestine or covert manner, to collect information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces”.
The challenge is that all electronic systems have signatures and vulnerabilities, and these signatures and vulnerabilities are well known or easily known to strategic competitors. Signatures and vulnerabilities are also more exposed as the size of a capability is increased—for example, when growing from a fleet of six to twelve submarines. Consequently, there are many countries able to collect, analyse, geo-locate or disrupt signatures and communications, including when forces are training or operating in Australia. Such threats to Australian communications have been outlined previously, but the threat posed in ‘peacetime’ during domestic training could be better understood and mitigated by most military and security forces.\(^2^7\)

As technology evolves, operational security for ‘operations’ and for ‘training’ cannot be treated as separate issues; nor can ‘personal’ communications and ‘work’ communications.

‘Radio silence’ is a long-standing doctrinal method to reduce a tactical unit’s electronic signature. However, radio silence will rarely be a viable option with modern equipment, particularly when submarines or Special Forces operate in advance of larger forces or gather intelligence for others. Further, some contemporary equipment will transmit or relay signals without user awareness. Military commanders must assess the cost-benefit trade off of whether or not to use certain military equipment (if indeed they have the choice). They must also determine if a mission or a capability has sufficient operational security and an appropriate electronic signature. Such an assessment can only be made if there is detailed knowledge of the signatures associated with technologically sophisticated communications devices. Such knowledge is also important to ensure that personnel involved in nationally sensitive military forces do not believe they are operating in a ‘low signature’ mode when in fact their signature can be readily identified.

There is no ‘peacetime’ for intelligence collection, because it is outside periods of conflict that the opportunity for significant intelligence targeting is present. This includes strategic competitors collecting on Australian forces in Australian-based training areas. Digital and Internet technology offers strategic competitors the opportunity to conduct inexpensive intelligence collection on sensitive capabilities and personnel at great range from a designated target. The cost of such collection will reduce further as technology such as commercial miniature satellites evolves.\(^2^8\)

It may be argued that information is now so freely available that submarines and Special Forces can ‘hide’ many of their signatures in the clutter and the


\(^2^8\) For example, some commercial satellite systems will provide services such as high resolution pictures of any point on the Earth’s surface between 55 degrees North and 55 degrees South within 90 minutes—see ‘Earth Observation: Anywhere and Everywhere’, \textit{The Economist}, Technology Quarterly, 27 August – 2 September 2016, pp. 6-7.
dross of information. The global penetration of WIFI networks is a good example of where there is now a higher signature threshold than existed in the past. This elevated baseline signature threshold presents an opportunity for operational security risk mitigation. However, to do this effectively, military planners and commanders (and defence policymakers) must understand their own signature, and understand the environment that they will operate in. Mobile telephony, for example, may appear a desirable means of communications for a particular mission, but not if all communications on a particular mobile network are being collected or analysed. Protection within information clutter may work if no one is looking for particular signatures, but submarines and Special Forces will remain a high information priority for any strategic competitor. A level of collaboration between submarines and Special Forces elements to determine emerging opportunities and risks may be beneficial in the future.

In summary, submarines and Special Forces may improve their ability to credibly protect their most important information and most sensitive operations by deliberately considering two things. First, they must expect more frequent disclosure of nationally sensitive information. The challenge of maintaining a secret grows over time, especially if a capability gets larger in terms of numbers of platforms or personnel. Second, they must comprehend that more technologically sophisticated capabilities means many signatures and many ways to collect information. Operational missions will become harder to credibly protect. Electronic signatures now mean that deployed locations may be difficult or impossible to fully protect. The strategic trend of 'information availability'—information becoming far easier to obtain—is exacerbating these problems because there are so many different ways to obtain that information, particularly through emerging technology. In combination, these factors mean that the successful achievement of operational security is more challenging than it has been in the past.

With these factors in mind, this paper now turns to considering how defence policymakers might mitigate the growing challenge of maintaining operational security for Australia’s most sensitive capabilities.

Adapting to Reality

The growing technological sophistication of regional and global actors means that they can monitor sensitive Australian military capabilities increasingly effectively. This means that a belief that sensitive capabilities can protect all of their information, all of the time is no longer tenable. Regular information disclosures and technological evolution means trying to

---

29 NATO assessed this was the case in Afghanistan, with extensive collection by Pakistan intelligence—see 'Afghanistan War Logs: Taliban Sympathisers Listening into Top-Secret Phone Calls of US-Led Coalition', The Guardian, 26 July 2010.
protect all information to an equal degree may result in the most important information being equally compromised. Impossibly high operational security objectives must be rebuffed. At the same time, policymakers must plan for a future where more is known about sensitive capabilities and missions. Efforts should be based on a clear understanding of operational security and information protection priorities, and should account for the new digital realities of information collection, signature understanding and the ‘off duty’ mobile and online presence of personnel. Education and deliberate planning for all threats to operational security is necessary. Some options to ensure that submarines and Special Forces remain optimised for contemporary conflict are as follows.

First, acknowledging that submarines and Special Forces will always produce and hold specific information on capabilities and operations that will remain highly sensitive, often over long periods of time, the Australian Defence Force may choose to take additional practical steps to protect these ‘Crown Jewels’. Such steps may involve: (1) a deliberate reduction or complete removal of information related to sensitive capabilities from military information technology networks (information technology reliance has already been proven to be particularly risky); (2) limitations on the numbers of personnel exposed to specific information; (3) conscious decisions to not employ specific capabilities on certain operations and training (or even a ‘war stocks’ methodology of only using specific equipment in the event of a significant military requirement), and; (4) a more robust layering of information to offer levels of protection for the most sensitive information.

Second, the number and scope of ‘Essential Elements of Friendly Information’ may need to be deliberately constrained, to ensure that designated information can actually be protected. For example, a force element may be unable to mask the signature of its headquarters location from a future adversary. Consequently, the location or identity of that headquarters would be problematic to protect, because it will be quickly compromised, and therefore practically cannot be considered to be an ‘Essential Element of Friendly Information’. Realising that this planning disclosure is likely necessitates a different approach to the deployment of that headquarters, such as spreading it over different locations, or not deploying it forward at all. It may also lead to a different assessment of whether a force element can be considered ‘clandestine’ during a particular mission or a particular phase of an operation.

Third, there should be a consistent Australian Defence Force (or even Australian security community) approach to identity protection for personnel involved in the most sensitive capabilities. Identity protection has long been a central feature of operational security for nationally sensitive capabilities.30

---

30 Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Senate Estimates Brief: Operations 05: Australian Defence Force Battle Casualties: Killed and Wounded as at 06 May 2013, Canberra, p. 3.
Technological evolution, and the data collection behaviour of technology giants such as Google and Facebook and countries such as China, has meant that identity protection is now much more difficult. The limited ability for personnel to control the information that family, friends and foreign military partners place on communications mediums such as social media adds further concern. Furthermore, information placed on the Internet is there forever. Submarines and Special Forces will, in the future, select personnel for service who have extensive histories on social media and the broader Internet. Ensuring that an identity protection strategy remains credible and achievable, through measures such as adequate protection for personal information databases, will need to start with acknowledging these realities.

Fourth, this article argues that doctrinal and political recognition of the often ephemeral nature of operational security may be useful. With technology offering more ways for a strategic competitor to gain specific information, the longer a secret exists, and the more people who are aware of the secret, the higher the likelihood of its compromise over time. This means protection for certain information may need to be seen as only viable for limited time periods and for specific locations. Operational security assessments need to be made after specific missions or training serials. This may lead to a more rapid declassification of compromised information in order to ensure that the classification system remains credible and meaningful. Adoption of new ‘Essential Elements of Friendly Information’ would need to be carefully considered, particularly if there is a high likelihood of their compromise.

Fifth, there must be recognition of the likelihood of future information compromise. The significant number of unauthorised information disclosures over time across the most sensitive military capabilities in Australia and in other nations leads to a reasonable assessment that disclosures will occur consistently into the future. This does not mean tolerance of individuals breaching operational security (either through information disclosure or through poor electronic signature mitigation)—in fact, there should be an organisational willingness to take action to rebuke those in serious breach or deter potential future breaches. But the Australian Defence Force should rehearse its organisational actions in the event of a significant information compromise, perhaps as an annual training serial, so a response to an incident can occur most efficiently and deliberately. The downgrading of classification or deliberate public release of certain information should be considered. The limiting of access to the most sensitive organisational information, and the potential removal of information from some information technology networks will also be necessary.

Finally, the regular rotation and disposal of specific ‘personal’ and ‘work’ communications systems, or modifying of their communications signature parameters or waveforms, may be worth considering. While there are clear integration and cost challenges, the often-highly sensitive missions undertaken by submarines and Special Forces must be afforded the most protection, including through the mitigation of known electronic signatures.32 A deliberate plan to dispose of certain communications devices or systems may mean the procurement of cheaper equipment in greater numbers. Furthermore, since electronic threats may be local, regional or global in nature, and strategic competitors will conduct intelligence collection through periods of non-conflict, submarine and Special Forces personnel should consider themselves and their information on an operational footing at all times, including through the conduct of adequate operational security planning for domestic training and in their personal lives. This may necessitate a shared and specific understanding of operational security threats across the national security community.

Conclusion

There are many shared operational security concerns for sensitive Australian military capabilities. This article focused on some of the shared interests of submarine forces and Special Forces. Clearly defined and consistent information protection requirements for sensitive capabilities, across the national security community, would appear to now be essential to ensure that adequate information protection is afforded where it is most required, and for a realistic view of operational security to be maintained.

The greatest risk to operational security arguably lies in the potential lack of understanding of where information vulnerabilities lie and when such information can be obtained, and in assuming that all information can be protected equally at all times. Disclosure of information across sensitive capabilities has been common and will occur more often in the future. Operational security should be considered a transient state of affairs, rather than something that is absolute or enduring. As uncomfortable as the concept may be for many, the Australian Defence Force should not find itself surprised by information disclosures in nationally sensitive capabilities in the future, but there are steps that can be taken to ensure that elements such as submarines and Special Forces maintain a level of operational and information security in the information age.

This paper does not advocate a laissez faire approach to operational security because the challenge is too great. It does argue that the Australian Defence Force (and broader Australian security community) approach to

operational security must be a deliberate effort across sensitive capabilities. This effort must take full account of the growing technological sophistication of strategic competitors and potential adversaries, the likelihood of insider threats, the vulnerabilities associated with maintaining a technologically sophisticated force, and the key information age trend of ‘information availability’. This paper also advocates a broader understanding of the often-prominent signatures associated with contemporary communications systems. Intelligence threats from strategic competitors are ever-present, including in Australia and on ‘private’ communications systems, and sensitive national capabilities will remain a high priority for foreign intelligence targeting. Unauthorised information disclosures must be anticipated, but deliberate actions can be taken to identify and then protect the most sensitive ‘Crown Jewels’. This will ensure that units like submarines and Special Forces will remain operationally viable unconventional capabilities.

Martin White is a serving Australian Army officer with extensive operational and command experience. He is currently completing a PhD through La Trobe University, focused on Australian defence policy.
Australia’s First Spies: The Remarkable Story of Australia’s Intelligence Operations, 1901-45

John Fahey
(Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2018)
ISBN: 9781760631208

Daniel Baldino

There is a conspicuous lack of comprehensive and pertinent research on the early history of Australia’s intelligence operations.

John Fahey, who previously worked at the Defence Signals Directorate and had served in a number of regimental and intelligence postings, has admirably filled this prevailing breach. The work is well-informed, engaging and displays a formidable command of subject matter on intelligence capabilities, the hard work of intelligence collection, the organisation of intelligence networks and the complicated correlation between intelligence and policy. Based on archival evidence, he has written a monumentally important, insightful and well-informed book of Australia’s intelligence operations in the years from Federation to the end of World War Two.

Australia’s First Spies makes a unique contribution to the secret history of Australia and its early intelligence operations that portrays a skilled synthesis of relevant material in exposing a wide gambit of under-exposed and neglected security undertakings and political activities. These range from the birth of SIGINT to insights into cryptographic systems to bureaucratic mismanagement within the defence sector to chronic underfunding and a lack of equipment to an ad hoc intelligence setup that had used unpaid services of individuals to prove information on suspicious individuals.

Eye-catchingly, Fahey also makes the case that Australia’s defence planning was in a much worse position in 1939 than it was in 1914 due to, in part, political indifference that led to no cohesive intelligence system, no protocols or mechanisms coordinating either collecting and assessment and only a small number of ad hoc intelligence organisations within the armed forces. Nonetheless, Australia would eventually become an important part of the worldwide Allied SIGINT system.
It is essential reading for anyone interested in intelligence studies, international security, organisational management, information studies, Australian history and political science in general.

Much of the detailed backdrop takes place in dramatic circumstances that shift from peacetime surveillance systems to a fast-paced wartime footing like the seizure of Germany’s navel codes in World War One or fighting a long and gruelling battle of attrition in coastwatching operations throughout New Guinea and the South-West Pacific during World War Two. Other elements of intelligence work are intricate and indispensable, albeit noticeably dry and mundane—as is typical of much good intelligence—like the creation of the Intelligence Corps in 1907 to make reliable maps of the Australian landmass.

At an unpretentious level, the contribution to historical debate makes a pointed case that thoughtfully reminds the reader of the need for independent capacity and value of timely and accurate intelligence in practical terms. The book is littered with examples, like the seizure of German’s navel codes in 1914 or the later reliance of HUMINT to provide raw intelligence on what the Japanese were doing in Bougainville, how far they had progressed and where valuable targets such as ammunition might be hidden, that then all acted to assist in political decision-making in tough wartime conditions.

And in doing so, especially given the ever-mutating rise of conspiracy theories and ‘deep state’ paranoia, Fahey draws our attention back to both the mandate and legitimacy of the intelligence sector as well as the multifaceted backgrounds of those individuals who worked in the service of their country. This was often despite a lack of resources, training and no system in place to support them. There is a lot of misconception about people who work in national security and intelligence. Fahey adds an important human touch to such endeavours in exposing a range of heroic, courageous and dedicated professionals such as ex-soldier Harry Freame who was the first Australian clandestine agent killed in action—and who it is noted, today lies buried in an unmarked grave in Sydney.

It is worth adding that many chapters broach, and provide an astute judgment about, the illogic of sexism in security practice and elevate the significant contribution of woman in the workforce to meeting defence requirements. Similarly, readers are reminded of the importance of language and familiarity with Asia. While Australia might have been fretting about Japan and its intentions in various pockets of the twentieth century, the biggest early skill gaps were linguists as no white Australians could even read public statements in the Japanese press.

In more specific terms, the book offers a pointed and thoughtful starting point that contributes to a range of ongoing debates. As the author points out, two
of its central and underlying themes aim to challenge dogmatic ideas about the realities of statecraft and are consistently reinforced based on the evaluation of historical material. First, the book develops arguments that it is erroneous to portray Australian policymakers as robotically sacrificing the fledgling nation’s self-interest in favour of Britain; secondly, the role of secrecy, while contentious, remains a legitimate part of the spy game at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

The first point about Australia’s realpolitik manoeuvring to secure its national interests, as opposed to assumptions of a simple subservient attitude, is again developed through the strength of detailed research that reveals the launch of a clandestine intelligence collection operation against the British Empire in the New Hebrides in 1901. This hard-nosed appreciation of Australian self-interest is an important early reminder that while allies might have overlapping interests, such interests will not always be identical. In this instance, as Fahey notes, Australia’s secret intelligence activity often reveals more about the real ambitions of policymakers than any official public pronouncements regarding Australia’s independence. This is an age of habitual realpolitik of the highest level.

At the same time, the book balances stories of both remarkable intelligence achievements and abject failure and does not attempt to sugar-coat past mistakes or misadventures. Unnecessary disputes and turf wars are a recurring theme such as clashes between personalities and factions within the Australian military and bureaucracy. Ditto the exercise of slapdash handling of sensitive information and appalling security provisions to prevent breaches of classified information. In short, secrets flowed out of Australia like through a sieve. This involved foreign spies penetrating many Commonwealth agencies, particularly External Affairs, and stealing secrets for the Soviet Union.

Particularly striking is the assessment based on tensions around the evolving mandate of the Intelligence Corps, as to whether it should collect information on foreign countries in the Pacific or predominately focus on internal security operations against civilians. While acknowledging that crystal-ball gazing is an imperfect art, a final decision to focus on domestic intelligence is seen as highly consequential. The end result was the Military Intelligence Branch being complicit by 1945 in some of the most egregious abuses of civil liberties in Australian history. Such lessons are sobering.

It additionally offers a rare and unique understanding of other central actors in the international sphere during this timeframe. This includes the US response in the Pacific during World War Two and the organisation and effectiveness of the Kempeitai (which sits alongside the failure of the Allied Intelligence Bureau to develop a proper appreciation of the enemy they faced). The Kempeitai were the ruthless and determined Japanese secret police and Fahey provides a superb piecing together of evidence to help
explain the intricate and often grisly world of Japanese intelligence procedures and systems. This is despite notable hurdles such as the Japanese burning most of their intelligence records before occupation.

Fahey asserts that there is no better spy than an insider. *Australia’s First Spies* is additionally proof that there is no better story-teller and narrator than a former experienced intelligence officer with a sharp eye for detail and a passion for the subject matter.

*Daniel Baldino is the Discipline Head of the Politics and International Relations program at the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle.*
A few weeks ago the Royal Australian Air Force took delivery of two new-build F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. They are the third and fourth such aircraft to fly in Australian skies—a full seven years after the 2012 in-service date that appeared in early planning documents when Australia first signed up to the program in 2002. They cost about US$100 million each, with the price increase being commensurate with the schedule slippage—they are about twice the price used in the early days of marketing by their builder, Lockheed Martin. They will need upgrades to their software in the next few years to meet some of the promised performance specifications and the RAAF will have to wait until sometime in the 2020s for them be able to operate with dedicated anti-shipping missiles.

Despite that litany of failure to meet program targets, and the fact that would-be adversaries have now had 15 years to prepare their forces to encounter the F-35, it remains the most effective combat aircraft available from western suppliers. Barring budget issues, the F-35 will be the first choice of most advanced nations in the market when they seek to replace the fast jets in their current inventories. On current plans F-35s will still be flying well after 2050, and it is likely to form the backbone of western air power for the next two decades.

In Global Defense Procurement and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, American academic Bert Chapman sets out to explore how the aircraft got to where it is today. Having followed the F-35 program closely for over a decade now, I read this book with great interest. It is important that the strategic, program management and industrial elements of what over the aircraft’s lifetime will be a trillion dollar investment in combat air power is well understood—and even more important that the lessons its protracted and often mismanaged development can provide. The book is certainly a timely contribution to the public understanding of the largest defence project yet, as the F-35 starts entering service with the United States and various export customers and has seen its first small-scale operational use in Israeli service.
At 400 pages, this book is a serious attempt to unpack the story of the F-35. The research is thorough and the extensive reference list is a valuable resource. That’s especially true of the chapter on the development program and its tortured history with Congress and various US oversight mechanisms. The author has worked extensively from primary source material to pull together a more complete story than I’ve seen in one place before, and the reading list will keep anyone wanting to read into the F-35 program busy for a long time.

That said, I can’t give this book an unqualified recommendation. While the development history and associated political bun fighting is well described, the author seems to be on less solid ground when it comes to strategic, budgetary and capability analysis. To give one simple example, on page 118 we find cost reductions achieved in the 2016-17 fiscal year described as “possibly … achieved in response to President Donald Trump’s pre-presidential tweet that the program cost was too expensive”. A careful review of Pentagon budget papers, reporting of contract values and the timelines involved show that such a suggestion is implausible.

Also less than compelling is a chapter on the history of jet fighters, which explains the notion of aircraft ‘generations’—a construct many analysts think an unnecessary and potentially misleading way to think about air combat. Much of the poorly informed public debate that has plagued the F-35 over the years has fixated on what constitutes a ‘fifth generation’ aircraft, with an associated checklist of characteristics that varies depending on whether one seeks to sell the F-35 or disparage it. (The discussion hasn’t been helped by marketeers blurring the picture by pitching upgrades to 40 year old designs as “generation 4.5” capabilities.)

In fact the F-35, like every other combat aircraft, will succeed or fail on not just its technical merits, but also on the way in which it’s employed and supported by other force elements and—crucially—the totality of adversary capabilities it faces. The fact that China and Russia now have aircraft that tick ‘fifth generation’ boxes, might be very significant—or it might not. History shows that victory in air combat depends on technical capabilities, numbers, geography and other factors that combine in ways that don’t simplify down to a list of airframe characteristics.

In the chapter on the F-35 in Australia the book describes the often acrimonious public debate that surrounded the program for the best part of decade. It does a reasonable job of describing the various arguments that did the rounds, including the seeming simulations performed by arch critics of the F-35 that got picked up and amplified by the ABC and other outlets. But again the analysis lets it down by giving too much space to views that don’t really warrant it and not rebutting them adequately. Though to be fair, the author ultimately calls it correctly when he says that
Australian opinion on the JSF is as divided as opinion in other participating countries … although it appears that there is enough support … across the political spectrum for the JSF to continue despite the cost overruns, repeated production delays and financial problems.

Similarly, the author’s overall conclusions are hard to argue with:

Despite the JSF’s protracted financial and technical problems and the fiscal constraints facing many JSF partner countries, which have caused them to reduce defense spending, emerging military airpower and geopolitical and technological trends make purchasing the JSF the least problematic military aviation alternative for the US military and its international allies.

It’s salutary to ponder that the United States and its allies are collectively spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the “least problematic” air combat capability, but that’s a consequence of an overly ambitious and—for most of its first decade—poorly run program that tried to do too much in one platform.

Andrew Davies is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and lectures on defence acquisition at the Australian National University. He has written a number of papers on the F-35 and has advised a previous defence minister and the Australian parliament on its acquisition.
BOOK REVIEW

Handbook on the United States in Asia: Managing Hegemonic Decline, Retaining Influence in the Trump Era
Andrew T. H. Tan
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2018)
ISBN: 9781788110662

Reviewer: Greg Raymond

For those of us who work in policy, or academia, and want to produce policy-relevant research or contemporary strategic affairs commentary, it’s so often the case that the need for a precise date or dollar figure leads to an unwanted trawl of the internet along with all its distractions. Andrew Tan’s new volume relieves one of that burden, instead offering the reader a compressed, succinct account of developments in the Asia-Pacific region with regard to its still most powerful and consequential player, the United States. This very engaging volume is one that many will find fills a valuable niche on the bookshelf. Besides the ready access to facts and figures, it offers its reader, in readable narrative prose, a useful and coherent account of the past few years’ events that many of us have watched unfold in news clips and tweets, straddling the end of Obama and his Pivot and the arrival of Trump and his unilateralism. It also offers a series of interesting vignettes and deep dives, whether they be Andrea Benvenuti’s reprise of how the outcomes of World War Two and the onset of the Cold War drew the United States ever more deeply into an Asian presence, or Pichamon Yeophantong’s quick survey of Southeast Asian attitudes to the United States.

Some of these essays yield surprising and novel insights. Sean Kenji Starr’s analysis of the relative profit-shares of US economic engagement in China shows that while the export figures of goods such as office machinery and IT depict significant Chinese growth, the shares of profits are very low compared with US companies. This is because of the globalisation of production and ownership and global value chains. Jai Galliott’s essay on US defence R&D investigates the twin impacts of the sequestration cuts to the US defence budget in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and the Trump policies towards strengthening the US military. In a conclusion sobering for Australian policymakers, he argues that Trump’s technological scepticism and “generally anti-science policies” do not auger well for United States’ capacity to maintain military superiority over China.
Apart from these very niche areas, many of the essays in the book address a central and important question: does Trump represent a real break with the past US foreign and defence policy, or is there substantial continuity? Paul J. Smith, even while noting the emergence of a “transactional realism”, sides with the notion of continuity due to the restraining effects of a military leadership that still strongly favours allies and forward presence. Benjamin Schreer considers the 2017 National Security Strategy, and what reassurance allies might take from its strong stance on China, in the light of its relative paucity of detail combined with Trump’s personal lack of credibility. Mark Beeson and Jeffrey D. Wilson address the broader impact of the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership from the perspective of geoeconomics, suggesting that future historians may see it as a turning point in declining US influence in the Asia Pacific region.

As might be expected, a number of the essays portray individual alliances and bilateral relationships, between the United States and regional countries, while others examine particular potential flashpoints and security issues such as the Korean peninsula and terrorism. In the first category, S. R. Joey Long’s brief history of the Singapore–United States partnership is a gem, covering the surprising shaky start with Lee Kwan Yew condemning the United States for behaving like an “imperialist power”, to today, where the smooth relationship is characterised by low-key and practical ways that Singapore helps the United States project its military power. In the former category, the biggest issue of all, the future of United States–China relations is given ample attention. On the latter, Robert Sutter argues that China’s domestic social and economic challenges, combined with its lack of comprehension of its neighbours’ sensitivities, will continue to limit its capacity to replace the United States.

Even in a volume of over 500 pages, there are still some gaps, perhaps inevitable given the breadth of the topic. The often-forgotten allies, Thailand and the Philippines, do not receive their own chapters. The South China Sea, a major arena for China and US contestation over the so-called ‘rules-based global order’ is also omitted as a discrete topic. And finally, perhaps reflecting the generally realist leanings of many of the contributors and flavour of many of the chapters, the region’s multilateral processes and organisations such as ASEAN are also ignored.

These absences aside, this volume does a fine job of capturing many of the critical themes and vital facts of US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and is a worthwhile acquisition. It is of course unavoidable that more recent policy developments, such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept are missed, but this does not detract from what is a very interesting, enjoyable and helpful volume.

*Dr Greg Raymond is a Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.*
BOOK REVIEW

Is Non-Western Democracy Possible?
A Russian Perspective

Edited by Alexei D. Voskressenski.
ISBN: 9789813147379

Reviewer: Elizabeth Buchanan

In today’s international political climate many approach Russian perspectives with measured caution. Yet, missing this handbook on how we might deal with the non-western world would be a mistake for both policymakers and for academia. In reviving the utility of traditional area studies and comparative politics for security studies practitioners, Voskressenski compiles a ground-breaking volume on democratisation processes across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. This unique text presents Russian scholarship on the intricacies of non-western political processes, covering a commendable array of historical and cultural drivers of non-western political development.

Central to the book is the concept of non-western democracy. Is it possible? Can western democracy as we know it flourish in the non-western world? How do the existing political cultures in Asia, Africa and the Middle East shape the prospects for western democracy? With evident historical failures to establish western democracy (read liberal democratic ideals) in a range of states across Asia, Africa and the Middle East, this text sheds light on how the unique political-cultural characteristics of the non-western world are overall non-conducive to the western democratic model. Instead, this volume illustrates that across various regions there is a different democratic model emerging through a process of modernisation, which is distinctively different to the western model. In this text, Russian scholars ingeniously map an emerging system of non-western democracy.

Voskressenski tackles a subject traditionally infused with ideology and yet presents a nuanced assessment of why and how processes of modernisation don’t always lead to westernisation. The Russian perspective on this, as presented by this volume, is simply that the non-western world is not geared towards western democracy due to cultural divergences. What follows in the text are evidenced and well-argued case studies spanning Asia, Africa and the Middle East which ultimately have the reader questioning existing beliefs and assumptions of democracy. The volume begins with, amusingly for Australians, a foreword by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Rudd commends Voskressenski’s ability to frame democracy.
as not solely a western concept, noting that successful democracies indeed exist on every continent.

This volume establishes the parameters of the eastern and western political worlds more broadly—note the world’s largest democracy (India) is considered a non-western nation. Voskressenski highlights the importance of comparative political science—an area of study in decline to the detriment of security scholars. There is an assessment of the correlation between economic development (processes of modernisation included) and the impact on political culture and therefore democracy in the non-western world. Strezhneva and Yefimova delve into political culture more broadly to determine the divergences between east and west to map how democracy forms and functions in different ways in the non-western world.

Yemelyanov’s chapter focuses on the political systems and political culture of states within Africa. In assessing processes of European colonialism and the ensuing historical evolution of African political regimes, Yemelyanov illustrates how this part of the non-western world has developed a political culture distinctly wedded to history and a system of cultural identity with some elements of western democracy. Epstein delves into the features of the political system and political culture unique to the state of Israel—the sole democratic nation in the near east. A chapter by Kudryashova offers a comparative analysis of the development of political systems in Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Looking at how these states organise authority and determine their political identity is an important undertaking in order to determine democratic development potential. For Kudryashova, modernisation is neither a linear nor a determining process and her chapter illustrates how the Islamic world continues to rely on historical-cultural drivers to structure their political systems. Further, Sapirova’s chapter deals with the political systems of Arab states and the factors influencing the formation and functioning of these systems. Laletin focuses on the Afghan state development and the role of tribes in political systems. This chapter provides a unique assessment of Afghanistan’s state development processes over the past almost two and a half centuries.

Lunev looks to the political processes and system developments in Central Asia following the break-up of the USSR. Most of these states proclaim themselves to be sovereign, democratic, secular and law-respecting republics. Lunev delves into the Central Asian variant of democracy—indeed unlike the western variant. In dealing with Eastern Asia, Lunev partners with Alayev to unpack the political culture of India. Koldunova and Yefimova then present an assessment of the political systems of South East Asia. Of interest is their study of Singapore, which they argue uses the western democratic model as a façade to hide authoritarian traditions “characteristic of the political culture of Confucian civilization”. For Koldunova and Yefimova, South East Asia represents hybrid political cultures which only very generally ever adhere to western democratic
models, as they are forever constrained by nationally specific political cultures.

We are reminded of the Mongol Empire by Luzyanin who looks to the evolution of political systems and political culture in Mongolia. The 1990 democratic revolution has endured and, as Luzyanin illustrates, Mongolia’s variant of democracy embodies a synthesis of traditional Mongol as well as modern western values and has managed to mould them into a non-western democratic model. The Korean Peninsula’s unique political systems are examined by Denisov in his fascinating chapter which delves into the past fifty years of divergent political system development in the case of the ROK and DPRK. Voskressenski rounds out the volume with a study on the evolution of political institutions in China, which is of great interest to security scholars pondering the future of the so-called liberal democratic rules-based order.

Voskressenski leaves us to question the value of typologising political systems and of holding western democracy as the gold standard. This volume challenges policymakers and interdisciplinary academics to really delve into the idea that there is potentially more than one democratic political form. In doing so, this engaging (perhaps contentious) book illustrates how the concept of democracy has been exploited for ideological gain (the West versus ‘other’) when it should instead be unpacked to recognise the sheer diversity of global democratic political models. This volume serves as a blueprint for understanding non-western states and for navigating the ever-evolving international political arena.

*Dr Elizabeth Buchanan is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Studies at The Australian National University, Canberra.*
Notes for Contributors

Security Challenges contributes to innovative and practical thinking about security challenges of major importance for Australia as well as the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The journal’s website can be found at www.securitychallenges.org.au.

Possible topics of interest include but are not limited to: emerging security threats and challenges in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean; the security role of the major powers; the management of Australia’s security relationship with the United States and other allies; strategies for Australia’s relationships with its neighbours; Australia’s and the region’s resource and economic security, the challenge of defence transformation in Australia and other countries; and strategies for managing and combating international terrorism.

Security Challenges welcomes submissions from any source. Early career scholars and new strategic thinkers are particularly encouraged to submit. Authors are strongly encouraged to submit manuscripts via email to editor@ifrs.org.au preferably in MS Word format. The receipt of manuscripts will be acknowledged within 7 days.

Security Challenges contains comments as well as regular articles. Recommended length for comments and opinions is 2,000-4,000 words, for articles 5,000-7,000 words. Articles exceeding 8,000 words are unlikely to be published. An abstract of no more than 100 words and an ‘about the author’ note of no more than 50 words should accompany the submission.

Each manuscript must be accompanied by a statement that it has not been published elsewhere and that it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. Authors are responsible for obtaining permission to reproduce copyrighted material from other sources.

The refereeing policy for articles requires that the anonymity of the author of the article is preserved. The anonymity of referees, whose comments may be forwarded to the authors, is likewise preserved. The review process normally takes about 4-8 weeks. The editor is responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; the opinions expressed in articles published and the accuracy of statements made therein are solely the responsibility of the individual authors. The editors disclaim responsibility for statements, either of fact or opinion, made by the contributors. The editors retain the right to condense articles.

Authors receive three free copies of the issue in which their article/comment/opinion appears as well as an electronic version of the issue in PDF-format.

All parts of the manuscript should be type-written and double-spaced. The manuscript pages should be numbered consecutively throughout the paper. Authors should follow the style used in this issue. A detailed style guide can be found on the journal’s website at www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCStyleGuide.pdf. It is the author’s responsibility to ensure that the submitted manuscript complies with the style guide. The editors reserve the right to reject manuscripts which do not accurately follow form and style requirements.
About the Institute For Regional Security

The Institute for Regional Security has two equally important objectives.

The first is to explore ideas and policy options that enable Australia and our regional partners to exploit the opportunities that will arise in the future security environment and to respond to the challenges that will surely accompany the changes we will see. This is done through our research activities and publications.

The second is to promote the development of the next generation of strategic thinkers. Better strategic policy requires greater incisive strategic thinking, and insightful guidance into strategic decision making. The activities of the Institute encourage this incisiveness and insight in our future leaders.

The Future Strategic Leaders’ Program assists the next generation of strategic thinkers to gain a deeper understanding and knowledge of the broader security environment, and to help them develop the skills and expertise necessary to contribute to policy and planning. A very important feature of the program is to create a community of young people interested and concerned about national security who will carry this network of relationships through their careers.

www.regionalsecurity.org.au

Support Us

As a non-for-profit, registered charity, the Institute for Regional Security relies on support of individuals and companies to sustain and expand our activities. There are many ways you can get involved and work with us to make a difference.

Please visit www.regionalsecurity.org.au for further information.
Contents

COMMENT
Joyobroto Sanya
Shaping Australian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century:
Thoughts on a Reflective Framework of Analysis ......................................................... 1

ARTICLES
Thomas Wilkins
Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump ........... 9

Bates Gill and Adam Ni
China’s Sweeping Military Reforms: Implications for Australia ................................ 33

Nell Bennett
One Man’s Radical: The Radicalisation Debate and Australian Counterterrorism Policy .......................... 47

Martin White
The Changing Operational Security Landscape for Sensitive National Capabilities ..... 63

BOOK REVIEWS
Reviewed by Daniel Baldino
Australia’s First Spies: The Remarkable Story of Australia’s Intelligence Operations 1901-45 by John Fahey .............................................................. 75

Reviewed by Andrew Davies
Global Defense Procurement and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by Bert Chapman ..... 79

Reviewed by Greg Raymond
Handbook on the United States in Asia: Managing Hegemonic Decline, Retaining Influence in the Trump Era by Andrew T. H. Tan .................................................. 83

Reviewed by Elizabeth Buchanan
Is Non-Western Democracy Possible? A Russian Perspective edited by Alexei D. Voskressenski ................................................................. 85

www.regionalsecurity.org.au

ISSN 1833-1459
Security Challenges is a fully refereed journal.