
Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis': Smooth Sailing or Rocky Seas Ahead?

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In late 2014, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo unveiled his 'global maritime axis' concept, designed to reinvigorate the country's identity as a maritime nation, better defend its seas and boost the maritime sector. His ambitious plan, also known as the 'Jokowi doctrine', is to transform Southeast Asia's largest state located at the nexus of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a global hub. The extent to which Jokowi can realise his ambitions, given their centrality to his policies, will be an important factor for Indonesia's identity, economy and defence. The article explores the key components of the 'global maritime axis' concept and discusses the challenges facing each component. It highlights the challenges in infrastructure and logistics, naval and coast guard defence, illegal fishing and regional relations, in the context of the Jokowi doctrine. The final section of the article analyses the potential opportunities for Australia-Indonesia relations and the impact the maritime vision has for Australia.

The maritime domain plays a large part in Indonesia's history. Across its vast archipelago, its people are connected by the sea and have relied on the oceans for trade and livelihood. In 1957, the Djuanda Declaration formalised the importance of the maritime domain for Indonesia, enshrining the idea that the seas formed part of Indonesian territory, echoed by the Indonesian word for 'homeland', *tanah air*, literally meaning 'land and water'. Being vast, Indonesia's maritime domains are also vulnerable—a point brought home by thorny issues like illegal fishing or disputed maritime boundaries.

With the election of Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, in October 2014, there has been a lively injection of thinking about Indonesia's national maritime psyche. As a presidential candidate, Jokowi opened a conversation about the importance of the nation's maritime domain and how its people have turned their backs on their sea. In order to address a number of domestic challenges and to unify his policies under a single vision, Jokowi introduced his ambition of transforming Indonesia into a 'global maritime axis'; that is, a nexus between the Indian and Pacific Oceans but also a strong and consolidated domain from which the Indonesian people could prosper.

Apart from its foreign policy dimensions, the concept looks predominantly to domestic concerns including protecting local economic interests by investing in sea-related infrastructure and countering illegal fishing. However, Jokowi's vision for Indonesia as a 'global maritime nexus', let alone 'maritime nation', remains incomplete. While it is visionary, it is piecemeal. What kind of maritime nation will Indonesia be? How will Jokowi's component maritime policies work towards this vision? This article seeks to build on existing

literature on the current president's global maritime axis vision by tracing the evolution of the so-called 'Jokowi doctrine' and critiquing the concept's utility. It will also examine the progress it has made in key policy areas—maritime infrastructure, territorial disputes, illegal fishing and military modernisation—and the challenges faced in each. It ends by exploring what a greater focus on maritime matters could mean for Australia–Indonesia relations and the opportunities therein.

Evolution of the Jokowi Doctrine

During the election campaign, Jokowi and his running mate Jusuf Kalla submitted a publicly available political manifesto (a vision and mission statement and program for action) to the Indonesian Electoral Commission, outlining their grand outlook for Indonesia and core national priorities. The document expresses a clear desire to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and strengthen the country in terms of its physical infrastructure, economy, institutions and reputation. There is no explicit maritime doctrine in the statement, but amongst the national priorities there are maritime references. For instance, the statement notes Indonesia as both an important physical nexus between the Indian and Pacific oceans but also as an 'archipelagic state'.¹ The vision-mission statement highlights maritime issues including 'comprehensive maritime cooperation' in the context of foreign policy and developing the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI) as a 'regional maritime force'.² In terms of addressing some of Indonesia's maritime-related economic challenges, the statement also seeks to develop a maritime industry with supporting ports and establishing more sea routes through the archipelago, and eradicating illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing by foreign vessels.³

In his inauguration speech, Jokowi framed the importance of Indonesia's maritime character in philosophical and historical terms, declaring that the "oceans, seas, straits and bays [were] the future of [Indonesia's] civilisation".⁴ He also invoked the Sanskrit phrase (and motto of the Indonesian Navy) *Jalesveva Jayamahe* meaning 'in the sea is where we will triumph' and closed by inviting his compatriots to sail with him, as their trusted captain, aboard the ship of the Republic of Indonesia towards a greater country.⁵

¹ Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla, *Jalan Perubahan untuk Indonesia yang Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian: Visi Misi, dan Program Aksi*, Jakarta, May 2014, <kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/Visi_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf> [Accessed 15 June 2015], p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁴ From the Indonesian "Samudra, laut, selat dan teluk adalah masa depan peradaban kita": Joko Widodo, 'Di Bawah Kehendak Rakyat dan Konstitusi', Inauguration Speech, Jakarta, 20 October 2014, <news.detik.com/berita/2723911/ini-pidato-lengkap-jokowi-saat-pelantikan-presiden/1> [Accessed 10 July 2015].

⁵ *Ibid.*

Jokowi further developed his maritime axis plans during a major speech at the East Asia Summit (EAS), held in Naypyidaw in November 2014. According to Jokowi, the geopolitical and geo-economic gravity in the twenty-first century had shifted to the Asia Pacific, with the sea increasingly important for the future.⁶ Amidst significant geopolitical and geo-economic changes, Indonesia had to reorient itself as a 'global maritime axis' and as a power between two oceans.⁷ Appropriate to the international setting, he emphasised the foreign policy dimensions of Indonesia's role as a global maritime axis in fostering regional and international cooperation to promote mutual prosperity.

The EAS speech is also significant as it was the first time Jokowi articulated the five 'pillars' of his axis concept: 1) rebuild Indonesia's maritime culture and recognise the intrinsic link between the country's identity, livelihood and future with the sea; 2) improve management of Indonesia's ocean resources, focusing on food security, through the development of the fishing industry, for instance; 3) prioritise maritime infrastructure and connectivity by improving ports, logistics, shipping and maritime tourism; 4) use maritime diplomacy to eliminate conflicts caused by illegal fishing, sovereignty breaches, territorial disputes, piracy, and marine pollution; and 5) develop maritime defence forces to both support Indonesia's sovereignty and wealth and to maintain navigation safety and maritime security.⁸

Upon election, one of the earliest manifestations of Jokowi's commitment to the concept was the creation of a Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs who is responsible for overseeing the ministers for transport, tourism, energy and fisheries.⁹ He also upgraded the national Coordinating Maritime Security Body (BAKORKAMLA) into its own command, the National Maritime Security Board (BAKAMLA), responsible for coast guard patrols and maritime security policy (explained later in this article). In foreign policy terms, Jokowi leveraged the maritime domain to build more cooperation and investment with China and Japan during his official visits to Beijing and Tokyo in March.¹⁰

⁶ Joko Widodo, Speech to 9th East Asia Summit, Naypyidaw, 13 November 2014, <www.beritasatu.com/nasional/224809-ini-doktrin-jokowi-di-ktt-asia-timur.html> [Accessed 11 December 2014].

⁷ From the Indonesian "sebagai kekuatan yang berada di antara dua samudera": *ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Indroyono Susilo held the position until 12 August 2015, after Jokowi's first cabinet reshuffle. He was previously the Fisheries Management Director at the Food and Agricultural Organization and is seen to have brought the relevant experience to the role: "'I'm Ready to Face New Challenges," Says Maritime Affairs Minister', *The Jakarta Post*, 26 October 2014, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/26/i-m-ready-face-new-challenges-says-maritime-affairs-minister.html>, [Accessed 20 July 2015].

¹⁰ Natalie Sambhi, 'Jokowi's trip to Tokyo and China', *The Strategist*, 30 March 2015, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/jokowis-trip-to-tokyo-and-china/> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

A Useful Concept?

The 'global maritime axis' doctrine is a highly versatile concept for Indonesia; its domestic, foreign policy and philosophical dimensions appeal to a number of the Jokowi administration's policy goals. The Jokowi doctrine also contrasts with the more grandiose ambitions of the former president Yudhoyono who favoured, for instance, the foreign policy tagline of Indonesia as a 'regional power and global player'.¹¹ Jokowi has explained that the development of Indonesia's maritime domain is intrinsically linked to the country's material advancement in terms of improving trade, connectivity between islands and safeguarding maritime resources—a key concern outlined in the vision-mission statement. It is also a way of unifying the areas of investment and development in support of the more abstract idea of Indonesia as an archipelagic nation. As mentioned above, the concept has been used as a theme in bilateral cooperation with foreign partners. Former Cabinet Secretary Andi Widjanto noted the potential synergy between Indonesia's nascent maritime doctrine and China's maritime Silk Road concept.¹²

The global maritime axis remains an important concept yet its centrality to Jokowi's politics should not be overstated. The idea of Indonesia as a global maritime axis sits alongside some other important Jokowi concepts such as '*gotong royong*', a predominantly Javanese concept understood in Indonesia as meaning 'working together for the communal good'. Jokowi emphasised the need for *gotong royong* in the vision-mission statement and his inauguration speech as well as naming his cabinet the *Kabinet Kerja* (Working Cabinet). Important to Jokowi's thinking is also the concept of '*revolusi mental*' or mental revolution in which he calls for the country to move away from outdated modes of thinking such as during the New Order era under Suharto.¹³

The breadth of the maritime concept is also a potential weakness. While Jokowi has provided some ideas for implementing specific elements of the doctrine—such as building ports and developing the TNI's naval capabilities—a unifying blueprint remains to be seen. There are risks that investment and development of the various elements do not follow a grand strategy. In a recent Sea Power Centre paper, Geoffrey Till rightfully

¹¹ Natalie Sambhi, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy Challenges and Australia–Indonesia Relations', in Jonathan Chen, Andrea Gleason, Greta Nabbs-Keller, Natalie Sambhi, Kyle Springer and Danau Tanu, *New Perspectives on Indonesia: Understanding Australia's Closest Asian Neighbour* (Crawley: Perth USAsia Centre, 16 December 2014), <perthusasia.edu.au/usac/assets/media/docs/publications/E-Book_New-Perspectives-on-Indonesia_Understanding-Australias-Closest-Neighbour.pdf> [Accessed 1 July 2015], pp. 26–27.

¹² Rendi A. Witular and Hasyim Widhiarto, 'Jokowi on World Stage, First Stop Beijing', *The Jakarta Post*, 9 November 2014, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/09/jokowi-world-stage-first-stop-beijing.html> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

¹³ Joko Widodo, 'Revolusi Mental', *Kompas*, 10 May 2014, <nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/10/1603015/revolusi.mental> [Accessed 1 July 2015].

highlights questions raised by Indonesia's maritime community including whether the upgrading of ports should occur before or after economic development of certain islands.¹⁴ Despite being announced as the first pillar of the Jokowi doctrine, there have also been few details from the administration on what a maritime culture looks like and how it plans to build or revitalise one (if there had been a pre-existing form). Without clear guidance, the idea of a 'maritime culture' could be interpreted in various ways: from 'maritime' in mere archipelagic terms to a more Mahanian sense of naval or sea power. This could prove challenging for policy development and coordinating the administration's efforts.

Lastly, there has been overemphasis on the foreign policy potential of the global maritime axis concept. As Aaron Connelly notes, Jokowi's conceptualisation of Indonesia as a global maritime nexus is not about maritime projection, rather it is inherently a domestically focused vision first.¹⁵ Indonesia's geostrategic location as the nexus between the Indian and Pacific oceans as well as its significance to sea lanes of communication are important yet secondary considerations.

Aside from these conceptual issues, which may be resolved over the course of the presidency, there are a number of challenges in implementing certain elements of the Jokowi doctrine. The following section of this article will explore the key security and defence components and discuss the challenges the Jokowi administration faces in each area.

Infrastructure: Building a Vision

Successive administrations have acknowledged that Indonesia requires significantly more investment in infrastructure if the country is to grow economically and raise its standard of living. In particular, Indonesia lacks sufficient transport and logistics infrastructure to move goods and people effectively and efficiently around its some 17,000 islands. In order to strengthen the country's maritime industry, priority areas identified include the construction of ports, railways, highways and toll roads, with the goal of increasing connectivity and reducing logistics costs each year by 5 per cent by integrating land, air and sea domains.¹⁶ For Indonesia to become a hub between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the government plans as many as

¹⁴ Geoffrey Till, 'Indonesia as a Growing Maritime Power: Possible Implications for Australia', *Soundings*, no. 4, May 2015, Sea Power Centre – Australia, <www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Soundings_No_4.pdf> [Accessed 19 June 2015], p. 3.

¹⁵ Aaron Connelly, 'Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2015), p. 9.

¹⁶ Widodo, Speech to 9th East Asia Summit; Widodo and Kalla, *Visi Misi, dan Program Aksi*, pp. 34-5.

twenty-four ports extending across the archipelago, with five of the twenty-four requiring USD 7 billion for construction.¹⁷

It should be highlighted that some of these priorities were also identified by the previous administration as part of its Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development (Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia—MP3EI) launched in 2011, designed to transform Indonesia into a developed country by 2025.¹⁸ The Masterplan also focused on improving logistics and connectivity throughout the archipelago and, due to the country's "proximity to the new center of gravity of the global economy" (East Asia and Southeast Asia), transforming Indonesia into "a center for global logistics by 2025 or earlier".¹⁹ These ideas are found in Jokowi's aims, unified as part of the global maritime axis vision, but they face the same bureaucratic challenges that existed during the Yudhoyono administration. The Masterplan was criticised for moving at a slow pace, with seven major projects only kicking off in the dying days of Yudhoyono's second term.²⁰ There has been early progress on areas of Jokowi's vision, with Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister Soesilo reporting that construction for four of the planned twenty-four deep-sea ports had already commenced; however, ensuring sufficient funds for new construction remains an issue.²¹ The global maritime vision will also be challenged by an economy that has slowed in growth over successive quarters.²²

To address some of the revenue problems, Jokowi has pursued foreign investment for major infrastructure projects, seeking cooperation with both governments and the private sector in Japan and China. China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, aimed at linking East Asia to the Middle East, provides further momentum for Jokowi to attract cooperation with Beijing on maritime infrastructure. In December 2014, Jokowi's foreign policy advisor Rizal Sukma stated that both maritime visions are complementary and promote "connectivity, safety and diplomacy".²³

¹⁷ Indah Mutiari Kami, 'Bangun Pelabuhan Laut Dalam untuk Tol Laut Jokowi Butuh Rp 75 T', *detik finance*, 3 February 2015, <finance.detik.com/read/2015/02/03/154248/2822289/4/bangun-pelabuhan-laut-dalam-untuk-tol-laut-jokowi-butuh-rp-75-t> [Accessed 10 July 2015].

¹⁸ Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, *Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011–2025* (Jakarta: Coordinating Ministry For Economic Affairs, 2011), <www.kemlu.go.id/rome/Documents/MP3EI_PDF.pdf>, p. 10.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 16.

²⁰ Linda Yulisman, 'Yudhoyono Kicks off Seven Bold Master Plan Projects', *The Jakarta Post*, 6 September 2014, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/06/yudhoyono-kicks-seven-bold-master-plan-projects.html> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

²¹ Kami, 'Bangun Pelabuhan Laut Dalam'.

²² The World Bank projects a recovery in annual GDP growth figures for 2016 but only to 5.5 per cent, from 4.7 per cent in 2015: The World Bank, 'Indonesia', Country Data, 2014, <data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia> [Accessed 21 July 2015].

²³ Sukma quoted in Basten Gokkon, 'China and Indonesia's Maritime Agendas Closely Aligned', *Jakarta Globe*, 3 December 2014, <thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/china-and-indonesias-maritime-agendas-closely-aligned/> [Accessed 30 Marcy 2015].

Meanwhile, Japan and China are vying to build a high-speed railway connecting the capital Jakarta with Indonesia's third-largest city, Bandung.²⁴

Territorial Disputes and the South China Sea

Indonesia is acutely aware of the vulnerability of its sovereignty and territorial integrity due to the sheer challenge of safeguarding the vast archipelago. This is compounded by disputes over islands, the claims from which can arise from historical economic use of these land features by parties such as Malaysia. Thus the safeguarding of Indonesia's archipelagic sovereignty is a key strategic interest, reflected in the past in Indonesia's Defence White Paper and more recently in its prioritisation in the president's vision-mission statement and other key statements.²⁵ However, the most significant development in this area is the increasingly assertive behaviour of China over its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Indonesian leaders have expressed concern about the South China Sea as a potential flashpoint; the potential remains for escalation from confrontations as was seen between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal. The pace with which China has been constructing artificial land formations in disputed waters has caused further uncertainty; China has stated that the islands could be used for both civilian and military purposes.²⁶ Unlike some other Southeast Asian states, Indonesia is a non-claimant state to the territory in the South China Sea claimed by China as part of its so-called 'nine-dash line' map submitted to the United Nations in 2009. However, Indonesia maintains a strong interest in the peaceful resolution of these disputes in accordance with international law and the maintenance of freedom of navigation in the surrounding seas. To this end, it has urged negotiations for a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN to continue, with Jokowi affirming his support for a resolution on the matter "as quickly as possible".²⁷ Indonesia's Foreign Ministers have also offered to play the role of 'honest broker' in negotiations.

While Indonesia urges the finalisation of the Code of Conduct, its ability to remain a neutral party has become ever more challenging. Two major developments highlight this fact. First, a series of confrontations between Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian authorities in waters off Indonesia's

²⁴ Ezra Sihite and Deti Mega S. P., 'Indonesia Plans "Beauty Contest" between China and Japan for High-Speed Train', *Jakarta Globe*, 13 July 2015, <thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jakarta/indonesia-plans-beauty-contest-china-japan-high-speed-train/> [Accessed 21 July 2015].

²⁵ Department of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, *Defence White Paper Indonesia 2008*, PER/03/M/II/2008, English edition (Jakarta: Government of Indonesia, 2008), pp. 35, 37, 47.

²⁶ Bonnie Glaser, 'On the Defensive? China Explains Purposes of Land Reclamation in the South China Sea', Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 20 April 2015, <amti.csis.org/on-the-defensive-china-explains-purposes-of-land-reclamation-in-the-south-china-sea/#> [Accessed 8 May 2015].

²⁷ Widodo, Speech to 9th East Asia Summit.

Natuna Islands undermine this neutrality. Located in Indonesia's Riau province, the Natuna area is home to the largest gas reserve in Asia with 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas.²⁸ Because it is also an area vulnerable to illegal fishing, incursions by foreign fishing vessels are not uncommon. This is further complicated by an overlap between the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia's Natuna Islands and China's nine-dash line claim. Indonesia's long-standing official policy is that there is no dispute with China. This position began with Ali Alatas, foreign minister in the 1990s, who refused to acknowledge the dispute to deny legitimacy to the Chinese nine-dash line claim.²⁹ As Alatas put it in 1995, "the repetition of an untruth will eventually make it appear as truth".³⁰ Instead, Indonesia issued a protest note to the United Nations in 2010, asking for clarification from China for the legal basis of its claim that, as stated in the note, "is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982."³¹ A recent example of this challenge occurred in 2013 when Indonesian authorities from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries arrested Chinese fishermen for operating illegally within the Natuna Islands' EEZ. Following threats and harassment by an armed Chinese maritime law enforcement vessel, the Indonesian captain was forced to release the fishermen.³² Indonesian officials have not raised these and previous incidents publicly with China; as Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto warns, raising the skirmishes in an unacknowledged overlap between the Natuna EEZ and nine-dash line risks tarnishing Indonesia's status as a neutral party.³³

Second, there have been conflicting policy statements on the South China Sea, signalling discord between government agencies. While the official policy affirms the absence of a dispute between Indonesia and China, in March 2014 Indonesian Air Commodore Fahru Zaini, then staff member for the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, stated "China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters ... This dispute

²⁸ Amahl S. Azwar, 'Govt Looks to Approve East Natuna Bid', *The Jakarta Post*, 14 August 2013, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/govt-looks-approve-east-natuna-bid.html> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

²⁹ Douglas Johnson, 'Drawn into the Fray: Indonesia's Natuna Islands Meet China's Long Gaze South', *Asian Affairs*, vol. 24, no. 3 (Fall 1997), p. 155.

³⁰ Ali Alatas quoted in I Made Andi Arsana, 'Is China a Neighbor to Indonesia?', *The Jakarta Post*, 8 August 2011, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/08/08/is-china-a-neighbor-indonesia.html> [Accessed 3 July 2015].

³¹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note no. 480/POL-703/VII/10, Unofficial Translation, 8 July 2010, <www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

³² Scott Bentley, 'Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the South China Sea', *The Strategist*, 29 October 2013, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/> [Accessed 3 July 2015].

³³ Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, 'Indonesia's South China Sea Dilemma: Between Neutrality and Self-Interest', *RSIS Commentary*, no. 126/2012, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 12 July 2012, <www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1788-indonesias-south-china-sea/#.VasbFiqqko> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters.”³⁴ Then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa was quick to clarify the country's official position, responding to Zaini's comments, affirming that “there are no outstanding or overlapping maritime territorial disputes” between Indonesia and China.³⁵ Yet the following month, then Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces General Moeldoko also wrote that his country was “dismayed” that China had mapped part of the Natuna region in its nine-dash line claim, as found in Chinese passports issued last year.³⁶ The communication issue highlights some tension in Indonesia's bureaucracy over this particular matter. The issue is further compounded by the president's relative uncertainty on the matter, being quoted during his Tokyo trip in March as stating that China's main claim in the South China Sea had no legal basis.

In addition to its economic importance, the area plays a significant role in defence scenario planning as well.³⁷ In 2014, a TNI commander posted there called for an increased military presence around Natuna,³⁸ while the previous administration announced the building of another military base on Natuna Island to house a helicopter squadron.³⁹ While some of the planning for these developments commenced before confrontations with Chinese vessels, the evolving developments in the South China Sea add further imperative to act.

The potential for confrontation with China near the Natuna Islands reveal an inherent tension in the global maritime axis vision. On the one hand, Jokowi plans for Indonesia to be a stable and peaceful nexus between the Indian and Pacific oceans. On the other hand, a military build-up in order to ensure stability also accords with a more muscular defence of Indonesian sovereignty, as envisioned as part of the president's maritime policies. Yet a build-up of military force in the area, such as the planned helicopter squadron, risks potential escalation between Indonesian and Chinese authorities, particularly when Chinese law enforcement vessels shadow illegal fishermen.

³⁴ 'China Includes Part of Natuna Waters in Its Map', ANTARA News, 13 March 2014, <www.antaranews.com/en/news/93178/china-includes-part-of-natuna-waters-in-its-map> [Accessed 3 July 2015].

³⁵ Kanupriya Kapoor and Jonathan Thatcher, 'Indonesia Military Worries over Asia Arms Race, Territorial Tensions', Reuters, 3 April 2014, <in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/indonesia-military-idINDEEA3204W20140403> [Accessed 3 July 2015].

³⁶ Moeldoko, 'China's Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea', *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 April 2014, <www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579515692835172248> [Accessed 27 June 2015].

³⁷ Evan Laksmana, 'Why there is no "New Maritime Dispute" between Indonesia and China', Cardinal Assessments, 2 April 2014, <thecardinal.wordpress.com/2014/04/02/why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china/> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

³⁸ Karishma Vaswani, 'The Sleepy Island Indonesia is Guarding from China', *BBC News*, 20 October 2014, <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29655874> [Accessed 28 June 2015].

³⁹ Indra Wijaya, 'Indonesia to Build Military Base in Natuna', *Tempo.co*, 10 September 2014, <en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/055605767/Indonesia-to-Build-Military-Base-in-Natuna> [Accessed 3 July 2015].

The Jokowi administration is also caught between a rock and a hard place in developing good ties with both China and the United States. In his March visit to Beijing, Jokowi secured much-needed investment from the Chinese Government and Chinese firms for Indonesian infrastructure and businesses. While it has been the practice of the Indonesian foreign policy elite to play down the existence of a dispute, military voices insistent on highlighting the problem and more violent skirmishes with Chinese vessels will inevitably cause a recalibration of this policy. In such circumstances, deepening cooperation with the Chinese Government could be challenging. Complicating the issue is the Jokowi administration's request for regular military exercises with the United States near the Natuna Islands.⁴⁰

Crackdown on Illegal Fishing

Indonesia sustains considerable losses due to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, impacting the livelihood and prosperity of local fishermen as well as the country's food security. Estimates of annual losses range from USD 672 million to 25 billion, with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries calculating 670,000 tonnes of fish stolen each year.⁴¹ As mentioned earlier, the Jokowi Government plans to strengthen the state's ability to protect Indonesian waters from this activity, which includes developing a coast guard and legal structures.⁴² The creation of the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and the appointment of Susi Pudjiastuti, an airline entrepreneur known for a no-nonsense approach to bureaucracy,⁴³ as Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries demonstrate further commitment to addressing the problem. In December 2014, Jokowi announced a ramping up of a policy of destroying foreign fishing vessels caught operating illegally in Indonesian waters—in the president's words, "shock therapy".⁴⁴ The administration's more assertive approach to this problem will face a combination of domestic and foreign policy challenges.

⁴⁰ Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, 'Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in South China Sea', Reuters, 13 April 2015, <www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-indonesia-southchinasea-idUSKBN0N400320150413> [Accessed 10 July 2015].

⁴¹ The head of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Ahmad Poernomo, stated the annual loss based on 670,000 tonnes of fish stolen was USD 672 million: Ihda Fadila, 'Illegal Fishing, 672.000 Ton Ikan Raib', *Bisnis.com*, 11 March 2015, <industri.bisnis.com/read/20150311/99/410834/illegal-fishing-672.000-ton-ikan-raib> [Accessed 16 July 2015]; Cabinet Secretary Andi Widjajanto was quoted as stating annual losses totalled around \$25 billion: Kanupriya Kapoor, 'Indonesia Holds 200 Malaysians in Crackdown on Illegal Fishing', Reuters, 19 November 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/19/us-indonesia-fishing-idUSKCN0J318O20141119> [Accessed 16 July 2015].

⁴² Widodo and Kalla, *Visi Misi, dan Program Aksi*, p. 25.

⁴³ Ben Bland, 'Indonesia Fisheries Chief Hooks Public Imagination', *Financial Times*, 2 January 2015, <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03bc26c0-897b-11e4-ad5b-00144feabdc0.html> [Accessed 3 January 2015].

⁴⁴ Ben Otto, 'President Jokowi Orders "Shock Therapy" for Illegal Fishing Boats', *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 December 2014, <blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2014/12/09/president-jokowi-orders-shock-therapy-for-illegal-fishing-boats/> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

Some analysts consider the administration's policy of detaining illegal fishermen and burning foreign vessels as a cause for tension in regional relations.⁴⁵ On National Awakening Day in May, the government made a spectacle of its boat burning policy, blowing up forty-one vessels, including eleven from the Philippines, five from Vietnam, two from Thailand and one from China.⁴⁶ For instance, Southeast Asian commentators argue this as contrary to the spirit of close cooperation on illegal fishing, particularly with ASEAN partners leading up to the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community.⁴⁷ On a positive note, Jokowi's assertive posture on illegal fishing creates further potential for cooperation with partners. During a state visit to Indonesia in April by Norway's Prime Minister Erna Solberg, both leaders agreed to step up cooperation in illegal fishing, making use of Norway's more advanced monitoring and technological capabilities.⁴⁸ However, the government will have to employ greater diplomatic capital in dealing with countries like Thailand that are a source for illegal fishing vessels and a partner in eradicating the practice.

A particularly important test case is China. Jokowi will also have to balance maintaining good relations with China and implementing his crackdown on illegal fishing. As mentioned in the previous section, fear of confrontation between Indonesian and Chinese authorities around the Natuna Islands over the arrest of Chinese fisherman is a complicating factor. The high-profile nature of the boats' destruction and the language of the president are for domestic purposes as well. However, the government's approach to Chinese vessels appears to have been uneven in application. In February, Minister Pudjiastuti berated the Indonesian Navy for allowing a Chinese ship, Fu Yuan Yu 80, to operate in Indonesian waters, despite the revocation of its license in 2013.⁴⁹ She was reported to be very upset in February when the operators of the Chinese vessel MV Hai Fa, a 4,306-tonne vessel detained in December, were handed only a fine of Rupiah 200 million (approximately AUD 20,000) instead of the ship being sunk.⁵⁰ Some officials have stated

⁴⁵ Connelly, 'Sovereignty and the Sea'; Carl Thayer, 'Indonesia: Playing with Fire in the South China Sea', *The Diplomat*, 18 December 2014, <thediplomat.com/2014/12/indonesia-playing-with-fire-in-the-south-china-sea/> [Accessed 17 April 2015].

⁴⁶ Tama Salim, 'RI Flexes Muscle, Sinks Chinese Boat, a Big One', *The Jakarta Post*, 20 May 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/20/ri-flexes-muscle-sinks-chinese-boat-a-big-one.html> [Accessed 21 May 2015].

⁴⁷ See comments by Farish Noor and Frans Hendra Winarta in Thayer, 'Indonesia: Playing with Fire in the South China Sea'.

⁴⁸ 'Indonesia, Norway to Increase Cooperation to Fight Illegal Fishing', ANTARA News, 15 April 2015, <www.antaranews.com/en/news/98486/indonesia-norway-to-increase-cooperation-to-fight-illegal-fishing> [Accessed 16 April 2015].

⁴⁹ Nani Afrida, 'Susi Torpedoes Navy over Chinese Vessel', *The Jakarta Post*, 26 February 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/26/susi-torpedoes-navy-over-chinese-vessel.html> [Accessed 27 February 2015].

⁵⁰ Esto Suryowati, 'Menteri Susi Marah Kapal Pencuri Ikan Terbesar Hanya Diuntut Denda Rp 200 Juta', *Kompas.com*, 23 March 2015, <bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2015/03/23/151355426/Kapal.Pencuri.Ikan.Terbesar.Hanya.Dituntut.Denda.Rp.200.Juta.Menteri.Susi.Marah> [Accessed 24 March 2015].

that collusion and corruption have been an ongoing problem when high-profile poachers were involved, with orders 'coming from above' to release those captured.⁵¹ Since Jokowi came to power, Indonesian authorities have destroyed one Chinese fishing vessel yet records show that the boat was detained in 2009.⁵² Chinese vessels have also been detained since December yet the sinking of the 2009 vessel could be seen as 'low hanging fruit' and unlikely to draw strong diplomatic protest from China.

Indonesia's deterrence policies will also have to be matched with an increased coast guard presence and monitoring capabilities. As mentioned earlier, in late 2014, Jokowi officially upgraded the Coordinating Maritime Security Board (BAKORKAMLA) into the National Maritime Security Board (BAKAMLA), tasked as a civilian body to conduct security and safety patrols of Indonesia's territorial waters and jurisdictional areas.⁵³ It is more powerful than its predecessor as well as enjoying a larger staff and fleet.⁵⁴ However, BAKAMLA's coast guard function overlaps with other agencies including the Navy, National Police and Transportation Ministry that have coast-guard like tasks.⁵⁵ It also must coordinate the activities of twelve other maritime-related institutions.⁵⁶ Lastly, BAKAMLA is being gifted ten ships from the Navy, however, they require modifications such as the replacement of larger calibre weapons with smaller calibres to operate legally as civilian patrol vessels.⁵⁷ In order to boost its effectiveness as a coast guard and patrol agency, BAKAMLA will need more assets in addition to the two ships it currently operates. Thirty more are reportedly being built, but until then its operations will be limited.

Military Modernisation and the Global Maritime Axis

The discussion above on sovereignty, the South China Sea and illegal fishing also highlight the need for the country to boost its military maritime capabilities. There are additional sea-related issues facing the archipelago including piracy throughout the key shipping lanes in the Malacca Strait, the movement of trafficked goods and asylum seekers by boat, and natural

⁵¹ Bagus BT Saragih, 'Combating Illegal Fishing: How Far Can the Govt Go?', *The Jakarta Post*, 25 January 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/25/combating-illegal-fishing-how-far-can-govt-go.html> [Accessed 24 March 2015].

⁵² Salim, 'RI Flexes Muscle'.

⁵³ Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia, 'Tugas dan Fungsi Bakamla', official website, 19 March 2015, <bakamla.go.id/home/tugas_fungsi> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁵⁴ Nani Afrida, 'Bakamla Trapped in Overlapping Agencies', *The Jakarta Post*, 3 February 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/03/bakamla-trapped-overlapping-agencies.html> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁵⁵ Siswanto Rusdi, 'The Dilemma of Indonesia's Coast Guard', *The Jakarta Post*, 11 February 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/11/the-dilemma-indonesia-s-coast-guard.html> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁵⁶ Afrida, 'Bakamla Trapped in Overlapping Agencies'.

⁵⁷ Nani Afrida, 'Navy to Give 10 Ships to Bakamla', *The Jakarta Post*, 11 March 2015, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/11/navy-give-10-ships-bakamla.html> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

disasters.⁵⁸ Traditionally a land-focused force, the TNI requires fighter aircraft, warships, patrol boats and submarines to adequately patrol and defend the country. Indonesia must also boost its surveillance capabilities. The previous administration commenced a military modernisation program, the Minimum Essential Force (MEF), designed to provide the minimum level required to defend Indonesia's strategic interests.

The Jokowi Government has pledged not only to continue Yudhoyono's MEF plan but to raise defence spending to 1.5 per cent of GDP in five years, develop Indonesia's local defence industry and build the TNI into a "regional maritime power respected in East Asia".⁵⁹ With economic growth at 4.7 per cent, the availability of funds for purchasing or upgrading weapons systems will be constrained. The acquisition of new weapons systems must also be complemented by an effective logistics system. As defence analyst Iis Gindarsah highlights, the TNI's logistical network has been developed to anticipate protracted guerrilla warfare.⁶⁰ The evolving strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific dictates an updating of Indonesia's war-fighting concepts and hence logistics approaches, with clearer guidance expected in the release of the 2015 Defence White Paper.

There are other institutional challenges to strengthening the Indonesian military's much-needed maritime capabilities. The Indonesian military, particularly the Army, has assumed a more prominent role in a number of law enforcement matters and civic affairs. These additional non-maritime duties could present a distraction in terms of resources and funding. In 2009, the Indonesian Government directed the military to take a greater role in counter-terrorism (CT) operations, traditionally the domain of the Indonesian police's elite CT unit, Detachment 88.⁶¹ During his tenure as military chief, General Moeldoko signed several memoranda of understanding on cooperation between the TNI and government ministries to undertake tasks from guarding understaffed prisons to countering extremism by disseminating the 'correct version' of Islam. Serious questions remain about the militarisation of these tasks. It should be noted that the military has not re-entered politics, so it is premature to liken the military's broadening role to its 'dual function' (*dwi fungsi*) under Suharto's New Order.

⁵⁸ Minister of Defence Ryamizard Ryacudu listed these threats along with terrorism, pandemics, separatism, cyber attacks and narcotics as threats facing ASEAN: Ryamizard Ryacudu, speech to IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 second plenary session, provisional translation, 30 May 2015, Singapore, <www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary2-a5ab/ryacudu-048e>, [Accessed 1 June 2015].

⁵⁹ Widodo and Kalla, *Visi Misi, dan Program Aksi*, p. 14.

⁶⁰ Iis Gindarsah, 'Military (also) Needs Logistical Innovations', *The Jakarta Post*, 14 December 2012, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/14/military-also-needs-logistical-innovations.html> [Accessed 21 July 2015].

⁶¹ Sidney Jones, 'TNI and Counter-Terrorism: Not a Good Mix', *Strategic Review*, 9 January 2012, <www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/tni-and-counter-terrorism-not-a-good-mix.aspx> [Accessed 5 June 2015].

Serving or retired Army generals currently hold Indonesia's major military and intelligence posts, including the Minister for Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu, chief of the National Intelligence Body (BIN) Sutyoso and current TNI chief General Gatot Nurmantyo, whose predecessor was also an Army general. Nurmantyo has affirmed his commitment to strengthening the TNI in support of the global maritime axis vision,⁶² although some analysts have expressed concern about "pro-army conservatism".⁶³ Jokowi's ability to manage potentially competing interests across the military's tasks and constrained spending across multiple portfolios will determine the extent to which the defence component of the maritime vision can be realised.

Opportunities for Relations with Australia?

As its southern neighbour, Australia will watch the progress of the Jokowi doctrine with great interest. The evolving strategic environment in East Asia will continue to dictate that a strong and stable Indonesia that can defend its maritime domains is in Australia's interests. While bilateral ties are subject to periodic ups and downs, expanding cooperation with Indonesia on maritime matters will be particularly challenging. The state of current relations is, in large part, due to the prevailing governments in both countries and the ways in which their key policies collide. For instance, the current Australian Government's policy of turning boats suspected of carrying asylum seekers back into Indonesian waters has angered both politicians in Jakarta and the Indonesian public.⁶⁴ Australian naval incursions into Indonesian territorial waters such as those during December 2013 and January 2014⁶⁵ will be more poignant against the Jokowi administration's heightened sensitivity to maritime sovereignty. Any efforts of deepening of relations must be cognisant of this setting and the risks of higher-profile diplomatic stand-offs.

If Australia intends to capitalise on the Jokowi doctrine, efforts must begin with rebuilding trust and improving communication. Maritime expert Sam Bateman proposes that Australia make an effort to better understanding Indonesia's concepts of straight baselines, which has caused in part incursions by Australian naval boats and civilian aircraft into Indonesian

⁶² 'Panglima TNI: Dukung Penuh Poros Maritim', Kompas.com, 15 July 2015, <print.kompas.com/baca/2015/07/15/Panglima-TNI-Dukung-Penuh-Poros-Maritim> [Accessed 21 July 2015].

⁶³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Nine: Indonesia: An Emerging Maritime Power', *Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key Developments and Trends* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), p. 142.

⁶⁴ Then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said he could not accept policies that would "violate Indonesia's sovereignty": 'Indonesia issues Warning Against Australia's Boat People Policy', ANTARA News, 24 September 2013, <www.antaranews.com/en/news/90847/indonesia-issues-warning-against-australias-boat-people-policy> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁶⁵ David Wroe and Michael Bachelard, 'Australian Breach of Indonesian Territorial Waters Angers Jakarta', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 January 2014.

territory.⁶⁶ Also, cooperation with Indonesia need not focus on bilateral means and indeed a multilateral setting could help ease bilateral confrontations while building familiarity on maritime matters. As the crisis over stranded asylum seekers off the coasts of Malaysia and Indonesia in May attests, humanitarian and transnational security issues will necessitate multilateral cooperation in fora like the Bali Process. In fact, students from the US Naval War College argue that Bali Process member states could consider establishing a Combined Joint Interagency Coordination Group permanently within the Bali Process's Regional Support Office.⁶⁷ The Group could assist in the fusion of intelligence data, provide expertise in multinational and interagency planning, and coordinate responses.⁶⁸ As co-chairs of the Bali Process, Australia and Indonesia could explore maritime cooperation further through the prism of greater multilateral as opposed to mostly bilateral coordination or, in Australia's case, unilateral action.

Australia could also take cue from the 2006 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation (the Lombok Treaty) which includes articles on strengthening maritime safety cooperation and capacity building in aerial and naval maritime security.⁶⁹ The Australian and Indonesian navies already conduct coordinated maritime patrols (CORPAT AUSINDO) that focus on illegal fishing.⁷⁰ Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto argues that cooperation can now extend beyond material assistance to maritime security policymaking and the training of personnel.⁷¹ Another way would be to boost Indonesia's maritime domain awareness which could prove both cost effective and help develop the country's common operating picture.⁷²

Australia can also build cooperation to indirectly support the global maritime axis vision. Such cooperation could address institutional issues such as

⁶⁶ Sam Bateman, 'Australia and Indonesia at Odds at Sea', *East Asia Forum*, 26 June 2015, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/26/australia-and-indonesia-at-odds-at-sea/> [Accessed 20 July 2015]; Sam Bateman, 'Incompetence: Australia's Incursions into Indonesian Waters', *The Interpreter*, 28 February 2014, <www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/02/28/Incompetence-Australias-incursions-into-Indonesian-waters.aspx> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁶⁷ Matt Boyce, Nicolas di Leonardo, Brian Evans, Nicolaus Heun, Sonya Lebowitz, Sander Matthews and Michael Rich, 'Realising the Full Potential of the Bali Process', *The Strategist*, 2 July 2015, <www.aspirstrategist.org.au/realising-the-full-potential-of-the-bali-process/> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Articles 13 and 14 in the 'Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation', Mataram, Lombok, 13 November 2006, <www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2008/3.html> [Accessed 5 July 2015].

⁷⁰ Australian Department of Defence, 'Australia and Indonesia Combine Forces to Tackle Illegal Fishing', *Navy Daily*, 1 July 2015, <news.navy.gov.au/en/Jul2015/Fleet/2141/Australia-and-Indonesia-combine-forces-to-tackle-illegal-fishing.htm#.Va4lvyyqqkqo> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

⁷¹ Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, 'Waves of Opportunity: Enhancing Australia-Indonesia Maritime Security Cooperation', *Strategic Insights*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2014, p. 5.

⁷² International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Nine', p. 142.

corruption and weak accountability. As discussed earlier, corruption has undermined the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry's ability to effectively prosecute and deter illegal fisherman. Elected on a platform that included a strong commitment to anti-corruption, the past six months have shown Jokowi falter by proposing a graft suspect as a candidate for the chief of the National Police. During the ensuing political stand-off between the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the police, Jokowi failed to support the anti-corruption agency, severely damaging his credentials and weakening the agency.⁷³ In order to realise Indonesia's potential as a global maritime axis, eradicating corrupt practices to encourage effective interagency cooperation will be key.

Lastly, Australia's experiences in interagency coordination and its whole-of-government approaches might prove fertile grounds for ideas and exchange with Indonesian counterparts. In the defence realm, Australia can continue to assist in indirect ways by supporting both BAKAMLA's and the TNI's capability and procurement processes. No matter the form that cooperation in this area takes, as stated earlier, the sensitivities of maritime sovereignty in the Jokowi administration warrant a quiet and consistent approach on Australia's behalf.

Conclusion

While Jokowi's global maritime axis echoes similar themes and ambitions of his predecessor's development plans, his concept forms a rallying cry that builds on Indonesia's archipelagic identity and celebrates its source of prosperity. It also soberly recognises the country's vulnerabilities and provides an action item task list for defending its sovereignty and natural resources. Yet the extent to which Indonesia can become a truly *global*, as opposed to merely regional, hub between two major oceans and the nexus of major shipping lanes remains to be seen. Its infrastructure, institutional and economic challenges are by no means insignificant—in fact, they form the *leitmotif* in past attempts at reforming the country. Despite his early setbacks on issues like corruption, there are still pockets of optimism about Jokowi's ability to surmount bureaucratic obstacles, as he did in his previous offices, and to work with a difficult parliament. Buoyed by early gains with Japan and China, there is still potential to leverage the maritime domain to direct even more foreign investment towards Indonesia. For its part, Australia can support its neighbour's ambitions, bilaterally and multilaterally, though populist domestic politics will remain a sticking point. If Jokowi can make significant gains on his vision, it will indeed be a feat for a country so often described in terms of its potential rather than its successes. For the

⁷³ For a detailed discussion of the Budi Gunawan case and the KPK, see Jacqui Baker, 'Jokowi's Police Go Unpoliced', *East Asia Forum*, 4 May 2015, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/05/04/jokowis-police-go-unpoliced/> [Accessed 8 May 2015].

world's largest archipelago, realising its strength in its seas and embracing the rocky seas ahead are a good start.

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